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Ste l l ingen 
Het concept ges tapeld recht (stacked law) weerspiegel t de his tor ie en dynamiek 
van landrechten in Honduras beter dan het begrip rech tsp lura l i sme. 
Land is niet a l leen om te bewerken maar vervul t vele andere functies, met name 
voor vrouwen. 
Met het s t r ikt volgen van de rechtsdoct r ine li jken technische Juristen soms het 
ui te indel i jke doel van het rechtssys teem -recht spreken en rechtvaardigheid 
bewerks te l l igen- uit het oog te ver l iezen. 
Corrupt ie in het ju r id i sch sys teem in Honduras is noch een individuele 
mora l i te i t skwest ie (waarbij de oploss ing is de ' s i ech te ' door ' g o e d e ' personen te 
vervangen) noch een kwest ie van het technisch trainen van rechters (betaald door 
ontwikkel ingsorganisa t ies ) . Beide oploss ingen kunnen niet de pol i t ieke wil 
afdwingen om het rech tssys teem te depol i t iseren en de invloed van economische 
belangen uit te schakelen . 
Het opnieuw ui tv inden van een ' ind igena ' t radi t ie door druk van bui tenlandse 
donoren leidt to t vernieuwing en vers terking van racisme en ongel i jkheid tussen 
burgers in Honduras . 
De bes tuursmat ige , van bovenaf opgelegde y-ß integrat ie leidt veelal tot 
oppor tunis t i sche , opperv lakkige samenwerking en negeer t het belang van de 
ontwikkel ing van onderzoeksvragen en n ieuwe concepten die pas ontstaan door 
noes te wetenschappel i jke arbeid 'van o n d e r a f . 
De huidige d iscuss ie over ' in te rd isc ip l inar i te i t ' drukt het belang van 
pluriformitei t van wetenschapsvis ies (zoals dat 20 j aa r geleden werd benadrukt ) 
ten onrechte naar de achtergrond. 
Om voetbal leuk te maken en Neder land te kwalif iceren voor het WK 2006, is het 
al lereerst nodig de leus 'we are the champions ' te vervangen door 'hand in hand 
kameraden ' . 
Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift 'Stacked Law: Land, Property and 
Conflict in Honduras' 
Esther Roquas , 12 februari 2002 
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Introduction 
In the mid-1980s, the land of Ana Salgado developed into a can of worms for a whole 
group of villagers. She had not known at first that she had sold something that was no 
longer hers. Her late husband had given her the land when he fell ill. After he died she 
allowed Antonio, their son, to use it for growing maize. In the meantime, she thought 
about what she wanted to do with it. She had considered selling it because she needed 
the money; her husband had left several outstanding debts and she also had to meet the 
cost of the funeral arrangements. When a rich merchant offered her a reasonable price 
for the land, she agreed to the sale. It was all settled in a deed of purchase and Ana 
received her money. She could never have dreamed that the sale was only the beginning 
of a chain of very problematic events. 
Ana had always thought of the land as her property, including the rights to control 
it and transfer it to others at all times. Yet according to the cadastral register (which she 
had no knowledge of), the land was illegally occupied national land. At the end of the 
1970s the national government registered the agricultural land in the village within the 
scope of the start-up phase of a land titling programme. This programme intended to 
give legal titles of ownership to those landholders who occupied or possessed national 
land. Ana's land also became subject to titling by the national government. The 
government considered her not as a private owner but as an illegal occupier of land 
belonging to the state. 
Just like many other plot holders in the village, Ana did not know about or 
understand these government activities. When functionaries of the INA (National 
Agrarian Institute) visited plot holders to discuss the matter, they did not meet with 
Ana but with her son Antonio instead. Antonio was working in his maize field on that 
particular day. Looking back, nobody knows whether Antonio lied to the 
functionaries, or if they simply assumed that he was the plot holder because he 
happened to be working on it. The INA recorded Antonio as the plot holder, and 
many months later, the land title arrived bearing Antonio's name. With the title in his 
hand, and completely ignoring the rights of his mother, Antonio claimed that the land 
was his. Naturally the merchant who bought the land became enraged when he heard 
about it. He had been convinced that the sale had given him exclusive private property 
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rights to the land. Yet with Antonio's claim in mind he knew that his rights to the land 
were not secure at all. He started to demand his money back from Ana. She felt 
miserable about Antonio's behaviour and she acknowledged that the claim of the 
merchant was justified. As she already spent part of the money, she had to borrow 
money from friends to pay the merchant back. Eventually she ended up in financial 
difficulties. 
Being a notorious alcoholic, Antonio was always in need of money and, as soon as 
he felt recognised as the owner of the land, he began to sell parts of it. His son, who 
had cleared a part for sowing maize, woke up one day to find that his efforts had been 
in vain because his father sold this section to another producer. In the end Antonio 
completely sold it and left the village. The buyers of the respective plots received 
private deeds of purchase. Not one of the buyers thought of the INA title at that time, 
which remained in Antonio's hands. They considered it as a useless document that would 
not influence the security of their private deeds of purchase. Yet they changed their 
minds in 1994, when the LNA started a campaign to collect outstanding debts on unpaid 
land titles. LNA brigades entered villages with the catch-phrase that only the person 
holding an INA title 'owned' the land, and that all other papers or claims were invalid. 
After hearing this the group of buyers decided that they had to arrange the official 
division of Antonio's title. But Antonio, who also heard about the LNA campaign, 
refused to hand over the title. 
Desperately, the group of buyers went to consult INA functionaries in the district 
capital. They received the message that the LNA was not able to interfere in conflicts and 
that the buyers had to settle the issue with Antonio first. Antonio assured the buyers that 
he would not reclaim the land. However, the buyers did not trust him because he was a 
drunkard and he would be able to sell anything if he needed money. The buyers also 
considered the possibility that Antonio's offspring would be able to claim the land after 
he died. One of the buyers finally decided to summon Antonio before the judge of the 
district court. It was the last option available to solve the problem. The regional court 
still had not reached a verdict in 2000 but the buyer did not lose hope, and he became 
only gradually worried about the thousands of lempiras he expended on lawyer fees over 
the course of years.1 
Ana Salgado inherited land as a widow but was not able to effectively control it. 
Moreover, she lost it because of the actions of her own son and a state agency that had 
not recognised her rights to the land. How and why did a situation emerge in which 
Ana thought she was the owner, whereas the state claimed that she was an illegal 
occupier of the land? Why did Ana resign herself to the loss of her rights and why 
wasn't she able to protect her land against the plans of her son Antonio? What role do 
state institutions play, now and in the past, in the generation and the solution of 
conflicts? 
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This book intends to grasp the causes of property rights insecurity in a mountainous 
area of Honduras. Land is one of the most important assets of small agricultural 
producers who work and live in this area. The book starts from two premises. The first 
is that serious problems surrounding land rights occur daily between individual 
agricultural producers, but that attention to these problems and their consequences is 
completely absent in the Honduran discussion about agricultural reform. The second 
premise is that the participants in the international discussion about land rights security 
tend to be interested solving the problem rather than investigating its roots and 
causes. According to a recent World Bank policy paper, the ideal environment in which 
property rights automatically individualise and transform into private ownership, has 
become distorted. Only through the correction of these distortions can property rights 
insecurity be remedied (Deininger and Feder 1998). 
The discrepancy that exists between large landowners and the landless rural poor • 
(the latifundio-minifundio model) has been a central agrarian question in Latin America ' 
for decades (Kay 1998). Unequal land distribution and the need for re-distributive 
agrarian reform has also dominated the discussion about agrarian development in 
Honduras. According to national census data, 82 percent of the farms hold only 19 \ 
percent of the agricultural area (calculated on the basis of SECPLAN, 1994). This \ 
suggests that the majority of producers intensively use small plots while a very small J 
minority holds the largest part of the land. The Honduran agrarian reform of the 1960s : 
and 1970s showed a typical mixture of more general aims described by Kay (1998:16) as j 
designed to increase agricultural production, to enhance social and economical equality, , 
and to diminish rural protest and win the political support of peasants. Yet the agrarian 
reforms did not produce results anywhere near these goals. The group of beneficiaries 
was relatively small and there were no significant changes in the division of land 
between smallholders and large landowners (Noe Pino and Thorpe 1992). Furthermore, j 
rural poverty did not diminish as a consequence of the reform period (Sieder 1995). A j 
result of the reform period was the emergence of new institutions and peasant | 
organisations in the countryside (Posas 1987), although many peasant organisations 
changed their radical points of view in their negotiations with the government. These 
new organisations and institutions quickly dominated the content of the debate about 
the agrarian question, and their intense engagement narrowed the discussion down to 
the subject of the reformed sector. The situation of the majority of agricultural 
producers who live and work independently and who are not organised or reached by 
outside institutional support is, therefore, hardly known. The focus on the large i 
landowner/ landless dichotomy overlooks, for example, the violent and complicated , 
conflicts about property rights in land between smallholders living and working in the ! 
same community. The question about the origins of these conflicts and how people 
cope with them remains unanswered in the literature focussing on the problems of the 
reformed sector (Kuckelhaus 1986, Ruben 1997). Therefore, this book wants to make a 
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contribution to the Honduran agrarian debate by bringing land conflicts between 
individual smallholders into the limelight. Such conflicts profoundly disturb daily 
relationships between family members or villagers, and they easily generate unrest and 
violence. In fact, it is difficult to find a landholder in Honduras who has not been 
involved in some kind of property conflict at some time. 
The second premise of this book is that multilateral development organisations 
involved in land rights policy-making are interested in the consequences and solutions 
to insecure land rights but tend to take the causes of this insecurity for granted.2 The 
FAO (1999) only addresses the consequences of land rights insecurity, which it 
considers to be an obstruction to production increases and investments and which leads 
to environmental deterioratto^linThTrratuTbtui 'migration. In their policy paper for the 
World Bank, Deininger and Feder (1998) state that in an ideal and undistorted 
environment, an evolutionary process of successively increasing precision in the 
definition of property rights to land takes place. Private property rights are the 
endpoint of a one-way process of technical change, population pressure, market 
integration and risk reduction. The authors describe the causes of insecurity as 
distortions of this automatic and inescapable linear development towards 'full and 
secure property arrangements'. Yet they do not deal with the questions of what these 
distortions are and how they come about. 
Distortions of the ideal evolutionary process should be corrected to allow a 
directional progress to safeguard private property, although the World Bank and FAO 
have recently started to think more flexibly about property rights security and admit 
that communal tenure might entail the same advantages as private property in certain 
circumstances (Deininger and Binswanger 2001, de Janvry et al. 2001). Private property; 
should enable the owner-operator to accumulate wealth and to transfer wealth to the 
next generation, to use land as a collateral for access to credit, to enhance social 
security, to have continued access to the land and open the door for long-term 
investments, and to take advantage of the social status and bargaining power attached^©,; 
having land (de Janvry et al. 2001). Although not in all situations, official titling is 
considered to be the best way to enhance security as it increases investments in 
sustainable production, guarantees a hTgher degree of transfer and increases access to 
formal credit. Furthermore, it is expected that private landowners will not migrate and 
that property rights conflicts will no longer occur. These authors do admit, however, 
that titling is costly and that the land market does not automatically transfer land to the,, 
most efficient user. 
This research departs from the idea that property rights insecurity has many causes 
and that insecurity may also arise in private property contexts. Private property may 
not bring about the expected advantages; titling programmes often do not solve 
insecurity and conflicts oyer property continue to persist. This book intends to lay bare 
the causes of insecurity in a situation where~lanrIrIolders consider themselves to be 
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owners of their plots. A switch from consequences and solutions to the causes of 
insecurity may be useful in understanding the effect of divergent land policies 
jtEroughout Honduran history. In spite of the apparently clear property claims in the 
research area, landholders' land rights are profoundly insecure. A solution to their 
problems requires at the outset an understanding of the actual and historical 
constellation of property relations, of the rights people think they have, the ways in 
which they defend and legitimate these rights, and the ways in which they acquire, sell, 
or transfer'these rights. r4eas for privatisation and titling of the involved multilateral 
development agencies generally lack such understanding. 
Insecurity and conflict 
Practically all current landholders in the village of El Zapote, in the mountainous area 
of the Santa Barbara district, have been involved in some kind of conflict about 
property rights, conflicts that are a manifestation of the felt insecurity of land rights. 
Conflicts, as well as the violent confrontations that often accompany them, strongly 
influence perceptions of property and the actions of landholders with respect to rights 
to land. Sometimes such conflicts immediately explode, but it also happens that the 
involved parties manage to by-pass conflict for a while. 
This book seeks to analyse the causes and historical backgrounds of many kinds of 
conflict about land rights. Jnheritance is a main process of land distribution that 
^neratesmequality and conflict. Inheritance practices take place in a context of tension 
between rules, the law of the state, and a changing world. Parents' inheritance strategies 
extend the period of their children's dependency vis-a-vis parents in a context of 
growing land scarcity. Another complication of inheritance practices generating 
conflicts is that inheritance and sale/purchase of land intermingle. Inheritance practices 
often completely neglect the rights of women, although they struggle for their rights 
and sometimes they succeed. Other conflicts arise about boundaries, right of way, 
Jalsified^deeds^ stolen papers^ or land grabbing. Solving such conflicts is not easy as they 
often tend to escalate. Conflicts between men and women about land ownership and 
control frequently occur. Women have difficulties controlling land once they have 
rights to it. Men may enter a downward spiral of alcohol abuse and sale of their land, 
requiring the intervention of women to halt. State interventions which aim to enhance 
security eventuate in the emergence of contrasting claims between the legal owner and 
the real owner, and between the state and the real owner. In the eyes of landholders, 
trie state should protect their private rights. Yet this book argues that the state through 
history has played a completely different role, and that property rights insecurity has 
intensified through its contradictory land policies. Furthermore, the state's judicial 
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system has never fulfilled the role as a neutral conflict settler and an institutional 
environment to solve conflicts is completely absent. 
Conflicts-about the distribution and transfer of property rights in land form the 
central focus of this book. They strongly influence the daily lives of agricultural 
producers and their families, and may persist for years and transcend generations. 
Processes of distribution and transfer of land are both material and ideological. They 
are instructive for social relations in families and in the village because they reflect and 
change power relations. 
Laws, norms and property 
A second aim of this book is to unravel the role of state interventions and to 
understand the complex ways in which property holders define, defend, and transfer 
their rights in land. Norms play a role in all these processes. Land has been a central 
focus of government regulations and policies ever since colonial times (Stokes 1973). 
Yet land is not distributed or transferred according to legal regulations. Local property 
arrangements in Honduras are often labelled as 'customary' or 'informal' (Stanfield et 
al. 1990, Wachter 1992, Coles-Coghi 1993). The question raised in this book is whether 
these labels indeed cover the signification and the content of this complex of rules. 
Although the users of these labels do not explain the content of the label 'customary', it 
suggests at least three things that can be questioned. The first is that the term 
'customary' suggests that the rules that can be distinguished in practices of 
redistribution and transfer of land, are the opposite of state law. The second 
presupposition is that it concerns a coherent system of rules. Thirdly, the term 
'customary' suggests that it provides landholders with safe and secure rights to land. 
In contrast to the notion of customary property arrangements, this book develops 
the concept of 'stacking' to better capture the apparent inconsistencies b^tseentstateu 
jaw and the complex nature of property rights and claims to land. I will argue that 
social practices surrounding Tand transfer result in the stacking of concepts stemming 
from the Civil Code and different agrarian laws in different historical periods; 
municipal provisions; local rules; 'customs'; and local gender images. This book pays 
attention to how and why state law becomes transformed and adapted in local practices 
of land rights distribution and in interaction with other rules and norms. The 
contradictory image of the state that both protects and threatens^land^rights is viewed 
in the light of the history of state policy towards land in the region. 
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Questioning the 'labour is land rights' ideology 
Honduran agrarian reform was based on the principle of 'land to the tiller'. The 
Agrarian Reform Law (Honduras 1975) demanded that land should be cultivated by the 
person who owns it. Hence, the law closely connected property rights to land with 
labour in the fields. The 'land to the tiller'discourse still dominates current discussions 
about the land question. The favourite image is that of the peasant who cultivates his 
crops on his own plot of land. The notion of connecting land and labour is not wholly 
unfamiliar to land holders because it overlaps the known arraxigeTrrentThatland rights 
can be gained through working. This book discusses the linkage between labour and 
property rigKts because it is one of the main causes of the detrimental position of rural 
women in property relations. 
The linkage of property rights and labour in the Agrarian Reform Law generated 
special criteria for the participation of women. Women could only obtain land through 
the Agrarian Reform Law in cases where they were the solely responsible person for 
raising a family. In practice, one could only obtain land through membership in an 
agrarian reform co-operative or an associated enterprise of producers. Women were 
only able to access these organisations if they had a son who could perform the work 
(Safilios-Rothschildt 1983). The discriminating criteria for women became questioned 
when a demand for women's land rights was launched throughout the world promising 
welfare, efficiency, and empowerment if women would obtain land rights at the same 
rate as men (Agarwal 1994, Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997).3 
The current agrarian law (Honduras 1992) does not discriminate against women, yet 
women suffer from the general restrictions on access just like men (Noe Pino et al. 
1993; Martinez et al. 1995). This book shows that the arguments used in Honduras to 
demand land rights for women become entangled in the very same connection of 
labour and property rights. The dominant claim is that the invisibility and negation of 
women's agricultural work are responsible for their detrimental position regarding land 
rights. The question raised in this book is whether this is the right analysis and a 
constructive starting-point for demanding land rights for women. The use of the 
connection between labour and property rights obscures any insight into the 
relationship between women and land. To unlink property rights from labour creates 
space to acknowledge women's rights in property and to understand what women do 
-with land, how they use and manage it, and what it means to them. 
Structure of the book 
To address critical questions surrounding who has a say in the land at what moment, or 
how property concepts of the state and landholders differ, Chapter One elaborates a 
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relational concept of property. An understanding of property as a relationship between 
people about a thing is necessary to understand how conflicts regarding property rights 
in land emerge. Moreover, the chapter introduces the notion of 'stacked laws and 
norms' for explaining the different elements of normative pluralism regarding land 
rights. The notion is important in order to distinguish the different elements of 
'pluralism', and to characterise the way in which they go together and the way in 
which social actors make use of them. Chapter One further presents the central 
research questions, some comments about methodology, and a review of methods used 
in field research. 
Chapter Two focuses on the differences between the state and landholders in the 
way they perceive their rights to the land. It analyses stacking in state law and in the 
divergent perceptions landholders ~and the state have of property. The case of 
landholders in the rural village of 'El Zapote' tells the story of a specific history of land 
rights and the role of the state and of how this history has shaped local perceptions of 
property. Two cases of state intervention, the construction of a hydroelectric power 
plant and a land titling programme, illustrate the different opinions and emerging 
conflicts between landholders and the state about who controls and owns the land. 
Next, Chapter^ Three/outlines the internal organisation of farm households in El 
Zapote; the role of labour relations and perceptions of kinship in the control of 
property, and struggles between household members for control over income and 
property. The chapter argues that, in contrast to an idyllic peasant image, farm 
households do not have a common property regime. The romantic ideal of Honduran 
peasant life is not able to explain why conflicts about property among family and 
household members occur. Chapter Three concludes that in the context of the 
Honduran agrarian debate, it is important to study the relations between farm 
household members instead of assuming that they have a certain, kinship inspired, 
content. 
Inheritance is an important mechanisms for transferring land in El Zapote. It is also 
a main source of conflict and violence between household and family members. It is 
furthermore an important process that enhances social differentiation among 
landholders. An important characteristic of inheritance conflicts is that they may 
aggravate and transcend generations because they are never solved. Chapter Four 
explains how inheritance becomes a deciding factor in the content of relations between 
the generations. Local inheritance practices do not follow the law, while a range of 
local norms exist about inheritance and how it should take place. The chapter argues 
that these norms influence but do not determine inheritance practices, nor are these 
practices static. The chapter addresses the background of local norms, the ways in 
which landholders use them in inheritance practices, and contemporary changes to 
these rules and inheritance practices. 
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Women are a particularly vulnerable group in inheritance processes. According to 
the law, women and men have equal rights to inherit land. However, the percentage of 
female owners is extremely low, which suggests that women do not succeed in claiming 
and controlling their rights. Chapter Five examines how gender plays a role in the 
control and use of land. Gender images are used that prevent women to effectively 
claim land. The chapter argues that female land owners look for land use strategies that 
do not contest the gender division of labour. Such strategies do not attack the male 
hegemony in agriculture, while women do turn their property to advantage and protect 
their rights in land. 
When local mechanisms of conflict avoidance and settlement fail, the court of justice 
is left as the only alternative. The inadequate working of the district court motivates 
landholders to primarily turn to developing conflict avoidance strategies. Chapter Six 
argues that this should not be glorified as an effective local response to the failing state. 
Three cases of land conflicts that involved the interference of the district court make 
plain why the court does not contribute to diminishing conflicts. The working of the 
court can? indeed be labelled as class justice. Nevertheless, the contemporary discussions 
about the changes of the justice system and human rights also affect landholders in 
remote villages in El Zapote. These discussions make them aware that they are subjects 
with legal rights and that they must demand the possibilities to claim these rights. 
In Chapter Seven I take up the various issues and discussions in this book to link 
them to the research question. I discuss the descriptive and analytical value of the 
notion of stacked laws and norms for explaining the law-norms complex. Next, I look 
at the lessons to be learnt from the relational notion of property used in this book for 
the debate about the land question in Honduras. Thereafter, I discuss the effects of the 
justice system's failure for the persistence of land conflicts. Finally, this chapter 
addresses some consequences of the analysis for contemporary development issues. 
9 
Notes 
1 The lempira is the Honduran currency unit. One US dollar was approximately 13 lempiras in 1997. 
2 International development organisations have been the driving force behind land policy in Central 
America for decades. Land titling in Honduras was financed by USAID in the 1980s. The World Bank 
claims to have invested 160 million dollars in Central American land titling operations during the last five 
years with another 110 million dollars to be invested in the future (World Bank 2001a). 
3 These arguments for demanding land rights for women have their roots in a global development discourse 
(Moser 1989). The idea is that land rights for women will enhance welfare because women will be better 
equipped to feed their families. This will lead to more efficiency because technical assistance, knowledge 
and credit can be distributed more directly into the hands of women. Furthermore, land rights generate 
empowerment because land is a tool for women's emancipation. 
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Chapter one 
Stacked laws and norms in property 
From the 1960s, the land question, especially the agrarian reform, has dominated the 
political debate in Honduras. The debate identified the sharp disparity that exists 
between large landowners and the mass of poor rural landless as a major impediment to 
economic development and social justice. Moreover, the unrestrained population 
growth in the countryside made land increasingly scarce.1 An agrarian reform 
programme, aimed at a redistribution of the land, was instituted to put an end to the 
increasing inequalities. 
Excellent overviews and critical assays about this prominent aspect of the agrarian 
debate have been published, and this book does not pretend to repeat what has been 
said (Del-Cid 1977, Brockett 1987, Stringer 1989, Noe Pino and Thorpe 1992, Salgado 
et al. 1994, Sieder 1995, Baumeister et al. 1996). Instead, this chapter starts from two 
shortcomings in the land question debate that have not received much attention so far. 
First, the Honduran debate has hardly paid any attention to the issue of property. 
Agrarian reform or land titling programmes tamper with property without actually 
looking at it. Such interventions affect much more than just the simple quantifiable 
distribution of a commodity, such as relations between people, norms about who 
should or should not have land, and the distribution of rights that may be derived from 
these norms. It is this book's intention to overcome this shortcoming by starting from 
a relational concept of property to research the problems of conflict and contradictory 
claims to land. 
Second, studies that look at property arrangements that existed before redistributive 
or land titling programmes were implemented, have defined the pre-existing land rights 
as 'customary' or 'informal'. This book will develop the notion of 'stacked laws and 
norms' to analyse how land rights were constituted and became established in state law 
and in social practices. I will show that the terms customary or informal do not 
adequately agree with the actual history and significance of land rights. 
This chapter first discusses the relational notion of property with regard to land 
distribution, which raises questions other than those generated by a 'quantitative 
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distribution' point of departure. Furthermore, this chapter looks at gender as a 
constitutive element of property relations, as well as the consequences of the temporary 
character of property in the transfer land rights. The state plays an important role in 
the regulation of land rights by issuing land laws, transferring national land to holders, 
acting as the protector of private property and playing a role in conflict resolution. A 
point elaborated in this respect is the striking contrast between the weak state and the 
dominant legal culture, which attributes a strong regulating role to the state. This 
chapter also introduces the notion of stacked laws and norms, upon which this book 
will build both the description of empirical processes and the analytical breakdown of 
the complex of norms and laws playing a role in the distribution of land rights. Finally, 
this chapter introduces the central research questions, elaborates some methodological 
notions and discusses the methods used in field research. 
Property: Relations, gender and inheritance 
'Property refers in essence to a question of distribution: the distribution of a material 
good, rights to this good and power.2 Sabean (1990:17) refers to Rousseau in his 
statement that property in regard to land is 'the act of one man drawing a boundary 
around some land and getting others foolish enough to respect it'. Property involves 
rights, duties and liabilities that are attached to people and that are distributed among 
people. 
The literature on property attributes important advantages to an analytical 
definition of property as the relations between people with regard to things or goods 
(Munzer 1990, Benda-Beckmann 1995, Hann 1998). Central to a relational concept of 
property are the questions as to what can be an object of property rights, who may act as 
a holder of property rights and what rights to the land does the holder receive? Some 
authors consider that asking these questions is important to avoid a 'western' concept 
of property as absolute ownership, and to create room for recognising differences with 
regard to the objects that may be possessed, and variations on the definitions of holders 
and rights (Whitehead 1984, van den Bergh 1996). People exchange 'things' and, at the 
same time, reproduce a range of images, concepts and meanings. Transfers of land, for 
example, not only reallocate material goods between people, but also include 
perceptions and definitions of rights and relationships between people that may vary 
cross-culturally. 
Private ownership is the ideal and the standard point of reference for Honduran 
landholders. In their eyes, private ownership stands for absolute freedom to control the 
land as they see fit. Nevertheless, a relational concept of property will show how the 
legal category of absolute ownership is not suitable for understanding people's 
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perceptions of their land rights, practices3 of rights transfer, and the logic and 
consequences of state interventions in land rights. 
The question about what rights to the land are transferred refers to the different 
'sticks' that together shape the 'bundle of property rights' (Munzer 1990). These 'sticks' 
include the right to possess, to use, to transfer, and to destroy the property (Munzer 
1990). By starting from a relational concept of property, we shift the land question 
away from it being an issue about the distribution of an economic good and toward it 
being a matter of rights, the divergent definitions of rights by social actors and the 
particular nature of these rights. 
Furthermore, a relational definition of property places social relations, and thus 
power, at the heart of the analysis. Power is the transformative capacity of human 
action (Giddens 1984).4 It is a capacity that is always present in social relations that can 
be productive or constraining (Flax 1987, Davis et al. 1991, Faith 1994). Important in 
this study is the notion that people do not engage in property relations as equals. 
'Things' as land are a potential source of power and, in agrarian societies such as 
Honduras, the distribution of rights to land is also a question of wealth and power. A 
landholder may use the land to generate capital, to control other people and to 
influence power balances in his or her favour (Hirschon 1984, Metcalf 1990, Moors 
1995). As a consequence, those in power are better able to gain access to and maintain 
control over land. 
Moreover, a relational notion of property stresses that property entails the rights of 
people against other people. Property norms define how a holder is able to exclude 
others from the use or enjoyment of the object (Brewer and Staves 1995, Blum 1995). 
The capacity of property holders to exclude others is not absolute, however. It is 
limited by other property holders as well as by the state. On the one hand, the state is 
actively involved in granting property rights to land to individuals and corporations. 
Yet, on the other hand, state law also defines duties and limits the freedom of property 
holders (Munzer 1990, Singer 2000). Property rights that have a private character 
become continuously redefined and shifted through public (state) intervention (Geisler 
and Daneker 2000). Exclusion is thus an essential feature of property. An important 
question is how the exclusion of others is achieved, and what limits imposed on this 
exclusion may be. For example, this book addresses the argumentation and coercive 
strategies employed by the state to exclude landholders from gaining ownership. 
The relational concept of property thus invites us to pose a set of questions lacking 
in the Honduran land debate. Who has what right to land, and who is entitled to hold 
land? How is power derived from property rights to land, and what role does power 
play in land transfer practices? How does public (state) intervention affect the private 
character of land rights? How does the transfer of material goods generate changes of 
meaning with regard to property objects and property holders? 
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Property and gender 
The inequality that exists between men and women in Honduras with regard to land is 
usually attributed to discriminating articles in the agrarian law or to machismo culture. 
The question is whether these mono-causal explanations do justice to the problem of 
gender and property rights to land in Honduras. This research poses several questions 
about the interaction between property and gender. How does property influence 
power balances between men and women (Hirschon 1984, Wilson 1984, Moors 1995)? 
How do women's and men's capacity to act as independent actors with regard to 
property differ (Whitehead 1984)? 
Gender refers to the culturally and historically variable social relations between men 
and women, characterised as relations of power (Grant 1993, Radtke and Stam 1994). 
Gender has an embedded nature; it is both a material and a social institution, as well as 
a set of ideologies (di Leonardo 1991). Gender ideologies are systems of meanings, 
values and beliefs about gender within a social group that are expressed through 
institutions and practices (Whatmore 1991, Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). 
Materialist explanations of gender inequality view labour as the central issue of 
analysis and as the key to solutions (Engels 1980, Coontz and Henderson 1986, Sayers 
et al. 1987).5 Materialist analysis has recently been criticised for presuming the existence 
of two essential gender categories while not giving attention to multiple identities (Flax 
1987, Jackson and Pearson 1998). Two lessons which have been learned from this 
debate are important for the purpose of this study. Within gender categories, there is 
differentiation based on differences other than gender. Furthermore, attention to 
gender identities may be important to the understanding of how gender inequality 
persists (Menkel-Meadow and Seidman Diamond 1991, Halsema 1993, Radcliffe 1993). 
The concept of gender identity refers to how people conceptualise gender through 
images and discourses. 
Above and beyond its rather simple understanding of gender, materialist 
explanations of gender inequality have a second important shortcoming. This concerns 
the centrality of labour for the analysis of, and the solution to, the oppression of 
women. In her path-breaking study about gender and property in Asia, Agarwal 
(1994:2) states: employment is taken as the principal measure of women's economic 
status, obscuring what has been commonplace in measuring the economic status of men 
or of households: property ownership and control'. Agarwal points to the vicious cycle 
that perpetuates the control of property by those who also control the institutions 
producing gender ideology, which prevents women from claiming property rights. 
This book coincides with Agarwal's alternative materialist approach to gender in its 
focus on property as a central source of gender inequality. 
Besides looking at property and gender to understand gender issues in the unequal 
distribution of land, this book also takes the view that gender is embedded in how 
property is defined, and that it is necessary to study gender in order to understand 
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struggles for and claims to property in their all-inclusive dynamics. By demanding 
attention be paid to a group of property holders who are often overlooked, subtle 
processes of exclusion and inclusion become visible. 
The temporary character of property: inheritance 
Property rights attached to a person who dies have to be transferred to others. Sabean 
(1990:421), citing Bourdieu, stresses that 'land inherits the heir'. Land, as a material 
good subject to property rights, does not cease to exist when the landholder dies. 
Rather, interested parties will start negotiating over the transfer and redistribution of 
land rights through inheritance or inheritance-like transfers (Benda-Beckmann 1995), or 
they may follow prescribed procedures to distribute the land. The transfer of goods 
between generations through inheritance is part of broader processes of devolution: 
property transfers that contribute to the reproduction of the social system (Goody 
1978). According to Goody, a main characteristic that makes inheritance distinct from 
other types of property transfer is that it takes place between the dead and the living. 
This book questions whether this is indeed a central feature of inheritance practices. 
Historians have studied inheritance through papers and documents (Narrett 1992, 
Spring 1993), which necessarily biases their research towards urban and upper-class 
milieus (de Haan 1994). The question of inheritance in farm households is less 
frequently touched upon. Studying this aspect of inheritance means that we have to 
look at the social practices in which people struggle for property and negotiate over the 
meaning of gender and kinship (Lison-Tolosana 1976, Brettell 1991, Voyce 1994). 
Additionally, farm household inheritance practices are closely related to changing 
production systems and people's perceptions of the future of agriculture (de Janvry et 
al. 2001). 
To study inheritance practices means that we study norms as well. A norm is an 
established guide that prescribes, forbids or directs certain actions. Inheritance norms 
prescribe who ought to be entitled to what kind of property, and how the distribution 
of inherited property should take place. Inheritance norms may grant rights to men 
while denying those of women, and they may prefer offspring instead of the surviving 
spouse. They may prescribe an equal distribution among heirs or establish the exact 
portion that each heir should receive. 
State law, for example, provides norms of inheritance aimed at achieving particular 
goals, such as the protection of the weak parties, the establishment of institutions to 
settle disputes, the protection of the public interests in property and the social function 
of land. State law may be diametrically opposed to the norms that people refer to and 
consider legitimate in inheritance practices. People may not be familiar with, or may 
deny, state law prescriptions. Instead of following the prescribed procedures, they may 
be incessantly busy constituting norms that they consider to be important to 
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inheritance and the transfer of property rights which may have completely different 
goals than those of the state. 
The contradictions of a weak state 
Land is an important and valuable asset in an agrarian society, and it has been a major 
source of political and economic power in the post-colonial state (Vallejo 1911, de 
Oyuela 1994). More than half of the economically active people in contemporary 
Honduras are involved in agriculture, with seventy percent of exports consist of 
agricultural products (Baumeister et al. 1996).6 Through the years, the state has tried to 
enhance the production of such agricultural export products as sugar cane, cattle, 
coffee, and bananas (Argueta 1975). 
Since agriculture has been of primary importance to the development of the nation, 
land has been essential to the national economy. Throughout history, the state has 
developed numerous policies, laws and legal stipulations to control the distribution of 
land and the establishment of rights to the land. However, the state has hardly been 
able to implement these land policies and uphold the law, which is a characteristic of a 
weak state (Migdal et al. 1994, Grindle 1997). 
Cotterrell defines the state as 'the whole range of institutions, agencies and processes 
by means of which political power is exercised within a defined territory' (1992:128). 
This is a rather simple definition that is not specific enough to fully cover the ways in 
which the term 'state' appears in this book. The use of the term 'state' does not mean 
that I see the state as a coherent organisation with homogenous aims and strategies. The 
term primarily refers to state agents. In this book, those entities and actors that are 
engaged in policymaking and the implementation of law with regard to land play an 
important role: among them are both the National Agrarian Institute (TNA) and the 
institute's officials working in the research area. Furthermore, the state judicial system 
and its officials play an important role in this book. A third part of the state that figures 
in this book is the local government in the form of the mayor and the municipal 
council. 
The state is additionally a concept in the minds of rural people. As an institution, the 
state stands for the exercise of authority and the making and implementation of the 
law. The political system is a part of the state that is very vivid in the minds of people: 
many people actively participate in political campaigns preceding the general elections. 
Their active participation is related to the state's role as a hope-generating machine, as 
Nuijten (1998:11) called it. People have high expectations of the state and, although 
they become frustrated every time, they continue to believe in the promises generated 
by the state. 
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Weak state-strong state 
A main feature of the 'weak' performance of the Honduran state is corruption and the 
overwhelming influence of party politics, aspects that also frustrate efforts to 
modernise the state. Another feature of 'weak' state performance could also refer to the 
state's lack of capabilities to pursue its own agenda (Murga Frassinetti 1978, Posas and 
Del-Cid 1983, Barahona 1991, d'Ans 1998). The state's fragility has left room for 
continuous interference by foreign entities, such as multinational banana companies, 
the government of the USA and more recently, the IMF (Molina Chocano 1985, Posas 
1992, Barahona 1994, Norsworthy and Barry 1994). A third general feature of the 
Honduran state, as mentioned above, is that it has difficulties upholding the law. Sta|e 
agencies, including the police, lack the means and knowledge to enforce the law and the 
judicial system works poorly, both of which contribute to the weak state performance. 
A defining characteristic of the weak state is thus the 'gap' between the intentions of 
the law and actual social practices (Feeley 1976, Comaroff and Roberts 1981). This 
book researches how the intentions of the law converge with social practices, and how 
laws and norms from different sources become connected, changed, set aside or re-
interpreted through these practices. 
Behind these features of the weak state, however, stands another story about the 
state. This is the story of oppression. The state dominated the daily lives of citizens 
under military rule. In those days, rural inhabitants experienced strong state repression, 
exercised by their own village authorities in the name of the military ruler. Many 
villagers vividly remember the detentions, the persecution of political adversaries, the 
murders, the imposed curfew. Decades of intermittent direct rule by the armed forces 
ended in 1981 when state power was turned over to elected civil governments 
(Norsworthy and Barry 1994). However, it took nearly two subsequent decades to 
finally weaken the power of the military. This book shows that daily experiences and 
confrontations with a strong state presence have directly affected people's perceptions 
about the role of the state. Legal culture is strongly attached to the state.7 Rural people' 
deeply respect 'the authorities' and expect them to maintain law and order. In their 
opinions, the state should protect the individual rights of all citizens. The state is thus 
the only recognised and legitimate authority with respect to law, order and justice. 
The role of law in the paradoxes of the weak state 
Legal culture focuses on the state and the law of the state is the only legal system in 
Honduras.8 People in Honduras express two views on what law is and how it affects 
behaviour, both of which ultimately attach law to the state. In the first notion, law 
stands for 'natural law': the state does not invent the law, but the law is an expression 
of fundamental values about human life, justice and equality, written down by the state 
(Stokes 1973). A second notion sees law as a technical instrument, as the rules that are 
laid down in the codes and statute books of the state; a 'legal positivist' perspective 
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(Galanter 1981, Snyder 1992, Hunt 1993).9 In the legal positivist view, law has no 
relation to ethical or political considerations and people's experiences, and the state, as 
the highest political authority, guarantees its objectivity. Legal positivist adherents 
consider these characteristics of the law as contrasting with other existing forms of 
social control, which are seen as partial and subjective. 
Natural law stands for the Utopia, how it should be. Landholders often talk about 
law in these terms. In their eyes, the law itself is morally justified; problems lie with the 
people who do not respect the law and the authorities who do not uphold it. But 
landholders combine their view about the content of the law with a legal positive 
perspective, just like state officials and legal experts: something is law when it has been 
written down in the law books. This book shows that landholders do not consider it to 
be important whether a presumed law is indeed written down in law books, but they 
assume that morally justified actions or concepts appear in the law books. 
People in Honduras complain about their government; complaints that directly refer 
to the weak image of the state. Corruption and lack of law and order are common 
issues in their daily conversations. But, on the other hand, there is a general feeling that 
law will solve all problems, and proposed solutions to the huge problems of poverty 
and development always concern new or adapted legislation. The common natural law 
or legal positivist standpoints need a concept of a strong state. To think that law is the 
instrument for maintaining law and order and achieving social change means that there 
must be a strong state that has the power to change practices by laying down, imposing 
and implementing the law (Nader and Todd 1978). 
There is a striking contrast between a weak state grip on land rights and the 
protection of property, and a legal culture that intensely believes in the working of a 
strong state. This book discusses the effects of this contradiction on people's perception 
of the state and on the state's abilities and legitimacy in governing land related issues. 
Stacked laws and norms 
Land rights evolve in a pluralist constellation of norms. There are norms that impinge 
on who may work the land or who may own the land; norms that prescribe how one 
should transfer land to other people and that assess how one should make a claim to 
land; and norms that drive people to use the land in particular ways. This section 
discusses the different elements of normative pluralism regarding land rights and the 
ways in which these elements relate, mingle or merge. 
Property rights are central to the organisation of society and are important subjects 
of state regulation. The law of the state defines what objects can be property, who is 
entitled to what right, and how these rights can be transferred to another person. 
However, the state is not able to completely control the establishment of land rights 
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and determine practices of transfer between property holders. The norms that play a 
role in these daily practices may not be directly derived from law and may encompass 
norms stemming from other sources. 
Distinguishing between elements in the law-norms complex 
Concepts such as living law (Ehrlich 1962), semi-autonomous field (Moore 1973, 1978), 
legal pluralism (Griffiths 1986, Harris 1996, Benda-Beckmann 2001), or plurality of law 
(Sack and Aleck 1992) intend to show that social order is not established through the 
law of the state or through state law alone. The core of these concepts is that, in 
society, different normative orders co-exist in a pluralist situation. To presuppose that 
there is normative pluralism means that we have to ask ourselves what it consists of. 
The mentioned concepts, however, are not unanimous about how we should see the 
different elements in the pluralist constellation of norms. 
For the purpose of this study, I consider it important to discern the different norms 
that play a role in land claims, and to analyse their respective contribution to the 
outcomes and effects of the 'pluralist' law-norms complex. Therefore, I make a first 
distinction between state law and other norms. I presume that state law differs from 
other norms in terms of legitimacy and effect on behaviour (Tamanaha 1993, 
Woodman 1998).10 State law is directly related to the specific constellation of state 
power, which is based on claims of sovereignty and coherence (Merry 1988). Thus, state 
law has a particular meaning and internal dynamic. State law - the written codified 
norms - is a powerful instrument not only for state officials and the judicial power, but 
also for landholders. 
The distinction between state law and other norms fits in with the general 
Honduran perception of 'law' as the law of the state, and 'non-law' as disordered and 
old-fashioned customs. This book does not start from the view that law is what is 
written down by state agencies in acts, decrees, statutes or codes, but instead, it aims to 
research what state law is and what it does. State law encompasses those norms that are 
created, established or imposed by the state or state officials, not all of which are 
written down, but may also be generated through the implementation and enforcement 
of law. Thus, state law itself has a pluralist character, it does not consist of one coherent 
body of norms, and state law prescriptions differ with regard to prescriptive capabilities 
and ideological effect. 
As with state law, other norms can be distinguished according to their source, then-
different ways of claiming legitimacy, and their differential effects on people's 
behaviour. Customs, kinship and gender all have normative dimensions, and then-
characteristics, flexibility, force or working differ in specific settings. Gender norms, 
for example, may overrule kinship norms in inheritance practices. Chapter Four 
demonstrates that the preference for the youngest child in inheritance is exclusively 
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attributed to the youngest son and not to the youngest daughter, because women are 
not seen as entitled to inherit land. Widows desperately try to claim part of the 
properties in spite of the prevailing family norms that prescribe that children should 
take care of their mother (Chapter Five). 
Many debates have evolved around the issue of what is 'legal' and 'not legal'. Roberts 
(1998:97) argues that a 'lawyerly way of looking at the social world' has many 
limitations. In a lawyerly view', law is the only element that constitutes social order 
and, consequently, everything that contributes to the social order is called 'law' (Hunt 
1993, Tamanaha 2000). 1 1 Law thus comprises state law and all other types of norms that 
might be constitutive to the social order. However, such a view contributes very little 
to my effort to discern different norms and their differential contributions to social 
order. If all norms are laws, then one should introduce other tools to discern them 
again which makes the effort to call it all 'law' a bit futile. 
Thus, property relations and land rights evolve in a situation of normative pluralism, 
in which social actors can justify their behaviour by referring to norms stemming from 
different sources. This book intends to reveal the elements of this normative pluralism 
and discover the effects of the different elements. I am looking at a way of making 
discrete the elements of the pluralist situation, and for that, I intend to develop the 
notion of 'stacked laws and norms'. 
Human agency, norms and their structural properties 
This research looks at why people do what they do with respect to estabUshing, 
controlling and changing property rights arrangements in land. This is certainly a 
question of norms, but it is also about human agency. Human agency refers to the 
capacity of social actors to process social experience and to strategically generate a 
network of social relations (Giddens 1984, Long 1992:22-24, Booth 1994). Social actors -
those who have agency -, are knowledgeable and capable of acting. However, they are 
not completely free. Their acting is constrained in various ways: by physical constraints 
or uncertainties, but also by social structures. 
For the empirical researcher, it is very difficult to deal with social structures. The 
implication of the existence of social structures is that people's actions are not only 
meaningful, but they have causes and effects (Sayer 1992:114). Structures get mixed up 
and cannot be isolated. Social actors take part in several structures at the same time, and 
may therefore confuse the effects of different structures. It is not clear at first sight 
whether inequality in inheritance practices is based in law, kinship, local rule systems, 
property definitions or gender ideology. Or, one may explain corruption either by 
pointing at the psychological character of judges or at the working of the system of 
political clientele. Our own understanding of such issues depends on the accounts of 
social actors who themselves mix up different structures and concepts. For example, 
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Chapter Five explains how landholders confuse gender with skills in defining who is 
suitable to become a landholder. 
Structures not only coexist and articulate, but they also endure: people reproduce 
them (Sayer 1992). They may not do this intentionally. Sayer (1992:96), quoting 
Bhaskar, states: 'people do not marry to reproduce the nuclear family or work to 
reproduce the capitalist economy. Yet it is nevertheless the unintended consequence 
(and inexorable result) of, as it is also a necessary condition for, their activity'. 
Structures are not static but they may gradually change from inside. 'Religious 
structures, teacher-pupil relations and the marital relation have all changed slowly but 
significantly, as balances of power and constitutive meanings and practices have shifted' 
(Sayer 1992:96). 
Norms are part of the constraints on people's behaviour; norms encompass 
structural properties that may restrain behaviour. Norms may also be enabling: making 
something possible. People claim rights and thus use norms, and norms serve as 
conditions for claiming rights. They justify their behaviour by referring to norms, and 
through their actions, they reproduce or change these norms. They may not do this 
intentionally, but it is the mere result of what they do. Norms can also have effects 
without deliberate actions. It is not necessary for people to live up to the norm 
precisely, but the norm can still exercise a powerful ideological effect on their acting. 
The structural properties of norms may generate different outcomes or effects in 
different settings and at different moments. Gender norms, for example, may be more 
effective in structuring behaviour than state law in a certain setting. Norms may be no 
more than loose guidelines leaving ample space for interpretation. Social actors choose 
between different norms as circumstances or their own goals and strategies require. But 
norms may also be compelling and combined with coercive enforcement. 
Stacked laws and norms 
This section has shown that normative pluralism is an essential feature of land rights in 
Honduras. Yet the notion of normative pluralism in itself does not give us a clue about 
how to look at the different elements of 'pluralism': what are these elements, what 
effect do they have, how do the elements stemming from different sources and 
appealing to different forms of legitimacy relate? The aim of this research is to test the 
notion of 'stacked laws and norms' to see whether it offers a way to answer these 
questions. 
This book develops the notion of stacked laws and norms in two different ways. 
First, the term allows me to empirically describe and analyse what norms are stacked in 
the course of time and what results from the stacking of different norms for concrete 
practices evolving around the organisation of property. For example: Chapter Two 
shows that historically, on top of Civil Code notions of property, property notions 
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stemming from agrarian laws have been 'stacked', and on top of that are stacked 
people's perceptions of Civil Code and agrarian law notions, which they derived from 
law but that are no longer legally valid. This has led to the divergent interpretations of 
land rights among landholders and state officials today, and to conflict and confusion 
about the meaning of particular property concepts and their corresponding rights in 
the land. 
Second, the term 'stacked' indicates more precisely how normative pluralism comes 
into being. There are different norms shaping property relations regarding land that do 
not flow together in a kind of fluid pluralism but become 'stacked' over the course of 
time. The first element of the complex is not replaced by another one, nor does it 
merge with other elements. The different elements are still identifiable, not only by the 
researcher but also by the involved social actors and they may still use or refer to the 
separate elements. The elements are thus not 'fluid' even though they influence each 
other. The notion of stacking thus specifies a process that is not leading to a disordered 
heap or pile of norms, but that gives normative pluralism a certain (stacked) structure. 
Research questions 
The story of the widow Ana was told in the introduction to this book. She lost her 
land due to the deceitful actions of her son and a state intervention that offered her son 
ample space to shrewdly use to strengthen his own claim. Violence and conflict 
I associated with land rights are daily occurrences with far reaching implications for the 
involved parties, generating and enhancing insecurity and injustice. These are not just 
/ the daily, trivial and unimportant problems of people of no consequence. In my view, 
i they touch upon the crux in the analysis and elimination of rank social injustice in the 
i rural areas of Honduras. 
The main question of this research is: What is it about laws and norms that enables 
them to generate violence and conflicts about property rights among landholders? The 
research has dealt with three major themes that come to the fore in the course of this 
book: practices of rights transfer, norms and laws and conflict resolution. 
Practices of land transfer 
• What are the major mechanisms of transfer of property rights to land; what rights 
become transferred and why; how do conflicts come about in these transfers? 
• Who is entitled to have and hold property rights, and who isn't? 
• How is property connected with land use strategies? What role does land use play in 
maintaining control over land? 
• What is the role of gender and kinship in the emergence and persistence of conflicts 
over property? 
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Stacked norms and laws 
• How does state law define property and which notions of property have become 
stacked through history? 
• What is the perception of landholders about property rights to land and why and 
how do their perceptions differ from the state's definition of their rights? What are 
the sources of their claims to the land? 
• What are the individual norms within a context of normative pluralism, and which 
role do these separate norms play in justifying claims? 
• How does the complex of stacked norms and laws affect transfer practices from state 
to landholder and between landholders as a result of inheritance? 
• How do social actors make use of particular elements of the complex of stacked laws 
and norms? 
Conflict resolution 
• What role does conflict avoidance play in property relations? 
• How are conflicts resolved if they emerge, and what role do the national state, the 
municipal authorities and the judicial system play in the resolution of conflict? 
• What characterises the working of the judicial system and what is the background of 
class justice as it is perceived by landholders and people in Honduras in general? 
• What role do the actors involved in the judicial system play in the persistence of 
injustice and legal insecurity? 
Campesino life, conflicts and field research 
Campesino life is not as romantic as I thought it was, or as it is viewed by Hondurans in 
the city. Any sense of peasant romanticism, of the autonomous hero with straw hat 
who resists modern life styles in order to protect traditional values, was gone after I had 
lived a few months in El Zapote. 1 21 was not only confronted with the not-so-romantic 
consequences of poverty, hunger and misery, but I also came across violence and 
injustice so often and of a kind that it was impossible to maintain that peasants live 
poorly but nevertheless joyfully and peacefully. It only begged for the question to be 
asked: 'What on earth is going on here?' 
Living as a researcher (or as a 'writer', as villagers called it) in a remote peasant 
village inevitably meant that my own concepts, ideas and prejudices were turned upside 
down. Yet this also made me wonder how state officials, rural experts and development 
planners obtained the knowledge they based their discourses and images of rural life 
and peasants on. After a brief discussion of existing images of rural villages, this section 
addresses the questions of how field research can have broader general implications and 
23 
how this research deals with studying conflict. Finally, the section looks at data 
collection during field research. 
Images of the rural village 
f National census data is the main source of information for state officials (those involved 
j in making land laws and in implementing these laws) and scientists at universities. 
| Development organisations base their work on more than census data, generating their 
^_own information through their activities in rural areas among specific target groups. 
I Yet they strongly focus on their own work and their target groups, and they do not 
acknowledge that ordinary village life tends to proceed untouched by their weekly 
hour-long meetings of women's groups or brief field visits in a polished Toyota. The 
images created by the state and NGOs about poverty, farm households, gender 
relations and development are expressed in documents, projects and activities, forming 
a dominant and influential information source in national discussions about agrarian 
.^policy and change. 
Generally, romantic images of community and rural life dominate development 
discourse. The peasant image (el campesino) presents a family producing grains for home 
consumption and some additional cash crops, living in a small white house made of sun 
dried bricks and a roof of red tiles; pigs and chickens wandering in the home garden 
j where the mistress of the house grows vegetables. The community image (la 
| comunidad) implies togetherness of the inhabitants as a whole, as well as the different 
| local organisations that work together to achieve collective goals. The idea behind these 
' Tramantic representations is that both peasant and community are under severe stress in 
contemporary times due to external changes and need to be rescued.13 For the purpose 
of this study, it was necessary to leave out the many assumptions about how rural 
people live, think and act. The bits and pieces of the picture that I was constructing 
about rural life in El Zapote defied the dominant images. 
Rural women in particular are subjects of image construction. Presenting women as 
victims is common among development organisations in Honduras and elsewhere (an 
example is NED A 1997). This is an artefact of the cry for attention to rural women as 
it started manifesting itself in the 1970s (Kandiyoti 1990). However, presenting women 
as victims is also a necessary condition for working with women in the present day. 
The notion of women as victims creates space for development organisations to become 
part of women's liberation through their own activities.14 Development organisations 
benefit from portraying the 'target group' as victims as this simplifies target group 
definitions and project designs, providing the right images to generate resources in 
donating countries (Wood 1985). The victim image has recently been counteracted by 
stressing that women are knowledgeable and capable and effectively use their room to 
manoeuvre within their social environments and networks (Villarreal 1994). However, 
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translated into development discourse, the knowledgeable and capable women turn out 
to be fantastic organisers, community protagonists or protectors of the environment; 
images of women that might be just as untrue as those derived from the view of women 
as victims (Shiva 1988, Tabora 1993, Rowlands 1997). 
'Real'people and generalisations 
My main research question emerged after I had been living in El Zapote for several 
months. I had originally been studying the labour relations between women and 
between men and women in the process of petate (sleeping mats) weaving, which is a 
major source of female income in the village. But the production of petates was not 
only about labour relations: it was also about control over goods, decision-making and 
property rights. Property, the issue of the distribution of rights and claims to goods, 
was a dominant influence in daily life and relations between villagers. Land was one of 
the most valuable commodities in El Zapote, and it was essential for survival. While 
reading the municipar-council logbooks, I discovered that a majority of the issues 
disciis^d^were-abraarland. I witnessed quarrels and violent behaviour among villagers 
over land rights, and I observed that women tended to lose their property and had 
difficulties making claims to land. 
The question of land, property and conflict is as relevant and important in the lives | 
of the El Zapote villagers as it is to the rest of the country. A detailed look into a village 
has the advantage that it portrays the lives of 'real' people with 'real' problems. But 
presenting data about one village always runs the risk of being faulted for its 'micro' 
perspective and its inability to serve as a basis for generalisations (Burawoy 1991). 
Honduran colleagues sometimes chided us, claiming we buried ourselves in a particular 
village where very bizarre and exceptional things happened. Apart from our conviction 
that El Zapote is not at all bizarre or exceptional, it is not the purpose of this study to 
make generalisations on the basis of empirical phenomena. The method of this book is 
to uncover mechanisms, structural properties and relations that have contributed to the 
generation of violence, conflict and struggles over rights, duties, inclusion and 
exclusion. Because of this, this book goes beyond describing empirical phenomena. On 
a more general level, the case study unravelled in this book generates insight into the 
process of how laws and norms are stacked, the process of law-making in a developing 
country and the outcomes and effects of law in social practices. 
Events and conflicts 
The general idea about norms is that they have emerged to evade conflict. It will 
become clekr from this book that norms may also lead to conflict (Turk 1978). The 
study of conflict is central to the 'situational analysis' approach as developed by van 
Velsen (1967). Central to situational analysis is the view that conflicts arise as a result of 
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contrasting norms. Norms in society are neither consistent nor coherent, and they 
allow for manipulation by individuals. Conflicts are not the result of deviant 
behaviour, but are a normal element of social change and an endemic feature of social 
life (Comaroff and Roberts 1981). J^and conflicts emerge in the process of articulation 
\ of norms and processes, and are embedded in relations (Nader and Todd 1978). Land 
uconflicts are not always manifested in visible and violent confrontations, but may also 
ybecome expressed through subtle mechanisms in daily practices. Conflicts may latently 
; persist for years and then suddenly come to a head and emerge. Landholders and their 
families may be at odds for years, which has negative consequences for daily 
interactions in the village. The very subtle references to and consequences of conflict 
are less visible than collective land occupations, squatting, bloody murders or 
machetazos. 
Conflicts are part of a range of events that reveal how property rights become 
defined and distributed, and also how meaning becomes attached to property. By 
studying conflict through the extended case method, structural characteristics of social 
relations come to the fore. The extended case method connects a series of events that 
illuminate choices and actions of people (van Velsen 1967, Burawoy 1991). In 
conflictive situations, people negotiate their social universe and enter into a discourse 
about it (Comaroff and Roberts 1981:248-249, Starr and Collier 1989). A violent land 
conflict may be connected to other conflicts in the past or present; it may be caused by 
the application of certain inheritance norms; and it may have acquired a certain 
direction because of gender images, alcohol abuse or differential perceptions of 
property or land use. Hence, conflicts about property may be seen as instructive events 
that also exhibit structural properties of norms, features of property relations, images 
of property holders, goals and strategies of social actors and perceptions about land and 
land use. 
Methods in field research 
I started researching violence and land conflicts by reading the minutes of the municipal 
council. The council had kept records of meetings and decisions by writing up 
chronicles in large black 'logbooks' (the actas municipdes), dating back to 1917 when 
the municipality of El Zapote came into being. Deciphering the hand-written texts in 
these books was worth the effort. The logbooks of the municipal council revealed loads 
of information about the history of the village and the village lands; the relationship 
between the municipal council and national and regional state authorities; the 
relationships between villagers and the local government; the way in which property 
| rights to land were distributed and land use became regulated; the management of 
| commons; the changing authority of council members; and the changing nature of the 
problems that the council handled. I also read the logbooks of the assistant mayor 
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(alcalde de policia), the authority that had the task of mediating and solving small 
conflicts between villagers. With the gathered historical information as background, I 
interviewed authorities and ex-authorities, agricultural producers and landholders on 
the practices of land distribution and management, emerging and disappearing laws and 
norms, and the role of village and regional authorities in granting land rights. 
The LNA and the National Cadastral Directorate provided my husband Kees Jansen 
and me with cadastral maps of the area that held information about the landholder, size 
and type of land use. The INA also supplied us with information about ownership and 
the property rights of landholders. The municipal land titles that were guarded by one 
of the council members (the sindico) also helped in locating plots of land that played a 
role in the diverse histories of land holding and to unravel the background of specific 
land conflicts. 
With a local research assistant, a survey was completed of all households in the 
village, including data about household composition and major sources of income and 
agricultural activities. We later checked this information against municipal data and 
kept records of changes and mistakes we discovered. This database was linked to the 
INA's cadastral information that contained information about plots, plot holders and 
the state definition of their property rights. 
I interviewed men and women of all ages on questions of kinship, family, household 
organisation, gender relations and gender identities. Through studying the tule and 
petate economy in the village, I first became acquainted with local discourses on these 
issues. Tule (Cyperus canus) is a perennial crop that is cultivated on tiny plots of land 
near rivers and streams. The tule stalks are dried and used by the women to weave 
sleeping mats (petate). In conversations about this production process, closely related 
issues of control of property and income, household organisation and gender came to 
the fore (Chapter Three). 
Inheritance practices, property definitions and land conflicts were subjects that 
people were eager to talk about because they strongly influenced their daily well-being 
and were essential to the organisation of farm households. Kees and I also completed a 
survey of eighty-three agricultural producers. The survey took place in a conversational 
setting, during which I was able to collect a great deal of data on inheritance practices. 
Land titling was an issue of lively conversations in the village, and it was instructive 
for the differences between state and landholders' concepts of property rights (fansen 
and Roquas 1998). Observations of interactions between INA officials and landholders 
demonstrated the discrepancies with regard to concepts, goals and definitions that 
neither officials nor landholders were able to understand. The issue of land titling raised 
questions about the consequences of public (state) interference in property rights that 
landholders saw as a private issue, and about the reconstruction of local property 
arrangements in contemporary.scientific and policy documents. 
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The land conflicts in El Zapote can only be understood within the framework of the 
(Jhistorical development of law with respect to land and property. I therefore consulted 
available sources and experts in this field. In order to assess the local specificity of rights 
transfer practices in El Zapote, I went to the General Archive of the Judicial Power in 
Tegucigalpa and read dozens of testaments from the twentieth century and other 
documents that concerned property transfers. Many aspects of transfer practices in El 
Zapote were comparable to what had been written down in documents from.the same 
period. The notarial property documents also shed light on the completion of legal 
procedures with regard to inheritance and other practices of land rights transfer. 
I collected three types of data at the regional level of Santa Barbara. First, after 
reading the legal documents in the General Archive of the Judicial Power, I decided to 
do the same at the district level. The amount of available documents about property 
rights transfer was limited at the district level, but their content matched the 
documents of the general Archive of the Judicial Power. Second, I interviewed lawyers 
and court personnel on the working of the regional court of justice and allied 
institutions to evaluate the roles they played and to see whether they supported or 
refuted the extremely pessimistic view landholders in El Zapote hold about the judicial 
system. A third source of information that I consulted was the civil and criminal case 
files of land conflicts. This consultation aimed to identify how the court handled land 
and land-related conflicts to learn how property rights were defined and to analyse how 
judges evaluated different types of evidence in land rights disputes. 
The Third Chamber of the Santa Barbara Court, the court that exercises jurisdiction 
in El Zapote, offered the opportunity to collect these three different sets of data. The 
Third Chamber did not have a judge during most of the time I spent at the court. In a 
period of six months time, three judges in a row were suspended because of 
'irregularities' they had committed. The judge who was appointed at the end of my stay 
spent most of her time taking courses in San Pedro de Sula. She refused to co-operate 
with my research project, but she was overruled by other court officials who gave me 
access to the archives of the court. I was only able to evaluate the work of the recent 
judges of the Third Chamber through case files and interviews with lawyers and other 
personnel of the court. I spent many hours in the archive room of the Third Chamber 
reading case files, talking to the personnel of the court and discussing case files and 
other issues with the lawyers who came to visit me to see what I was doing. I also 
interviewed lawyers in their offices, as well as the representative of the National 
Human Rights Commissioner based in Santa Barbara. The case files concerned both 
land conflicts between individual landholders and the claims of campesino groups 
struggling for land rights with the Agrarian Reform Law in their hands. 
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Notes 
1 Population growth is stable at 3.3% at the national level (BCH 2000). 
2 Property rights issues are also discussed with regard to non-material things, such as licenses, milk quota, 
fish quota, and intellectual property rights (Reich 1964, Wiber and Kearney 1996, Hann 1998). 
3 The term 'practices' refers to the whole of thinking, speaking and acting by humans within the context of 
conditions for existence, relationships and ideas and principles (Ramdas 1988). 
4 Gender studies in particular often departs from a notion of power as transformative capacity because it is 
suitable for analysing power relations that appear to be 'natural', such as gender (Bourdieu 1989, Risseeuw 
1988, Yanagisako and Delaney 1995, Kandiyoti 1998). 
5 Engels (1980) argued that the oppression of women ensued from the emergence of private property in the 
process of capitalist development. Women became instruments for the production of children in the 
interest of the transfer of private property (Stolcke 1984). Engels reduced women's subordination to a sole 
effect of the working of capitalism. Furthermore he assumed that the function of women's subordination 
was also an explanation of its existence (Barrett 1988). 
6 It seems that through the increasing urbanisation and industrialisation (assembly plants), the agricultural 
sector's significance to the national economy is rapidly diminishing. 
7 Legal culture is 'the whole range of ideas which exists in particular societies - and varies from one society 
to another - about law and its place in the social order' (Cotterrell 1992:23). 
8 A legal system consists of primary rules - that prescribe or prohibit behaviour -, and secondary rules that 
necessarily require the presence of legislative and adjudicative institutions (Roberts 1979, Griffiths 1986). 
In other parts of the world, legal systems other than the law of the state exist, such as Islamic law. 
9 A criticism of legal positivism is that it presumes state law to be coherent and secure in its definitions and 
prescriptions. Another argument against legal positivism is that it incorporates the ideological project of 
seeking the supremacy of state law and the elimination of all other norms in society (Benda-Beckmann 
1997). The legal positivist project might harm, for example, the autonomy of groups of people to use their 
own indigenous legal systems (Assies et al. 2000). 
10 It has been argued that distinguishing between state law and other norms inherently creates a hierarchy 
between them. Moreover, such a distinction would promote an ideological project of enforcing state law 
at the expense of other norms and legal systems (Benda-Beckmann 1997). However, we gain in analytical 
power if we distinguish state law from other norms. I am looking for analytical tools to precisely 
differentiate norms instead of lumping them all together. State law is distinctive because of its specific 
relation with the state, while other norms may have very different driving principles and forces. This does 
not at all mean that I place state law at the top of a hierarchy of norms, let alone that it implies an 
inherent political project to promote state law at the expense of other norms. 
11 Social order is constituted through more than just normative dimensions (Tamanaha 2000). Language 
contributes to social order without being normative or legal. Relations in farm households have 
normative dimensions - family law, gender norms, inheritance rules -, but non-normative dimensions such 
as greed, love, dislike and fortuities also contribute to the constitution of these relations. 
12 Fieldwork in the framework of this book took place between September 1992 and February 1995 in El 
Zapote. I did fieldwork at district level in Santa Barbara during April-June 1996 and January-July 1997, 
mainly on legal issues and the working of courts. In 1999 and 2000, while living in another region of 
Honduras, I was able to make several brief visits to the research area. 
13 This may sound as if I am exaggerating the simplifications of aid workers and urban professionals. 
Nevertheless, I feel that my reworking of these images is sincere. For example, a similar view on the 
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peasant was aired in a conversation with a representative of a Dutch Co-Financing Agency. It was only 
one out of many occasions in which I heard such ideas about rural life. On other occasions, fellow 
researchers lamented the substitution of the romantic tiled roofs for sheets of corrugated iron, without 
considering the advantages of latter for the poor. The community image was strong among Peace Corps 
volunteers who tried in vain to implement a water and latrine project in El Zapote without understanding 
why 'the community' did not support their efforts. 
14 A striking feature is that there is not much continuity in development work but that new fashions in the 
international development discourse determine the agenda. A notable example is the shift in attention 
from 'women's productivity' (seventies and eighties) towards domestic violence nowadays. 
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Chapter two 
Rights in the land of El Zapote 
Phenomena such as a maize plot destroyed in the mountains or the Babel-like 
confusion in a conversation between landholders and a government official are but two 
of the numerous manifestations of land conflict hidden in daily village life. This chapter 
seeks to analyse what norms or rules people refer to in social practices for assigning and 
claiming property rights to land. A main focal point is the complicated assembling of 
different normative spheres with regard to these property rights. Contrasting 
interpretations about property between landholders and the state are a main source of 
conflict in itself, but they may also trigger conflicts between landholders. 
This chapter presents a picture of how land conflict is manifested in El Zapote. I 
then turn to explaining the normative spheres through which social actors justify then-
claims and behaviour; normative spheres that are characterised by stacked Civil Code 
and agrarian law notions of property. Thereafter, I examine the process of stacking laws 
and norms for the vested property rights in different zones of El Zapote, thereby giving 
attention to the divergent perspectives on property of landholders and the state. On the 
basis of two cases of state intervention, I look at how 'stacking' of norms at the village 
level leads to these differential perspectives on property rights. I question whether the 
terms 'informal' or 'customary', as used by policymakers in Honduras, are adequate to 
specify the nature of landholders' perceptions of their rights to the land. 
Manifestations of conflict 
Before I start to unravel the complex frame of normative spheres playing a role in the 
emergence of conflict surrounding land and property, this section briefly discusses 
manifestations of conflict in El Zapote and the type of events that generate these 
conflicts. My intention is to give an impression about the dimensions and nature of 
these conflicts. 
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Talking about land conflicts means that issues of distribution are involved; looking 
at land in terms of quantity, it is clear that land is unevenly distributed among 
agricultural producers. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 give an impression of the land distribution in 
El Zapote. The census of 1993 does not provide details exclusively for El Zapote, but 
the situation that year may be comparable to the data for the district of Santa Barbara. 
Table 2.1 Distribution of land in El Zapote in 1974 
Farm size Number of farms Percentage Acreage (ha) Percentage 
<1 ha. 100 26 65 2 
1-5 178 46 416 16 
5-20 80 21 784 30 
20-500 27 7 1,369 52 
Total 385 100 2,634 100 
Source: Censo Nacional Agropecuario 1974 (DGECH 1978). 
Table 2.2 Distribution of land in the Santa Barbara district in 1993 
Farm size Number of farms Percentage Acreage (ha) Percentage 
<1 ha. 92,713 32 5,322 2 
1-5 12,353 43 27,684 12 
5-20 4,736 17 46,455 19 
20-500 2,420 8 165,638 67 
Total 28,782 100 245,099 100 
Source: Censo Nacional Asropecuario 1993 (SECPLAN 1994). 
Data about land distribution at the district level show that 8% of the farms occupy 67% 
of the total production area in 1993. At the other end of the spectrum, 75% of the 
farms are smaller than five hectares, occupying 14% of the production area. These 
statistics correspond to the typically uneven distribution of land between a few large 
landholders and a majority of small landholders. The existence of uneven land 
distribution, however, is not proof that conflicts are caused by it. Manifestations of 
conflict are, in fact, not in line with the picture of clashes between large and small 
landowners. 
Manifestations of conflicts about property 
Fighting among drunken men regularly occurs at weekends in El Zapote. Villagers sigh 
that the participants in these fights are irresponsible and that drinking alcohol is a bad 
habit. What looks like a fight between two drunkards, however, is often not caused by 
the alcohol itself, but it is often an existing conflict fought out under the influence of 
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alcohol. A fight between drunkards thus does not directly reveal the cause of the 
quarrel. 
Figure 2.1 portrays the ways in which conflicts about land are manifested in El 
Zapote and of the events through which conflicts emerge. These manifestations and 
events play a major role in the course of this book. 
CONFLICTS ABOUT LAND 
Manifestation Events 
aggressive defensive 
Personal threats 
Violence 
Rows between children 
Poisoning dogs, pigs, chicken 
Setting free or remove 
horses and mules 
Moving fences 
Destroying crops 
Involve police, judges, 
lawyers, courts 
Avoidance 
Strengthen claim by 
cultivating crops 
Looking for social 
support 
Sale of the land 
Involve mediator 
Eg.: 
Inheritance 
Contested land sale 
State interventions 
Discussions about 
extraction of firewood 
or use of water wells 
Lease arrangements 
Fencing in commons 
Refusing right of way 
Figure 2.1 Manifestations of, and events generating conflict in El Zapote 
Conflicts about land may start with a small disagreement between two parties and may 
gradually develop or they may silently persist for years and then suddenly boil over. At 
first sight it is not always clear that a conflict about property is involved when people 
start to openly threaten each other or get mixed up in violent confrontations. It is also 
not clear that quarrels between children of different families have something to do with 
land rights. The mysterious poisoning of domestic animals (dogs, pigs, chickens) also 
leaves room for guessing who did it and why. Several times I observed people 
complaining that someone deliberately opened the fence of their pasture field in order 
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to set their horses and mules free. Harassment is often an early sign of problems 
between two persons or two farm households about land rights. 
Moved or destroyed fences, demolished plantations, or secretly harvested crops are 
more direct indications of conflicts about land rights. Fences are visible expressions of a 
claim on land: the fence excludes others from entering the field. Fencing is subject to 
obligatory municipal prescriptions.1 If done with barbed wire, the landholder must 
surrender the barbed wire's deed of purchase to the municipality to prove that it has 
not been stolen or taken from another plot. Besides damaging and moving fences, 
ruining plantations or harvesting someone else's crops are also effective means to 
contest another person's claim. 
Serious threats, bloody fights or murders make the involvement of 'authorities' 
inevitable: the police, the local justice of the peace, lawyers or the district court. A 
general opinion in El Zapote is that becoming involved in a court case is not advisable. 
Just the very idea of it is often enough for parties to drop claims and withdraw 
themselves from the conflict (Chapters Four and Six). 
The receiver of threats, violence and other misery first tries an escape route to avoid 
the conflict. The landholder will try to strengthen the claim and hold control over the 
land by fencing it in or by planting crops (Chapters Four and Five). He may use all 
means available to influence public opinion in the village in his favour. Conflict 
avoidance strategies are very important in property relations. Nevertheless, when a 
conflict is provoked, sale of the land is a final option before it is too late. A sale may 
involve loss of capital and years of labour, but these disadvantages are often preferred 
over involvement in a conflict or a dispute in court. Occasionally the receiver of threats 
is able to find a 'mediator' who intercedes to try to solve the problem. The mediator 
may be a villager who knows the aggressive as well as the defensive party. Political 
leaders may also act as mediators in conflicts between party members. The involvement 
of these local mediators also has a 'price', not so much in terms of money, but in terms 
of involvement in social networks and political relations. 
Civil code and agrarian notions of property 
Social actors justify their choices, arguments, strategies of exclusion and reinforcement 
of claims by making, changing and using norms. Therefore, this book focuses on 
understanding these norms, not only to unravel their complexity but also to 
understand what norms express and how people use them. State law makes a significant 
contribution to the complexity of normative spheres regarding rights to land. The 
regulation of land rights has always been a central point of attention for the Honduran 
state, as land is a major means of production and important to the development of the 
national economy. Article 3 of the Constitution explicitly protects private property 
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(Honduras 1994). State regulations in regard to land rights, nevertheless, have never 
been transparent. This section investigates whether the confusing legal concepts of land 
property rights have triggered the emergence of competing claims and differential 
property notions between the state and landholders. 
This section first discusses the civil code arrangements of ownership and possession 
that describe the rights and obligations of property holders in general terms.2 Agrarian 
laws, especially those dealing with land rights, have added new dynamics to the existing 
notions of property. The agrarian law concept of the ejido - land that the national state 
assigned to municipalities or hamlets - has played an important role in the formation of 
land rights in El Zapote. The legal construction of the ejido did not involve a radical 
split with Civil Code notions of property. Next, I go on to discuss agrarian law 
stipulations that did involve changes of the Civil Code concept of property: the social 
function of property, collective property, reduced ownership and the abolishment of 
the land-to-tiller principle. Finally, I analyse how Civil Code and agrarian law notions 
of property clash with each other. 
Civil Code notions of property 
The Civil Code (Honduras 1989) came into existence as part of a process of nation 
building that started several decades after independence in 1821 and in which the 
administration of Marco Aurelio Soto (1876-1883) played a central role (Meyer and 
Meyer 1994; d'Ans 1998). Around 1880, the Soto government finished modernising the 
constitution and proceeded thereafter to develop the 'Patriotic Codes', among which 
was the Civil Code.3 The discrepancy between the new, more liberal constitution and 
the Patriotic Codes, which still strongly expressed a Spanish authoritarian view on law, 
led to new reformations of the codes under liberal French and United States influences. 
After a major revision in 1889, the four books of the Civil Code received its 
contemporary form in 1906 (Quesada 1967). 
The Civil Code is a mixture of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and the Chilean Civil 
Code of 1855 (Stokes 1973). The Chilean Code was based on a combination of Roman, 
French, Spanish and German law (Carcamo Tercero 1969). The Civil Code expresses 
principles of equality and freedom in, for example, liberal inheritance rules and 
testamentary freedom (Carcamo Tercero 1969). 
Although created in 1906, the general opinion nowadays is that the Civil Code still 
functions adequately. Other codes and laws launched after 1906 have replaced certain 
articles or entire books of the Civil Code (family code, contract law, agrarian laws). 
Some of these changes have also affected the legal validity of civil code concepts of 
property. 
The Civil Code defines propiedad or dominio (ownership) as 'the right to exclusively 
possess a thing and enjoy and dispose of it without limitations except those established 
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in law or defined by the will of the owner' (art. 613). Ownership bestows the owner 
with full power over a thing and produces the ability to exclusively appropriate all 
utilities that the thing can provide for. The faculties of ownership are the rights of use, 
enjoyment (appropriation of products), consumption (for example, destruction), 
possession and disposal (for example sell or transfer it). Ownership is exclusive in the 
sense that only one owner can claim the rights and may exclude others. It is also 
enduring in that the owner cannot lose these rights as time passes. As article 613 states, 
the law does impose some restrictions on ownership that affect the absolute and 
exclusive character of property in the Civil Code in a few exceptional cases. For 
example, expropriation is possible for reasons of public interest. Special orders may 
impede the power to fell trees, or zoning schemes may forbid the construction of 
houses (Cruz Lopez 1993). 
The Civil Code sets out in what ways one is able to acquire ownership. Several of 
these notions play a role in agrarian law and in people's thinking about land: 
• Accesion (accession): Article 634 describes accession as the right to own things that 
become either naturally or artificially a part of something already owned (Soils and 
Gasteazoro 1992). 
• Ocupation (occupation): Occupation refers to taking possession of a thing which no 
one owns (art. 660). A restriction is that it is not possible to occupy things which are 
prohibited to have by Honduran or international law (art. 660). 
• Tradition (transfer): Article 697 defines this way of obtaining ownership as the 
material delivery of property in order to transfer title or ownership between living 
persons (Solis and Gasteazoro 1992). People must have the capability and the 
intention to transfer ownership. Sale is an example of a tradicion. Inheritance is not a 
tradicion as it does not only involve living persons (Cruz Lopez 1993). 
• Sucesion (succession): Articles 930-957 and further, define the acquisition of rights in 
property upon the death of a person, whether or not there has been a will (Solis and 
Gasteazoro 1992). 
• Prescription adquisitiva (adverse acquisition): In article 2263, the acquisition of 
ownership because of possession of a thing during a certain period under legal 
conditions, becomes possible (Cruz Lopez 1993:74). 
This section discusses two issues related to the Civil Code definitions of property that 
play an important role in the emergence of different normative spheres regarding land 
rights: first, the difference between ownership and possession and second, how the 
Civil Code's idea of adverse acquisition is applied to land. 
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Ownership and possession: a difference in law 
The difference between ownership and possession in the Civil Code is very important 
for understanding the perceptions about landholder's land rights and the state. In 
ordinary language in Honduras, possession and ownership are used indiscriminately; in 
law, however, they are two different things. 
The Civil Code establishes that possession is not a right but 'a fact which is 
protected by law' (Cruz Lopez 1993). 'Possession is the tenancy of a thing or the 
enjoyment of a right with the spirit of being owner, by ourselves or in our names. The 
possessor is known as the owner, as long as no one else is able to justify that he is (the 
owner)' (art. 717). The conditions for recognising possession are that possession must 
be based on good faith and just title (art. 719). Good faith refers to the knowledge that 
the thing is obtained by legitimate means (arts. 723-724). Bad faith refers to the 
conscious and wilful doing of a wrong for a dishonest or fraudulent purpose (Soils and 
Gasteazoro 1992). Thus a possessor does not own the thing, but he does own its 
products as long as he has good faith. 
A title refers to the means whereby the holder has the just possession of a thing 
(Soils and Gasteazoro 1992). If a person sells something which is owned by others, the 
sale in itself is just title. However, it gives the buyer access to possession and doesn't 
transfer ownership, because the person who sold did not have ownership in the first 
place. 
A person who does not possess the thing he owns can recover ownership through an 
appeal to recovery or vindication.4 The owner may use vindication or 'action of 
ownership' when he owns a thing but does not possess it. Through the appeal to 
vindication, the possessor will be condemned to give it back (art. 868). Hence, the 
owner is able to recover his property that has been wrongfully held by a person who 
has no right to it (Soils and Gasteazoro 1992). A civil vindication procedure is the 
common way to determine who has what right in the disputed land and to claim 
ownership (Chapter Six). 
Ownership and possession embody more or less the same advantages: they are both 
bestowed on a particular thing, and a thing has only one owner or possessor. In this 
light, it is not strange that landholders do not see a difference between ownership and 
possession: they perceive their rights as ownership. The state, on the other hand, 
recognises private ownership only when the land is registered in the Public Register of 
Property (arts. 2304 and further).5 Without registration, a landholder has possession in 
the eyes of the state. The state thus seems to recognise only two types of property 
arrangements in land: public (state) and private property (Stanfield et al. 1986). The 
consequences of the different perceptions of landholders and state with regard to 
ownership and possession come especially to the fore when the state intervenes in 
existing land rights arrangements (this chapter). 
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Possession and adverse acquisition 
Possession can be converted into ownership under certain conditions. If a possessor has 
good faith and just title, and he possesses the thing for a period of three years for 
moveable property or ten years for immovable property, he is able to claim ownership 
(arts. 2284 and 2286). Without just title, this is six years for moveable property and 
twenty years for immovable property (arts. 2284 and 2287). 
It has been argued that the Civil Code notion of adverse acquisition does not have a 
bearing on national land; a landholder cannot claim ownership on the basis of 
occupation or possession of national land (Cruz Lopez 1993). Occupation is only 
possible with regard to things that no one owns and, in the eyes of the state, land is 
owned by either the state or a private owner (art. 618). Furthermore, referring to article 
13 of the constitution, Cruz Lopez argues that possession cannot lead to ownership of 
the land. Article 13 reads that 'ownership of the state is inalienable and 
imprescriptible'; hence, national land cannot be turned into privately owned land by 
adverse acquisition. 
The presented legal argumentation about why the concept of adverse acquisition 
cannot be used for national land is overruled by agrarian laws that have instituted 
special arrangements for adverse acquisition regarding national land, arrangements that 
can be found in the legal concept of the ejido. 
The state does recognise claims of occupation and possession of national land. For 
example, decree no. 8 of 1973 contains a radical attempt to convert national and ejido 
lands into productive units. Article 4 allows the occupation of these lands by landless 
peasants. Occupation and possession of land thus became institutionalised and 
recognised by the state (Stanfield et al. 1986). State agencies also accepted claims of 
possession and occupation of national land during the implementation of a land titling 
project in the 1980s (this chapter). Although the state might deny that landholders on 
national land are owners - because ownership is exclusively related to registration - state 
law does recognise that landholders have property rights other than ownership. 
According to agrarian law, these property rights can be converted into ownership 
through adverse acquisition such as construction. 
The ejido and notions of property 
The Central American pater patriae Morazan initiated the everlasting agrarian reform 
politics of the Honduran government in 1830 when he started to confiscate large 
haciendas of the church and the national elite in order to redistribute the land among 
the population (Molina Chocano 1985, Bueso 1987). A main goal of agrarian legislation 
was to populate large areas of the country by converting public property into private 
holdings (Stanfield et al. 1986). The administration of Marco Aurelio Soto intended to 
stimulate the production of valuable export crops and considered communal land as an 
impediment to development. The Soto administration propagated an agrarian policy 
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through which communal land would gradually become replaced by individual family 
plots. In order to achieve different goals, the state opted for different ways to make use 
of the land. The state sold land to individuals, but it also assigned it as ejidos to villages 
and hamlets (Bueso 1987). 
Ejidos have been very important in the history of land rights in the rural areas. 
Villages and hamlets could submit an application to the national government to obtain 
certain areas as ejidos. The ejido was not an invention of the Soto administration but it 
existed long before. The Land Regulation Law of 1835 considered the issuance of ejidos 
as a way for the treasury to obtain funds by selling and taxing land (Vallejo 1911:158). 
In 1846, land law defined the ejidos as 'those grounds that were given for free to the 
villages, [in contrast to] the grounds that the villages bought, because they are the 
absolute owners of these grounds' (art. 2; Vallejo 1911:183). 
For the state, the ejidos provided a way to encourage agricultural (export) 
production. People who were too poor to buy land from the state obtained access to 
land through the ejidos. Access was therefore linked to prescriptions for use. 
In time, the different agrarian laws changed the notion of the ejido. Major changes 
took place in municipality and landholder property rights and in the extent of control 
that a municipality could wield over the distribution of ejido land (Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3 Property rights and control over distribution with regard to ejidos in different agrarian laws 
Law Property rights Control over distribution 
1888 Land Holder has possession after completed land survey. Control is in hands of the municipal council or the 
Regulations Holder with certificate has usufruct (certificate is issued for assistant mayor in hamlet (art. 9) 
free) (art. 10) 
1889 Agrarian Law Holder has the right to buy the concession (art. 10). Municipal council draws up regulations regarding 
Villages are allowed to permanently divide gido grounds the distribution of ejido lands. These regulations 
into private plots; every holder is considered dueno have to be revised by the district council (art. 8). 
(owner) (art 11) 
1924 Agrarian Law Ejidos are assigned to the municipality and leased to Control over distribution is nationally settled in 
private persons. State keeps direct ownership (art. 8). Genera] Réglementations of the ejidos (art. 29). 
Concession holder has right to buy the land, but as long 
as it is not more than ten hectares (art. 32) 
1936 Agrarian Law Concessions may not be larger than 25 hectares (art. 23). Control over distribution is in hands of the 
^ municipalities (art 23) 
The changes in the ejido regarding property rights and control over distribution reflect 
the state's effort to deal with the concepts of ownership, possession and usufruct (arts. 
745-789 of the Civil Code). It is only through the Civil Code that the concepts obtain 
meaning; they are not redefined or reconstructed in agrarian laws. The exact content of 
the notion ejido is not clear through all these changes, nor is it clear what property 
rights municipalities and concession holders obtained in the ejido land. What is clear, 
however, is that: 
• The state continued to be the owner of the land; hence the state was explicit in that 
ownership of the ejido remained with the national government. This has also been 
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made explicit in more recent agrarian laws. The Agrarian Reform Law of 1975 
determines in article 6 that ejido land is subjected to agrarian reform, which means 
that control of the land returned to the national government (Honduras 1975, USTA 
1978). The 1992 Law of Agricultural Modernisation (art. 50) stipulates that the JNA 
reclaims all national and ejido land that persons may illegally possess (Honduras 
1992). 
• The state looked for opportunities to privatise the ejidos. It made permanent 
division of the ejido possible, and ejido landholders were allowed to buy the land 
which they held in concession. The law thereby made use of the legal construction 
of adverse acquisition. Article 15 of the Agrarian Reform Law established that every 
person who held 5 to 200 hectares of ejido land for ten years or more had the right 
to request that the state assign him the plot. The current Law of Modernisation 
(1992) specifies that if a person peacefully uses ejido land for a period of three years, 
then the possessor is allowed to buy the land from the state (art. 50). 
• The state adopted changes at high speed so that it was unlikely that the changes and 
their implications were clearly communicated to municipalities and ejido 
landholders. Later I discuss the way in which ejido rights were perceived by the 
national state, the municipality and landholders in El Zapote. 
Agrarian taw influences on property concepts 
We have seen that the ejido did not mean a radical split with Civil Code concepts. 
There were, however, other influences on property stemming from agrarian laws that 
did represent such a split. This section discusses the idea of the social function of 
property; the idea of collective property; reduced ownership; and the abolishment of 
the land-to-tiller principle. 
The Constitution of 1957 first instituted the social function of property in article 
157 (article 103 of the present constitution, Honduras 1994). The social function of 
property affects the absolute character of ownership. Article 1 of the first Agrarian 
Reform Law of 1962 (Honduras 1962) states that: 
. . . the object [is] the transformation of the social agrarian structure of the country, 
and the incorporation of the Honduran people in general, and the rural population in 
particular, into the economic, social and political development of the Nation, through 
the replacement of the systems of latifundista and minifundista by a just system of 
property, tenancy and exploitation of the land, based on equal distribution, the 
adequate organisation of credit and the integral assistance for rural producers, aiming 
that the land is for the man who works on it, basis of his economic stability, 
fundament of his progressive social wellbeing and guarantee of his liberty and 
dignity.6 
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The social function of land that was central to the agrarian reform process was thus 
related to the importance of land for the development of the nation and agricultural 
production. The agrarian reform process promoted the equal distribution of land, and 
this land should be for the tiller and no one else. Article 42 of the second Agrarian 
Reform law (Honduras 1975) defined the land-to-the-tiller principle as 'direct 
exploitation': 'that the owner works on the land in person or with the help of his 
family. In case the owner is disabled or temporarily absent it is sufficient that he 
personally directs the work, and that he is responsible for the financial aspects.' The 
social function of land made it possible for the state to expropriate a landowner when 
he did not meet the requirements. Ownership, hence, did no longer entail rights but 
obligations as well, for example: to work on the land, to pay taxes, and to protect the 
environment (art. 24, Honduras 1975). 
A second influence of agrarian law on the Civil Code notions of property came with 
the second Agrarian Reform Law of 1975. This law explicitly changed the focus 
towards collective property rights and away from individual private property, which 
had previously been central to the state's efforts to work towards economic 
development. Article 3 encouraged landless producers to organise into co-operatives 
and associations to be better able to adopt convenient technologies, to increase 
production and productivity and to substantially augment agricultural wages. Co-
operatives were granted collective property rights and were expected to work as a 
group on the undivided co-operative land. The agrarian reform process continued until 
the beginning of the 1990s, although the main active years were from 1973 until 1977 
(Kiickelhaus 1986; Posas 1996). The impact of agrarian reform has not been impressive 
in terms of quantities of beneficiaries or distributed land. In ideological terms, however, 
the impact has been substantial. The idea that collective property and collective labour 
produces solidarity, better production rates and more equality has dominated the land 
question debate for a long time. 
Thirdly, agrarian laws made it possible that the state transferred national land to 
individual holders but without transferring full ownership. Different agrarian laws have 
instituted the 'family agricultural unit' title, which did not transfer full ownership to 
the holder. The Agrarian Law of 1924 already made the issuance of family unit titles 
possible (arts. 14-24) and the 1975 Agrarian Reform Law also left room for individual 
titling in family agricultural units (arts. 97-103, Honduras 1924). Decree no. 89 of 1982 
(Honduras 1982) instituted the land titling programme PTT (Proyecto Titulacion de 
Tierras) in which plots smaller than seventeen hectares were titled as family agricultural 
units.7 The family agricultural unit title entailed that the holder was prohibited to 
transfer or subdivide the land without the consent of the LNA. The family unit titles 
were meant to prevent small property holders from being forced to sell their land, and 
to prevent land from becoming concentrated in the hands of a few. Moreover, 
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incomplete ownership titles were intended to prevent the subdivision and 
fragmentation of land. The title did not grant the holder freedom to divide the land 
between heirs. 
While land had been intrinsically connected to the working tiller in previous 
agrarian laws, this principle was again set aside in the 1990s with the Law of 
Modernisation and Development of the Agricultural Sector (Decree no. 31, Honduras 
1992).8 The Law of Modernisation radically modified the social function of land as 
found in the Agrarian Reform Laws of 1962 and 1975. A major change was the 
abolition of the 'land to the tiller' principle: it allowed for the separation of ownership 
and working on the land in article 64, stipulating that land must be 'adequately 
exploited'. Another major change of the social function was that the Law of 
Modernisation became especially interested in the abolishment of the minifundio, 
defined as plots of land smaller than one hectare. Article 34 established that 
minifundios should be expropriated and regrouped. Ex-owners who are able to use the 
land in the best way and who have the best capacities to work the land should be 
preferred as the recipients of the regrouped land, as well as ex-owners with a major 
number of dependants. 
The four issues discussed thus touch upon the essence of the Civil Code property 
notions, by introducing the social function of land, by turning to collective property 
rights in land instead of individual, by allowing the state to sell land without 
transferring full ownership, and by separating ownership and work. 
Confusion about the applicability of agrarian law: a case 
Agrarian laws are not a substitute for the Civil Code (Casad and Sotela Montagne 1975; 
Cruz Lopez 1992:20). Nevertheless, the judge in the following 1982 civil demand in the 
First Court of Santa Barbara thought that it did. The kind of confusion that played a 
role in this case is seen later in this book, especially in the role the INA intends to play 
in determining land ownership and solving conflict (Chapters Four and Six). 
Representing his two clients, a lawyer presented a demand of 'demarcation and 
fencing' to the Santa Barbara court. The demand entailed the determination of 
boundaries between the plots of his clients and the demanded party. The judge 
immediately declared the demand to be invalid. He referred to article 27 of the Law of 
Agrarian Reform, which prohibits two or more people to commonly own land in case 
common ownership is caused by inheritance. Heirs are obliged to partition the land; if 
they refuse to do this, the land will be subject to expropriation. The judge considered 
that the plaintiffs commonly owned the land, which he considered to be illegal. 
The lawyer appealed the sentence to the court of appeals. He argued that land can 
only be expropriated when it is not used for agricultural purposes (art. 28, Agrarian 
Reform Law). The lawyer further argued in his appeal that 
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Even in [a case that fulfils the conditions for] immediate expropriation, no legal 
official can refuse to deal with a demand related to ownership and other rights in 
immovable properties, because in this case the courts and tribunals of the Republic 
would have nothing to do, because the great majority of the rural plots are subject to 
expropriation for one reason or another. If the courts and tribunals of the Republic 
declare inadmissible all demands concerning ownership or actions of ownership 
because of the fact that the owner of the immovable property does not exploit it 
according to the requirements of the law, then, nobody could defend what is his, and 
this would sow more insecurity than is already present in the rural areas. On the other 
hand, the Agrarian Reform Law is situated in another sphere, the administrative 
rather than the judicial, [and cannot be used by the judge] to refuse to investigate a case 
like the one we concern ourselves with, or to declare it inadmissible. 
The decision of the judge suggested that when landholders did not have legal 
ownership, they would no longer be allowed to put forward their claims and conflicts 
in the court. The lawyer asserted that if the law should be carried out to the letter, the 
result would be that not a single land claim is legal, because few landholders actually 
comply with the legal demands of ownership. The lawyer thus considered that practices 
differ from law, and that if judges would exclusively look at the legal regulations, 
nobody would be able to successfully defend a claim on land. This would only lead to 
more insecurity, while the court should have the aim to enhance security. 
The lawyer also referred to the conflicting status of the Agrarian Reform Law and 
the Civil Code. In his view, the Agrarian Reform Law was merely an administrative 
law that was not meant to replace legal claims emanating from the Civil Code. The 
Agrarian Reform Law prescribed the procedures to be completed in the LNA offices 
with respect to the land that the INA intended to give out in the framework of agrarian 
reform, but it should not be used to settle conflicts and determine claims on land, 
which was not distributed under agrarian reform conditions. 
The court of appeals decided to revoke the verdict of the previous judge, using the 
following arguments: 
• The demand of demarcation and fencing is an institution created by the state as a 
right inherent to property and which is made effective by the prescriptions in the 
Civil Procedural Code. 
• The judge based his arguments on legal grounds that cannot prevail over civil norms 
because it refers to a judicial order of administrative character (hence, the Court of 
Appeals copied the argument of the lawyer). 
• It appeared from a study and analysis of the file that the verdict of the judge was 
predetermined and that this had been to the detriment of the appealing parties. 
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The Court of Appeals ordered the judge to investigate the case according to legal 
procedures and to formulate his conclusions in a definite verdict. The judge of the First 
Court thereafter declared himself incompetent in the case and forwarded the file to the 
Third Court where it ended up in the archives. 
In this case, the judge tried to apply agrarian law in a way that it was not meant to be 
used. The case concerned land that had nothing to do with the agrarian reform. The 
lawyer cited above was clearly against the view that the Agrarian Reform Law ceased 
all possibilities to claim rights on the basis of the Civil Code and would also affect land 
that had not been subjected to redistribution programs within the agrarian reform 
framework. 
Stacking agrarian and civil code notions of property 
What becomes stacked in land rights legal regulations? This section has shown that 
Civil Code notions of property are used within agrarian law stipulations about land 
and land rights: possession, usufruct and occupation. On top of that, agrarian law has 
started attributing a social function to land, which entails a radical infringement on 
ownership. 
The main Civil Code notion of property is still essential to landed property rights: 
Registration in the Public Register of Property is the one and only proof of private 
ownership; the state considers all land that has not been registered as 'national' to be 
thus owned by the state. However, agrarian law stipulations have driven a wedge 
between the strict dichotomy of 'public' and 'private' property. Agrarian laws trigger 
the idea of a 'bundle' of property rights in which forms of incomplete ownership are 
possible and in which different elements are distinguishable. The elements of the 
bundle all obtain meaning through the Civil Code, as agrarian laws have not 
fundamentally altered their significance. The Civil Code notion of adverse acquisition 
has been copied in agrarian law by being made applicable to the possession of ejido and 
national land. Different agrarian laws have continuously changed the conditions for 
adverse acquisition. The possibility of adverse acquisition means that possession and 
occupation of national land generate claims; claims on the basis of which ownership can 
be assigned. 
The Civil Code concept of ownership only knows a limited number of restrictions. 
It attributes exclusive faculties to owners but offers the possibility to expropriate the 
owner for reasons of public interest or national security. Limits to the faculties of 
ownership are nevertheless exceptional. Agrarian law has brought the social function of 
land to the fore, and herewith it has changed the notion of ownership. The social 
function prevails against the exclusive faculties of ownership (Menendez Hernandez 
1971). Land has public goals, for example, to enhance production, to sell national land 
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in order to fill the treasury and to create possibilities for levying taxes. These public 
goals necessarily lead to a restriction of the faculties of ownership. Owners of land have 
thus rights and obligations. 
The implication of the social function attributed to land has also been that the state 
is able to transfer incomplete forms of land ownership to landholders. The social 
function entails, for example, that land should not become concentrated in the hands of 
few, and that it should not end up completely fragmented. Through incomplete forms 
of ownership such as the agricultural family unit title, the state has been able to impose 
conditions on sale or inheritance. 
Alongside this process of stacking property notions in law, property notions have 
become stacked in the minds of landholders and in practices of land transfer. The full 
impact of stacking for landholders becomes more vivid in the next section. Important 
at this point is that Civil Code notions are central for landholders and that a message 
about a social function of land does not get across. Landholders feel themselves owners 
of the land because they comply with what they consider the legal requirements for 
ownership: 
• They invest labour and make improvements. Article 602 of the Civil Code considers 
land and improvements to be inseparable: real property is the land and what is 
attached to the land (Stanfield et al. 1986: 25). The value of land in El Zapote is 
directly linked to improvements. The value of coffee fields, for example, is higher 
than the value of land suitable for maize cultivation.9 Landholders are the creators of 
the improvements and hence, of the land as well. 
• They possess the land in a quiet way without interruption. This is a legal basis for 
claiming ownership (art. 720). 
• They have a deed of purchase, or even a bundle of papers that award legitimacy to 
their land claim. 
• They fence in their land according to the locally enforced requirements for making a 
claim. 
History and status of village lands 
El Zapote acquired various village lands over the course of time. This section first 
establishes how El Zapote acquired these different grounds and how residents applied 
for concessions, use or other property rights in these zones. It then discusses what 
property rights were transferred to landholders, which norms and legal constructions 
became stacked during processes of transfer, and how landholders and the state perceive 
their rights in the village lands. The differences in perception between landholders and 
the state are further analysed in two cases of state intervention. 
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El Zapote had been an hamlet of a nearby village but became an independent 
municipality in 1917. The inhabitants of this nearby village called the people in El 
Zapote 'chulucos', to refer to the type of trousers that were worn by the indigenous 
people. Nowadays, the outside world perceives El Zapote as a poor and backward 
village removed from modern comforts and far from modern agriculture or 
development. The village lands are merely rocky and hilly and are not suitable for large 
scale and mechanised production methods. 
Land scarcity plays an important role in the emergence of conflict. Scarcity is not a 
measurable quantity but is merely a perception. In the first half of the twentieth 
century, the municipal council motivated ejido applications to the national state by 
referring to the scarcity of land for agricultural producers. Considering that the 
municipality had much fewer inhabitants in those days than now, scarcity must have 
had another meaning in that period of time than it currently has. Elderly residents still 
remember how they cleared the forests with an axe in the past. In the past, free land 
was available for every person 'who wanted to work', but the available land has 
nevertheless rapidly diminished. 
Central to contemporary perceptions of scarcity is population growth. El Zapote 
had 1228 inhabitants in 1926. This grew to 5653 in 1988. Farm size was reduced in these 
years from 13.6 ha in 1952 to 4.0 ha in 1992 (Jansen 1998). Villagers broadly share the 
opinion that too many people live in the village and that it will be impossible for all 
youngsters to build a future in agriculture. 
Changes in the production system also contribute to the perceived land scarcity. 
Permanent pastures were introduced to replace a combined system of maize cultivation 
and pasture; booming coffee production changed definitions of quality of land; and land 
was taken out of production for non-production goals Qansen 1998). 
The villagers of El Zapote have lived through radical changes that have taken place 
within a few decades. Many feel that they are not able to keep pace with the changes. In 
the past, people considered it advantageous to have 'public' property that everyone 
could use. 'My father-in-law was always against fencing of free land. He said that the 
land and the water wells were for all the people, that everybody needed it for the 
animals'. Farmers who thought in this way stood aside during the ongoing process of 
privatisation of land rights. 
Concessions in the ejidos 
Even before receiving the status of an independent municipality, the village had applied 
to the national state for the assignment of village land as ejidos. The village lands 
Teocintal and Malapon obtained ejido status at the end of the nineteenth century.10 
An individual who requested to use a plot of land in the ejido had to comply with a 
particular procedure, which started with a request to the municipal council. The 
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following example shows how a concession request was performed. A man called Juan 
Membreno asked the newly installed municipality to grant him a concession in 1918. 
The following text appeared in the municipal acts on August, 1,1918: 
Present was Juan Membreno who requested to rent a plot of land in Nejapa' where his 
deceased father Orlando Membreno had his coffee field. He argued that he has the right 
of preference regarding this concession because the plot has coffee trees and cocoa which 
were sown by his late grandparents of whom he is the only testamentary heir. The plot 
he wants in concession is six manzanas and adjoins the possession of Antonio 
Membreno in the North, in the East waste land, in the South the possession of Santos 
Membreno and in the West the crevice of Nejapa.11 The municipality unanimously 
decided to grant the concession to mister Membreno to cultivate the described plot. He 
will pay 25 cents a yearfor every manzana in the appropriate office. 
First, the procedure was initiated when Juan went to the municipality in person to 
present his request to the meeting of the municipal council. Second, the municipality 
verified whether he was meeting certain requirements necessary for obtaining a 
concession. 
• Possession: He proved to have possession of the land that had belonged to his 
deceased father, and that had also been in his family for generations. The argument 
that the land was in his family for generations strengthened his claim that he must be 
given preference above other potentially interested persons. 
• Crops: The goal of the ejido regulations had been to stimulate the cultivation of 
export crops. Therefore, the important thing was to grow perennials such as coffee, 
cocoa or fruit trees and not just maize. The perennials furthermore symbolised a 
strong claim to the land: they are improvements. 
• Boundaries: His request also clarified the boundaries of the plot he wanted in 
concession. Although it was not explicitly stated in this municipal act, it was 
normally required that the land be fenced in. In this particular case, it was probably 
obvious that the requested plot had been fenced in. 
The concession request of Juan Membreno shows that during this period (1918), it 
wasn't at all self-evident that he had rights to his ancestral ejido land. He could not 
automatically inherit the concession but had to submit a request for it. The municipal 
act further stated that he had to pay a yearly fee. According to the landholders, 
however, nobody ever paid these fees. 
Although every resident (men and women) had the right to request an ejido 
concession, many people never did. Nowadays villagers are somewhat puzzled about 
why some people did and others didn't request a concession when this was still 
possible. They put forward that: 
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• People who did not request an ejido land concession did not want to work. 
• There was plenty of free land to use without the need to comply with a procedure; 
hence, there was no need to request a concession. 
• People who did not request an ejido land concession were 'ignorant', meaning that 
they didn't think about a future in which there would be no free land available. 
Another possible obstacle to submitting a request for a concession might have been 
that it was not at all easy to request one. One had to visit the municipal council 
meeting in person, which was difficult for women or for people from remote hamlets. 
One had to convince the sindico (a specific member of the municipal council who deals 
with land problems and measurements of boundaries) to come and measure the land. 
Such barriers could have been difficult to overcome for many villagers. 
The municipality had the right to reclaim concessions which were not in use 
according to the requirements. On February, 15,1926, the municipal act read: 
The mayor pleaded to declare invalid all concessions to ejido and communal land, 
that have been given out to the villagers more than three years ago, and which have 
been abandoned, fenced in or not, and which are without any crops. The municipality 
considered the communication of the mayor and, on the basis of Art. 11 of the current 
Agrarian Law, it decided to declare these concessions expired. The municipality will 
recuperate its rights in these concessions. 
A villager named Jacobo Villanueva in 1930 complained to the district authorities in 
Santa Barbara about the fact that the municipality suspended his concession. The 
municipality wrote to the district council in Santa Barbara on this occasion: 
The municipality council granted a concession to Jacobo Villanueva in the communal 
lands ofNejapa, consisting of nine and a half manzanas, to fence it in and cultivate it 
within the terms of the Agrarian Law. However the petitioner didn't comply with his 
duties and therefore in the same year the municipality decided to declare expired all 
concessions granted in earlier years to individuals who do not follow the prescriptions 
in Article 11 of the Agrarian Law. The declaration of mister Villanueva that he 
fenced in the concession with posts, ditches and trails, and that he sowed hundred and 
eleven coffee trees, is totally untrue. Because only this year in February he placed a few 
posts, which were feeble so they couldn't serve him and he cultivated a few coffee trees 
not more than ten. In this same month Villanueva presented a document in which he 
requested a prolongation for fencing in the land but it was denied because it was 
behind time limit and because this was a concession that was already declared expired 
in December last year. Thirdly, the declaration of Jacobo Villanueva that the mayor 
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allowed him to finish the clearing of a maize field in the concession, is also untrue. It is 
true that he was prohibited to continue clearing because the same plot was requested by 
don Francisco Reyes and. bsause he [refused to] ask permission as do the other 
villagers. Hence the municipality imposed a fine of five pesos for this abuse.... mister 
Villanueva did not tell the truth in his plaint before the district council, because if it 
were true that he sowed coffee trees last year in the plot he tries to defend without any 
right, why does he try to clear the same plot for maize? This proves that he had not 
sown these coffee trees and that he does not speak the truth. 
In this conflict between a villager and the municipality, the municipality had 
apparently withdrawn Jacobo Villanueva's concession because he had not used the land. 
The final solution to this conflict did not appear in the logbooks of the municipal 
council. It is clear, however, that the municipality strictly followed the rule that land 
that had been granted in concession must be used, or otherwise it could be recovered 
and given to someone else. 
In a few cases I found that a concession holder herself requested to have the 
concession cancelled. In 1938, for example, a widow stated before the municipal council 
that she was too old and too poor to pay for the barbed wire needed to fence-in the 
concession of her late husband. She added that her sons refused to help her. The council 
declared the concession expired. However, in the next meeting two of her sons showed 
up to request the concession again. They stated that they had loaned the barbed wire to 
their mother and that they didn't want to loose the concession. Possibly this widow 
used the municipal council to deal with a conflict between her and her sons about their 
dedication to the land. It was not a situation that frequently occurred, yet it does show 
that in those days the villagers did not consider the land they held in concession as 
privately owned. 
Both men and women were able to apply for concessions in the ejidos. However, 
only 24 of the 374 requests for concessions in ejidos, as recorded in the municipal acts 
between 1917 and 1974, were made by women (Jansen 1998). It's possible that women 
did not visit the council meeting themselves but left concession requests in hands of a 
husband or son. On the other hand, women held the majority of houseplot concessions 
in urban ejidos. Hence it was more common that women owned houses than land, 
which may be explained by the gendered division of labour (Chapter Three). 
The municipal acts also make reference to problems between villagers about the 
distribution of concessions. In 1931, for example, a villager presented a document to the 
council that read: 
/ was the first to solicit the plot of land that was requested and measured in favour of 
the Hernandez family. I am a villager as they are: they possess land to work on, I 
haven't got a quarter of a manzana and as a villager I have the right that I will be 
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given [land] where I will be able to work. I now ask why some are preferred and others 
are disregarded. If you do not solve my request I insist that you will certify the 
documents and resolutions so that I can appeal before the district council to improve 
my situation. 
This villager's statement makes clear that the distribution of ejido land had problematic 
aspects and that political, personal and clientist relationships possibly played a role in it. 
This man was distressed because the municipal council granted a concession to people 
who already possessed a considerable amount of land. Although the concession system 
was meant to provide access to land to people who did not have it, it did not provide 
equal opportunities. Gender, knowledge, social status and social relations with 
municipal authorities influenced access to the concession system. The process of 
unequal distribution of the ejidos did not take place in the context of harsh struggles for 
land but, for the residents of El Zapote, it was merely an unconscious and gradual 
process. For a long time the unequal distribution of concessions had not been a 
problem as there was plenty of other land that could be freely used. 
The previous section discussed how the state changed politics with respect to the 
ejidos and how these changes became expressed in agrarian laws. Although there was no 
strict policy of enforcement of new stipulations regarding the ejidos, changes in 
agrarian laws did influence practices in El Zapote. For example, the suspension of the 
concession of Jacobo Villanueva in 1930 took place under the 1924 Agrarian Law; the 
national state wanted to regain more control over the ejidos through this law. It is 
possible that the municipal council received orders from the district council or the 
national government to review whether the concession holders used the land in 
accordance with the regulations. 
In the following decades, the number of concessions that were requested and granted 
diminished. The municipality lost its central role in distributing ejido land and the 
status of the ejido concessions gradually changed. The ejidos became permanently 
fragmented as individual concession holders devolved it to heirs or subdivided and sold 
it without the municipal council's permission. In the perception of holders, the 
concession had made way for individual ownership: they started calling the land their 
property. 
Bought land and quasi ejidos 
The council of El Zapote held other types of titles to other village lands. A considerable 
part of these village lands were bought from private persons by the municipality. The 
municipality bought the land of Carcamo from a man named Vicente Moreno in 
1934.1 2 In order to pay for the land, the land surveyor and administrative costs, each 
resident was asked to pay a certain fee. The municipal council declared on June, 15, 
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1934: 'It suits this village more than anybody to buy this land, because the inhabitants 
do not have [land] to work and maintain their agricultural tasks; because the little that 
the municipality has are clay soils and they are fairly exhausted, given the extreme 
[situation]'. After buying the land, the municipal council drew up the regulations 
concerning the use of Carcamo. It was meant to be a communal zone, combining the 
cultivation of seasonal crops (maize) and livestock grazing. Every villager who 
financially contributed to the sale was allowed to use one manzana. It was prohibited 
to fence in the land. 
The municipality also intended to buy the land title of Juniapal, adjacent to 
Carcamo.1 3 This land was initially owned by Vicente Moreno, who was also the former 
owner of Carcamo. Moreno had become indebted to the state and therefore handed 
Juniapal over to the state in order to pay off his debts. This provided the municipal 
council with an opportunity to claim this land on behalf of the residents of El Zapote. 
In January 1945, the logbook of the municipal council read: 'The mayor who presides, 
states that considering the population increase in this village, which has 2500 
inhabitants, the ejidos are not sufficient for all people to dedicate themselves to 
agricultural work and especially the cultivation of sugar cane, and he proposes that 
...[the municipal council] will put forward a request to the National Congress in order 
to receive the state owned land of Juniapal'. 
The request did not proceed as was expected, and the municipal council had to 
renew the request in 1949. However, the municipal council soon discovered that the 
village missed out because the ex-mayor and large landowner Alfredo Lara used his 
former position and connections to rent Juniapal from the state. 
Lara had been mayor and sindico of the municipality. As a representative of the 
village he was able to invest time and money to travel to the capital city and negotiate 
with the national authorities about Juniapal. The council was ignorant of his intentions 
to rent Juniapal on his own behalf. However, on December 26, 1949, the municipal 
council had finally discovered what Lara was up to. The logbook of the municipal 
council reported that a council member was sent to the capital city in order to look for 
a lawyer. The council wanted to convince the authorities that 'justice must be done' 
and that Juniapal belonged to the municipality and ought not to be in hands of a third 
party. The effort was in vain, however, as Lara gained possession of Juniapal. 
New conflicts between Alfredo Lara and the municipal council arose when Lara 
invited land surveyors to determine the boundaries between Carcamo (owned by the 
municipality) and Juniapal (rented from the state by Lara). Council protests against the 
land surveys were partially successful because thereafter the council obtained the 
northern part of Juniapal. This land is now in use as a village commons. 
In the rather chaotic period that followed, the Juniapal and Carcamo titles of the 
village, kept by the municipal council, disappeared. Villagers suggest that several land 
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surveyors were bribed. In spite of the disappearance of the titles, the villagers continued 
to consider Juniapal and Carcamo as village properties and continued to use it. 
The Nejapa area was bought from the state by a group of villagers at the end of the 
nineteenth century.14 This privately owned land was not an ejido in a legal sense, yet 
the municipal council and the villagers considered it as such; it was a quasi-ejido. When 
the original buyers of the land had passed away, the council started to grant concessions 
to this land in the same way as it did with in the ejidos. The municipal council has 
kept the title of Nejapa as well as the ejido titles. 
The title to Yoro was also bought from the state by a group, in this case four 
brothers who founded the hamlet of Yoro. 1 5 In contrast to the Nejapa land, Yoro has 
never been considered to be an ejido. People now convey that Yoro is owned by the 
inhabitants of the hamlet of Yoro, who are all descendants of the original buyers. 
Rights to this land are not clearly established, and disputes and violent clashes between 
the different heirs of the original buyers regularly occur up to this day. 
Table 2.4 Different village lands, perceptions of property rights of landholders and involvement in 
state interventions 
Former ejdos 
Malapon $> 
Teocintal 
Privatised concessions 
in ejido 
Direct purchase from 
state (.large 
landowner) 
Communal properly 
bought from state 
Nejapa & Yoro 
Municipal Commons 
Northern part of Juniapal 
Free national 
land 
Few spots in 
mountains 
Holder IndMdual or 
group of heirs 
Individual or group of 
heirs 
Originally group of villagers, 
now individuals 
Municipality Individual 
Perceived 
rights of 
holder 
Individual or 
group 
ownership 
Individual or group 
ownership 
Individual or group 
ownership 
Temporary usufruct to 
individual 
Free to take 
possession 
Rights 
according 
to the state 
Occupied or 
possessed 
national land 
Ownership, registered 
in Public Register of 
Properly 
- Occupied or possessed 
national land (Nejapa). 
- Communal private land 
title (yoro) 
Unknown. Municipality 
does not have a title; title 
holder is possibly the large 
landowner and family 
Ownership of 
national state 
Influenced 
by: 
PTT Hydroelectric plant 
(Gircamo) 
PTT (Nejapa) Hydroelectric plant PTT 
From possession to ownership 
The notion of private ownership dominates perceptions of property in El Zapote, but 
this notion slightly differs with regard to the different areas in the municipality. Table 
2.4 compares the differences between official rights and perceived rights of landholders 
in different areas. In most areas, holders perceive their rights to the land as ownership. 
Nevertheless, their perception may stand out against the perception of the state 
regarding the holders' rights to the land. 
Former ejidos: Perceptions of landholders and the state were clearly incompatible with 
respect to the (former) ejidos. Landholders thought that they owned their plots, while 
52 
the state considered the land to belong to them. The contradictory perspectives of 
landholders and the state regarding the ejidos have emerged within the context of 
changing ejido politics. 
When the village received the ejidos from the national government, it did not count 
on the possibility that the state would reclaim the land again decades later. At that 
moment, the municipal council regulated the use of the land, whether or not it really 
had 'ownership'. The council controlled whether ejido land was used according to the 
municipal prescriptions and it reserved the right to cancel a concession when evidence 
existed that a holder was not in compliance with them. The municipality's ejido rights 
were not made explicit in the law, which exclusively referred to the rights of the 
concession holder and those of the national state, but not of the local government: the 
municipality. Specific incidences, such as the one taking place in the 1990s, show that 
the municipality considered itself the 'owner' of ejido land. At that moment, the 
municipal council decided to take back parts of ejido land in order to construct a road 
to the coffee fields without compensating the landholders. The council argued that it 
was allowed to do this because it concerned ejido land. Thus the municipal council 
acted in this case as if it was able to completely control ejido land for its own purposes. 
Former agrarian laws from 1888 and 1924, for example, explicitly outlined that the 
ejido concept did not transfer ownership to holders and that the land remained in the 
hands of the state as the national owner. We have seen that, in those days, holders of 
ejido land acknowledged that they were not the owners of the land. They recognised 
the power of the municipal council to distribute the land and to control land use, and 
they knew that they had to renew their concessions. This situation apparently changed 
beginning in the 1940s when concession holders started to sell and transfer their land 
without asking the council's permission. The result was that ejido land became 
withdrawn from municipal control. The land became continuously resold, re-divided 
and transferred to heirs and the notion that ownership of the ejidos belonged to the 
municipal council or to the national state disappeared. 
The dominant idea today has become that every person holding a socially recognised 
claim on a plot of land is to be considered the 'owner'. Through complying with the 
local ways of claiming ownership - labour investment, possess peacefully, stock deeds of 
purchase and fence in the land - this notion of ownership has been reinforced and 
reproduced until the idea of the concession has slipped out of sight completely. 
The question of why this happened has no easy answer. In the 1940s, pressure on the 
land increased because of the introduction of permanent pasture land in the agricultural 
production system, which led to significant changes. For example, the system whereby 
producers first cultivated maize on unfenced plots and grazed cattle on the crop 
remnants has gradually disappeared. These changes might have enforced the idea that 
land was becoming scarce. Without freely available land, it became more important for 
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landholders to fully dispose of their land on their own behalf or on the behalf of their 
heirs. The municipal council's input in the land was ruled out. 
From the point of view of the national government, the granted concessions gave the 
petitioners possession of the land. The law of 1888 created the possibility for 
concession holders to apply for a usufruct title (dominio util). The Civil Code defines 
usufruct as the faculty to enjoy a thing with the obligation to conserve its form and 
substance and to give it back to the owner (art. 745). Limited duration (art. 746) is a 
characteristic of usufruct. On the basis of the usufruct title, the holder can also claim a 
title of ownership (dominio pleno) by buying the land from the state. The municipal 
council had to serve as intermediary between the holder and the national state for 
receiving a dominio pleno. The council had to pass the application to the national 
government. The state issued a presidential title, which the holder had to inscribe in the 
Public Register of Property. 
Only a few landholders in El Zapote held a usufruct title (see Table 2.5). The 
majority of holders of ejido land thus had possession. The possessors of the ejido land 
enjoyed the same rights as owners, including the right to transfer the land, until the 
very moment that the state appeared claiming to be the owner of the land. 
Communally bought land: The Nejapa area had been privately bought from the state 
by a group of villagers. The municipal council had nevertheless treated the area as if it 
was an ejido. In the 1980s, in the framework of a land titling project that I discuss later, 
the national government defined the Nejapa zone as national land, denying the private 
character of the land. The state argued that the original buyers never completed 
payment for the land to the state. However, the title held by the municipal council 
contained clear evidence that the group did pay the last quota, although in tobacco 
instead of money. With regard to the property rights in the Nejapa area there was thus 
a strong contrast between the perceptions of landholders (individual ownership), the 
state (state ownership), the municipality (ejido), and the 'real' rights to the land (private 
ownership by a group of people that had already passed away). 
The national state did recognise the title of Yoro as private ownership. Ongoing 
struggles for control of this land, nevertheless, claims victims almost daily. Within the 
title of Yoro, different holders with private titles claim plots of land, but most of them 
lack any social recognition of their rights. Moreover, the original title is still held by an 
heir of one of the original buyers, who tries in vain to reclaim the whole area (Chapter 
Six). 
Village commons: The village commons are the northern part of Juniapal. It is unclear 
whether the municipality indeed ever held a title to this land; in fact, the title no longer 
exists. The commons are meant to be for landless people to sow maize. The users are in 
fact not all landless, but they have no other land to sow their maize plots. The grounds 
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are overexploited steep slopes that are full of large stones. The idea of the commons is 
that nobody is allowed to lay a permanent claim to it; fencing is prohibited, although 
some have succeeded to do it without repercussions so far. The users of the commons 
try to gain more control over the land by using other means such as planting perennials 
and fruit trees. 
Private ownership: The national state recognises those landholders who have 
registered their property in the Public Register of Property as the owners. There are 
two groups of private owners in El Zapote. The first are landholders who initially held 
a concession of land which they thereafter bought or acquired from the state and 
registered it in the Public Register of Property. The second are members of the Lara 
family who directly bought land from the state. 
Free land: There are only tiny spots of unclaimed land left. Villagers consider this land 
'free' to grab for anyone who wishes to use it, while the national state considers these 
plots to be national land. 
Stacking of norms about rights in village lands 
The different perceptions of the rights in the ejido land between landholders and the 
state have developed through a process of stacking norms. In time, people have stacked 
legal regulations, interpretations of these regulations and their own normative 
framework with regard to ownership. Seen from the perspective of a landholder, the 
temporary usufruct granted by the concession develops into ownership because people 
comply with the local standards set for ownership. They work on the land, make 
improvements, possess it peacefully, fence it in and keep the deeds of purchase that 
testify about the history of transfer of rights to the plot. These 'local standards' are 
merely based in legal regulations and legal notions of property and in local regulations 
drawn up by the local government. They have thus become the general point of 
reference for ownership claims. For example, making improvements and fencing are 
strictly forbidden in the village commons where ownership claims of individual users 
are not accepted. 
The state holds on to the concept that ownership can only be recognised with regard 
to plots registered in the Public Register of Property. Although the state has been clear 
regarding what ownership entails and who should have it, the state has not been clear 
about the rest of the property rights that it assigns to the land through agrarian laws. 
The questions as to what a concession entails and what rights to the ejidos are bestowed 
upon the municipaUty have never been answered. 
Whatever the content of concession and ejido, the state considered it legal to 
withdraw all regulations regarding the ejidos at a later stage, and to proclaim that the 
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ejido was back under the control of the national state. The next section discusses how 
state interventions in local perceptions of land rights have been received and what the 
consequences of such interventions were for the process of stacking legal regulations, 
interpretations of law and landholders' own norms. 
State intervention: two cases 
The construction of a hydroelectric power plant on village land in the 1970s meant a 
radical infringement on landholder's perceptions of their property rights. It made 
landholders realise that there was a difference between ownership and possession and 
that they did not hold full ownership of the land. The implementation of the land 
titling program PTT in the 1980s and 1990s had far-reaching consequences for the 
relationship between landholders and the state. It sharply brought the differences 
between government and local definitions of land rights to the fore. The PTT program 
meant an immediate threat to the local concept of ownership as well, generating new 
conflicts and becoming a new source of ongoing conflicts. 
The hydroelectric power plant 
In the mid- 1970s, the government launched a plan to construct a hydroelectric power 
plant close to the main village of El Zapote. The proposed sites were the river plains in 
the area of Carcamo, where two rivers flow into each other. From the start it was not 
clear who had what legal claim to this land. The area was subdivided among 
landholders who fenced their plots in and considered themselves to be private owners. 
Carcamo had been used as a communal mixed zone for both annual crops and cattle 
for a brief period before the subdivision. After the municipality purchased the land, it 
drew up regulations for its use. At one point, some users started to fence in the plot of 
their choice. In 1936, complaints started to reach the municipal council that the 
regulations were not being respected by every user. The illegal actions in Carcamo of a 
man called Juan Romero were brought before the municipal council: 
We, the villagers, observe that we do not respect the arrangements. We know that 
there is a law but we avoid obeying both the law and the authorities. We have mister 
Juan Romero who was owner of a plot but he took one manzana outside what was his, 
with or without authorisation. We request the enforcement of article two and five of 
the law and propose to assign responsibility to the law-breaker because we believe that 
the municipality will not doubt our words. It is a visible thing that we all see that 
mister Romero took a piece of land east of his plot and west another one and he will 
continue to fence in more and more until he is owner of Carcamo. That's why we 
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request to follow the law against mister Romero..., we are the inhabitants of this 
village, we have all equal rights in the land and therefore we believe that the 
municipality must listen and provide justice because that is what we ask. 
The complete subdivision of Carcamo into individual plots was a question of time in 
spite of this protest. At the time that the government launched the hydroelectric power 
plant plan, the individual plots were mostly small and used for maize and beans, tule, 
bananas and vegetables. Hardly any of the landholders remembered that the land had 
once belonged to the municipality. 
The municipal council did not have a title or a deed of purchase for the land when 
the state launched the plan for the hydroelectric power plant. The state concluded that 
Carcamo was national land whereas nobody was able to prove his rights by showing a 
title. Some villagers, including the supposed perpetrator, suggested that the document 
was deliberately burnt during the continuous land surveys of the boundaries between 
Carcamo and Juniapal. The Public Register of Property did not hold a copy of the deed 
of purchase proving the purchase of the land by the municipality. The INA registers, 
on the other hand, contained many old documents and titles of Carcamo. The existence 
of these different titles made the situation complex, yet only knowing that these 
different land titles existed should have been enough to conclude that it was not likely 
that Carcamo was national land. It was nevertheless in the interest of the state to 
conclude that the land they wanted for the hydroelectric plant was national land, and 
the state abstained from properly investigating the existing claims to the land.16 
The state straightforwardly confiscated the land and told the producers to leave.17 
However, the state was forced to back down after joint protests by the landholders and 
began to treat Carcamo as if it were an ejido. It first proposed to compensate the 
landholders for the improvements, improvements being any additions made on the 
land that required an investment of labour or capital. Landholders had never thought of 
the land and the improvements as being distinct. As they believed themselves to be the 
owners, they regarded every transfer of land through sale or inheritance as a valid 
transfer of land and improvements at the same time. The holders received the 
compensation for the lost improvements in three quota to prevent them from using it 
all at once to buy alcohol. 
Furthermore, the state intended to give new land to all former producers of the 
Carcamo area and, to that end, it bought land in an adjacent municipality. The former 
owner of the new land, for whom the sale had been a lucrative deal, was acquainted 
with high level officials of the electricity company ENEE. The compensated 
landholders, however, continued to be dissatisfied. The Carcamo area had been highly 
appreciated for its closeness to the village, while it took a two hours walk to arrive at 
the new land. The quality of the new land was variable, just like the quality of the 
Carcamo land had been. During the distribution phase, land quality did not play a role 
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at all, and the result was that some received good land and others land which was of no 
use. Local politics strongly affected the distribution, the result being that many former 
landholders of Carcamo did not feel compensated at all for the loss of their land. They 
blamed local authorities for enhancing inequality. Moreover, the promised 
'development' of the village in the form of electricity and roads as a means of 
compensation failed to occur. It took years and many protests of the villagers for the 
ENEE to start the promised electricity project in the village. 
The intervention of the state in the Carcamo area through the hydroelectric power 
plant has been significant to the lives of landholders in many aspects. After more than 
twenty years, many producers who had been involved in the case were still not able to 
control their emotions when talking about the loss of their land in the area. The 
involved landholders did not understand why the state was able to claim the land and 
they were still convinced that they were illegally robbed of the land. The small 
compensation for the improvements and the new land that they received far away from 
the village were not sufficient. It is possible that the government officials thought that 
the landholders would not consider it a big deal to lose marginal and small plots of 
land. From the perspective of the landholders, however, the Carcamo land had been 
extremely valuable. 
The involved landholders said that it was through the power plant affair that they 
learnt about the concept of improvements. Before the arrival of the power plant 
project, landholders did not make a distinction between ownership, possession and 
improvements: they considered the land transfers as a sale of the land, including the 
improvements. The state introduced a different idea of property rights through the 
power plant project, one distinguishing between possessing, working and improving 
the land, and the ownership of the land. The separation of ownership and 
improvements was unintelligible to the involved landholders and the state in fact 
recognised this problem because it not only paid for improvements, but it also 
substituted the land that it took from the landholders. 
The experiences with the hydroelectric power plant project and the introduction of 
the concept of improvements has not produced consequences for property rights in 
other parts of the village. Landholders continue to divide and sell their land without 
distinguishing ownership, possession and improvements. 
The village commons form the only exception. Here, landholders distinguish 
between the ownership of the land, generally thought to be in the hands of the 
municipality, and possession and use of the same land. There are important differences 
between this area and other areas of the municipality. The village commons are meant 
to be for public use by the landless. The recognised owner, the municipality, strictly 
upholds the rules drawn up for its use or, at least, attempts to do so. Although a few 
producers have tried to permanently claim land in the village commons, it is generally 
acknowledged that the purpose of the village commons should be respected. 
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The land titling programme PTT 
The infringement on property rights of the land titling program PTT (decree no. 89, 
Honduras 1982), a few years after the construction of the hydroelectric power plant, 
was far-reaching; the program completely changed the relationship between 
landholders and the state. The power plant affair involved dozens of producers; the 
P T T affected practically all landholders in the village in one way or another. 
The objective of the PTT was to sell national and (former) ejido land to the 
landholders. In El Zapote, the PTT affected the ejidos and the quasi-ejido Nejapa, the 
private character of which the state refused to recognise. The PTT was an international 
agreement between the governments of Honduras and the United States of America 
that was ratified by the National Congress.18 The three main goals of the PTT were 
(LNA 1990:2): 
• To benefit small- and medium-size producers by granting them definitive property 
titles which will convert them into legitimate owners of the land. 
• To provide rural people with security and peace so that they can invest in their 
parcels and participate more fully in the development of the production process. 
• To ensure that coffee farmers and small- and medium-size producers can obtain 
technical assistance and credit to increase the production of food, work and family 
income. 
The intention of the P T T was to give landholders ownership (dominio pleno). The 
general idea behind titling programmes is that ownership enhances security and 
facilitates credit and technical assistance aimed at increasing agricultural production 
(Deininger and Binswanger 2001).1 9 The PTT did not entail a completely new concept 
of transferring ownership of national land. On the contrary, the program aimed to 
make the existing procedures, adapted versions of the concept of adverse acquisition in 
national and ejido lands, less costly, less formal and quicker (Stanfield et al. 1986:19-20). 
The PTT followed a strategy of massive titling and surveying an entire area at once. 
Instead of waiting for landholders to start the procedures in the INA -which was one of 
the existing ways to obtain an ownership document- the INA invited the landholders 
to title their plots. The landholders in El Zapote had not been waiting for such land 
titles, but they weren't necessarily opposed to receiving them. The very fact that the 
PTT entailed a sale, however, made the PTT problematic. Stanfield et al. (1986:25) 
comment on this problem in their evaluation of the PTT: 
If the holder has, through the appropriate possession already met the Code 
requirements of ownership, what is the basis of INA's title and the underlying notion 
of the sale of the land? Not only is the Civil Code provision apparently violated, but 
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the common beließ of the peasants as to their existing ownership rights seem to be 
contradicted. 
The PTT basically entailed a sale: the state sold land which landholders already-
considered to be their property. Landholders had completed the requirements for 
ownership in the every way known to them. The concept of the PTT radically 
overturned their perception of their rights. I shall explain below how landholders in El 
Zapote experienced the arrival of the PTT. 
In contrast to the Agrarian Reform Law, women were not discriminated against by 
the PTT as they were allowed to hold land titles just like men (Chapter Five). The 
procedure was free of charges as all costs of administration, land survey and cadastral 
mapping, and registration in the Public Register of Property were to be covered by the 
project.2 0 The ascribed advantage for landholders was that they did not need to hire a 
lawyer: the INA completed the procedure after an initial agreement of the land holder. 
Furthermore, landholders received a definite title that they were immediately able to 
use, for example, to obtain credit. The contract of sale integrated a promissory note 
(pagare) signed by the landholders; their signatures guaranteed payment for the land.21 
As our own observations have shown us, the PTT was technically very weakly 
organised. The technical deficiencies of the land surveys and mapping were a 'future 
source of difficulties that could produce a questioning of the validity of individual titles 
and of the entire property system' (Stanfield et al. 1986:15). Problems were, for 
example, the lack of consistency between INA data and the Public Register of 
Property, and the many mistakes that officials made in this highly complex process. 
Buying my own land: landholders and PTT 
The first phase of the P T T in El Zapote started in 1983. At the end of the 1970s, the 
National Cadastral Directorate finished the land survey and the registration of the plot 
holders of ejido land and land that the state considered to be owned by the national 
government. The 'engineers', as people called them, told landholders that there was no 
need to worry about the registration. They assured the anxious landholders that their 
ownership would be respected. They did not tell them that the survey was done in the 
framework of a titling program. The registration included a combination of several 
features: names of producers, size of parcels, definition of property status and available 
documents to sustain claims. This provided a wealth of information to the national 
state that it had never had before and that could also be used for levying taxes. 
Table 2.5 recapitulates the property status of the involved parcels based on a 
combination of cadastral register data and the PTT registration. 
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Table 2.5 Cadastral registration of property rights and juridical instruments in the municipality of El 
Zapote, 1979 
Property right Number of Type Document Type of public document 
parcels Comunero Individual Community Private ; Public None Public Resist' Property 
eroi Municipal 
' concession 
Possession 577 8 568 1 570 7 0 3 4 
Occupation 317 30 287 0 1 316 
Usufruct (dominio uSD 22 0 20 2 16 4 
Free area (unclaimed 27 
national land) 
Unknown 39 
Total 982 38 855 1 571 27 318 19 8 
Source: based on a comparison of cadastral mapping and PTT data. 
The unclear category definitions in Table 2.5 are probably due to all kinds of errors 
during the registration process. Possession means that a plot holder has at least one 
private or public document for the land.22 Private documents are deeds of purchase 
ipapel de venta) which are issued between buyer and seller and which are drawn up in 
the presence of witnesses. It contains date and place, the names of buyer and seller, the 
boundaries of the plot, the size of the plot, the plot history (how the seller got hold of 
it originally), the price settled for the plot, and the names of the witnesses. Important 
for landholders is not only their own deed that testifies about their own purchase, but 
to keep all former deeds of the plot as well. Together the papers form a bundle that tells 
the history of transfer of the particular plot. 
Table 2.5 shows seven landholders with public documents who were also assigned 
possession. Four of these documents were original municipal concessions. The 
remaining three were Public Property Register deeds (escritura publico). In other cases, 
municipal concessions were categorised as 'usufruct' (see below). Public Register deeds 
eventually remained outside the titling program because the holders already owned the 
land. 
Property rights were classified as occupation, the second category of Table 2.5, when 
the landholder was not able to show any kind of document. Given the large number of 
parcels that received the label 'occupation', the state had no choice but to recognise the 
claim of these landholders. The state thus abstained from freely selling plots and instead 
titled the land in the names of the landholders who possessed or occupied the land, 
following the idea of adverse acquisition. 
The table furthermore reveals that twenty-two parcels were categorised as dominio 
util, usufruct. The major part of these parcels had a usufruct title registered in the 
Public Register of Property. Four parcels were categorised as usufruct because the 
holders had a municipal concession. 
Most landholders in El Zapote have some notion of the possibility of applying for a 
public deed. Nevertheless, only a few landholders had actually done so before the PTT 
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arrived. One reason to abstain from registration is that it is expensive; one needs money 
to pay for the land, the journeys to Santa Barbara, lawyers, official paper and stamps. 
Another reason is that the bundle of private documents sufficiently protects against 
claims of other people. A deed of purchase entails proof that the holder had paid for the 
land, which is a convincing confirmation of ownership more important than public 
registration. The proof of payment reduces the possibility that someone else will make 
a claim on the land. 
The deed of purchase has other advantages as well. For example, it is generally 
accepted by local moneylenders as a collateral. The deed of purchase is also used as a 
way to divide up the inheritance. In the past it was more common that landholders 
drew up a will, but the will was not a very reliable instrument. It often happened that 
the heirs quarrelled over the distribution of properties as if the will did not exist at all. 
A way to keep away from this dilemma is to transfer the land to the chosen heirs in 
separate deeds of purchase. The deed testifies that the heir has bought the land for a 
certain price. In reality the heir does not really pay for it (Chapter Four). 
The sale and purchase of land by way of the deed of purchase also gives landholders 
confidence because of the included standardised procedure. Drawing up a private deed 
of purchase is a solemn procedure. The idiom of the document is 'official': the jargon of 
lawyers and bureaucrats that differs so much from daily language of rural people. Only 
a handful of people in the village are able to produce such a document. The boundaries 
are surveyed and settled by the municipal sindico, an authorised member of the 
municipal council. Witnesses are present when the deed of purchase is signed and the 
fixed sum is paid. The private documents are presented to the government authorities 
or to the judge in case of a conflict. Neither private nor public deeds offer complete 
protection against the claims of other people, but many landholders nevertheless think 
that transfers of land by way of private deeds of purchase are the safest. 
While interviewed, landholders remembered that, during their first visits in 1983, the 
INA officials strongly suggested that participation in the PTT was obligatory. LNA 
personnel abstained from telling landholders that they had to pay for the title and what 
this payment exactly meant. The involved landholders discovered this only after they 
had signed the promissory note. They were not aware of the implications of the 
promissory note and most of them never grasped what the exact meaning of the 
payments were that they were supposed to make. 
The cadastral mapping and the legal and administrative services provided by the LNA 
were all free of charges to the land holder. However, the title did involve a payment for 
the land; the price requested for the land in El Zapote by the INA was half of the local 
value of land. Titled as 'family agricultural units', it was fixed at 60L (30 US$) per 
hectare. The expectation was that even poor producers could pay these fees (Stanfield et 
al. 1986, Wachter 1992, Melmed-Sanjak 1993, Khan 1996). The INA never imagined 
that 30 US$ would be an insurmountable obstacle for resource-poor producers. 
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The difficulties concerning the price of land was only one of many differences of 
perception between INA and the landholders. The following story told by one of the 
landholders of El Zapote expresses these differential perceptions: 
When Jose Bueso was a young boy his father, who had a fairly large amount of land, 
gave him a small plot of land. He handed him a deed of purchase in which the 
transfer between father and son was settled. When Jose became an adult his father 
also assigned him a much larger plot of land in the quasi-ejido of Nejapa. Jose rented 
part of it out and gave the rent to his mother. After years of administering this land 
on behalf of his father, his father said that the land was Jose's. Father, however, 
didn't give him a deed of purchase this time. Jose didn't know why he hadn't, but he 
had to accept it because there was nothing he could do about it. 
Jose needed land for production and, although he knew that his rights in the 
Nejapa land were not secure because of the failing deed, he started to fence it in and 
to use it. All went well for years as nobody contested his rights to the land. Then, 
his father suddenly fell ill and needed money to pay for medical expenses. Several of 
his children insisted that their father should sell the Nejapa land; the same plot that 
he had handed over to his son Jose years ago. However, father decided to sell his 
cattle instead. Yet he did not recover and just before he died, he called upon two 
younger sons and bequeathed the Nejapa land to them. Again, he did not give them 
a deed of purchase. After father had passed away, Jose's two brothers of claimed that 
they had inherited the Nejapa land. Jose succeeded in buying them out, paying one 
brother 500 Lempiras and the other 300. Thereafter, the brothers dropped their 
claim. 
Jose's laconic expression that he 'had to buy my inheritance twice' refers to a 
second time he had to buy the land which he originally inherited. The land in the 
Nejapa area was national land according to the categories of the INA. The INA 
issued a title for the land and Jose was obliged to again buy his land from the state. 
Thus, Jose originally inherited the land from his father. Thereafter, he had to 
buy out his two younger brothers who made a claim in the land as well. At last, the 
LNA insisted that he had to buy the land from the state. The fact that Jose had not 
received a private deed from his father made it possible for the other brothers to 
contest his rights. He knew and understood this perfectly. In contrast, the 
intervention of the INA was a complete surprise to him. After he had bought out his 
brothers he considered the land to be his. He never imagined that the state would 
come and claim that the land was owned by the state. 
The story of Jose, which other landholders might tell using different details but with 
the very same tenor, shows the differences in the perceived land rights in the ejidos 
between landholders and the state. It is not difficult to follow Jose's reasoning about 
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why he considered himself the owner of the land. He inherited the land and bought his 
brothers out. Viewed from his perspective, the payment for the state issued title could 
not be considered to be a payment for the land since he already owned it. Landholders 
therefore perceived the payment as a tax. Titling entailed, in their view, that the 
government surveyed the land and registered the names of plot holders in order to be 
able to collect taxes. 
The result of the confusion about the nature of the land title and the required 
payments was that there was a hold-up in the payments of the quota for the title. At 
the start of the second operation of the PTT in 1994, more than ten years after the start 
of the program, only 21 percent of the issued titles in El Zapote had been fully paid 
(PTT data, Listado de Saldos por Municipio; Khan 1996). The second operation of the 
PTT was therefore fully dominated by the idea of collecting these outstanding debts. 
The government had been pressed to demand payment for the titles by USAID (fansen 
and Roquas 1998). The LNA attributed the complete lack of eagerness to pay the title to 
the ill will of landholders. To collect the outstanding debts, the INA didn't shun 
straightforward threats to expropriate holders who refused to pay their quota at once. 
The INA threatened that the landholders would lose their land and that INA would 
sell it to another applicant. 
The 1994 campaign was only about payments. There was hardly any reference to the 
goals of the PTT and the advantages of titling. The INA's attitude was also different: 
instead of assuring the landholders that their rights would become better rights through 
the PTT, the only slogan was 'pay or be expropriated'. The INA had no interest 
whatsoever in the problems that the titling programme had caused: 
• The starting-point of the PTT had been that land rights were insecure and that 
ownership, issued through titling, would make these rights more secure. The result 
was, however, that existing conflicts had intensified, with the LNA title as a new 
instrument in the hands of one of the parties (Chapter Four). 
• New conflicts emerged, for example, between men and women, due to specific 
regulations during the implementation of the PTT (Chapter Five). 
• Resource poor producers were not able to pay the quota. The INA however, refused 
to see that people might own a plot of land but that this did not mean they also had 
capital to invest. 
• The second INA operation refused to deal with the soaring problems caused by the 
titling operation itself. For example, mistakes made by the first LNA brigade caused 
conflicts between landholders concerning the registration of the wrong owner or 
the subdivision of a plot after the land survey. 
• The common ways of transferring land through deeds of purchase continued. After 
ten years the title deed had become not more than one element in the bundle of 
'papers'. Hence the registration data of the LNA were no longer correct after ten 
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years. The INA, however, only recognised the person who was title holder ten years 
before as the legitimate owner. 
The DMA did recognise the claims of possession and occupation in national land during 
the PTT. The ejido plots were titled in the names of the actual holders and not freely 
sold to interested persons. Viewed from the perspective of the landholders, the state as a 
whole has been ambiguous with respect to the question of ownership-possession. 
Different state sectors used different perceptions. The National Cadastral Directorate 
assured the landholders of their ownership rights in order to secure their co-operation 
during the land survey. Politicians regularly supported the point of view of the 
landholders during political campaigns by confirming that the land belonged to the 
people who worked it. Although the LNA recognised possession of landholders during 
the first phase of the project, the second LNA brigade emphasised that landholders had 
no rights whatsoever without a land title. This slogan precluded the recognition of 
claims of possession or occupation. 
Stacking and the notion of customary regulation 
Evaluators of the impact and working of the PTT have characterised the pre-PTT 
situation regarding land rights regulation and definition as 'customary' or 'informal'. 
Stanfield et al. (1990:3) allege that, with the tacit approval of the state, a 'customary' 
system of defining and transferring land rights to possessed national land emerged. 
Wachter (1992:176) observes that 'private possession in the informal way actually 
existed in the open areas, which was also allowed by the state'. Coles-Coghi (1993:56) 
argues that 'the customary recognition and enforcement of property rights in land stem 
from socially supported practices established through continuous use over time'. Carter 
and Salgado (2001:264) convey that in land transactions before PTT, 'informal means 
are predominant because they are based more on the usage and local custom than on 
legal rules'. Following the mentioned studies, the informal pre-PTT situation is caused 
by a lack of interest and an inactive attitude of the national state towards the 
landholders on national and ejido land. Customary rights provide security and work 
well among local community members. The basis for claiming customary rights is 
working the land and creating improvements. 
The process of stacking laws and norms with regard to land rights, as I have 
described it, sheds another light on the pre-PTT situation, when landholders did not 
have secure property rights to the land. Conflicts about who had rights in the land 
have always existed. Thus, whatever the character of the pre-PTT rights might have 
been, they did not form a secure customary legal system. Furthermore, I have shown 
that the pre-PTT situation did not emerge because the state lacked interest in the rural 
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areas. In contrast, the state has been preoccupied with the distribution of land rights 
since independence and the state has tried to come to grips with the distribution and 
the definition of land rights through a whole range of agrarian laws. The landholders' 
notions of rights today have emerged within a historical context of continuously 
changing state policy and they are for a large part the result of the dynamic working, 
application and reinterpretation of law. 
Analysis of the stacked elements in the perceptions of landowners has shown us that 
they use concepts and notions about property that are clearly based in Civil Code 
concepts of property. They have ownership because they possess, work, improve and 
fence in their land; an adapted concept of adverse acquisition. The pre-PTT situation 
was thus not diametrically opposed to state law. We have seen that, at certain moments, 
the state acknowledged the legal basis of their claim that they do have property rights 
although they do not have registered ownership. Terms as customary or informal, 
hence, do not do justice to the nature of the pre-PTT situation. 
What the state considered to be possession or occupation of national land was 
ownership in the eyes of the landholders in El Zapote. They fulfilled all requirements 
to claim ownership both in civil legal terms and in terms of social recognition. This 
chapter has argued that the perception of landholders regarding their rights to ejido 
land has changed over time. Over the course of time, the municipal council was no 
longer recognised as the institute to assign temporary usufruct rights. This was possibly 
related to the general loss of authority of the council, but probably also with 
perceptions of growing land scarcity. The council was something completely different 
from the national state: people would have acknowledged that the municipal council 
had a say in the land but they did not recognise the claim of ownership of the national 
state. 
Why did the PTT end as a threat instead of achieving its goal to enhance security of 
property rights? Central to the misunderstandings between the INA and the 
landholders was the required payment for receiving the title, which made the 
transaction a sale. The state thus acted as a landholder and it did not fulfil the role that 
landholders expected from the state: its role as protector of their property rights. The 
precise meaning of the payment was totally unclear to the landholders, who perceived 
it as a tax. They did not understand the difference between possession and ownership 
and considered registration in the Public Register of Property as merely producing a 
redundant document. 
The legality of the threat of the INA to expropriate landholders who would not pay 
for their titles is debatable. Landholders who worked and held the land in a peaceful 
way at least had possession of the land, a fact that the LNA also recognised during the 
first phase of the PTT. Whether or not the state had a legitimate claim as the owner of 
the land in El Zapote is also debatable. It depends on how one tells the story of the 
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ejidos, and the appropriation of municipal and communal resources by the national 
state. 
The judicial practice does take land claims other than registered ownership seriously. 
A large part of the case files in the Santa Barbara district court of justice concern civil 
procedures of vindication or other civil property claims on unregistered and privately 
transferred land (Chapter Six). Hence, the LNA's assertion that only the PTT title had 
'legal value' is certainly not sustained in the practices of the court. 
The landholders of El Zapote may pay their land titles in the end, but they will 
continue their old practices of transferring and subdividing land through deeds of 
purchase without registration in the Public Register of Property. A return to the old 
situation means that, through the PTT, the state did not create a dynamic well 
functioning Property Register and correct cadastral maps. The PTT title is worthless to 
landholders in a region like El Zapote because of the low value of the land. However, 
coffee producers in other regions of Honduras are keen on receiving a registered title 
because they have land of a higher value and are also able to register improvements. 
Thus the complete redundancy of the PTT in marginal areas like El Zapote seems to be 
less dramatic in other regions with land of higher value and other production systems. 
It remains to be seen what the results will be regarding the enhancement of rights 
security and settlement of conflict. 
The influence of state interventions as the hydroelectric power plant project and the 
titling project on local understandings of property are twofold. First, state intervention 
in local property concepts has strengthened existing conflicts between landholders and 
has also created new types of conflict. Landholders do not have equal access to the 
substituting means offered by the state, which contributes to an aggravation of existing 
conflicting situations. Secondly, the experiences of landholders with the hydroelectric 
power plant and the PTT have reduced the credibility of the state as protector of 
property rights, and it has nourished their general distrust of state institutions. 
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Notes 
1 The origins of the strong local prescriptions concerning fences are not completely clear. The logbooks of 
the municipal council referred to fencing as obligatory for claiming a concession in ejido land. This was 
probably part of the local regulation with regard to the assignment of concessions in ejido land. The 
Police Law (AMHON 1961) states in art. 361: 'The fences of land and pastures must be seven cuartas 
[distance between tips of little finger and thump of an outstretched hand] high, with sufficient girth and 
consistency to impede the entrance of cattle'. Without following this prescription, the landholder was not 
able to demand compensation in case cattle of another producer destroys crops. 
2 I do not pretend to present a complete juridical outline of all aspects of the Civil Code concept of 
ownership. The section only discusses those elements that I consider useful for understanding the 
divergent perceptions of property of landholders and the state. 
3 The five Tatriotic Codes' were the Civil Code, the Penal Code, the Code of Civil and Criminal 
Procedures, the Mining Code and the Commerce Code. 
4 Just like ownership, possession can be recovered through 'actions of possession' (arts. 895-908). In time, 
the actions of possession improve titles. Bad faith, for example, cannot be transferred to another 
possessor. The new possessor will have good faith. 
5 The Public Register of Property is the central institution for the registration of property rights. 
6 The main intention of the agrarian reform process can also be explained in a way other than the 
formulation in article 1. The state needed to calm down the discordant atmosphere in the rural areas. 
Moreover, agricultural production stagnated and the government needed new instruments for 
modernising the existing production systems and putting land that hadn't been used before into use. 
7 The maximum limit of seventeen hectares was in line with the Agrarian Reform Law, only that under the 
PTT it was extended from ten to seventeen hectares. The argument was that ejido and national lands were 
of lower quality than the irrigated land that formed the basis for the establishment of the ten hectares 
maximum for family agricultural unit titles in the Agrarian Reform law. 
8 The main objectives of the Law of Modernisation were to promote a formal land market in order to 
enhance efficiency and to increase productivity, and to reduce the role of the state in the process of 
agricultural modernisation (art. 4). The idea was that the distribution of land as a process should not be 
guided by government interference but it should be left to operating market forces (art. 69, Thorpe 2000, 
Carter and Salgado 2001). An important aim of the Law of Modernisation was to improve land market 
facilities. The Agrarian Reform Law intended to avoid the renting-out and the sale of land. In contrast, 
the Law of Agricultural Modernisation increased the possibilities to sell land obtained through the 
Agrarian Reform process, and it allowed renting-out and joint ventures (arts. 54 and 55). 
9 In the land titling program PTT, land and improvements were separated, which significantly contributed 
to the lack of understanding landholders had regarding the issued title. The PTT valued the land without 
the improvements, resulting in low values of the land. 
10 Teocintal was 9 caballerias and 176 cuerdas cuadradas. One caballena was 45 hectares. The area of Malapon 
was 726 hectares. 
11 A manzana is an area measure, officially 0.697 hectare; in El Zapote the manzana measures 0.8361 hectare 
(jansen 1998). 
12 The sale concerned 90 hectares that were part of a larger title called Carcamo-Maitun. Vicente Moreno 
was not a villager. He was a state official who inherited Carcamo and Juniapal from his father. 
13 Juniapal was 433.65 hectares but the village only managed to control the northern part of it. An extended 
version of the story about the fight for Juniapal is told in Jansen (1998:32-36). 
14 The land of Nejapa is 810 hectares. 
15 Yoro is 315 hectares. 
68 
16 The land surveys performed on behalf of Alfredo Lara regarding the boundaries between Carcamo 
(belonging to the village) and Juniapal (private property of Alfredo Lara) led to an unclear situation. 
Villagers protested that the land surveyors moved the stones which served as boundary markers. The 
enlarged area fell within the title of Alfredo Lara. Years later, in the 1990s, Alfredo's son claimed that his 
title of Juniapal included the land taken up by the hydroelectric power plant. He for his part demanded 
compensation from the state for the loss of the land. 
17 Personnel of the electricity company ENEE acted on behalf of the national government in this case. 
18 Fervent adherents to land redistribution politics inside and outside the DMA strongly opposed the PTT. 
They considered the issuing of titles to individual landholders as an act of frustrating the collective project 
of the agrarian reform. 
19 For a critical discussion about the relation between private titles and access to credit and technical 
assistance, and investments in sustainable production methods, see Jansen and Roquas (1998). 
20 Stanfield et al. (1986) confirm that in PTT the administrative costs for titling national land exceeded the 
value of the land (de Janvry et al. 2001). 
21 The Agrarian Reform Law issued provisional titles that mortgaged the land until it had been paid. The 
PTT, on the other hand, issued definite titles that holders could immediately use, for example, to obtain 
credit. 
22 Stanfield et al. (1986:24) convey that possession is proven only through witness declarations and technical 
studies. However, this would prove 'occupation' according to the registration data of El Zapote. 
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Chapter three 
Property and labour in farm households 
Typical naive-style paintings of Honduran artists present an idea about a countryside 
filled with white houses with roofs of red tile surrounded by flowers, chickens, horses, 
pigs and children, where campesinos work their maize plots wearing straw hats and the 
women wash clothes in the river or fetch water carrying water carafes on their heads.1 
A painting of Roque Zelaya shows a beautiful village of white houses surrounding a 
white church, of which the inhabitants are portrayed catching fish that fall from the 
sky (the common narrative of the lluvia depeces) (Ramos and Valenzuela 1996). Food, 
self-determination and traditionalism are chief elements in these paintings of rural life, 
promoting the family ideal of the man working in the fields and his wife in her home 
garden filled with flowers. The paintings reflect on peaceful existence in a traditional 
society that does not suffer from the burdens of modern life. The question raised in this 
chapter is whether such images of the countryside are in agreement with the realities 
and what seems to be forgotten in them. One of the most important things not 
reflected in these pictures is the internal dynamic of a farm household: the way in 
which labour, property and income become organised, arranged and divided. 
This chapter looks at farm households as arenas of struggle about property, income 
and labour. To understand property relations with respect to land means that we have 
to gain insight into these households. How are property relations organised in farm 
households and how do household members struggle for and negotiate control over 
property? How do property relations in farm households relate to the division of 
labour? Honduran studies and debates about agrarian policy often search for 
explanations of property relations in farm households in the role of machismo or in the 
role of kinship. This chapter discusses the notions of machismo and kinship and their 
limits, to explain the emergence of conflicts about property between members of a farm 
households. 
The subsequent section deals with the internal organisation of farm households in El 
Zapote with respect to labour, property and income. Thereafter I look at processes of 
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control and decision-making about labour, property, and income, in the combined 
production of tule and petates. The chapter then discusses two factors as possible 
explanations of the internal dynamics: machismo and kinship. 
Internal dynamics of farm households 
Debates about the consequences of capitalist development and the commoditisation of 
the relations of production have dealt with the question of differentiation in peasant 
societies (Friedmann 1981, Goodman and Redclift 1985, Friedmann 1986, Bryceson et 
al. 2000). Some scholars argue that the peasantry will eventually disappear, but others 
suggest that differential development patterns emerge among peasants. The shifting 
balance between production for the market and for household consumption has been a 
central point of attention (Binford and Cook 1991). This section especially focuses on 
the internal dynamics of farm households as a first step to understand how production 
and household domains are connected and how labour and property relations are 
organised. 
The internal dynamics of households have become an issue under the influence of 
feminist critics arguing that, thus far, rural research has treated the household as a 
'black box' (Redclift and Whatmore 1990, O'Laughlin 1999). The black box household 
encompasses a western notion of 'family-household': a combination of kinship and co-
residence, which is considered to be the natural way of living (Bender 1967, Barrett 
1988, Bourdieu 1996).2 The black box notion portrays the family-household as the 
opposite of the harsh capitalist economy 'outside', as a site of solidarity and altruism. 
The social task attributed to the black box household is the reproduction of human 
beings and labour power. 
Feminist critics of the black box concept of family-household contend that 
household structures differ world-wide. They have questioned the natural character of 
the combination of kinship and co-residence and have insisted that the moral family 
economy of pooling and sharing does not exist. Through the way in which the black 
box model of family-household is used, it conceals the exploitative economic 
relationship that exists between men and women because it legitimises labour relations 
and social hierarchy (Bennholdt-Thomsen 1981, Lem 1991, Whatmore 1991, Maynes et 
al. 1996). The black box model does not pay attention to the role played by kinship 
ideology and love in obscuring inequalities and injustice in the household. To open the 
black box model means that the internal organisation of farm households should be 
seen as an active social process in which ideology plays a decisive role (Whatmore 
1991). 
The opening of the black box of the rural family-household is important for 
understanding the internal dynamics of farm households. Thus far, few studies have 
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done so for Honduras. This section therefore first explores how labour is deployed 
both within the household and in agricultural production, and how property and 
income are distributed. 
Farm households and production 
I use the term 'farm household' for all households in which one or more members are 
involved in agricultural production. The farm household is a central arena of struggles 
for control over labour and property, struggles that transcend the boundaries between 
the household-domestic domain and the agricultural production domain. There is no 
fixed division of labour, and household members may lose or gain property in the 
course of time. 
The family ideal of people in El Zapote is the nuclear family: father, mother and 
children. Nevertheless, Table 3.1 reflects that only half of the farm households do 
indeed consist of a nuclear family. Moreover, the composition of a farm household in 
El Zapote changes in time: a nuclear family household this year may be an extended 
household next year, and vice versa. 
Table 3.1 Composition of farm households in the main village of El Zapote in 1993 
Number of households Percentage 
Nuclear family 227 46 
Other composition 218 45 
Unknown (only main couple known) 44 9 
Total 489 100 
The group of households in the category 'other composition' in Table 3.1 consists of 
households with a wide variety of combinations of members: 
• married and unmarried couples without offspring 
• single mothers with children 
• widows and widowers 
• extended households: grandparents, parents, children, grandchildren, great-
grandchildren, adopted children, other family members. 
Farm households may accommodate several agricultural producers with different 
relationships to other household members who are involved in different arrangements 
regarding the use and distribution of labour, property and income. Some household 
members have only their meals in the farm household but work or sleep elsewhere. 
The amount and type of labour that household members are expected to perform, is 
primarily related to what is produced and the availability and quality of land. Maize 
and beans are the staple foods in El Zapote; the majority of agricultural producers in El 
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Zapote cultivate maize and a minority cultivate beans for home consumption. Even 
when circumstances permit them to buy maize at the market, and when it would be 
economically reasonable to do so, they continue to produce it. Most maize producers 
do not produce enough maize to sustain their households, which obliges them to 
purchase maize at the local market as well. Some maize producers are able to sell or 
lend out a small surplus of these grains. 
The important cash crops in El Zapote are coffee and tule, a perennial, the stalks of 
which are used to weave petates, or sleeping mats. In 1992, 46% of the agricultural 
producers cultivated coffee (Jansen 1998). According to our household survey data, this 
group of producers matches with 35% of the farm households, as more than one coffee 
producer may be present in one household. With respect to the households in the 
survey, 23% cultivated tule and 12% cultivated both coffee and tule. The survey data 
also demonstrated that 54% of the households did not cultivate any cash crop (Jansen 
1999). 
The quantity and quality of land that agricultural producers have at their disposal 
differs. There are landholders who may possess more land than they are able to use, 
which means that they plan for a fallow period of considerable duration with positive 
effects on production rates. Producers who do not have enough land of their own will 
try to rent the land of other landholders or they may use the municipal commons for 
maize production. The choices producers make regarding the crops they want to 
produce depends on the availability and quality of the land, but they also consider, for 
example, the available labour power for clearing and weeding. 
Division of labour 
Discussions between farm household members about the deployment of unpaid family 
labour, the compensation for invested labour, the hiring of paid labour from outside 
the household, the division of labour and control over children's labour are everlasting 
and part of daily life. Every working day, the question as to who is available at which 
moment and for what kind of work needs to be answered. 
With regard to certain tasks, farm households have a more or less general division of 
labour between men and women and between generations (Stiirzinger and Bustamante 
1997). As this section will show, this division of labour is nevertheless neither fixed nor 
clear. 
Agricultural work in the fields is mainly men's work. Men clear fields, burn fields, 
sow, weed, distribute fertiliser, spray pesticides, watch the fields and harvest crops. 
Many women have never even seen the fields in which the men of their households 
spend their whole day, and they mentioned several reasons for not knowing, visiting or 
working in the fields, including: 
• the work in the fields is too heavy 
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• the fields are too far away 
• they have their own work (referring to petate weaving, among others) 
• there is no one else to do the household work 
Women broadly share this aversion to work in the field but, nevertheless, they 
occasionally do it. Some women, for example, help out during the harvest of beans or 
tule. To see these women working in the fields does not mean that all women harvest 
beans or tule regularly or that they are obliged to do, or responsible for, this work. It is 
merely what these women say that it is, 'helping out'. 
The only task in the field that women perform on a larger scale is picking coffee, but 
the number of women that actually do this is not constant. Whether or not they will 
join the coffee harvest depends on the conclusions drawn on the basis of several 
considerations. Leaving the house means that women run the risk of becoming the 
subject of village gossip and losing their reputation. Women therefore only pick coffee 
in groups of friends and neighbours, which gives them the necessary protection against 
harassment and gossip. A second aspect that influences the number of women 
participating in the coffee harvest is that they only pick coffee at the beginning of the 
harvest season when the coffee is ripe in the lower parts of the mountains. When the 
harvest moves up higher in the mountains, few women continue to work in the coffee 
fields because they consider them to be too far away. A third consideration about 
whether or not women decide to join the coffee harvest is the price paid for the petate. 
During the first years of our stay in the village, few women went to work in the coffee 
fields, but this changed in the 1996/1997 harvest season when the price paid for a petate 
was much lower than the income that could be earned through picking coffee. The low 
petate price and the wages in the coffee harvest stimulate more women to choose to 
work in the coffee fields at that moment. 
Women are responsible for housekeeping and the performance of a broad range of 
domestic tasks, but this does not mean that they are solely responsible for doing them 
all by themselves (Fordham et al. 1987; Kuhn 1990). For example, women are held 
responsible for washing clothes but this does not mean that they actually wash it all 
themselves; they may see to it that it is done by others. Daughters from six years old 
onwards wash their own clothes as do adult sons on occasion.3 
Furthermore, women are responsible for preparing and distributing the food. They 
prepare fresh tortillas three or more times a day and cook beans and other foods.4 
Preparing tortillas is the most time-consuming activity that is exclusively done by 
women, but in most farm households more than one woman is available to get it done.5 
In the afternoon, they wait for their husbands to come back from the field to 
immediately serve them food and coffee. Men and boys fetch the firewood that is used 
to heat the stove, which they bring with them when they come back from their work 
in the fields. Women who live alone may fetch firewood from locations close to the 
village. 
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Women in El Zapote talk about their 'work', they do not refer to performing 
domestic tasks but to weaving petates when talking about their 'work'. In local 
discourse, weaving petates is part of the work in agriculture. Weaving is an exclusively 
female domain that has a great impact on women's self-esteem and image. I shall explain 
this later in a discussion about the production process of petates as an arena for gender 
struggles for property and control. 
Besides housekeeping activities, there are many agricultural tasks that have to be 
done within the boundaries of the farm household, and for which women and men 
share responsibility. This may include the washing and drying of coffee; removing 
maize from the cobs and drying and storing it; feeding domestic animals such as 
chicken and pigs; butchering; and repairing all kinds of tools. Both men and women 
participate in community activities and visit meetings organised by the extension 
services of the state, non-governmental organisations, or the school, although women 
are outnumbered on practically every occasion. 
How do we evaluate the division of labour on the basis of these observations? We 
have seen that a clear division of labour for working in the fields exists between women 
and men, the preparation of food and the weaving of petates, but the division of labour 
is much less clear with regard to other tasks. Labour is thus not rigidly organised and 
divided according to fixed patterns. Choices regarding who does what depend on may 
things, such as the kind and quantity of agricultural production, the number of farm 
household members, the season, the presence of small children, the relationship 
between husband and wife, or the number of girls and boys. 
Day by day, farm household members discuss how things should be organised and 
how family labour should be used and for what. Sons ask their fathers' permission if 
they wish to work as a day labourer for other producers, which is generally possible 
when the father decides that he does not need his son on that particular day. Mothers 
order their daughters to light the fire in the stove, to start weaving petates, or to do 
other tasks. On the other hand, when children grow older, parents need to reward then-
offspring's contribution and provide incentives for them to work. Adult sons may 
demand some kind of 'payment' for their work and control their own income. Parents 
may therefore grant elder sons a daily wage or a part of the harvest. Another possibility 
to keep sons content with their situation is to allow them to cultivate a field of their 
own as well, or to allow them to work for others in order to earn some money. 
Struggles about labour not only take place between parents and children, but also 
between men and women, in which balancing the relative importance of the different 
tasks is a point of continuous struggle. 
Agricultural producers have to regularly hire wage labourers to be able to cope with 
labour demands in production. Labour peaks characterise agricultural production, 
during which labour demand is higher than producers or farm households themselves 
are normally able to bring in. Hiring wage labour is also necessary when a person falls 
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ill. Female producers especially have to rely on wage labour when they are not able to 
expect labour from male family members. 
Wage labourers and peasant producers do not form two separated social 'classes' in 
El Zapote. There is only a small group of permanent wage workers, all of whom work 
for the same patron. These people are often indebted to their patron and are obliged to 
respond to any demand the patron makes for their labour. Permanent wage labourers 
either do not have a farm of their own or they only cultivate a tiny plot of maize for 
home consumption. Most agricultural producers depend on non-permanent wage 
labourers who are found among a broad network of friends, neighbours and family, 
and who are peasant producers themselves. They come to 'help', in local terminology, 
and earn the normal daily wage rate. The maintenance of a network is of crucial 
importance in order to obtain labourers at crucial moments. 
A producer is thus not automatically able to claim the labour power of household 
members on the basis of household membership or kinship. In periods of high labour 
demand, a farm household may not have sufficient labour available and the producer 
will depend on labour recruited outside the farm household. Moreover, not all 
household member labour in agricultural production activities is unpaid; payments 
made to household members may take different forms which are often not directly 
visible. Sons do not automatically work for their father, especially when they become 
older; the father has to provide something in exchange, such as a part of the harvest or 
the promise that he will be one of the future heirs. 
Children and their labour 
Children perform a substantial portion of work in farm households. From five or six 
years old, a son works in the field together with his father. Boys gather firewood, fetch 
the horses or mules in the early morning, and bring them back to their pasture at the 
end of the day. Both boys and girls visit the mill to grind maize for tortillas (two or 
three times a day); they care for small children; buy things at the shop; go to the 
middleman or tule owner to sell a petate; or they are sent off to other people with all 
kinds of questions or requests. Girls first start working by helping the other women in 
the household with the weaving of petates. Later on, they learn how to start weaving 
and how to shape a petate themselves and eventually work independently. Girls also 
lay the fire for cooking and make tortillas. 
An important task of children is to run errands (hacer mandados).6 Children are not 
only sent off to buy soap or sugar, but they also do 'painful' things such as asking for 
loans, requesting payment of loans, or looking for day labourers. Adults who 'feel 
ashamed' to ask such favours from others first send their children to check the reaction 
to their request. 
77 
Children 'serve' their parents by adding labour to the farm household and by 
running errands, but the work of children is also considered as a part of their 
upbringing. Parents say that by starting to work at an early age, children learn the 
value of working, producing food, and earning money. The elderly in the village 
convey that the upbringing of children has changed during the last decades. Parents say 
that they raise their own children less austerely compared to their own youth, and that 
the relationship between parents and children has become less authoritarian. In their 
opinion, they have developed a different relationship with their children than they 
themselves had with their parents. 'We had to keep our mouth shut when adults spoke 
and if they spoke to you, you had to cast down your eyes'. Nowadays, children speak 
freely to their parents about all kinds of topics. The amount of physical violence that 
parents use to 'correct' their children's failures has diminished. The same is true for the 
school teachers who use less physical punishment in the classroom than in the past. 
Parents consider it important that children learn the common values of respecting 
other people, obeying orders and working hard. 
The role of education instead of work has become more important in rearing 
children. There are more possibilities to finish primary school and at least three years 
of secondary school. Primary schools are found in the central village and in all hamlets 
of El Zapote. The central village also has a three year secondary school, which has been 
officially recognised by the government since 1996. The increased income of coffee 
producers has also expanded the opportunities for their children to leave the village to 
continue their studies. 
Property and income 
The distribution of property rights and the division of income are both subjects of 
conflict between household members. Conflicts over income have been a central point 
of attention on the feminist research agenda (Dwyer and Bruce 1988, Deere 1990). 
Struggles for property rights, however, have been neglected for a long time although 
they are of equal importance for relations between farm household members. The 
theoretical assumption that income and property are subjects of conflict between farm 
household members is not in line with the popular image of peaceful peasant life that I 
portrayed in the beginning of this chapter. It means that we have to forget the image of 
family members altruistically sharing resources and income. 
Maize and beans are typically products that are brought into the farm household and 
consumed by all its members. However, if the producer sells a surplus of maize or 
beans, he or she controls this income and solely decides on its use. Analogously, it is 
the producer who controls the earnings of the sale of the cash crops coffee or tule. 
Coffee producers who worked with their sons, however, were under pressure to share 
the earnings or to give them a small part of the harvest. Spouses also made claims on 
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the coffee harvest for coping with such expenses as school uniforms. I witnessed how a 
coffee producer refused to give his wife any say in how to use the earnings of the coffee 
harvest. She therefore secretly sold small amounts of the coffee when it was drying in 
the patio. Tule producers constantly found themselves in a field of tension between 
their own wish to sell tule (and control the earnings themselves) and the claims of the 
women in their farm household who demanded the tule for their weaving activities. I 
met one tule producer who sold tule to his own wife.7 In many other cases, tule 
producers ignored the demands of women in their own households and sold the tule to 
other women in the village. Such sales often took place when a producer was on his 
way back home with one or more mules or horses loaded with tule. Thus, the tule 
never reached the physical boundaries of his own farm household. In other cases, tule 
producers only harvested tule if requested to do so by women outside their own farm 
households, a favour which was often paid in advance. 
The weaver controls the earnings of petates and uses them largely for household 
needs like soap, oil, and salt. During hunger periods, when the harvested maize is 
already eaten, women use the earnings of petates to buy maize. Young women who live 
in their parents' farm household control the earnings of weaving petates themselves, 
and they often use them to pay for school fees and necessities. Likewise, sons who earn 
a daily wage by working for others also control this income themselves. Both daughters 
and sons are expected to pay for their own clothes and medicine, but they are also 
pressured to give their mothers a share of their earnings for general household expenses. 
Hence, income and earnings are individually controlled by the household member who 
is the producer or the labourer. Just like income and earnings, property rights are held 
individually. Land, means of production, cattle, houses, horses, trees, bicycles and tools 
are in the hands of individual owners. They are not owned, as the romantic Honduran 
peasant image suggests, by the farm household as such. 
In spite of these general organising principles, property rights of individuals and 
their control and decision-making power are continuously contested by other villagers 
and household or family members. The question of who owns a thing does not say 
anything about who controls or uses it. The extent to which the owner of a thing has 
control and decision-making power over it is closely related to the way in which he or 
she acquired and accumulated the property, and also labour relations. 
Control and decision-making in the production of tule and petates 
The production of tule and petates is important for the survival of the majority of farm 
households in El Zapote. It is characterised by struggles for control and decision-
making about labour, property, product and income. Moreover, it is an important site 
for producing gender images that not only play a role in tule and petate production, 
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but also in struggles for control over other goods (land). This section first describes the 
production process of tule and the labour process of petate weaving. It then analyses 
how the harvest of tule became the starting place for a small family drama in a 
particular farm household. 
The art of petate weaving 
The department of Santa Barbara is known for the production of handicrafts made of 
natural fibres: Panama hats, baskets, handbags, and petates.8 These handicrafts find their 
way to the national tourist market, while several of them are also internationally 
appreciated. The makers of these products are often extremely poor and earn only a 
fraction of the settled prices on the market from their work. The outside world knows 
little about the importance of handicrafts to the local economy, the production process, 
and the labour relations between the poor rural people who are involved in its 
production. In contrast to other handicrafts of Santa Barbara, the tourist market 
absorbs only a fraction of the produced petates, and they are merely a utensil for poor 
Hondurans who use them as sleeping mats. Hence, with respect to the market, petate 
production differs from the other Santa Barbara handicrafts. 
Patios in El Zapote are stuffed with drying tule; mud paths between the houses are 
filled with mules transporting green tule stalks and women and children carrying 
petates on their heads on their way to the local wholesale buyer. Women of all ages sit 
on the floors of their houses while weaving petates. To give an idea of the extent of 
production, women weave petates on a regular basis in 337 (70%) of the 489 households 
in the village, while 199 producers of tule live in the village (CDI 1988).9 The amount of 
petates that are produced is difficult to estimate. A low estimation based on data from 
the main village is that 6,000 petates are exported out of the village each month. Other 
sources estimate that some 20,000 petates are produced in the municipality (Baide 
Velasquez 1991). 
The combined production system of tule and petates completely differs from coffee, 
which is the other major commodity in El Zapote. The production process of tule-
petate is not based on modern technologies, it is not incorporated into the international 
market and there is no network of institutions created around its production and 
market. 
Several development projects of both the government and NGOs have tried to 
develop the tule-petate economy. An important shortcoming of these projects has been 
that they have only focused on the women who weave petates. These projects did not 
understand how the production of tule and petate relate, and how the production 
process constructs labour and property relations within farm households and between 
women. 
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Cultivation oftuleand weaving petates 
Tule can be found from Mexico to Colombia (Williams 1981). In Mexico and Central 
America, indigenous populations use the dry stems of tule for weaving petates (Castro 
et al. 1991, Castro Ramirez 1994). The village of El Zapote is by far the largest producer 
of petates in Honduras. While petates are made with wild tule that grows along rivers 
and in other watery places in other places in Mexico and Central America, tule in El 
Zapote is cultivated in tiny plots called tular. A tule field normally measures one or two 
tareas.10 Land that is suitable for tule cultivation is scarce and relatively expensive. 
Tule is a permanent crop that takes two years after planting to produce the first 
usable stalks.11 Producers do not fertilise tule. Plagues and diseases do not attack tule on 
a large scale and pesticides are not used. The producer weeds the field now and then, 
although weeds do not grow rapidly because of the dense foliage. The phase of the 
moon is essential for planting and harvesting tule, as tule harvest is only suitable during 
several days in a month. Harvesting means that ripe stalks are cut and stripped of then-
leaves at the spot. The stalks are bundled in cargas, which is the amount of tule that can 
be loaded on a mule or a horse, and which should contain the quantity of tule sufficient 
to weave twelve petates Qansen 1999). 
Women dry the tule stalks in the sun on their patios or alongside the road. After 
drying, the triangular stalk is divided into three fibres and the 'heart' (corazon). They 
separately bundle the heart and sell these bundles to outside buyers. The heart is used 
to make chairs and other pieces of furniture, while it has multiple local uses for binding 
things together, including bundles of tule, and for saddles. After taking the heart out, 
the remaining fibres of tule are sorted by length and bundled. One to four bundles are 
needed to weave a petate, depending on the length of the fibres. If more than one 
bundle is needed, then, the petate will have a joint made with a bamboo needle.12 The 
weaving of a petate may take a woman one to three days while sitting on the floor 
inside their houses without much day light. The poorest women are also the fastest, but 
it is said that the work of these women is of less quality as well. 
Struggle for material and income: labour arrangements in petate weaving 
Women are continuously busy to guarantee their supply of tule in order to be able to 
'work'. Yet they do not have equal opportunities to obtain tule. Access to tule depends 
on: 
• whether or not tule is produced within the farm household 
• whether or not women are able to come to grips with decisions about the time of 
harvest 
• whether or not women are able to prevent the sale of tule to other weavers 
outside the household 
• whether or not women are able to save the money to buy tule 
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• whether or not women succeed to maintain the right network contacts in order 
to have access to tule provided by others 
Several women in El Zapote own and manage a tule field themselves and thus have 
easy access to the material. Most of these women do not weave themselves but allow 
other women to do the weaving. There are also women who obtain their tule through 
a husband, son or brother who has a tular. Some women have control over all tule that 
they bring into the farm household. However, many tule producers sell tule to other 
weavers outside the farm household. This means that the women in the farm 
households of these producers have to negotiate and struggle for gaining control over 
the amount of tule they receive. 
Women who do not have direct access to tule have different options. If a woman has 
some money, she is able to invest it in buying tule from other producers. She has to 
find a producer who is willing to sell his tule and reach an agreement about the price, 
and she has to make sure that the purchased cargo, contains the amount of tule sufficient 
to make twelve petates, and not less. Women who are not able to make such an 
investment work at piece rate for women who have tule. Weavers at piece rates earned 
2 lempiras at the time when the petate was sold for 5.20 lempiras. Hence, weavers 
earned 39% of the value of the petate. Furthermore, the system of 'real por real' is 
common among friends.13 Women who have tule give the material for two petates to a 
woman who weaves them. The weaver then returns one petate to the owner of the tule 
while keeping the other one to herself. 
The main actors in the double production process of tule and petates are the tule 
producer, the weaver who also controls her own tule, and the weaver who depends on 
other women for her access to tule (Figure 3.1). 
Tule producer 
Female holder of dried tule, 
independent weaver 
Weaver at piece rate 
Real por real 
Petate buyer transfer of material 
transfer of earnings 
Figure 3.1 Exchange of labour, material, and earnings in the production of petates 
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The producer of tule has to decide when and for how long he will harvest his tule 
field. The moment and duration of a harvest period depends on the moon. Tule does 
not immediately decay in the field, and it is possible to skip one or more harvest 
periods if the producer prefers to finish other more urgent tasks. In his decision on 
when to go and harvest tule, the producer will anticipate the labour which he has at his 
disposal. The tule producer will plan a tule harvest when women outside his own farm 
household offer an advance payment for tule that they want to buy. The planning of 
the tule producer further depends on how he negotiates with the women in his own 
household. 
A woman who has access to tule - the tule holder -, prepares the tule for weaving. 
This includes the laborious process of drying the tule stems, which may take seven days 
or more, depending on the weather. Every morning, the tule holder has to bring the 
tule outside and spread it out in the sun. When it starts to rain, she has collect it 
quickly because rain ruins the drying tule. When the stems are dry, the tule holder sorts 
them by length and bundles them, and they are then ready to be handed over to a 
weaver. The tule holder has to decide how many petates she and other women in her 
farm household will be able to weave, and how much tule is left over for women 
outside the household. Within the farm household, this is a question of negotiation. 
Grown-up daughters, for example, may be willing to weave petates but may insist on 
keeping control of their earnings. If the tule holder thinks that there is not enough 
labour in her own farm household, she will look for women in her social network who 
want to weave petates at piece rate or in a 'realpor real' arrangement. Tule holders who 
regularly control large amounts of tule have their own circles of weavers. These 
weavers are often continuously indebted to the tule holder by borrowing money from 
the tule holder and weaving petates in return.14 
A weaver who does not control her own tule first considers whether she has enough 
to buy tule from another producer. If this is not possible, she starts visiting women 
who are able to give her work at a piece rate or she asks a friend for a 'real por real' 
arrangement. If she is indebted to a tule holder she has no choice but to work to settle 
the debt. Weavers who do have direct access to tule try to establish a small network of 
tule holders that guarantee them access to tule. However, many weavers who work for 
piece rates are not able to create or maintain such a network. 
Relations between tule holders and piece rate weavers are often tense. The tule 
holder offers advance payments to commit weavers to work for her and she 
deliberately creates debts. Through the debt mechanism, the tule holder ensures herself 
of having labour available whenever she wishes. The debts reinforce the unequal 
position of weavers who are not able to negotiate about the reward that they receive 
for their work. Tule holders complain that weavers are foolish to run up debts and do 
not work properly. Piece rate weavers, and especially those who work to pay off debts, 
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try to weave one petate a day, with less attention paid to the quality of their work. The 
problem for tule holders is that petate buyers may decline carelessly made petates. 
Ten people, more or less, buy petates on a regular basis. Several other people buy 
petates only at times when they need money. In addition to the local buyers, buyers 
from outside the village make daily visits. These people visit houses and try to persuade 
women to sell them petates. These outside buyers offer women more space to negotiate 
prices than local buyers; local buyers tend to offer one and the same price and only 
change it when all other buyers change it as well. Women receive a better price for 
their petates when they sell them in docena (twelve petates). The buyers make rolls of 
twenty-four petates, which is the necessary format for selling on the national market. 
Most buyers sell the rolls to wholesalers in the city of San Pedro de Sula. 
Although the price of the different buyers and the best possibilities of negotiation 
are the subjects of daily conversations between women in the village, the choice for a 
particular local buyer does not depend on the price he or she offers. Debts and other 
mechanisms play a role in committing women to sell petates to a specific buyer. Buyers 
pay for petates in advance and commit women to selling petates for a previously settled 
price. Social networks and local politics also play an important role in the choice of a 
buyer. 
Gender and weaving petates 
Petate weaving is a critical source of income for poor farm households. In El Zapote, it 
means the difference between dead-end poverty and having something, both in terms of 
income and as a source of self-esteem. Weaving petates means to have and to 
independently control an income, no matter how small. The very fact of having and 
controlling this income has a positive effect on women's position. Their contribution 
to the survival of the farm household is crucial, buying things like maize, salt and soap 
with their income. When such basic needs are ensured in some other way, petate 
weavers have more room for manoeuvring to decide whether they will buy tule, send a 
letter to their family, set out on a trip, or save money to buy clothes for the children. 
Weaving petates thus offers women of all ages the possibility to make autonomous 
decisions on all kinds of issues. 
Gender relations are renegotiated and gender images become reconstructed through 
the negotiations about the moment of harvest; the different ways of controlling tule; 
the process of weaving and the generation of income; and the various arrangements 
regarding the exchange of labour and material. Observing all these negotiations and 
networking, it occurred to me that women in El Zapote do not see themselves as 
housewives. I frequently heard women assert that they 'do not work', which is not a 
sign that they have a false consciousness about their loads of domestic tasks (Valestrand 
1991). Household tasks are not referred to in terms of work: they are considered to be 
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'duties'. The expression 'not working' has two different meanings. Firstly, it refers to 
the fact that women do not work in the fields and secondly, 'not working' may also 
mean that they are not weaving a petate at this very moment, for example, because they 
do not have dry tule available. 
Women describe themselves, and are described by others, as petateras, petate 
weavers. The petatera image has a strong positive connotation. Being a petatera means 
that one performs productive work, generating an income that contributes to the 
persistence of the farm household and that is considered to be more essential than 
domestic tasks. There is also a less common counter-image that considers petate 
weaving an activity that threatens the natural complementary relationship between 
men and women. In this image, it is the man's job to come home with the food for the 
whole family: 'Petate weavers make their men lazy inhabitants of the hammock'. The 
positive petatera image is dominant. It is this image that is important to women in 
struggles for resources. Women use this positive image when they become involved in 
struggles for land. The positive petatera image is then set against the image that women 
'do not work' (Chapter Five). 
'No tamales for Christmas': labour and control over tule 
Tamales are cooked rolls of maize dough stuffed with meat and vegetables and wrapped 
in banana leaves. They are a favourite dish in Honduras, and not dishing them out on 
Christmas evening means a severe social loss of face. The Christmas evening tamales 
played a role in a controversy between Rosa and Excequiel about control over tule, 
labour and property. 
In October 1994, Excequiel and his two adult sons went to harvest tule for five 
successive days, harvesting four cargos of tule. Rosa went with them to the field to cut 
off the leaves of the stalks on the first and the fifth day. On Monday, Rosa worked hard 
but on Friday, she went to the field, taking along Dalila, her youngest daughter of five 
years old. She stayed for three hours, one hour of which she dedicated to bathing with 
Dalila in the river. When she left that day, she told me that she would help cut the 
leaves off so that one of the boys would be able to walk up and down with the horses 
loaded with tule twice. The family returned early at lunch time, and they were all in a 
dreadfully bad mood. A few hours later, Excequiel revealed that they did not harvest all 
the ripe tule. He had planned to harvest it all and to allow his two sons to sell one carga 
each in order to show them what it means to sell your own harvest. Rosa, however, had 
strongly opposed his plan. Now Excequiel said that he did not know what to do. He 
would spend Sunday to thinking and replanning his work schedule. 
The month of October was a very busy one for Excequiel. He had to prepare the 
second maize field (postrera) and he also wanted to weed his coffee field. Yet Rosa said 
that he should continue harvesting tule as long as the position of the moon was 
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favourable. Excequiel thought it over. A man had approached him to buy two cargas of 
tule on behalf of his wife. Furthermore, Excequiel planned to harvest a medio with a 
labourer. The a medio principle assigns half of the harvest to the labourer and the other 
half to the owner. After my cautious suggestion that Rosa might want to obstruct any 
sale of tule, he laughed: Tiow can she stop me? If I want to sell it, I will sell'. 
A few hours later Rosa entered my patio to share her concerns about the tule. As with 
every problem, she talked about it as if it was all a joke: 
You know, Excequiel told me that he wants to sell a few cargas. There was a man from 
Naranjal... he just wanted to carry them off. I told him [Excequiel]: Do as you like, sell 
it. But when you come home there will not be salt, soap and no meat in your soup. 
Forget it. If you do not bring me tule, there will be no money. You will not eat 
tamales for Christmas. 
I put forward that she already had four cargas of tule in the house and that I did not 
understand why she should want even more. She then said: 
/ will store it. It will soon be November, December... There will be no time to harvest 
tule. I dry the tule now, and I will have a supply for the months to come. I paid Josue 
[a neighbour] in advance to harvest me a carga, but he returned the money to me. On 
his way home, another woman offered him fifty-five lempiras, while I gave him 
forty... You see it is not easy to buy tule... 
Excequiel and his sons would start the coffee harvest in November and December, which 
would completely absorb their time and energy. Rosa knew that it would be impossible 
to convince Excequiel during that period that he should harvest tule. It would also be 
impossible to buy tule from other producers who also worked in the coffee harvest. 
Rosa wanted her husband to continue harvesting tule and she had to think how the 
problem of his needing labour for other tasks at the same time could be solved. She 
therefore suggested he invest less family labour in preparing the maize field, and instead 
that she invest some of her own capital: 
I told him about the maize field: Here you have Gramaxone, the horses and the money 
to pay for day labourers. In this way you can do it in one day. I will pay., with 
Gramaxone... I recently bought it when I went to San Pedro. It is not much work. You 
first harvest the maize that is still there and then you apply Gramaxone. Or you apply 
Gramaxone first., it's a small job.. 
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Gramaxone is the brand name of the herbicide paraquat to make weeding easier and 
faster. Herbicides are increasingly used to offset labour shortages in weeding. 
Excequiel thought the situation over for a few days to come up with a possible 
solution. On the next Monday, he took along his friend Florencio to harvest tule. 
Florencio recently sold his own tular because he ran into problems with the owners of 
adjacent plots. He bought a new tular, but he had to sow it again so he was not yet able 
to harvest from it. Florencio's household included several petateras who were 
complaining about not having tule day after day. To Florencio, it was a blessing when 
Excequiel offered for him to harvest tule in his tular. Being a close friend of Excequiel, 
Florencio did not pay for the tule he harvested in Excequiel's field. 
The October events in the farm household of Rosa and Excequiel show how tule 
became a vehicle for struggles about control over labour and earnings. It was a busy 
month for Excequiel and there was not much time to harvest tule. He also knew, 
however, that the tule field needed to be harvested or the ripe tule would dry out and be 
lost. His initial idea was that his sons would do the work, and that they would be 
rewarded: he would allow them to sell the harvest. The boys would be able to buy new 
clothes for Christmas and Excequiel would have satisfied his duty as a good father. 
Rosa, on the other hand, wanted to maintain control over as much tule as possible, so 
that she could have a supply for the months to come. She also opposed her husband's 
plan because she did not want to establish a precedent with regard to the sale of tule. She 
was afraid that by allowing her sons to sell, they would continue to claim a share of any 
product they worked for. Rosa demanded that all the ripe tule would be harvested and 
brought to the house. In order to substantiate this claim, she went to the tule field 
herself. Her labour was not strictly necessary and Excequiel never asked her to help out 
in the field. Yet by working with her husbands and sons in the tule field, she too was able 
to lay a claim to the harvested product. 
Rosa used financial household arguments to support her claim that she needed the 
tule. More than any financial argument, however, Rosa's main preoccupation was to 
preserve control over the tule. Her husband had always given her the tule he harvested, 
and she had no intention of sharing her control of the tule with other household 
members. If she would allow her sons to sell tule at that time, she was convinced that 
they would continue to demand such privileges. 
Another striking aspect of Rosa's actions was her growing interference with decision-
making in the agricultural production system, which was normally Excequiel's domain. 
The situation was that Rosa controlled money that was necessary for making 
investments (labour power, herbicide), while Excequiel was broke. Excequiel tried to re-
establish himself as the head of the household. He conveyed in really macho terms that he 
was the one to decide and that he would sell tule whenever he wanted. In reality, 
however, he did not act as he said. He was not able to tell his wife to mind her own 
business and force his own plan through. Therefore he came up with the 'solution' of 
87 
offering a role in the harvest to his friend Florencio. He did not like the idea of leaving 
the ripe tule to be lost to spoilage. By allowing Florencio to harvest he did not sell the 
tule but instead 'helped out' a friend. Florencio's payment would be indirect. He and 
Excequiel worked together on the basis of reciprocity. They were used to helping each 
other, and they trusted that each action of one would be paid back by the other in time. 
The 'Florencio solution' kept Excequiel from losing face while it prevented any 
complaints from Rosa. 
Farm households and machismo 
Property relations in farm households are also gender relations. When the subject of 
gender is brought up in Honduran studies, either the concepts of machismo (Kuhn 
1990, Martinez et al, 1995, Mendoza 1996) or patriarchy (de Oyuela 1993) are cited as 
explaining factors. Central to this section is the question of what machismo entails both 
in the literature and in El Zapote. Is machismo is a useful concept that might contribute 
to our understanding of property relations between men and women in El Zapote? 
After a brief review of the concept of machismo, this section analyses images of the 
'ideal partner' in expressions of men and women in El Zapote; images that embody 
concepts of gender. Thereafter, this section discusses what characterises property 
relations between husbands and wives. 
Machismo and family structures 
The fact that the term 'machismo' pops up regularly to explain gender relations does 
not mean that there is consensus about what it means (Melhuus and Stolen 1996). It is 
not clear, for example, whether everyone using the term is denoting the same 
phenomena or relations. For some authors, machismo does not refer to male-female 
relations but to relations between men. Lancaster (1992) connects machismo to 
masculinity and male behaviour towards other males, of which the central features are 
drinking, fighting and sexual conquest. Machismo is thus about men, although it 
captures aspects of men's behaviour that are related to women. Stevens (1973:90) 
describes male behaviour in the context of machismo as characterised by exaggerated 
aggressiveness and intransigence in male-to-male relations, and arrogance and sexual 
aggression in male-to-female relationships. To counteract this male behaviour, women 
can fulfil two roles: first, as the inferior and weak woman who must be protected by 
men1 5 and second, as the spiritual and morally superior woman (de Oyuela 1993, 
Brusco 1995).1 6 Motherhood is the basis of moral superiority and of women's capacity 
for sacrifice and humility (Stevens 1973). 
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The house/street (casa/calle) dichotomy plays an important role in machismo 
(Radcliffe and Westwood 1996). The public role of the man - calle - alienates him from 
the private sphere of household and family - casa - that is dominated by women.17 
Machismo leads to the ideological contradiction that men are dominant and important, 
but also absent in daily family life where the women keep the household going and 
make the main decisions (Brusco 1995). 
Gender relations, and especially marital relations, play an important role in two 
virtually contradictory images of the Latin American family (Dore 1997). The first 
image refers to a family structure in which a man leaves his wife and children behind in 
order to build a new family with a new (younger) wife, who he again abandons to start 
a new family with another wife, and so on. The woman and her children form the 
nucleus in this image while men are only temporarily present in the household. The 
second image portrays the patriarchal family, in which a strong male head totally 
controls all other family members, including his wife (Brusco 1995).18 The first image in 
particular refers to machismo, while the latter refers to another form of male 
dominance, which Brusco calls patriarchy. 
Family structures in El Zapote embody elements of both images. Many men have 
had several families - the first image - while at the same time, the man is the recognised 
household 'head', the second image. The pictures cannot be generalised, as there are, for 
instance, many women as well who abandon their husbands and children. The 
important conclusion for El Zapote is, in my view, that the central relation in farm 
households continues to be the husband-wife and not the mother-child relationship of 
the first image. The goal of an abandoned woman will be to find a new partner; she will 
not persevere in staying behind with her children. 
The ideal partner 
This section looks at images of the ideal partner to develop more concrete idea about 
what gender means to people in El Zapote and to what extent they incorporate 
machismo or patriarchy as elements in their concept of gender. The word 'machismo' 
is not known in El Zapote but people use deviant forms of the term as macho and 
machista. Macho is a merely positive term meaning 'strong'. Either a man or a woman 
may be called macho, but also 'nature', the weather, or any other phenomenon. 
'Machista', on the other hand, is a negative term for men who treat women as slaves, 
who command, dominate and limit their personal freedom. 
In conversations with young women about their future, they were very clear about 
the undesirability of marrying a machista man. In the words of one of these women: 
I do not want to marry a Honduran man. They are all machistas. They do not allow 
you to go out and they demand food all the time. They treat you as if you were a slave. 
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/ think that it is good for a couple to share, but not as a slave. Iam not going to marry 
a machista that treats you like that., who demands "fry me an egg... immediately!". 
The comments of another young woman were also revealing about the negative image 
of the Honduran man: 
/ will go to San Pedro to work and to study. I will certainly not get married. A 
married woman cannot study anymore. That's the way Honduran men are, they are 
machistas. They prohibit their wives to study. They say you want to go to college only 
to fall in love with other men. Men can't stand it if a woman has finished her studies 
and knows more than they do. 
What these women call machista may be patriarchal in the terms of Brusco (1995) and 
Dore (1997): it is the picture of the dominant man controlling his wife's behaviour. 
Elements of machista come back in concepts of and criteria for the ideal partner. I 
researched images of the ideal partner of men and women because I assumed that it 
would give me an idea about gender images in the husband-wife relationship. Women 
and men use norms, principles, criteria and considerations when they talk about their 
ideal partner. Table 3.2 gives an overview of what women and men brought forward in 
discussions about the characteristics of a (future) partner in life. 
The ideal wife is portrayed as fulfilling her duties vis-a-vis men and her family. Being 
a wife means that a woman is obliged to carry out the main domestic tasks (cooking, 
cleaning, washing clothes), child raising, and the performance of such agricultural tasks 
as petate weaving and drying coffee. It is also the wife's duty to have sex with her 
husband if he wants to. Case files in the judicial archive of registered divorces in Santa 
Barbara show that a valid reason for getting a divorce is that the woman has not 
'performed her duties'. 
A man, on the other hand, does not have duties but has responsibilities in local 
discourse. The main responsibility of a man is to bring in food, the maize for 
household consumption. 'The man has to bring in what the household needs. I have to 
bring in the food, I have to care for my wife. If I do not give her food, she will walk out 
on me'. This man, and many others, liked the idea of having his own harvest of maize 
in the house instead of depending on buying it from other producers. 1 don't like to 
see my wife and kids walking through the village with a bag to look for maize (to buy 
from another producer)'. If maize production is not enough to feed the farm 
household, women might assume part of the responsibility of providing the household 
with maize. Women play a central role as maize providers in the lean months from 
June to August, buying grain with the money they earn from petate weaving. 
The qualification trabajador, someone who works hard, is one of the most positive 
compliments to receive. The qualification is classless; everyone, whether man or 
90 
woman, poor or not, is able to gain it. Women who are considered to be hard workers, 
for example, combine their domestic tasks and mothering with weaving petates to earn 
an income. Men who are said to be trabajador work hard in their fields, produce their 
own maize for household consumption or, more generally, try to advance in life by 
working hard. 
Another positive qualification for the ideal female partner is that she is economical 
and knows how to manage her budget. The ideal woman does not spend money on 
'useless' things like cassettes, candies or soft drinks. Furthermore, the ideal woman is 
well-bred. This means that she is not allowed to quarrel with other women or to hang 
out in the streets. The ideal wife is able to develop a good relationship with her in-laws. 
Another qualification used for men but merely for women, is to be unassuming 
(humilde). This notion refers to an absence of snobbery and the pretension to be more 
than one really is. 
Table 3.2 Constructions of the ideal partner in life by men and women in ElZapote 
The ideal wife The ideal husband 
She should not be a relative.1' He should not be a relative 
She knows and performs her duties He is responsible: he takes care of the family, he brings in food and money for 
household expenses 
She works hard (trabajadora) He works hard (trabajador) 
He is not an alcoholic 
She is economical 
She is well-bred and unassuming 
She is a mother to his children 
He is not machista 
He is monogamous 
He must have prospects, think about the future, and allow her to use birth 
control 
She lets him freely visit friends or gatherings He lets her freely visit friends or gatherings 
She is not jealous He is not jealous 
For women, it is important that their ideal partner is not an alcoholic spending time 
and money in the pub, because a drinking husband stands for deep trouble. Men who 
are alcoholics have health problems, they are not able work hard, they squander their 
income, and sometimes they become violent towards their wives, children, or other 
persons. The following quote is from a woman who held on to promises that her 
husband would stop drinking, although this never happened afterwards: 
/ went to live with him although I knew he was a big drunk. He promised me to stop 
drinking and I believed him. But he didn't. In the beginning he only drank on 
Saturdays, but later also during the week. Sometimes he was drunk for a whole week 
or month. He gave me money to buy food and then used the remaining part in the 
cantina. Later he did not have enough money, and he plunged into debt. 
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Both men and women consider drinking as a despicable habit, but for men who do 
drink it is part of being male and therefore very difficult to abstain from. Evangelical 
churches are helpful in providing a space in which men are able to stop drinking 
without loosing their male identity. A man who is an alcohol addict is not necessarily 
called machista, because being machista is not related to drinking. 
Both men and women, however, detest jealousy in a relationship, although jealousy 
may have very different implications for them. A wife might only complain about her 
husband if she thinks he is too intimate with another woman. On the other hand, the 
consequences of a jealous partner are much more drastic to women. There are women 
who spend their days locked up in their houses because of their jealous husbands. 
In the view of women, the ideal man 'has perspective'. The man with perspective is 
certainly not a permanent day labourer. The man with perspective has at least 
completed primary school. He might have a fair chance of inheriting part of his 
parents' estate one day. The man with perspective thinks about the future, how to 
invest money, what to study, and how many children would be desirable. 
An important requirement for the ideal male partner is that he is faithful to his wife. 
This is not only a sentimental concern, but also a material concern for the 
consequences of when a woman and her children are left behind. 
Furthermore, women mentioned the use of birth control as requirement for the 
ideal partner. Birth control is a subject that women freely discuss among themselves but 
which is taboo in conversations with men. Birth control is a difficult subject for men 
because, on the one hand, men acknowledge that it makes sense not having too many 
children while, on the other hand, they consider that birth control makes them lose 
control over their wives' fertility. Nevertheless, women use birth control with or 
without the permission of their husbands. The evangelic churches play an important 
role in the propagation of family planning and in increasing the acceptance of birth 
control by men.2 0 
Comparing gender constructions on the basis of the 'ideal partner' and machismo 
images, we see that the gender constructions of the ideal partner embody many more 
elements than the machismo or patriarchy elements alone. The ideal partner 
constructions show that men and women to a large extent mention the same criteria, 
which are thus the same for the ideal wife and husband, such as working hard and not 
being jealous. 
A vision of the marital relationship as a natural alliance in which there is a common 
though divergent responsibility for work, household, production and procreating and 
rearing children, colours the considerations regarding the ideal partner. He or she is not 
only a partner to love and to hold, but also in making life possible: in agricultural 
production, in earning an income, in buying or constructing a house, in buying land, 
and in decently raising offspring. In fact, we see that machismo describes phenomena 
that are part of the ideal partner constructions. Machismo alone offers a very restricted 
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view of gender: it mainly describes male behaviour and it victimises women. The ideal 
partner constructions express a gender relation in which the behaviour of both husband 
and wife is valued and evaluated on almost equal terms. 
Husbands, wives and property 
Any form of marriage implicates arrangements with respect to property. It is 
characteristic in the rural areas of Honduras that people do not marry officially and 
that property relations between husbands and wives are not influenced by whether or 
not a couple is married. 
Central to the legal construction of marriage is procreation. Marriage is a natural 
union in which the natural characteristics of men and women complement each other 
with the aim to procreate (art. 28 Family Code, Honduras 1991). The Constitution (art. 
I l l ) also records the moral importance of family and maternity. The duties that family 
law assigns to the spouses reflect the naturalness and complementary character of the 
husband-wife relation: to live together, to be faithful, to respect the other, to support 
each other, to share responsibilities and the education of the family, to take part in the 
household and to practise a profession (arts. 4144 Family Code). Living together also 
includes the obligation to share the nuptial bed in order to satisfy the 'sexual instinct' 
and to procreate (Cruz Lopez 1994:44). There thus seems to exist ideological 
consonance between the law and the way women and men in El Zapote think about 
family relationships. The discussion of the images of ideal partners has shown that the 
relationship between husband and wife is considered to be a natural way of living with 
naturally defined roles, tasks and responsibilities. 
There is no consonance between law and perceptions of the conjugal relation when 
it comes to the 'economic regimes' in marriage. The law establishes different forms of 
economic regimes such as community of property or the complete separation of 
property (arts. 64-81 Family Code). Article 72 of the Family Code furthermore 
establishes that all household goods are the property of the wife. 
Yet the legal economic regimes of marriage are completely unknown to people in El 
Zapote, for whom marriage does not significantly establish or alter how property is 
divided between husband and wife. The local meaning of 'marriage' is to start a family, 
to settle, to have babies, to work on your own. Marriage and other forms of 
cohabitation imply arrangements with regard to food provision, care in case of illness, 
the provision of shelter and clothes to wear. A decision whether to officially get 
married or not depends on access to capital, pressure of parents or the advice received 
from the church. Both marriage or cohabitation, however, entail one and the same 
economic regime: men and women have their own properties and each partner keeps 
what he or she brings to the arrangement.21 
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It thus appears as though property relations are clear: one person is the owner of 
such things as land, the house, tools or the animals. Yet property relations show 
themselves to be more complicated when the spouses end up in trouble and might want 
a separation or divorce. Confronted with abuses of their property rights or left in the 
street after a separation, women discover that they have a disadvantaged position in the 
property relations with their husbands. Men own almost everything and women's 
voices are only more significant with regard to houses, at least when the concession or 
ownership of the house plot is in her name. In Chapter Five I shall elaborate in detail 
how women cope with their own disadvantaged positions in property relations relative 
to their husbands. Women say, for example, that running away from home makes 
them run the risk of losing all material claims, the custody of their children, their own 
properties and their social status and position in the community. This is knowledge 
that they have acquired through experience and from observing the lives of other 
women. 'Being a woman, you should never leave the house. You lose all your rights. 
For example, you will not be able to claim the house. If you leave you are guilty, you 
are the one who broke up. That is not what a woman should do'. It is common that a 
husband manages and disposes of his wife's properties, and he may even sell his wife's 
land without her consent and without informing her. 
The economic regime and machismo 
We have seen that a definition of tasks, rights and duties between husband and wife 
cannot be described in terms of machismo alone. The ideal partner constructions do 
not entail images of the dominant and aggressive man and the inferior woman. The 
term mochista is used as a negative reference point to indicate the undesirability of 
certain characteristics and habits of a partner. The ideal husband-wife relationship fits 
in a legal concept of marriage that puts forward the natural and complementary roles of 
men and women in their union. 
People's perception of the husband-wife relationship does not entail an ideal 
economic regime: the economic regime is defined as it is generally defined in terms of 
individually held property rights. Nevertheless, this does not mean that property 
relations between husband and wife are thus clearly defined, as becomes evident when 
there is a separation or when one of the spouses dies. Moreover, the case of Rosa and 
Excequiel has shown us that it is not so simple in daily life. Excequiel is the household 
head, the producer and the owner of the land. Yet he cannot absolutely resist the claims 
and strategies of his wife Rosa and his adult sons. The significance of the husband-wife 
relationship with respect to property, the power generated by wives versus husbands or 
vice versa are all subject of daily struggles in a complex household arena of members 
involved in developing strategies, counteracting reactions and generating discussions. 
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Kinship and friendship 
A term that often pops up in relation to the internal dynamics of farm households is 
kinship. Kinship plays a role in legitimising and organising relations of production, 
power and authority structures, and the division of labour, income and property 
(Bouquet and de Haan 1987, Kendall 1983, Whatmore 1991, de Haan 1994, Maynes et 
al. 1996). This section discusses whether Bourdieu's thesis (1996:22) that kinship 
belongs to the forces of 'fusion' that counteract forces of 'fission' in families is correct. 
Does kinship play a role in conserving the power constellation of farm households? If it 
does, then how does it work? What role does kinship play in property relations? 
Without making the slightest pretension of giving a general account of discussions 
about kinship, I will very briefly look at some aspects of how kinship is perceived in 
the literature. Some authors have described kinship in terms of blood ties with a 
predetermined and essential meaning: kinship relations are characterised by altruism, 
generosity and amity, for example (Fortes 1970). As they are blood ties, they are 
endurable and generate collective identities and feelings of belonging.22 A discussion has 
emerged within this perspective of kinship, examining the degree to which the social or 
the natural sphere predominates in the content of a kin relationship (Gellner 1987, 
Harris 1990). A different view on kinship considers kinship as an idiom for underlying 
realities which define, inform and suffuse kinship relations with meaning (Gudeman 
1976:13-14). The meaning of kinship is thus not predetermined, but Gudeman considers 
it to be response to ecological and economic conditions.23 
The organisation of property relations as I found it to be in farm households in El 
Zapote cannot be attributed to a predetermined and blood-related meaning of kinship. 
The agricultural producer cannot automatically rely on labour freely provided by other 
household members on the basis of their mutual kinship bond. Property and income 
are not automatically shared by all household members because of their kin relatedness; 
parental authority does not have a fixed meaning. Extended farm household members 
may not be related at all through kinship as adoption of children who do not have 
parents to take care of them is very common. Furthermore, outside the farm 
household, kinship does not seem to play any significant role at all. Hence kinship does 
not predetermine the meaning of a relationship; it is merely an idiom that is used in 
certain circumstances for certain reasons. Two aspects related to the use of kinship as 
an idiom are important: first, Gudeman's idea of the optative nature of kinship and, 
second, reinforcement of kin relations by something else in order to become 
meaningful. 
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The role of friendship 
Understanding the role of kinship within farm households is easier said than done, but 
it is clear that kinship plays a minor role outside households. In his study of a rural 
Panamanian village, Gudeman (1976:175) calls the role of kinship 'ascribed optation'. 
Kin networks and relations may be used and activated at certain moments while 
remaining dormant at other times. It is possible that a person in El Zapote presents his 
first cousin to a stranger as 'my cousin', a relative, while the next cousin is completely 
ignored without even saying good-bye. The optative nature of kinship is typically used 
and operated strategically by social actors Farm household members may use kinship 
sentiments and arguments to achieve their goals in struggles and negotiations about 
control of labour, income and property. For example, the discussion between Rosa and 
Excequiel (husband and wife) about the tule harvest that I described in a previous 
section was ended when a quasi-kinship relation (Excequiel and his friend Florencio) 
changed the conditions for the discussion. 
The optative character of kinship points to a second characteristic: kinship needs 
reinforcement in order to become effective. Biological kin, a blood relation, is not equal 
to recognised kin, but the question is then raised about what the conditions are under 
which kinship becomes recognised. In his study, Gudeman (1976) considers that 
residence is important in the recognition of kinship. Biological kinship needs 
reinforcement through residence in the household group in order to give meaning to 
relationships between its members. In Gudeman's view, this would explain why 
kinship plays a role within the farm household but not outside. The El Zapote case, 
however, directed my attention to another phenomenon that influences the working of 
kinship: the role of friendship. Relatives mutually exchange labour, rent land, or 
borrow each other's pack animals only when they are also friends but, without 
friendship, the kin relation is denied or has no meaning. 
Friendship is extremely important for social cohesion and the building of networks. 
Friendship also exists outside kin networks and exceeds the boundaries of the 
household, the village, the district and even the country. It surpasses religious, political, 
social and gender differences. The son of the rich landowner and the son of the day 
labourer who grew up together may maintain this friendship in spite of their class 
differences. They may activate it whenever they want or need it. Friendship also 
emerges between classmates and between men who worked together as day labourers 
when they were young. The church also generates friendships. Visiting the same 
religious community means regular gatherings with the same group and the churches 
themselves enforce mutual support and material help.2 4 
An essential value of friendship is 'respect'. Furthermore, friends visit each other at 
home where they sit down and talk and laugh. Friends help out when someone is in 
trouble, such as in cases of illness or emergencies. The mutual help of friends is 
important in agricultural practices; one resolves problems with the help of friends, such 
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as a lack of wage labourers during the coffee harvest, or, for day labourers, a paid job or 
contract. Friends rent land or pack animals to each other, or they borrow each other's 
concrete drying floor to dry coffee, tule or other products on. In the lean season, when 
maize is not always available, friends help each other by lending maize on credit. They 
also exchange knowledge about new seeds or pesticides or new production methods. 
Friends may also serve as mediators in conflicts and act as witnesses in court cases. 
The role of friendship is also notable in women's groups organised by development 
agencies. These groups mainly consist of friends, sometimes overlapping with relatives. 
The women in the groups said that they would refuse to enter a group of 'strangers' 
(although they may have known these 'strangers' their whole life). Such a group would 
not work, they said, because they would distrust each other's intentions. Particularly 
for women, space is important in making friends because they are often tied to the 
house and seek friendships among their neighbours. 
Hence, kinship is recognised when it is combined with friendship, and friendship 
and kinship often overlap. A person can be close friends with relatives, and friends who 
aren't relatives use a kin idiom for expressing their bond. As Florencio, one of the 
actors in the tule case that I described in a previous section, told me: 'I have no 
relationship with my own brothers. But with Excequiel, we are like brothers...you're 
better off having a brother like Excequiel who isn't a relative that just wants to 
quarrel.' 
Property and labour relations are thus not organised through kinship alone. 
Inside and outside farm households, kinship does not entail intrinsic values but is used 
strategically at certain times to achieve certain goals. The meaning of kin relations 
inside and outside farm households is thus the subject of negotiation and struggle. 
Although farm households consist mainly of husband-wife and parents-offspring 
relations, other factors determine if relationships are continued within and outside farm 
households. Friendship is important in the continuation of meaningful relationships 
between parents and offspring and between siblings. 
The role of friendship is also notable in inheritance practices and the process of the 
transfer of property among family and farm household members (Chapter Four). 
Kinship idiom is very important in inheritance. Inheritance norms seem to be based on 
kinship in the sense of blood ties, without any need for endorsement through 
something else. These rules prescribe that inheritance rights are independent of the 
concrete meaning of the relationship between the testator and heirs, or between the 
heirs. These rules are constantly renegotiated in practices of inheritance, however, via 
negotiations in which friendship does play an important role. 
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Campesino images and daily life in farm households 
The peaceful peasant who resists modernisation and preaches self-determination; the 
natural relationship between husband and wife who complement each other in 
character and talent; joint family production based on altruism between relatives who 
work together for the common goal of producing food and culture: these are all parts 
of the romantic image that nourishes the views and plans of organisations, intellectuals 
and state policymakers in Honduras. The typical campesino cannot be identified in the 
rural life of El Zapote. Farm households are not built upon joint properties and 
collectively decided investments. They are not made up of conjugal models and kin 
relations with a naturally given meaning and they do not have a fixed and 'natural' 
division of labour. Agricultural producers cannot unconditionally claim unpaid family 
labour. The organisation of work in the household and in agricultural production and 
the transfer of property rights are sources of unremming tension between farm 
household members. 
For people in El Zapote, farming means the economic aim to produce food and 
income. This does not mean that processes of struggle for labour and property are 
determined by economic calculations of the homo economicus. This chapter has 
explained that notions of gender and kinship play an important role in the actions, 
decisions, and considerations of farm household members. They also inform norms, 
principles, and practices of property transfer, deployment of labour and the 
distribution of income. 
The most important feature of property relations in a farm household is that 
property is held individually, hence, there are no collective properties belonging to the 
household as such. Whether it concerns the house, the house plot, land, tools or 
animals, the rights in these assets are in the hands of individual household members. 
The same is true of earned income: the person who earned it decides on its use. 
Feminist writers have long attacked the viewpoint that income is automatically pooled 
to the benefit of the farm household (Safilios-Rothschildt 1988), but the idea that the 
pooling of resources and income takes place in an unproblematic and power-free way 
based on kinship-driven altruism is vividly influencing agrarian policies in Honduras 
today. 
Property rights held by individual household members are also redistributed 
between individuals, and struggles and negotiations between farm household members 
about the distribution of labour power, control over property and income form part of 
the daily setting of farm households. 
This chapter has investigated whether machismo or kinship are useful notions to 
look at the internal dynamics of farm households. The notion of machismo is far too 
simple to explain how husbands and wives perceive gender and. how they negotiate 
control over property and income. The course of this book will take this argument 
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further by looking specifically at processes of inheritance and the role played by gender 
notions. This chapter has further concluded that kinship should not be presented as the 
force of fusion in farm households. Kinship does not have a predetermined meaning; it 
is merely an idiom that social actors strategically use and that needs to be reinforced by 
other means. If a kin relation is meaningful, then the relation is given meaning through 
friendship. 
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Notes 
1 The term campesino has political connotations in Honduran history, and agricultural producers in El 
Zapote generally do not use the word to identify themselves. They associate the term with the campesino 
organisations that played an important role in the period of agrarian reform. The association with the 
violent land occupations in that period makes them hesitant to use the word campesino. They prefer to 
call themselves producer (productor). 
2 Bourdieu (1996) argues that the state plays a key role in the dissemination of the natural image of the 
family. In this way, the state tries to hide its own interference in the private sphere of the family 
(Comaroff 1987). 
3 Young men have become more interested in learning aspects of housekeeping these days. They anticipate 
a situation in which no woman - unless well paid - is available to arrange their domestic affairs, such as 
after they migrate to town. 
4 Tortillas, small pancakes made of maize dough, form the heart of the gastronomic culture of several 
Central American countries and Mexico. The complete process of preparation of the dough, forming the 
tortillas and cooking, is very laborious and may take more than eight hours a day. Women cook dried 
maize together with some lime for a long time. It is then ground. In the past, this was done by hand using 
a grindstone (piedra de moler) but nowadays there are several electric maize grinders in the village. 
Children are sent to the grinder twice a day, or women might go themselves if they feel like having a chat 
or a small walk. During the grinding process, water is added to the maize. Back home, women form small 
pancakes from the dough with a typical movement of the hands and immediately cook them on the 
hotplate of the stove. 
5 In El Zapote, women's responsibility for housekeeping is not an inherent barrier for doing productive 
work (Howard-Borjas 1989). Extended farm households tend to accommodate so many women that there 
is not enough to do for all of them. Many girls and young women are allowed to spend their time 
weaving petates, a task that allows them to pay for their own education. 
6 The term 'hacer un mandado' is frequently used for all kinds of things and tasks. The standard street 
conversation begins as follows. Question: 'Where are you going'? (jA donde vaf). Answer: 'to do an 
errand' (hacer un mandado), together with a head movement in the right direction. The answer has all 
sorts of meaning, which does not need further explanation. It varies from 'walking with no aim in 
particular', to 'going to the shop to buy a pound of sugar', or 'visiting the patron to ask for a loan'. 
7 This was an exceptional case which other villagers talked about disapprovingly. 
8 The word 'petate' stems from the nahuatl word 'petlad' (Simeon 1977). 
9 The CDI data are based on a survey of the municipality of El Zapote, hence this survey includes the main 
village and all hamlets. In our own survey, which only concerns the households in the main village, we 
found that tule is produced by one or more producers in 106 of 489 households. 
10 A tarea is 523 m 2 (1/16 manzana). 
11 Producers do not agree on whether there are several classes of tule. Some attribute the difference between 
yellow and green tule to difference of class, and others to different soils or the quantity of rain. 
12 Making a joint is special to the way of working in El Zapote. In other villages and countries the tule is not 
sorted by length and when a fibre ends, another one is joint to the weave. This results in a petate which is 
less solid. 
13 A real is a bundle of dried tule. 
14 Poor women run up debts not only because they need to buy food; gambling is another cause of poor 
women ending up in a dead-end downward spiral of debts. 
15 Spanish colonial law considered women as inferior and in need of protection by men (Dore 1997). 
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16 The term marianismo refers to the cult of feminine spiritual superiority (Stevens 1973). It attributes semi-
divinity, moral superiority and spiritual strength to women. The question whether marianismo should be 
placed as opposite to machismo or seen as part of machismo has been discussed extensively (Abrahams 
1989, Vellinga 1985, Steenbeek 1995). 
17 It has been argued that the term 'machismo' is not suitable to analyse the internal dynamics of farm 
households because there is no strict separation between male and female spheres (Brusco 1995, Radcliffe 
and Westwood 1996). 
18 The two images of family relationships reduce the role of women to either mourning the male absence or 
suffering the male presence (Brusco 1995). 
19 Relatedness in terms of kinship has a specific local interpretation. For example: almost fifty percent of the 
villagers bear the surname Cruz but not all of them share the same ancestors. A child receives two 
surnames, one of the father and one of the mother. The first surname of father and the first of the mother 
are passed on to their offspring. The local norm is that two persons cannot get married if they share one 
of their surnames, yet so many people are called 'Cruz' that there are spouses who both have this family 
name. 
20 This is in line with the observation that both the Catholic and the evangelical churches contest machista 
elements. At first glance, the Catholic ideal of the family fits in with machismo. The Catholic Church 
promotes the idea that the woman is the core figure of the family-household while the man is the one 
who works 'outside' and provides for the family (Radcliffe 1993, Melhuus and Stolen 1996). Yet the 
Catholic ideal does not promote a public role of men in terms of aggressive masculine behaviour but 
instead refers to the husband's responsibilities. The evangelical churches, on the other hand, contest 
machismo by advocating the necessity of the return of men into the private family sphere (Brusco 1995). 
21 Galan (1998) argues that the Civil Code provisions do not enforce equality between husband and wife but 
that they offer the space for couples to arrange property relations and economic regimes among 
themselves, resulting in women being in a disadvantageous position. 
22 A point of discussion is whether the intrinsic values attributed to kinship are a typical 'Western' cultural 
interpretation. Such a view of kinship incorporates numerous assumptions about gender, such as the 
centrality and intrinsic value of the biological ties between mother and child in social life and social 
reproduction 0unko and Fishburne Collier 1987). 
23 Similar to the famous question as to why women - and not men - are the oppressed gender, de Haan 
(1994) criticises such an approach because of its inability to explain why, of all things, kinship is used to 
organise certain activities. I agree with his critique, yet I do not think it is necessary to have an answer to 
this 'why' question to be able to study how kinship is used. 
24 It is notable that members of several evangelical churches call each other brother or sister. The bond and 
the friendship they share from going to the same church is expressed in kinship terms. 
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Chapter four 
Laws and norms in inheritance practices 
Inheritance is a prolonged process that sets family members at odds with each other. 
For many people, it is synonymous with deep trouble, producing disturbed 
relationships, involvement in court cases, material losses, and violence. Problems 
related to inheritance occur at all social levels, are difficult to solve and sometimes 
survive several generations. Inheritance affects more than just the relationships in the 
family circle; timing of property transfers and the exclusion or inclusion of different 
heirs embody choices that directly influence agricultural production patterns and social 
differentiation (Goody 1978). 
To understand how and why inheritances frequently result in trouble, we first have 
to study the nature and specificity of this process. What makes inheritance so special 
compared to other processes of property transfer? Through which laws or norms do 
people justify their claims and decisions regarding inheritance? How do norms and laws 
affect the emergence and the solving of conflicts related to inheritance? What kinds of 
strategies do parents and offspring pursue to achieve particular aims within the scope of 
inheritance? 
This chapter starts with the case of how don Anastacio cheated his fellow siblings. 
Experienced as a land grabber and invader of other people's property, he had learnt 
how to claim his sister's inheritance after her death. The section thereafter discusses the 
contrasting differences between the law and local norms of inheritance. Central to the 
Civil Code arrangements of inheritance is the protection of siblings as the principal 
heirs. Inheritance practices, however, deal with many divergent objectives property 
holders and heirs. The subsequent section analyses a civil court case between two 
brothers that, in the course of time, turned into a criminal case between a group of 
cousins. The chapter then discusses inheritance strategies as seen from the point of view 
of parents and then looks at the way offspring deal with inheritance. The chapter 
intends to find out the role laws and norms play in the emergence of violence, how 
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stacking of laws and norms takes place, and how this produces changes in inheritance 
practices. 
Inheritance practices and strategies: Anastacio and his siblings 
Don Anastacio Garcia is 76 years old. He and his wife Flor have eleven children, 
several of whom still live in the village, while others have migrated to the city of San 
Pedro de Sula. Anastacio is a known personality in the village. He was a school teacher, 
a job which he fulfilled for years to everyone's satisfaction. In spite of lacking the 
official title as a real 'profesor', he is said to be a much better teacher than those who 
teach nowadays. He was also the municipal secretary for years. He still draws up 
letters, documents or official papers for illiterate villagers. After his retirement, he 
started to invest his small pension in his coffee fields and other agricultural activities. 
The villagers' image of Anastacio is not wholly positive, however. His extramarital 
affairs are a source of village gossip and people disapprovingly talk about his habit of 
taking pleasure in invading other people's property. 
In the 1970s, he was a member of a peasant group allied to one of the national 
peasant organisations, which tried to occupy the land of the Lara family (Chapter Two) 
within the framework of the agrarian reform. In the fights with the Lara family, he 
nearly lost his life as well as spending several days in prison. Thereafter, he individually 
invaded land belonging to other holders on several occasions. Anastacio's eyes twinkled 
when he talked about these events and he became very enthusiastic. Villagers 
commented: 'Don't think that Anastacio is a nice man. Look at what he did to his own 
brothers!'. 
Dofta Mina and husband 
Children Anastacio 
(married to Flor) 
Jesus Ricardo 
(mentally disturbed) 
Clara daughter (name 
unknown) 
Eduardo, the lazuro 
(youngest son) 
GmndcMlclren Eleven children Oswaldo Tomes 
Figure 4.1 Actors in the conflict over the land of dona Mina 
The land of dona Mina 
Anastacio's mother, dona Mina, had four sons: Eduardo, Anastacio, Jesus and Ricardo. 
She also had two daughters, of whom only Clara remained in the village. Mina owned 
two large plots of land. Her grandson Tomas still retained good memories of his 
grandmother. He recalled that she controlled land in a place called Crossroads and also 
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had a considerable amount of mountain land. According to the logbooks of the 
municipal council, Mina was granted a concession to the mountain land in 1953. Tomas 
claimed she basically used it by renting it out to other agricultural producers. Producers 
were particularly interested in leasing the land in Crossroads that was suitable for the 
cultivation of beans. Mina wanted her sons to have the land but none of them showed 
any interest in using it at that time. When she decided to sell the mountain land, Tomas 
bought twelve manzanas which he still owned. Anastacio also bought part of this land 
but he sold it afterwards. 
After Mina died, her land in Crossroads came into the hands of her husband. He 
spent the last years of his life ill and infirm, taken care of by his daughter Clara. As he 
was very grateful to Clara, he wanted her to inherit his belongings but he also felt that 
he should comply with the general custom to bequeath everything to the youngest son, 
Eduardo. Hence, he told his children that in case Clara would die, Eduardo would 
become the heir. Clara received a public deed to her father's land in her name. Clara, 
Eduardo and Ricardo lived together in the parental house after their father's death. 
Ricardo, who was mentally disturbed, was not able to live independently and he needed 
the daily care of his sister and brother. 
One day, Eduardo ended up in deep trouble. He killed another man whom he 
suspected of having a relationship with the woman he was in love with. He was sent to 
the local prison pending the district court's decision.1 Clara sold part of the land in 
Crossroads and finally succeeded in purchasing her brother's freedom. 
Clara's death marked the beginning of a new range of events. Since she never 
married and had no children, Anastacio and Jesus considered themselves as the heirs. 
They did not respect their father's wish to consider Eduardo as the heir after Clara's 
death. Now, as it is, Anastacio made matters worse by arguing that they had to act 
because Eduardo wanted to sell the land. 
Anastacio discovered the land title among Clara's possessions that had been issued to 
her under the PTT titling program (see Chapter Two). She had never made the effort 
to pay for the title, thinking it was a document of no importance chiefly because her 
father had already given her a public deed of the land. Anastacio, however, saw that the 
title was an official document with stamps and the signature of a lawyer: 'I thought this 
must have some value', he said. 
The LNA urged the family to pay for the land title, or else the land would revert to 
the state. Thus Anastacio signed the promissory note; he and his brother Jesus went to 
the LNA office in San Pedro de Sula to transfer the title to their names and they each 
paid 190 Lempiras. The LNA official asked them whether Clara had other heirs. When 
he heard that the other brothers Eduardo and Ricardo were poor, he said that these 
heirs 'would not be a problem'. He considered that the other heirs had no chance to be 
declared the legitimate heirs of Clara because they would never be able to afford a 
lawyer. 
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Eduardo became enraged when he heard that he brothers succeeded to title Clara's 
land in their names. Anastacio recalled: 'My brother is so naive, he let others incite him 
to complain to the authorities that I threatened him with death. I was locked up in 
prison here in the village, but Flor went to my lawyer in Santa Barbara.2 My lawyer 
came with the title document and I was immediately released'.3 
Eduardo sued Anastacio and Jesus in the court of Santa Barbara. He presented 
Clara's public deed of the land to the court and he told the judge that his father wanted 
him to become the heir after Clara's death. Anastacio, on the other hand, presented 
Clara's paid land title to the judge. The judge was thus left with two claims of 
ownership, one of which had to be nullified. At first, the judge pronounced that he 
intended to assign the land to Eduardo. He argued that Anastacio and Jesus had nothing 
because they had presented the title that bore Clara's name: their own title had not yet 
been issued. But Anastacio told the judge that in that case he would go to the local 
Santa Barbara radio station 'Hondas de Ulua' to declare that the PTT land titles had no 
value in the court of justice. An LNA official who was present in the court quickly 
approached the judge for a discrete consultation. It was in the interests of the LNA that 
the PTT land title should be preferred rather than the public deed. After this tête-à-tête, 
the judge changed his mind. He assigned the land to Anastacio and Jesus, and Eduardo 
lost the case. 
Anastacio happily concluded his version of the story: 'It took a lot of time and 
money and I had to make many rounds through Santa Barbara. All those papers... I 
always wanted one of my sons to become a lawyer, it's a great thing'. Although Jesus 
also benefited from what happened, in the eyes of other villagers don Anastacio was the 
one who was blamed. Jesus was dead at the time of these interviews. Moreover, 
villagers considered Anastacio as the brains behind the operation using resources that 
were not open to other people. 
Jesus and Anastacio divided the land into two plots. After the death of Jesus, his son 
Oswaldo decided to sell his portion of the land to his uncle Anastacio. Oswaldo needed 
money to pay the services of a lawyer whom he had hired to get back the land which 
had been sold by his aunt Clara when Eduardo was in jail. Oswaldo argued that this 
land never belonged to his aunt Clara because it had been his father's legitimate 
portion. In his eyes, his aunt had no right to sell the land. Oswaldo never saw this claim 
rewarded. Then one day he returned from San Pedro de Sula where he lived. Without 
consulting anyone, he again invaded the land he inherited from his father, but which he 
himself had sold to his uncle, and started sowing beans. Bystanders were luckily able to 
prevent a bloody machetazo between Oswaldo and one of Anastacio's sons at the last 
moment. 
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Causes of conflicts 
Anastacio was certainly an exceptional man with a particular set of resources and 
knowledge. Yet the particular history of Mina's land in Crossroads was only partly 
shaped by the personal characters of the people involved. Over the course of time, the 
land was partly sold to purchase freedom for a murderer; it was subject of conflicting 
claims of three brothers in court; it was divided between two brothers; it was partly 
sold and thereafter invaded. Anastacio again subdivided his part between his own 
eleven children. Several of them sold their share to others after they received it. The 
sum total of these events was a history of competing claims, shifting boundaries and 
latent and active conflicts, the general history of which is shared by other families and 
other plot histories. In the case of the Mina's land, the following elements played a 
decisive role: 
• heir preference 
• competing claims between deed and PTT title 
• judges who were not led by justice but by interests 
• lack of possibilities to claim rights 
• mingling of inheritance and sale in property transfer 
• reinforcement of kinship. 
The way that Anastacio's father dealt with the inheritance is common. First, his 
point of departure was that he wanted one of his children, and not all of them, to be 
the heir. He preferred his daughter who took the responsibility of caring for him in his 
old age. Nevertheless, he also tried to comply with the custom of preference for the 
youngest son. I explain the particularities of this custom later in this chapter. The 
consequence of inheritance preference is that other interested persons are left 
completely empty-handed. Whether inheritance preference leads to conflicts or not 
depends on the claims of the excluded parties and their ability to put these claims 
forward. 
It is also common that the sale and inheritance of the land get mixed up in the 
process of inheritance. Clara sold part of the land in order to set her brother free, but 
the sale of the land was not considered legitimate by other heirs because they did not 
recognise her exclusive rights to the land in the first place. Grandson Oswaldo had sold 
his land rights to his uncle, but he later again tried to make a claim with the argument 
that he had inherited the land. 
Another common issue that arises during the inheritance process is that not all 
parties have equal access to resources in their struggle for obtaining a share of the 
inheritance. Anastacio had two important resources at his disposal that other people 
lacked: money and his knowledge of procedures, papers and bureaucrats. He was 
familiar with practices of trickery with official documents and he received full co-
operation of the LNA administration for this purpose. He knew what to say and how 
to act to make them co-operate. 
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The arbitrary working of kinship is also a common characteristic of inheritance 
practices. Blood relationships are the one and only basis for claiming inheritance rights: 
without blood relation, it is difficult to put oneself forward as heir. However, the 
assignment of rights do not automatically follow logically from one's position in blood 
relationships. Whether or not one is able to make a claim depends on many other 
aspects of the relationship. Kinship thus needs reinforcement of other relational 
features. 
Inheritance and the legal framework 
A general phenomenon in the world is that inheritance rules exist to be broken 
(Gregory and Altman 1989). An explanation of this phenomenon might be that this is a 
way to adapt inheritance to local circumstances and features (Netting 1993). This 
chapter asks whether indeed a smooth adaptation of inheritance rules to changed 
circumstances takes place. Moreover, it discusses whether the central goal of such 
adaptations of inheritance rules is to preserve the unity of the farm (Netting 1993). This 
section compares the different norms regarding inheritance in state law. The 
subsequent section then turns to the norms that play a role in inheritance practices. 
Inheritance norms in civil and agrarian law 
The third book of the 1906 Civil Code is about inheritance (Honduras 1989). This 
book prescribes two procedures for inheritance, the first of which is applicable when 
there is no testament (art. 958). In this case the law ascribes rights of inheritance to 
heirs in the following order: children, parents, brothers and sisters, the surviving 
spouse, the municipalities (art. 960). In case the deceased has children (including 
adopted children), all inherit equal parts of the estate (art. 965). Although the Civil 
Code distinguishes between the inheritance rights of legitimate and illegitimate 
children, this difference was abolished by the Constitution of 1957 (art. 102). The 
Family Code of 1984 (Honduras 1991) also grants equal inheritance rights to legitimate, 
illegitimate and adoptive children (art. 155). Without children, parents and the 
surviving spouse inherit at a ratio of one to one. Without children or parents, brothers 
and sisters, and the surviving spouse inherit at a ratio of one to one. Without brothers 
or sisters, only the surviving spouse inherits, although there are certain conditions 
regarding this (art. 971).4 In case there is no surviving spouse, other family members to 
the sixth degree are entitled to the inheritance. If other family members do not exist, 
then, the inheritance is bestowed upon the municipality where the deceased lived (art. 
974). 
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Article 979 stipulates the principal of testamentary freedom but adds a few 
restrictions. The first restriction concerns the livelihood (alimentos) of minor children 
and invalids (arts. 206-226, Family Code). Minor children cannot be completely 
disinherited in a testament because they are entitled to a livelihood until they are adults. 
In case a testament omits this facility, the judge must enforce it (art. 1148). A second 
restriction on testamentary freedom is the conjugal portion of the surviving spouse (art. 
1150). The spouse, however, cannot automatically claim the conjugal portion. The 
economic regime in the former marriage primarily determines which properties 
belonged to the remaining spouse and which belonged to the deceased spouse. The 
surviving spouse is entitled to one fourth of the properties of the deceased spouse at the 
most. It depends on the personal wealth of the surviving spouse how much the conjugal 
portion will be. For example, if the surviving spouse owns 40.000 lempiras and the 
conjugal portion should be 70.000, then the surviving spouse is only entitled to 30.000 
lempiras as an addition to his or her own fortune (Cruz Lopez 1995). The surviving 
spouse can thus only claim a conjugal portion in addition to his or her own fortune. 
Every adult is entitled to draw up a testament (art. 986). The solemn form is written 
(art. 990) in the presence of a notary. For an 'open' (read aloud) testament, three 
witnesses are needed (art. 994); the closed form requires five witnesses (art. 1003). In 
villages where a notary isn't available, the justice of the peace (JP) may fulfil this role 
(see Chapter Six for an explanation of the institution of the JP). Less solemn forms of 
drawing up testaments also exist. This may be done verbally in the presence of five 
witnesses in specific circumstances, for example epidemics. The judge needs to confirm 
the testament and it has to be publicly registered (arts. 1014-1026) 
Except for the two restrictions of livelihood and the conjugal portion, both 
mentioned above, a testator can freely distribute his or her properties. It is possible to 
name someone as the universal heir, or to assign specific properties to specific persons. 
The law perfectly allows for the disinheritance of descendants. It is sufficient to avoid 
naming the child that one wishes to disinherit in the testament. 
Agrarian laws also contain stipulations about inheritance rights. According to 
Menendez Hernandez (1971), agrarian laws have been in conflict with the Civil Code in 
this respect. The Agrarian Reform Law of 1975 prescribes that the surviving spouse or 
a child who complies with the requirements for beneficiaries may inherit the land, yet 
it strictly prohibits the division of the land between various heirs (art. 84). This makes 
it opposed to the Civil Code that allows testamentary freedom with only a few 
restrictions. The Law of Modernisation of 1992 reformulated the same article to give 
preference to the surviving spouse. Hence agrarian law, in contrast to Civil Code 
stipulations, is inclined toward the preservation of the farm instead of achieving 
equality between heirs. 
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Legal procedures to claim inheritance 
The procedure of inheritance is a way to acquire ownership of the properties of a 
deceased person (see Chapter Two). In order to legally claim an inheritance, the heirs 
start a civil procedure in court and an administrative procedure in the Finance 
Department (which collects taxes and assesses the value of the deceased's properties), to 
take possession of the inheritance. The court procedure is called a 'declaration of 
inheritance'. The obliging character of the procedure aims to protect minors who are 
not able to protect their own rights. The procedure precludes the possibility that 
certain family members divide the inheritance among themselves in common 
agreement without interference from the judicial court. 
The procedure starts with a request to the civil court to name a person as the heir 
and to grant him or her the 'effective possession' of the inheritance. The judge 
'investigates' whether the applicant is a legitimate heir of the deceased and designates 
effective possession of the inheritance with the addition that the verdict does not affect 
the rights of other heirs. Other heirs can also complete the procedure and can be 
granted effective possession. 
I studied dozens of court files from these procedures in the General Archive of the 
Judicial Power in Tegucigalpa. I found sentences of the court in cases of people who 
died several decades before the heir submitted the application to the court. In these case 
files, the heir did not start such a procedure immediately after the death of a person. 
Inheritance procedures are characterised by delays and untimely endings because of 
problems in the presented personal documents. The applicant has to present several 
documents: birth-certificates of the applicant and the deceased, a marriage certificate 
and a certificate of death of the testator.5 Another document that the procedure 
requires is a statement from the Finance Department about the total value of the 
inheritance which was left by the deceased. These documents are major obstacles to 
starting and successfully ending the procedure. 
Many people do not have a birth-certificate. When someone desperately needs such a 
document, long journeys are often required to acquire it. Money for travelling is not 
the only obstacle to acquiring birth-certificates. Birth-certificates frequently contain 
spelling errors. Moreover, a person may use another surname than the one mentioned 
in his birth-certificate. He may use, for example, the surname of the uncle with whom 
he grew up instead of the name of the mother. Judges in the studied case files frequently 
postponed or nullified cases because of the unclear identity of the applicant or the 
deceased person. Failures in personal documents easily occur because books of local 
civil registers may easily be burnt, lost or inefficiently managed, making it more 
difficult to obtain certificates of birth or death. 
Furthermore, a lack of knowledge or capital may present obstacles for starting and 
completing the procedure. Lack of knowledge and ignorance about the existence of 
legal inheritance procedures are common in rural areas. Additionally, a lack of capital 
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makes it difficult to obtain the necessary documents. Ideological obstacles such as those 
regarding the rights of women may also play a role. I came across cases of women who 
requested to be named as heir. However, women often started a procedure to request 
possession of the inheritance for their children without claiming the conjugal portion 
which they were possibly entitled to. 
Although complying with legal inheritance procedures is obligatory for obtaining 
ownership of inherited goods, these procedures are rarely used in El Zapote. Two 
lawyers whom I asked about this contradiction gave divergent answers. The first lawyer 
was a famous and expensive lawyer in the capital city who worked for well-paying 
clients. The second lawyer mainly served relatively poor rural clients in the Santa 
Barbara district. The first lawyer had no idea about the world of the client group of the 
other lawyer. His ideas were based on a concept of the educated client with resources. 
He expressed the view that it was an obligatory procedure and that every heir was 
obliged to follow the legal prescriptions. In his eyes, there would be no other way for 
heirs to claim the properties of a deceased person. He ignored the fact that the 
procedures were rarely used, or only by people in town who had the means to 
complete them. The second lawyer referred to the complexity of the procedure and his 
clients' lack of money to complete it. He stated that many people do not know about 
the existence of legal prescriptions concerning the acceptance of inheritance. They do 
not feel the necessity of the procedure because they do not legally claim ownership. A 
declaration of inheritance is needed when the heir intends to inscribe the property in 
the Public Register of Property. In other cases, heirs take possession without the 
intervention of a judge. 
The perceptions of these lawyers were strikingly different. A strict adherence to the 
legal procedures was no longer possible for the second lawyer, who was constantly 
confronted with the inaccessibility of such legal procedures and their non-conformity 
with people's perceptions of property. What people do - not complying with 
procedures of inheritance - was ignored by one lawyer but considered legitimate by the 
other. 
Stacking norms in inheritance practices 
This section will look more closely at practices of inheritance and how norms become 
stacked over time through these practices and again shape inheritance practices. This 
section primarily analyses the content of testaments. The result of testamentary 
freedom is that the content of testaments tells us much about the norms and practices 
of inheritance. This section also asks the question of whether and to what extent the 
image of inheritance constructed through reading the testaments differs from 
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inheritance practices in El Zapote. Furthermore, how the practices of inheritance in El 
Zapote change under the influence of a process of stacking norms is examined 
Writing testaments 
'People do not write testaments, you know, because they are afraid of thinking about 
death. They prefer to leave it up to the heirs to divide after death'. This lawyer 
correctly assumed that the majority of people do not make use of the possibility to 
make a will. As this chapter will show, however, the cited lawyer erroneously alleged 
that making wills is set aside in favour of letting the process of distribution of property 
among heirs take its course. Wills demonstrate different aims of the persons who make 
them. This section argues that these aims are also central to inheritance strategies 
without a will. 
I read fifty testaments from the period 1900-1990 in the General Archive of the 
Judicial Power in Tegucigalpa. I inferred from these documents the main aspirations for 
making a will: 
• to enforce a particular division of properties among different interested persons 
• to attach conditions to the inheritance 
• to disinherit 
• to anticipate and prevent problems between heirs 
Divisions, conditions and stipulations in different manifestations came to the fore in 
the last will of Jorge Alvarado. Jorge's grandson Roberto presented a request in court in 
1957 to be declared his grandfather's heir. The court file contained the last will and 
testament of Jorge, in which he declared that he was the father of six legitimate children 
(four of them deceased, the other two Nila and Feliciano lived), three illegitimate 
children (Jose, Victor and Anita), and one unofficially adopted daughter (hija de 
crianza) called Antonia. Jorge declared his grandson Roberto to be his only and 
universal heir. Furthermore, he assigned legacies to the following people: 
• To grandson Roberto: the house, but with the condition that Jorge's wife Maria had 
the right to live in it as long as she was alive. The condition attached to this legacy 
was that Roberto had to take care of Maria. Roberto also received land and a house 
in the mountains. 
• To daughter Nila: two manzanas of land, not further specified.6 
• To daughter Anita: a pasture field, not further specified. 
• To son Jose: three manzanas of the land where Jose also built his house. 
Furthermore, a plot of pasture land and several other specifically indicated small 
plots. 
• To the adopted daughter Antonia: four manzanas of land, on the condition that 'if 
she wishes to sell the land, then, she should preferably sell to grandson Roberto'. 
• To son Feliciano: several specific plots of land. 
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• To son Victor: land and a house his mother had the use rights to as long as she 
remained alive.7 
There were several remarkable aspects in this will. Jorge named his grandson as his 
only universal heir, which meant that he should organize the funeral, the distribution 
of properties and the payment of debts. To name one person as the universal heir was 
generally a strategy to prevent problems and to assure the proper execution of the 
testament. The testator apparently considered his grandson as the relative whom he 
particularly trusted. 
A second characteristic of Jorge's will that I also noticed in the wills of other people 
was that properties were assigned without being very specific or precise. To assign Nila 
'two manzanas of land' and Anita 'a pasture field', does not guarantee that these 
women will receive something according to the intention of the testator. Jorge 
apparently trusted that the interested people knew exactly which properties or parts of 
properties he was referring to. One can image that this would easily become a source of 
conflict after reading the will. 
A third point is that Jorge did not leave the women out, but there were some 
striking features in the provisions he made for them. In the legacy to his adopted 
daughter Antonia, he anticipated her wish to sell the land. He built in the condition 
that if she considered selling, she would sell to Roberto. Jorge also thought about his 
wife and about the mother of his illegitimate children. Neither woman received a 
legacy, but instead were appointed use rights to the houses in which they lived. 
Moreover, he imposed the condition on Roberto that he had to take care of Maria, and 
on Victor that he had to respect his mother's use rights to the land and the house for as 
long as she lived. These women did not receive strong property rights to their houses, 
as Jorge transferred ownership of these properties to others. Both women were 
dependent on the goodwill of their sons, and it was not very likely that they would be 
able to defend their rights if their sons were to throw them off the property. 
In contrast to many other testaments, Jorge did not aim to disinherit one or more 
heirs. He seemed to have legated properties to all of his offspring and he made 
provisions for the two women he felt responsible for. In many other testaments, the 
main aim was to disinherit. Some testaments mentioned reasons for it, for example, 
'scandalous behaviour towards the testator'. In other wills, the testator did not mention 
the 'why' of this action. For example, an eighty year-old widow had two daughters, 
Marcela and Paula. The testament stated that her deceased husband did not contribute 
to the marriage capital, but that she inherited twenty-five pesos from her own father. 
At the time she made the testament, she owned a house, a 'possession' (unclear what 
kind of possession) and a plot of land of three manzanas with sugarcane and bananas. 
The testament declared that: 'She [the widow] gave her deceased daughter Lidia a small 
terrain to cultivate, but since she disappeared... she transferred her house and 
possessions to her youngest daughter Paula, and she will be the only and universal 
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heir'. The document then continued: 'She denies the rights of her daughter Lidia so 
that her childrea.. cannot claim property rights to the land she refers to because of 
their bad behaviour against the testator who didn't want to specify the reasons for her 
irritation'. This widow thus made the testament to disinherit her grandchildren who 
legally had inheritance rights in representation of their mother Lidia. She named Paula 
as the only heiress and therefore disinherited her daughter Marcela as well. Marcela 
wasn't mentioned at all in the testament, which was enough to have her disinherited. 
I came across testators who assigned properties to the surviving spouse in only a few 
cases. Several testaments stated that the spouse did not 'contribute' to the marriage 
capital and that for this reason, she or he was not entitled to any property. 
It is common that testators intend to anticipate problems between heirs. In several 
testaments, testators divided their assets between their offspring but added the 
condition that they would be entitled to receiving these properties only if they accepted 
the will as it was. For example, a testator in San Francisco in 1970 included the 
condition that goods had to be equally divided between the children '...in good 
harmony, without the need to occupy the courts because he [the testator] states that it 
is my will that he who wants to go to court, angry about this distribution of my 
properties, will lose his rights...'. Such comments and conditions in testaments seemed 
to anticipate the situation where, in spite of drawing up a last will and testament, the 
testator needed other instruments to accomplish the will. The statement, the document 
itself, was not enough to guarantee this. 
The conditions that testators imposed upon the receipt of inheritance rights were 
very detailed in some cases. In a testament of 1901, a widow expressed her concerns 
about the behaviour of her offspring after her death. She therefore posed conditions on 
the heirs regarding her own funeral arrangements. This widow declared in her 
testament that she was sixty years old and had been married twice; both husbands had 
died. She had one child with the first and eight with the other. She owned a stallion, 
two horses, four cows, two bullocks, a young bull, a house, a sewing machine and a 
plot of land with bananas. The testament stated that '... her daughter Rosa owes her 
thirty pesos because she sold a bullock without her permission. And twenty-two redes 
[old type of coin] because she slaughtered a pig'. The document continued: 'when she 
dies her body will be buried in a coffin, and she orders that Mass be celebrated and after 
that a 'novenario de misas resadas' in one of their houses for the sake of her soul.8 After 
the novena they will celebrate two Masses: one after a year and another on her 
birthday'. She further stipulated that 'after deducting the costs of the burial and 
sickbed, what is left over shall be divided between her children in equal portions. Her 
son Abraham will preferably inherit the possession 'Las Mesas', where he already 
cultivates a sugarcane field. Her daughter Rosa only gets what is left after deducting her 
debts'. The document explicitly disinherited several grandchildren: '...that to her 
grandchildren... she doesn't assign the inheritance to which they were entitled in 
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representation of her deceased daughters Julia and Emilia, and the reason why she 
chooses to disinherit these grandchildren is because it is her will without mentioning 
any motives'. 
Hence, heirs do not consent to the division and to their share; the property holder 
wants to disinherit certain heirs; and the testator fears that his or her last wishes will 
not be obeyed. The question is whether the goals of people who make a testament 
actually stand a chance of being realised. The testaments have shown that testators want 
to actively decide who will inherit and who will not. Central to the stipulations that 
they laid down in their testaments were the rights of offspring; the testator assigned his 
properties to the surviving spouse in only a few testaments. The testators intend to 
anticipate problems relating to the fact that heirs do not always comply with the last 
will, but start their own struggles after the death of the testator. The aim of the testator 
is to reduce the space for these struggles as much as possible. The subsequent sections 
will compare the goals of testators and the norms built into their testaments in the 
practices of inheritance in El Zapote. 
The lazuro rule 
The main feature of inheritance in El Zapote is that it concerns an unequal division of 
property in which a system of preference for the youngest son, called the lazuro, is 
dominant.9 When the youngest child is a girl, some people will call her lazura. This 
does not mean that she will be appointed as the only heiress as the right to inherit land 
is strongly attached to male offspring. When they were asked about the history and 
reason why the lazuro rule existed, villagers shrugged their shoulders and only said that 
it was a custom. They were not able to think of a reason why it had always existed: 
It's the custom here, the parents only give to one child, the lazuro. He can be 
surrounded by other brothers but they do not receive anything. I don't know why 
because they are all children... it should be a little to all. Here it isn't like this, various 
people, almost the majority, are like this. They do not give to everybody, only to one 
who is called the lazuro. The lazuro is the one who exerts himself less, he is the last one 
and his elder brothers, maybe they have worked but they do not achieve anything... 
I heard numerous stories about the consequences of the rigorous application of the 
lazuro rule: 
My father left all his belongings to my brother Ariel who was the lazuro. Ariel left the 
village and went to San Pedro where he finished primary school. My father made a 
document just before the death of my elder brother. He called a few witnesses, the 
mayor and the municipal secretary, and stated that he wanted his youngest son to have 
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all he owned after his death. He wanted them to draw up a deed of purchase, through 
which he sold to Ariel all that he had, for 1900 Lempiras. Everything, even the 
furniture in the house. The witnesses insisted that he had other children as well, and 
that he shouldn't do this. My father answered that his eldest son would die anyway [he 
was an alcoholic]. The witnesses said that nobody knew how long he would live. But 
in the end, they drew up the document. Ariel found out [that the document existed] 
when he came to bury our elder brother. He took the document with him to San Pedro 
and went to see a lawyer as soon as possible. That's why it is all his, now. 
The man whose story I quote here, Excequiel, was enraged about his father's 
behaviour. He was the son who took care of his old and sick parents, while Ariel, the 
lazuro, left the village and lived in the town of San Pedro. Even after Excequiel began 
his own farm household, he made sure that his parents had enough food and firewood. 
Excequiel built his first house on a plot of land which was his father's. However, he 
decided to move when the land came into the hands of Ariel. He frequently rented part 
of the land from Ariel to cultivate beans and he tried several times to convince Ariel to 
sell him the land, but Ariel refused. 'He doesn't want to sell to a relative. He waits until 
my mother dies too, and then he expects to sell the house, the land and everything, in 
one go'. 
Excequiel had no explanation for his father's behaviour: 'He was a brute, only 
interested in drinking. He didn't want to please his children. He expected everything 
but gave nothing'. 
Primogeniture (oldest son) or ultimogeniture (youngest son), are common systems of 
preference in inheritance in many countries (Lison-Tolosana 1976, Goody et al. 1978). 
According to Foster (1960:153), inheritance practices in Spain differ according to 
geographical region. In one area, Foster came across a system that preferred the 
youngest son: the father gave dowries and additional property to the eldest children as 
they married and moved away, while the youngest son stayed at home to care for the 
older people and received the inheritance as a reward. 
The lazuro rule in El Zapote, however, does not seem to have such a logic, or at least 
not anymore. It may have had it in earlier times when migration was difficult and land 
less scarce. Nowadays, the preference system does not entail conditions and obligations 
for the lazuro. Ariel left the village without the intention of ever coming back and he 
never sent money to his parents. It was his brother, Excequiel, who worked with and 
for his parents. Using the rule of preference for the lazuro, the father knew that his 
action would not lead to guaranteed old age care but this was obviously not his motive. 
A second feature of the lazuro preference is that it does not necessarily entail any 
compensation for other heirs: Ariel received everything and his fellow siblings nothing. 
Excequiel built a house on the land of his father, but he had no rights to this land and 
he felt obliged to leave the spot when Ariel was named as the only heir. 
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The general image of the lazuro is the spoiled youngest child of the family who does 
not have to work as the other children do. The fact that the youngest son 'doesn't 
work' is a main cause of irritation and frustration among the other siblings. They feel 
that their own work and efforts are not rewarded by the parents. The rule of the lazuro 
does not agree with the philosophy of 'one good turn deserves another', or in other 
words, the expected reciprocity of work for a share in the inheritance. This is especially 
true for women. It is harder for women to make their efforts apparent to their parents 
than it is for their male siblings. Moreso than with men, they are automatically 
expected to do all kinds of work for parents without receiving any reward. I will return 
to this theme in Chapter Five. 
Not all parents stick to the rule of lazuro as strictly as the father of Excequiel and 
Ariel did. In the following case, a landowner decided not to apply the rule. Problems 
emerged thereafter because the youngest son himself started to claim rights: 
My grandfather owned a lot of land. He died unexpectedly, nobody had foreseen it. 
When he died he said to my father [Obdulio] that he charged him with the task to 
divide his properties between all children. There were three brothers and two sisters. 
My father was the eldest and had always worked with my grandfather. Problems arose 
when my grandfather was dead and buried. The lazuro of the family, who was called 
Carlos, refused to let my father divide the land, saying that he should have everything. 
It went out of hand and the mayor became involved to solve the conflict. Carlos 
proposed, then, that he and Obdulio could share the properties. My father refused. He 
wanted to divide the properties between all brothers and sisters, which was my 
grandfather's last will. He said that there was plenty of land, and that everybody could 
have land, a cow and a calf. They could sell the remaining cattle and divide the 
money. But Carlos insisted he have it all himself and in the end my father gave in. He 
refused a share for himself and said that it was better that all would be lost. My father 
was a man but then he cried. I remember that day very well. Carlos sold everything, 
except for a small plot which is now worked by his children. 
Villagers' stories about the lazuro rule all express that nobody can imagine why one 
would give all their properties to the youngest son. Although the lazuro rule is still in 
practice, its purpose and usefulness are now collectively rejected. Some informants have 
suggested that the emergence of the custom of the lazuro preference is related to the 
free availability of land in the past. In those days, it was easy for young people to start 
their own farm household because they could just grab some free land to work. They 
did not depend on receiving land as inheritance to obtain access to land. It was likely 
that the last child living with his parents - the youngest son - would inherit all the 
properties and that the other heirs had no need to claim rights as well. When land 
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became scarce and the possibilities to start to work independently diminished, the 
lazuro's claim on all properties became contested by other heirs. 
Another possible explanation of the lazuro rule is that it allows parents to continue 
exercising control over their youngest child. The youngest child still lives in the house 
while other children have already departed and started their own farm households. By 
naming the youngest child as the only heir, parents eliminate the possibility of 
loosening control over their land and house in too early of a stage. This may be linked 
to a third explanation, that the lazuro rule had indeed been related to old age care 
provisions in the past. However, the rule was also implemented in situations in which 
it was clear that the lazuro would not guarantee old age care, and in which other 
children provided for their ageing parents. 
The literature about inheritance preference in rural areas refers to the undesirability 
of fragmentation of agricultural estates as part of rural culture (Netting 1993, de Haan 
1994). However, I consider this to be an unsatisfactory explanation of the lazuro rule. 
Although the lazuro rule has existed as long as the people in the village could 
remember, the same was true for practices that totally opposed the rule. Landholders 
who worked with their fathers but never received anything and who considered 
themselves to be 'victims' of the lazuro rule insisted on an equal division of their own 
properties between their heirs. I also hesitate to accept the theory that accounts for 
inheritance preference as a way to avoid fragmentation: people do not express 
fundamental objections to a division of the land. The strategies of landholders with 
regard to inheritance are inspired by all kinds of reflections and aims. They try, for 
example, to prevent their children from obtaining part of the land to only sell it soon 
afterwards. 
The lazuro rule persists while there is apparently no logic or reason behind it. Local 
conditions and perceptions of inheritance among the people involved have changed but 
the rules have not changed correspondingly. This suggests that the slowness of adapting 
a social institution to changed circumstances is at stake here. Nobody supports the 
application of the lazuro rule; people try to bypass it but it continues to affect practices 
and people's perception of inheritance. 
Local Inheritance rules: relocation in new contexts 
Villagers of all ages and both genders regularly discuss the issue of inheritance and 
through these discussions, new rules of inheritance emerge. The growing scarcity of 
land creates more tension about inheritance and people start to look more intensively 
for alternatives. The main norm that is set against the lazuro rule is the norm of 
equality between siblings. Equality between siblings is pursued as the new norm to 
refute the lazuro preference. The norm of equality is rarely rigorously applied in 
practice as the notion of equality leaves much room for discussion and manipulation. 
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What does 'equality' mean? Which siblings are allowed to share in the inheritance? The 
equality norm is thus subjected to a variety of compromises. Basically, these 
compromises are of two kinds: accidental compromises and adaptations of the norm. 
The following cases tell the story about how accidental compromises to the norm of 
equality emerge. I call them 'accidental' because they 'just happened' without a 
deliberate intention to actually change norms. In the Gomez family, father Emilio died 
and left a plot of land of fourteen manzanas to his offspring, consisting of nine sons and 
two daughters. Their father never divided the land between them; he thought that they 
should use it collectively. This was done so initially, but problems arose between the 
siblings when their children (Emilio's grandchildren) also started to make claims on the 
land. The siblings decided to divide the land among the children so that they all would 
have their own share to bequeath to their own heirs. The division, however, became 
contested because it had not been made equally. Sergio, for example, lived in the 
paternal house on the land. Yet the plot of land on which this house was built was 
assigned to another brother, Angel. Angel wanted Sergio to leave the land and to 
relocate his house on the land that Sergio himself obtained. Sergio refused to leave 
because it was a good house surrounded by valuable fruit trees and tule. 
When the INA came to title the land, new problems emerged. The LNA titled the 
entire lot of land in the name of the late Emilio and insisted that the heirs would 
collectively pay and thereafter subdivide the title because otherwise they would lose it. 
Several siblings were too poor to pay their share or they simply refused to take up this 
responsibility. A group of siblings paid the title and then demanded that those who did 
not contribute to the payment should give up their rights to the land. Hence, internal 
differences of opinion about equality, as well as the INA intervention, caused the late 
Emilio's wish that his children would equally and collectively use the land to become 
contested. 
If a landholder decides to distribute his properties among all his children it does not 
mean that all heirs receive equal shares. In one family, the father died at a young age 
and left a widow, four sons, four girls, and sixteen manzanas of land. The widow took 
possession and three years before her own death, she divided the land between her 
children. She bequeathed them all, but she made a difference between the sons and the 
daughters. Her 12 manzanas of land in Nejapa was divided between all the children: the 
sons received two manzanas each and the daughters one manzana each. The coffee field 
of four manzanas which she owned in the mountains was divided only between the 
sons, each receiving one manzana. One of her daughters explained: 'I think that my 
mother thought what they used to say here: it is the duty of the husband to help his 
wife, so women do not need to inherit land as much as men'. 
The land of Obdulio, who himself had been a victim of the lazuro (previous section), 
was also divided between all siblings. The eldest daughter received a plot of land of 
more than seven manzanas. Her three sisters all received smaller plots of less than three 
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manzanas. A son received more than eight manzanas of high quality land, while the 
lazuro of the family received four manzanas and the parental house. Another brother 
only received a plot of land of only one manzana. 
In these cases of accidental compromises on the norm of equality, the desired norm 
was to achieve equality but the result was an unequal division of property. The unequal 
result, however, was not a sign of changing norms but it was merely the outcome of 
personal preferences, coincidences and family histories. 
Actual adaptations of the norm of equality also take place, with adaptations taking 
the form of new norms. First, education as a means to escape poverty has become more 
important in the village. The private evening college was turned into a public daytime 
college, which was much less expensive. Moreover, the intensification of coffee 
production and a related increase of income enlarged the possibilities for the offspring 
of coffee producers to continue their studies. Parents raised the question as to what 
extent the education of these children should be considered as their share of the 
inheritance. I recorded phrases such as 'you are the one to decide about who receives 
(inheritance) rights. If a father has paid for the education of the child, then that is his 
inheritance. You don't have to give him land too'. Inheritance was seen as a means to 
support the future of a child. If this is completed, one way or another, the right to 
inheritance of this child expires. 
The rule that education should also be seen as part of inheritance was clearly 
expressed in the following event in the Hernandez family. Domingo Hernandez, coffee 
producer, started to drink during the coffee harvest in 1994. He drank all through 
December and January. Fortunately, his wife was assisted by their eldest son Daniel to 
deal with the coffee harvest. Daniel arranged the day labourers, went to the field every 
day and returned with the mule and the bags of coffee. He helped his mother to clean 
and dry the coffee. One day, Domingo started yelling at his son so that every passer-by 
enjoyed the family quarrel too. Domingo asked what Daniel was doing and whether he 
thought he would be able to claim the coffee field by working. He blamed Daniel for 
being a profiteer. He further shouted that he had paid for Daniel's education (who was 
a jobless school teacher) and he was expected to live on his own now. Then he threw 
his son out of the house. Domingo obviously wanted to ventilate his frustrations while 
he was drunk. However, his actions also expressed his fear that, apart from his 
education, Daniel wanted to claim the coffee field as his inheritance. Domingo made it 
clear that, in his eyes, Daniel had already received his share and that the other siblings 
who didn't study were entitled to the coffee field. 
A second new rule concerns the rights of migrated offspring. Migration has recently 
become more important as an option for young people. Both pull and push factors are 
causing the apparent increase in (often temporary) out-migration. In San Pedro Sula and 
surroundings, large assembly plants (maquilas) have emerged, offering salaried jobs that 
many youngsters had never dreamed of in their home villages. On the other hand, 
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young people in El Zapote are extremely aware that it is impossible for all to make a 
Uving in agriculture. Migration is a solution to the shortage of land. 
I witnessed a conversation between Excequiel and Rosa about the controversial issue 
of the inheritance rights of migrated offspring. They have two sons who migrated while 
two sons and two daughters still lived in their household. Rosa had just come back 
from San Pedro where she visited her eldest son Mario. She was telling about Mario, 
who said that he had no intentions of coming back to the village. He thought life in the 
village was harder than in the city. He urged his mother to tell his brothers that they 
should stay and help their father and that he would not claim his inheritance in case his 
father died. This was a difficult issue for the father, Excequiel. His own father had 
followed the lazuro rule and assigned all he had to the youngest son (previous section). 
Excequiel was therefore determined to act differently regarding his own inheritance. 
He listened to Rosa and then said that 'they are all my children and they have the same 
rights'. He wanted to include a son who grew up in another household and who he 
doesn't officially recognise as his own. Rosa reacted by telling an adapted version of a 
bible story: 
While living, a man bequeathed all his properties to the lazuro. Now, this lazuro sold 
everything and left the village. There he consumed the money. When he had nothing 
left he found work as a labourer in a pig farm He had nothing to eat and had to eat 
the same as he gave to the pigs. One day he thought about his miserable life. He 
remembered that he still had a father and a mother. He decided to return to the village 
and asked his parents for forgiveness. His parents forgave him and admitted him into 
their household as the lost son. 
After telling the story, both Excequiel and Rosa started to interpret it in order to 
explain their arguments. Rosa said that the story made it clear that you should never 
transfer properties to children who do not live in the village. 'If you give land to Mario, 
he will sell it. What can he do with it? All children receive a small plot that is not big 
enough to live on. I am not an advocate of transferring all to the lazuro. I think that 
you must give it to the children who help you. I said to the boys: work hard in the 
coffee field because it will be yours in the future. It is for yourself that you should 
work hard'. Excequiel interpreted the story to mean that whatever the son had done 
with the inheritance, he was still a son. 'You have to give to him because he is your 
son'. Excequiel wanted to hold on to his principle of equality but, at the same time, he 
considered the logic of his wife's arguments. In general, children who definitively 
migrate lose their rights, but this is different when these migrated children also help 
their parents by regularly sending them money (Papma 1992). At the time of this 
conversation, the sons of Rosa and Excequiel who had migrated were not sending 
money to help their parents. A few years later, one of them started to send money on a 
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regular basis, which immediately changed his position. His parents thought of giving 
him a part of their home garden to build a house. 
A third rule of inheritance is about the difference between legitimate and illegitimate 
children. Although the law prohibits distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate 
offspring in inheritance, people in practice do make a difference and they may use the 
difference as an occasional argument in their struggles for inheritance. However, the 
local rule does not give more rights to legitimate over illegitimate children. In fact, this 
can be either way. In some cases, illegitimate children were successful in claiming a 
larger share of their father's inheritance because they belonged to the last family with 
which their father had resided. In other cases, though, illegitimate children were not 
able to claim their rights vis-a-vis the legitimate offspring who used the legitimate-
illegitimate distinction as an argument to set aside their half-brothers or half-sisters. The 
rule does not define exactly who has what rights, but it is only used to confirm a 
certain difference between legitimate and illegitimate children, whatever the content of 
this difference is. Men who have several wives and families during their lives are often 
confronted with the problem of legitimate and illegitimate children. For example, a 
friend of Pablo commented: 
You know how many times I told Pablo that he has to go to a lawyer? If he dies, there 
will be problems. I heard that now all children have equal rights according to the law. 
But do you know who receives the inheritance if Pablo dies? His brother. His family 
has no rights because his wife isn't married to him. His sons are illegitimate. The 
woman he is married to has no rights because she lives with another man. If she would 
not have that man, she would have had the rights but now she doesn't. His legitimate 
children could claim rights but all three are girls. 
In the eyes of this friend, Pablo's three illegitimate sons should have the rights to 
inherit. Yet he thought that it would be difficult to claim these rights because of then-
status as illegitimate children. The illegitimate sons were owed their rights, according to 
another local rule, because they worked with their father in the fields. In contrast, the 
commentator thought that the legitimate children should not claim rights because they 
were girls. The difference between legitimate and illegitimate children was used as an 
occasional argument with an unpredictable content. I call it a 'rule', however, because it 
is referred to in order to guide and justify behaviour concerning inheritance. 
Pablo's friend used arguments about legitimate and illegitimate children that mixed 
with ideas about gender and about the rights of women in marriage. He constructed 
other rules in his comment that expressed his idea about gender differences in 
inheritance. In the eyes of the commentator, the official wife lost her rights because she 
lived with another man. The legitimate daughters should not claim the inheritance 
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because they were girls. Pablo's current wife did not seem to have any rights at all in 
the eyes of the commentator. 
In general, the rule expressed by both men and women is that both genders should 
be treated equally in inheritance. Hence, there is no general rule that women should be 
completely excluded. When specific inheritance questions and practices are concerned, 
equality of men and women is overruled by arguments that redefine this equality 
between the genders and, more specifically, establish who has access to what right. The 
short comment of Pablo's friend included a range of ideas and perceptions about the 
inheritance rights of women and daughters which amend the rule of gender equality 
and limit access to inheritance for women. Chapter Five will enter at length into the 
way in which women use the norm of equality in struggles for inheritance. 
Stacking of inheritance rules 
What happens in inheritance practices in El Zapote does not differ substantially from 
the image created by the testaments I read in the General Archive of the Judicial Power. 
Yet most people in El Zapote do not make testaments themselves. There are some 
indications that this was done in the past more than today. A man who was frequently 
involved in drawing up such documents in the past said: 
The old people in the past, they drew up a testament with the municipal secretary and 
the JP. In the testament they declared who would receive what after he died. But the 
problem was, such a testament did not make any difference. Because after his death, 
children started to fight anyway. A testament doesn't secure that all will be divided 
accordingly. 
Testaments do not form part of contemporary inheritance strategies because there are 
no instruments to enforce their execution. The testament does not ensure the testator 
that the heirs will respect his last will. Hence he needs to deploy additional strategies 
anyway. The necessity to write a testament is therefore reduced. 
Landholders in El Zapote share the same anxieties expressed by testators in their 
testaments. They also want to enforce a particular division of their properties, attach 
conditions to receiving properties, disinherit certain people and anticipate and prevent 
problems. They also want to actively decide who gets what without blindly following 
the local norms of inheritance. I explained that these local norms are under constant 
pressure to change. The lazuro rule is put under pressure to change because 
circumstances and the ideas about what is important to people have changed as well. 
Youngest son preference causes more inequality today than it did in the past. 
Inheritance has become more vital as a mechanism for accessing land because land is no 
longer freely available. 
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Equality between siblings has become a main rule of inheritance. This is possibly 
part of a more general tendency to consider equality between people as important. The 
struggle has now become how to define equality in practise and many amendments are 
being made that exclude or limit the rights of particular interested people. Inheritance 
no longer stands for receiving land or other valuable assets from one's parents, but it 
may also take the shape of financial support in order to receive education. Inheritance 
has become more strongly connected to helping or working for one's parents and 
migrated offspring who do not take part in this may lose their rights. A further point 
of discussion between villagers is how to interpret the equal rights of women: equality 
is redefined in the light of existing gender norms regarding land ownership. 
A continuous process thus takes place in inheritance practices, through which norms 
are stacked on other norms. Preference of one heir as the general norm is about to be 
replaced by equality between siblings, but using this rule in practice means that new 
norms of preference are emerging as well as new meanings of 'equality'. It is clear that 
local rules of inheritance do not emerge as a reaction to a law that doesn't suit the local 
circumstances. They have developed, and still develop, in a relatively autonomous way 
in relation to law. 
Inheritance and violence 
On a hot day in February, 1993, my husband Kees returned from a trip to the 
mountains pale and shocked. On his way back to the village he attended a crying man 
to the health care centre who was losing a lot of blood due to machetazos (wounds 
made with a machete) in different parts of his body and had almost fainted. Upon 
arriving at the village, the JP seemed extremely reluctant to act. Only months later did 
we began to understand who the victim had been and why the judge didn't want to 
attend to the conflict. The incident had concerned an inheritance conflict between 
different generations of one family. The case is extreme and ordinary at the same time. 
It is extreme in its long duration, violent character and consecutive court cases. It is 
ordinary because it represents the main mechanisms that play a role in the emergence 
of inheritance conflicts. 
Victoriano Deöado 
Children Leondo Marcelo Marino (deceased) 
Grandchildren Manuel Nestor (also known as Lidio) 
Marcelito 
Felipe 
Figure 4.2 Actors in Delgado family conflict about inheritance 
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The farmer, Victoriano Delgado, had three sons: Marcelo, Leoncio and Marino. 
Marino was mentally retarded and didn't play an active role in the conflict. By the time 
this story begins, when the machetazo took place, Marino had already died. After 
Victoriano's death in 1975, his sons Marcelo and Leoncio jointly filed an application for 
the concession of Victoriano's land in a place called La Pita. According to the book of 
acts of the Municipal Council, they stated before the council meeting that they jointly 
and peacefully possessed this land for thirty years. Although the brothers were able to 
peacefully divide the land in La Pita, this did not happen with the second property of 
Victoriano. This was a plot of seven hectares in an area of the mountains called La 
Laguna. The main actors involved, and other villagers, related different versions of the 
story of Victoriano's inheritance. 
The first version ran that Victoriano transferred his properties to his son Marcelo in 
his dying hour. Leoncio had migrated to the north coast and wasn't expected to return 
to the village. After several years, however, Leoncio showed up and demanded his 
portion of his father's inheritance. At that moment, Marino lived in the parental house 
and Marcelo in another house on the same house plot. Leoncio threw Marino out of 
the parental house and went to live in it. Marino thereafter moved in with Marcelo. 
The brothers Leoncio and Marcel then started to wrangle over their rights to the land 
in La Laguna and the parental house. Other villagers told another version of the story. 
In this version, the 'engineers' of the National Cadastral Directorate came to measure 
the villagers' plots of land under as part of the PTT. Victoriano ordered Leoncio to 
accompany the engineers to his plots, but Leoncio refused to obey his father and said 
that he didn't feel like it. Thereafter it was Marcelo who went with the engineers to the 
land in La Laguna. This resulted in the land being titled in Marcelo's name. A third 
version of the story gave credit to Leoncio, who was seen as having acted wholly in 
good faith. He and Marcelo had visited the INA brigade together and the LNA official 
told them that the title of the land would be in their names. However, Marcelo cheated 
his own brother and paid the LNA official so that the land was titled only in his name. 
The first court case-, a civil procedure to demand property 
The slumbering conflict between Marcelo and Leoncio about the land grew worse 
when Marcelo decided to sue his brother in the Third Court in Santa Barbara in 1991. 
He hired a lawyer and started a civil vindication procedure to demand the return of the 
land that he considered to be his property (Chapter Two). The vindication procedure 
can be used by property holders to regain ownership at the expense of a possessor. At 
the time of this court case, Marcelo was 78 years old and Leoncio 71. 
The case file started with Marcelo's demand. It read: 
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For some time now, the accused has occupied more or less three manzanas of which he 
cultivated more or less one manzana with coffee trees, in the south of my property. He 
refuses to leave the terrain in spite of the fact that I showed my title to different 
authorities to whom we turned to, and that the accused has no document to prove that 
he is owner of the land in question or which supports the claim he pretends to make. I 
appear in front of this court in the hope that I will be given back my land which was 
illegally occupied and I therefore submit this demand. 
Marcelo thus argued that Leoncio occupied part of the land he possessed legal title to 
and which Leoncio had no documents for. The court called upon Leoncio to react to 
the demand. He related that: 
I have to say, mister judge, that only two weeks before the presentation of this demand 
I found out that my brother possesses a title to the land of which the whole village, all 
inhabitants and neighbours, know that it was our father Victoriano Delgado who left 
us two plots of land: one is the plot which Marcelo Delgado demands and the other 
which we call La Pita. We have been possessing both plots and we have been using 
them one half each according to the agreement we made after the death of our father. 
We made a division with a straight line of penquillo.10 Afterwards, the plaintiff 
changed the direction of the line and included a plot of land which was mine, and 
since that moment problems have started. At this moment that I see the demand I 
know that my brother malignantly and insolently and outside my knowledge, and 
who knows with what tricks, succeeded in exclusively titling the land, which we 
jointly owned and have divided in his name. When the titling programme of the INA 
came, we went to the INA official together to inspect and measure the property, and he 
told us that the title would be in our names, and the official charged us 45 lempiras 
each to title the land. The result was that I was in expectation of my title and I 
believed that the title would bear both our names, as the INA official explained. I was 
still waiting when the plaintiff came and distributed a plot which belonged to me; he 
gave it to a son-in-law. This provoked my reaction and since that moment I saw the 
confidence of my brother when he disposed of my property and I began to see that 
something had happened and that I had become the victim of a vile deceit by both the 
INA official and my own brother. 
In his answer to the demand of his brother Marcelo, Leoncio also brought up the issue 
of the parental house, although this did not form part of Marcelo's demand. 
The house which belonged to my father was transferred to an invalid brother, after 
consulting him. [Marcelo] took him to his own house and, strangely enough, our 
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brother died three days after he took him with him. My brother the plaintiff took 
control of the house with the argument that he bought the house from our invalid 
brother Marino Delgado. I tell this story because mister judge knows of the rudeness of 
the plaintiff. 
Leoncio and his lawyer seemed already convinced that he would lose ownership of the 
land because his brother Marcelo had a land title in his name. He therefore tried 
another strategy and insisted that if Marcelo wanted to take the land he possessed he 
had to pay for the improvements. 
The most important thing is that while our father lived I cultivated two manzanas of 
coffee in this property, of which I renewed some parts because it is an old coffee field 
which needs to be sown again... hence, in case my brother malignantly succeeds in 
securing the land through a title, he has to pay me for the improvements in order to 
become possessor of these improvements, because all villagers know that I have always 
worked in this field and I will continue working it until I will be legally forced to 
vacate the land. 
After Leoncio's declaration, the case file continued with the collection of 'proofs' 
which were brought up by both parties. Leoncio requested the interrogation of four 
witnesses. These witnesses declared that the land of Victoriano Delgado was divided 
between Marcelo and Leoncio, and that Leoncio cultivated a coffee field on this plot. 
Three other witnesses testified that they knew that Leoncio was awaiting the PTT title 
that should be in his name. Furthermore, Leoncio demanded an inspection by the JP, 
which should clarify whether the plot was divided into two parts and what the age of 
the coffee field was. The court ordered the JP of the village to inspect the land and to 
report to the court. After describing the boundaries of the plot in question (expressed 
by describing the names of the adjoining owners in four directions), the JP declared 
that the plot consisted of a coffee field of seven manzanas and two manzanas that were 
not in use. He found the borderline of penquillo to be approximately fifteen years old. 
Furthermore, the JP declared that he saw a cross made to define the division. He 
considered the coffee field to be twenty years old, and there was also a part with new 
plants. The JP also observed that a part of the coffee field had been fenced separately. 
Marcelo's first evidence he submitted was his P T T title of the land. Furthermore, he 
came out with three witnesses who declared that Leoncio occupied the land which 
belonged to Marcelo for years. According to the witnesses, Marcelo had the PTT title 
because he was the owner of the land. 
After presenting the documented evidence to sustain the respective arguments, both 
parties added a concluding statement to the case file. The lawyer of Marcelo concluded 
that Leoncio tried to prove ownership of the land without presenting the necessary 
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public documents. He only presented declarations of witnesses which was, as the 
lawyer argued, not enough according to the law. Marcelo's lawyer also remarked that 
Leoncio said he uninterruptedly possess the land in a peaceful manner, but he did not 
say since when he possessed it. In this remark, the lawyer was referring in this remark 
to the civil law of adverse acquisition, which stipulates that ownership may be claimed 
after ten years of possession (see Chapter Two). 
In his conclusions, Leoncio's lawyer stressed that he did acknowledge the existence 
of Marcelo's title. However, he insisted that Marcelo had to pay for the improvements 
of the coffee field that were made by Leoncio. Furthermore, Leoncio's lawyer 
remarked that the inspection report of the JP and Marcelo's PTT title presented 
different boundaries of the land in question. A third remark was that Marcelo did not 
prove to be the owner of the improvements as these did not appear in his P T T title.1 1 
Leoncio's lawyer knew that the plaintiff had a strong argument with possession of a 
title document of the land. The only strategy he could think of was to demand 
payment of the improvements and to refer to failures in the procedure. The JP's 
declaration indeed mentioned names of the owners of the adjoining plots which were 
different from the names mentioned in the PTT title. The question was, however, if 
such differences meant that there was something wrong with the title deed. The PTT 
title was drawn up at some time around 1984, while the JP inspection took place in 
1991. It may be possible that the adjoining owners were not the same as the earlier 
owners, due to sale or inheritance processes. One of the mentioned adjoining owners in 
the PTT title, for example, did not appear in the JP's inspection report, but his wife's 
name did. Hence, the fact that the names of the adjoining owners differed was not an 
indication in itself that the PTT title and the JP referred to a different plot. 
Nevertheless, Leoncio's lawyer deliberately suggested this. He used the argument as a 
trick to convince the judge of procedural failures. 
Leoncio's lawyer's strategy paid off. The judge accepted his argument that the 
situation, surface area and boundaries of the occupied plot of land were not clear. He 
stated that clarity was essential to delivering a decision about the illegality of the 
occupation. The judge copied Leoncio's argument word for word, stating that the PTT 
title and the JP's inspection report did not mention the same adjoining owners. He 
concluded that it was therefore not clear which plot of land was the object of the 
conflict. He rejected Marcelo's demand and declared the case inadmissible (sin lugar). 
Marcelo's lawyer appealed, and the court of appeals discovered the technicality that the 
judge declared the case inadmissible outside the time limit. The court of appeals sent it 
back to the judge, but he again pronounced the case as inadmissible in January, 1992. 
Leoncio's lawyer thereafter filed a request to the court 'to execute the sentence'. 
Leoncio apparently thought that he had won the case because Marcelo had lost it. The 
judge, however, stated that neither of them had heard a sentence in either one's favour 
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and that there was nothing to be done unless a new demand was submitted. With this 
declaration, the case file was finished and sent to the court's archives. 
The second court case: criminal accusation of damages and wounds 
The second procedure started in February, 1993. This case file opened with a 
declaration of the JP in El Zapote in which Leoncio Delgado accused his nephews 
Marcelito and Felipe Delgado, sons of Marcelo Delgado, of 'damages'. Leoncio stressed 
that Marcelito and Felipe destroyed the fence of his property in 'La Laguna'. In his 
inspection report, the JP concluded that Leoncio's fence was totally destroyed, and that 
part of the posts were pulled out of the ground and others were slashed to pieces. 
Leoncio added that his son Manuel saw the accused men on the property and then, one 
day later, the fence was destroyed. The court asked Manuel to make a statement. 
Manuel declared that: 'The day that they wounded my brother Lidio [officially called 
Nestor Perdomo], Felipe and Marcelo Delgado stayed in the coffee field and returned 
to the village in the middle of the night. The next day, I got up early and went to the 
coffee field. I found the fence totally destroyed'. 
The Court in Santa Barbara decided to call upon Marcelito and Felipe Delgado. 
Only Marcelito appeared in front of the judge. He declared that he was 56 years old and 
commonly called Marcelito, 'little Marcelo'. He added that he knew nothing about 
Nestor's wounds, but that he did pull the fence out by order of his father, Marcelo 
Delgado. Marcelito was charged with 'damages' and he was sent to the Santa Barbara 
prison. He hired a lawyer and managed to become provisionally released on a bail of 
810 lempiras. The court then called the father, Marcelo, to testify. Marcelo confirmed 
that he sent his son Marcelito to pull out the posts because they stood on the part of 
the land which he had given to Marcelito as his inheritance. After the father Marcelo, 
two of Marcelito's friends testified that Marcelito had behaved blamelessly. 
The case then altered in content because Nestor (Lidio) appeared in court to make 
his declaration. He apparently came to testify about the destroyed posts. 
This particular day I met them [his cousins Felipe and Marcelito] at half a kilometre 
more or less from my father's coffee field. It was about two o'clock in the afternoon... 
that Marcelito Delgado had an axe and Felipe a colima [type of machete] and a bag, 
because I could see the bad intentions they had I returned [to the village] and I kept my 
eyes on them, and when I reached them, Felipe asked why I returned and I said I forgot 
something but I said that to deceive him because what I really wanted was to warn 
Manuel that they went with bad intentions and that he should take care of himself but 
I never managed to reach him to tell him anything because Felipe wounded me and I 
returned as fast as I could but the next day my brother returned to the coffee field and 
saw that the posts were destroyed and pulled out. 
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The court apparently was confused by this statement because the fact of a destroyed 
fence now became mixed up with a case of wounding a person. The court asked the JP 
whether one of the parties was able to present documents to prove ownership of the 
land. Furthermore, the court wanted to verify whether the intention of Nestor's 
statement was to charge Felipe with wounding him with a machete. If he did want to 
press charges against Felipe, then the wounds of Nestor needed the evaluation of a 
forensic doctor. The court further ordered the JP to check the antecedents of the 
accused persons and their involvement in other criminal charges. Thereafter, the case 
file continued with the accusation of the destroyed posts as well as the charges of 
Nestor against Felipe Delgado. 
In June, Felipe Delgado voluntarily presented himself in court because of the charges 
against him with respect to the attack on his cousin. Felipe declared that he was 
working as a day labourer in the coffee fields of Salvador Lopez on the day of the 
incident. He was accompanied by four other day labourers. He denied wounding Felipe 
and stressed that he did not commit any offence. He further claimed to know nothing 
about the destroyed fence. After this declaration, he was sent to the Santa Barbara 
prison. The day labourers and the owner of the coffee field in which they worked that 
day appeared to testify. Their statements expressed that Felipe was a good worker who 
was unpretentious and honest and who didn't have problems with anyone. He was a 
Christian and showed good behaviour, and he was poor and struggling. 
The case file then contained several hand-written sheets of paper. One of these 
documents was a letter to the mayor of El Zapote from December, 1990. 
Through this letter I would like to inform you that on this date Marcelo and Leoncio 
Delgado, with as witnesses their respective sons Felipe Delgado and Manuel Delgado, 
have reached the following agreement: 
That the terrain in Teocintal will be remeasured and divided in two equal parts, 
without including the parts which are in hands of Candido Perdomo and the part 
which don Marcelo bought from Juan Sarmiento. 
That the terrain in Robledal will be remeasured and divided into three equal parts, 
one for each brother Marcelo, Leoncio and Marino. 
Regarding the houseplot of Marcelo and Leoncio which is also an object of conflict, we 
have agreed to involve the municipal sindico, who will evaluate the situation and 
determine the possibilities. 
That a deed of purchase will be made at the moment that Leoncio Delgado will pay 
the agreed sum concerning the payment of the title and some travel expenses, which 
will be 440,99 lempiras. 
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It will be in your power to draw up the document and the solution of the conflict, 
taking into consideration the agreement between the parties. 
The document was signed by an official of the INA titling division. This document 
showed that the LNA had indeed made efforts to end the conflict between the brothers 
before the start of Marcelo and Leoncio's first (civil) procedure against each other.1 2 
Several villagers remembered that the LNA had reached a compromise between the two 
brothers. They said that the compromise failed because Leoncio was not prepared to 
pay his share of the costs of the land title. 
The court again called upon Nestor and he made a second declaration: 
On February 18 of this year at two thirty in the afternoon I returned from work on 
the property of my father Leoncio Delgado when suddenly Felipe Delgado appeared 
and without saying a word or discussing anything, he hit me with a colima he brought 
with him and when I saw this, the only thing that I could do was to hold him off with 
my left hand and he cut my forearm, I wanted to pick up my machete because it fell 
during the first machetazo and when he saw that I wanted to lean forwards he hit me 
again in my right hand and when I saw that he would kill me I turned and ran but he 
reached me and hit me again with the machete in my back. I kept running to the 
village and from there they transported me to the hospital of Santa Barbara and 
afterwards to San Pedro... I want to declare that I have never been an enemy of this 
man because we always talked, and that this problem happened because of the dispute 
about some plots ofland with his father. 
This declaration was followed by a medical report which confirmed the existence of the 
wounds described by Nestor. The court then decided to charge Felipe and set a bail of 
2000 lempiras. Marcelo, Felipe's father, used the PTT land title as collateral in order to 
pay the bail, after which Felipe was released from prison. 
The question of the destroyed posts then continued. Marcelito's lawyer argued that 
Marcelito did not cause the damages because whatever he did, it took place in the 
property of his father, who himself had ordered him to remove the fence. The lawyer 
also argued that Leoncio Delgado, who charged Marcelito with damages, was not able 
to prove his property rights according to the law. The lawyer thus concluded that the 
supposed offence, in fact, did not exist. The judge accepted this argumentation and 
released Marcelito of all charges against him. 
The court of appeals in Santa Barbara reviewed the case file and detected several 
technicalities. It declared that Felipe's case needed to be treated in a separate case file. 
Furthermore, the sentence concerning Marcelito' case, that he was freed from the 
charge about the destroyed posts, was nullified. The case file ended with this decision of 
the court of appeals. 
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Outside the court: 'solution'of conflict 
Many villagers knew about the court cases with regard to the Delgado family, although 
they didn't understand the particulars. For example: several villagers were called to 
testify on behalf of one of the parties. Their perception about the story of the conflict 
depended upon whether they considered themselves to be in the 'Leoncio' or the 
'Marcelo' camp. 
Both camps shared the opinion that some kind of escalation of the conflict had 
become inevitable. The problem had existed since the death of Victoriano in the 1970s, 
but the escalation came in the 1990s, when both brothers grew very old and wanted to 
divide the land in a dispute between their own children. At this point, the two old men 
as well as their children became involved. 
Nobody had thought that Felipe Delgado, son of Marcelo, would become an 
aggressor in the conflict. The same evening of the machetazos in La Laguna, when it 
was still unclear who did what to whom, a man (Marcelo camp) pondered about what 
happened: 'It can't be Felipe, he is a believer (in God) and he stood very aloof from the 
conflict. But you never know, the devil can be present everywhere'. This man passed 
by later that evening to tell us that it had indeed been Felipe who had used his machete. 
While he had stated before that the aggressor would be locked up in jail for several 
years, he now thought that Felipe would only have to pay a fine and the medical costs 
of his cousin, as 'it was only a few wounds'. He adjusted his judgement of the case 
knowing that it was his friend Felipe who had offended the other man. 
When we interviewed Felipe, he had just been provisionally released after a stay of a 
month in the Santa Barbara prison. He said during this interview that he was guilty and 
had made a mistake. However, several conversations and years later he maintained that 
his cousin had attacked him and that he had done nothing but defend himself. His 
provisional release was made possible by paying the bail (2,000 lempiras), and he also 
had to pay the lawyer, who asked 1,500 lempiras. To pay the bail, his father used the 
PTT title of the La Laguna land as collateral to obtain a bank loan. Felipe himself sold a 
coffee field he owned in the mountains to pay the lawyer. In order to obtain his 
definitive liberty, the lawyer again asked for 2,055 lempiras. Felipe started to work for a 
stone quarry close to the village, harsh work that paid well. Without continuance of 
the court case against Felipe, the lawyer had no trouble providing the necessary 
document of definitive release, as long as Felipe paid him. 
After the conflict escalated, Marcelo, who held the UNA land title, divided the land 
in La Laguna between his five sons. Leoncio did not succeed in making his claim on the 
part he had been using, hence he lost it. He and his children left the village and went to 
live in the north coast area. Marcelo didn't transfer the land as an inheritance, but he 
sold it to his sons for a cheap price. Felipe bought \XA manzanas, for which he paid his 
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father only 300 lempiras. He and his brothers separately received deeds of purchase. 
Marcelo's sons were now the recognised owners of the land. They were not the 'heirs', 
a position which could still be attacked by their uncle and cousins. They bought the 
land. The sale of the land with a deed of purchase gave them more security than just 
being the heirs. 
The working of the judicial system in this conflict shows several peculiarities. First, 
there was the role played by the JP. It's possible that Leoncio's lawyer's strategy was to 
deliberately cause confusion about the boundaries in order to avoid a definitive 
sentence. The inspection report of the JP made the judge decide to declare the case 
inadmissible. The inspection report and the PTT title differed with regard to the 
mentioned adjoining owners. They did not necessarily concern different plots, but the 
judge considered the differences in the lists of the adjoining owners to be an indication 
that the two documents were indeed about different plots. The limits of the study of 
this case file are clear in this respect: I was not able to determine whether the JP 
deliberately made up an inspection report with divergent adjoining owners. Leoncio's 
lawyer was the one who requested the inspection report, and possibly the JP therefore 
conformed to the vision and strategy of this lawyer. 
A second issue with respect to the performance of the JP was his aversion to show 
up when Nestor had been badly wounded. 'The judge is not able to stand blood' was a 
village comment. However, it was also possible that the JP was reluctant to become 
involved in the conflict between Marcelo and Leoncio. The case file of the second court 
case showed that the JP initially accepted the complaints of Leoncio about his 
destroyed fence, but he kept silent about the violent confrontation that took place. 
This issue came only came up coincidentally in the testimony of one of the witnesses. It 
is unclear why none of the parties initially mentioned the bloody incident. One reason 
could be that the destruction of the fence was in itself considered to be the important 
and threatening act, of which wounding Nestor was only a part; to wound and to 
become injured were nothing but instrumental in the acquisition of land rights. 
A second judicial actor playing an important role in this family conflict was the 
court in Santa Barbara. The question is whether this court played the role that was 
expected, as the neutral conflict solver and speaker of justice. The judge in the first 
court procedure did not pay attention to the roots of the conflict; this was the way in 
which the inheritance of Victoriano was divided. The question that the judge dealt with 
was not if and how Victoriano's inheritance had been divided. His central concern was 
who was able to prove ownership of the land. The exclusive focus on this question 
produced a rather limited perspective on the overall problem. The judge was not able to 
deal with the complicated background of the case, nor was he able to assess the 
problem of the boundaries, the dubiousness of the witness declarations, the JP's 
inspection report or the plain way in which Leoncio's lawyer presented the desired 
compromise/payment by Marcelo for the improvements. 
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The judge decided that no judgement was possible because it was not clear whether 
both parties were talking about the same plot of land as the boundaries in different 
documents were incongruent. The instituted type of civil procedure, vindication, did 
not leave room for other questions than those related to who had a legal claim of 
ownership. Had this been different, if there had been more room to understand what 
was going on in this family and if the division of the inheritance had been properly 
understood, it's possible the conflict would have ended without a violent finale. 
The criminal accusation that followed consisted of two parts: one against Marcelito 
and one against Felipe. Marcelito was definitively released of all charges because he had 
acted under the authority of his father, Marcelo, who was said to be the owner of the 
land. Marcelo gave his son the particular part of the land which Leoncio claimed to be 
his. The judge decided that Leoncio could not prove to have the same or better rights 
to the property. Moreover, with his decision concerning Marcelito, the judge indirectly 
assigned ownership to Marcelo: he justified Marcelito's actions by arguing that 
Marcelito acted under the authority of his father, who was the owner of the land. 
Felipe endured a short stay in prison. He was poor and did not have capital 
immediately available, but he was able to pay bail and was provisionally released. He 
was working hard to save enough money to obtain a document of definitive release for 
all charges. 
The judicial system thus did not contribute to the resolution of the conflict and, in 
fact, the Santa Barbara court's involvement probably worsened the situation. The 
litigants could not do anything but seize at the local solutions to conflicts of this kind: 
to sell the land in conflict through private documents (Marcelo to his sons) and to leave 
the village (Leoncio and his sons). The sale of the land made the object of the conflict 
between Marcelo and Leoncio disappear and granted new property rights to Marcelo's 
sons. Leoncio left the village to avoid more violence. He did not have other means for 
demanding justice. 
The conflict over land in this family reflects several mechanisms characterising local 
inheritance practices. Although the lazuro rule is not literally applied at all times, 
inheritance practically always means the unequal distribution of properties. A second 
feature of this family drama was the slumbering character of the dispute. The source of 
the problem was the distribution of rights in Victoriano's land in the 1970s, but it 
ended up in a violent confrontation between his grandsons in the 1990s. The conflict 
persisted for years, but it exploded when Marcelo and Leoncio grew old and wanted to 
transfer their land to their own heirs. In general, one sees that conflicts over property 
rights that are not well resolved continue to silently persist until the moment that the 
actors in that conflict intend to transfer their properties to their own heirs. Here 
another feature of inheritance practices plays a role as well. The involved grandsons 
from both sides were strongly under the influence of their very old and patriarchal 
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fathers. These fathers held the keys to the inheritance firmly in their hands, and 
therefore were able to control the behaviour of their adult but still dependent sons. 
The role played by INA officials and the titling programme was also noteworthy. It 
was an exceptional case, because the INA indeed tried to mediate between the parties 
by making an agreement that nevertheless had no chance of succeeding. Furthermore, 
the INA played a strange role in promising Marcelo and Leoncio that the land should 
be titled in both their names, which was, in fact, impossible. The title in Marcelo's 
hands became the key in the escalation of the conflict. As in many other cases, the title 
became a new instrument for actors involved in conflicts and a way to make an extra 
claim. 
Local comments also considered the conflict in the Delgado family to be exemplary 
of the working of the judicial system. The JP confirmed his local reputation of 'too 
weak to be able to stand blood'. He was not able to handle the conflict and the pressure 
applied to him by the two parties and their respective local supporters. Furthermore, 
the case confirmed the general conviction that involvement in courts means 'you lose 
more [money] than you gain' (Chapter Six). Indeed, both the civil and criminal 
procedures did not lead to any outcome or solution. Both parties spent (borrowed) 
money on paying lawyers; Felipe bought himself free by selling land, but needed to 
work harshly to pay for his freedom and his land became mortgaged. The actors in the 
conflict spent money and effort but without receiving the desired result in the end. The 
local solution, sale of the land, meant that Marcelo's sons eventually came out ahead. 
Parents and inheritance 
Parents work for the benefit of their children.13 This assertion played a central role in 
the motivating parents' actions in inheritance practices. This section explains the 
complex strategies of parents and the way in which they cope with new circumstances, 
new claims and changing meanings of inheritance. Central to these strategies, from the 
point of view of the parents, is the creation of dependence and to maintain control over 
properties for as long as possible. The complicated processes that take place in the 
framework of the transfer of rights to the next generation often take years. They find a 
beginning at the moment that parents are still in their most productive years. At that 
moment, adult offspring start to exert pressure on their parents to help them advance 
in life. 
Using the term 'strategy' might suggest that all parents deliberately plan the things 
they do with regard to inheritance, in line with the goals they want to achieve but this 
is not the case. Parents have to balance different goals, to weigh the pros and cons of a 
certain action, and to counteract the pressure of potential heirs in a process that may 
easily take years. 
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'Chronicle of a death foretold': the case ofCiro Menendez 
Ciro Menendez's case teaches us important things about how inheritance is used to 
maintain a relation of dependence and continue exercising control over property. He 
was a well-off coffee farmer with six sons and two daughters, a gentle person to the 
visitor to whom he proudly showed his fat pigs, his house and his technologically 
advanced coffee fields. Yet he became extremely aggressive when he was drunk. People 
in the village used to tell how he beat his own sons in front of the day labourers, a 
completely abusive thing to do. His wife was a shy and quiet woman who was not 
tempted to say a word when he was around. 
Oro Menendez 
Children 
Maximo 
(school teacher) 
Cristino Cirito Filadelfo Two minor sons 
(lived in parental 
household) 
Two daughters 
(lived independently, 
received nothing) 
Figure 4.3 Actors in father-son conflict in Menendez family 
Ciro's six sons had all worked with him in the fields and he allowed one of them, 
Maximo, to study. Maximo became a schoolteacher. His sons Cristino, Filadelfo and 
Cirito started their own farm households but they still worked with their father in his 
fields. Ciro's two youngest sons still lived in the parental household. Ciro considered 
himself to be a good father since he helped his grown-up sons build houses on his own 
house plot. An explanation for his following peculiar behaviour might be, however, 
that he didn't want to stop dominating them and he did not intend to give up control 
over his properties. 
The INA titling programme forced Ciro to title various plots of land in the names of 
his sons. During the implementation of the PTT, the INA office applied the rule that 
every landholder should only receive one title containing four plots at the most, and 
that all additional plots had to be titled in the names of other people (Chapter Five). 
Just like all the other land holders in the village, Ciro considered that the land titles 
would not affect his power and control over his own land. He judged that he would 
still control his properties as long as he held all the titles in his own hands, thus not 
handing them over to the title holders. When Ciro discovered that he had to pay the 
LNA for the land titles, he decided that his sons should pay for the titles themselves. He 
still kept the documents and he did not hand the plots over to them. 
Maximo did not immediately find a job as a schoolteacher after he graduated. 
Therefore, Ciro said that he should start working on the plot of land that was titled in 
his name. Maximo started to grow coffee in his field. It takes three or four years and a 
lot of hard work for a coffee field to start to produce. However, when the field was 
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about to give its first real harvest, his father reclaimed the plot of land and said that it 
was his. According to Maximo, his father said: 'The land is not yours. You have had 
your education as your inheritance. You cannot make a claim on my land as well'. 
Maximo did not want to quarrel with his father so he left the land and lost his 
investments. 
Ciro had also assigned two adjoining plots to his sons, Cristino and Cirito, and he 
allowed them to work the plots themselves. After a while, Cristino and Cirito started 
to argue about the boundaries, fights that provoked the anger of their father. Ciro went 
to the fields of his sons and rigorously cut down all coffee trees so that both had to start 
all over again. Thereafter, Cristino decided not to use the land for coffee production. 
He argued that as long as he didn't have the papers, his father could easily take the land 
and all his efforts would be in vain. In case his father should die, his brothers would be 
able to claim it as well. Instead of producing coffee, he occasionally used the field for 
sowing beans. His father did not leave him in peace, however. His father appeared 
during the bean harvest period and demanded a share. Cristino reported: 'I told my dad 
that I was poor. I do not have enough to eat. Why should I give a share to a father who 
has already too much to eat? Why should I feed such a father?' In the end, Cristino 
grew tired of the whole situation and he decided to completely abandon the land. 
Ciro also allowed his son Filadelfo to work in the field that was titled in Filadelfo's 
name. This was a field adjacent to a plot that Ciro used for himself. Filadelfo had been 
using this plot for ten years when one day, Ciro decided that the fence between them 
was not in the right place. He then moved the fence in such a way that he incorporated 
at least half a manzana of his son's land. He also cut down two rows of Filadelfo's 
coffee trees. 
Filadelfo was obviously enraged and very worried about the situation. He had paid 
the PTT title of his land, but the title document was still in hands of his father. When 
he complained to his father about the moved fence, Ciro threatened that he would 
burn the title document and that he would throw Filadelfo in jail. Ciro's threat and 
Filadelfo's despair over this made it clear that both father and son did not understand 
the character of the land title. Ciro thought that there was only one copy of the title -
the one that he had in his possession. He thought that because he possessed the title 
document that he was able to claim the land. Filadelfo, on the other hand, did not 
know at first that the Public Register of Property held a copy of the title. He, too, 
thought that Ciro was able to make a claim because Ciro held the document, in spite of 
the fact that Filadelfo paid for the title and that the title deed bore his name and not his 
father's. Their lack of understanding about the meaning and legal impact of the land 
titles was related to the redundancy and non-conformity regarding local perceptions of 
these land titles. 
Ciro and Filadelfo pressed criminal usurpation charges against each other in 2000. 
They both spent time in prison and had to sell other properties to pay for bail and a 
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lawyer. Filadelfo placed his father's coffee field under embargo, arguing that he owned 
the field. Family members and friends were extremely worried that the conflict 
between father and son would get out of hand. A friend said: 'It is not a question 
whether one of them will die. The question is only who shall it be'. 
One may wonder what inspired Ciro to behave in such a way. He deliberately 
manipulated his sons and he wanted to continue to use their free labour, which is 
difficult to enforce if a son lives on his own. In order to keep them in his power, he 
assigned land to his sons to use, but without transferring them other rights such as 
control or ownership. He was therefore able to deprive them of the land at any 
moment. By doing this, he benefited from his sons' hard work in the fields. He was 
able to demand either the land back or a share of his sons' harvests. On the other hand, 
the sons had to keep up with their father's behaviour. They judged that it was their 
only way to ensure themselves of becoming owners of the land one day. 
It was only between Ciro and his son Filadelfo that the situation went out of hand. 
Ciro wanted to have power over his sons, but instead of obeying his wishes, Filadelfo 
turned against him. Ciro's behaviour reflected the typical dilemmas of propertied 
parents. He did not want to die and leave it up to the potential heirs to divide the 
property, nor did he write a last will and testament since he could never be sure that his 
last will would be respected after his death. A second dilemma was that he did not want 
to transfer land to his offspring; he needed the land to be able to continue claiming his 
children's free labour and services, and to maintain their dependence in case he would 
need help or care in his old age. The PTT title deed played a significant role in the 
emergence of the conflict. At first, Ciro thought that the PTT title deed had no value, 
and that ownership of the land titled in the name of Filadelfo would remain with Ciro. 
Filadelfo, however, claimed his rights to the land because he paid for the title. This 
payment, and not so much the fact that Ciro had assigned the land to Filadelfo, was 
central to Filadelfo's perception of his rights to the land. Ciro, on the other hand, 
thought that he could contest Filadelfo's claim by burning the title deed. 
Choices in transferring property: who, when, and how secure? 
The central questions for land-owning parents are to whom they would want to 
transfer the land; when they would want to do this; and in what way so that their own 
conditions and goals would be fulfilled. The answers to these questions lie in three 
major fields of making choices: 
• exclusion and reduction of heirs 
• postponement of definitive transfer of ownership 
• development of strategies that aim to increase security of both parent and child 
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Although parents claim to pursue equal rights between all heirs, this is difficult to 
sustain in practice. A system that prefers one or more heirs is still common. Parents try 
to reduce the number of heirs, claiming they have to reduce the number of heirs 
because they do not have not enough land for them all. Children who have migrated 
are the first to be excluded from the inheritance in favour of their siblings who live in 
the village and depend on agriculture to make a living. Education and professional 
training may also reduce the group of potential heirs, although educational 
opportunities are not explicitly offered as an alternative inheritance. Parents rely on a 
silent agreement that paying for education means exclusion from the inheritance of 
land, but they are never completely sure that the child will indeed abstain from 
claiming land. Women form a third group that is very often excluded from inheritance 
(Chapter Five). 
I found that landholders in several families choose and exclude heirs without citing 
many reasons or previous discussion. The excluded siblings simply know when they are 
excluded and that they have no chance of receiving anything. A frequently heard 
statement is that inheritance has to be earned, and that only children who care for then-
parents are entitled to an inheritance. Yet it is obvious that opinions differ between the 
parties about the meaning of 'care'. 
The troubles and discussions about the division of land among heirs sometimes 
inspire landholders to entirely refrain from dividing the land. Instead, they control it 
themselves until their death, or they sell it to a third person outside the family circle. 
Parents may attempt to maintain control over their land and avoid conflicts between 
heirs by refraining from transferring the land to their offspring. On the other hand, 
parents who do not transfer property rights run the risk of losing control over the 
labour and care that should be provided by their offspring. More often, parents develop 
strategies in which they try to balance the different interests through a specific way of 
transferring property rights. In these strategies, the transfer of 'papers' plays a main 
role. 
The main area of tension between parents and children is not only the moment of 
the transfer of property rights (during the life of a landholding parent or after death), 
but also the security of such a transfer. In order to provide security, the transfer of 
property rights has to be set down on 'papers': private deeds of purchase drawn up 
between the landholder and his or her child. Landholders may transfer property to a 
heir through a quasi deed of purchase that testifies about a sale that is not a sale in 
reality because the heir does not really pay the price stated in the deed. Such a quasi 
deed looks like a normal deed, stipulating the price that is paid and signed by the parties 
and by witnesses. 
A transfer of property rights through a deed of purchase provides more security than 
a transfer between a parent and a child within the scope of inheritance. The document 
testifies that a payment has been made, although the child has not actually paid the 
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sum. The quasi payment is central to security: one owns a thing that one has paid for. 
Third parties are hardly able to contest property rights to the land of a person who is 
able to show a deed of purchase. When land is transferred between a landholder and an 
heir without a deed, other persons might contest the transfer because there is no proof. 
Both parents and children agree on the importance of the deeds. 'If you don't give them 
papers they will quarrel if you die. That is not what a parent should do.' 
A related dilemma for parents in this scope is to determine the moment of the 
transfer of papers. The determination of this moment has the character of a silently 
played game. Landholding parents want to hold on to the child as long as possible. 
They please their child by assigning him or her a plot of land to work, or a part of then-
own house plot to build a house. However, they refuse to hand over a quasi deed of 
purchase of the assigned land. Some parents explicitly state that they do not trust the 
child; they are afraid that the child will sell the land if he has complete control over the 
property.14 Once they have given the papers to one child, the others will start to make 
claims on the property as well. 
Without papers, many children decide not to use the assigned land or only use it for 
growing maize and beans (annual crops). In order to gain security of property rights to 
the assigned land, children are forced to wait and continue to be dependent on their 
parents until they receive the papers. 
Landholding parents create the impression that are uncertain about their 
contradictory wishes with respect to the best way of transferring properties, avoiding 
conflicts, controlling their children's labour power, and assuring themselves of old age 
care. Only a few landholders were able to come up with elegant ways to settle these 
matters. A woman told me: 
You know mypadrino... he has many children but he has arranged it all perfectly. He 
drew up a paper for every child he has, in which they can read to what they are 
entitled. He keeps all these papers in a locked cupboard of which he has the only key. 
He wears it on a string around his neck. If he dies the key will pass on to his wife. And 
when she dies too, the children are allowed to open the cupboard and take whatever is 
theirs. 
More often, the end result of the 'paper game' is a compromise between parents and 
child. Landholding parents transfer land to children by actually selling it to them for a 
cheap price. In this case, the child thus actually pays a settled price. This way of transfer 
has advantages for both parent and child. Parents receive money in return for their land 
and children receive secure property rights. It is a compromise between an inheritance 
transfer and the sale of the land by partly giving and partly selling it to children. 
In practices of inheritance, parents try to balance different interests: to keep control 
over their properties for as long as they wish, to receive old age care when needed, to 
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avoid quarrels between the heirs, and to have money available when they would need 
it. Landholding parents try to enlarge their children's dependence in order to secure 
access to their labour power and increase their chances for old age care. However, most 
of them are not able to completely refrain from transferring some of their property 
rights to their children while alive. 
Furthermore, parents reduce the amount of potential heirs and try to keep control 
over their properties as long as possible. Some aged landholders sell their land in order 
to be able to completely dispose of it. Others transfer their land to heirs but try to 
choose the right moment. They have to counteract the pressure of heirs who demand 
deeds of purchase in order to have secure rights to the land. 
Inheritance strategies of children 
Inheritance is important to children; it is perhaps a basis to build on in life, but it is 
often not enough to enable them to lean back and enjoy life afterwards. 'There isn't 
enough [land] for all of us' is a common opinion. Work, and not inheritance in itself, 
makes people go beyond poverty and misery. Inheritance is thus important but not 
essential. Yet in spite of its relative importance, practices of inheritance are 
characterised by life-and-death struggles between siblings. The overall importance of 
inheritance as one of the mechanisms of access to land has increased in the face of 
increasing land scarcity. It plays an important role in causing and increasing inequality. 
From the children's point of view, there are several possible ways to deal with 
inheritance: to withdraw and refrain from claiming an inheritance; to resign to one's 
fate; or to develop strategies to anticipate struggles for property in order to obtain one's 
share. 
Women especially tend to easily drop out of inheritance, not only because their 
rights are denied by others because of the fact that they are women, but also because 
they themselves decide to refrain from claiming inheritance rights. Women have little 
faith in their own abilities to defend their rights against others, and they are often afraid 
to confront their siblings and deal with judicial authorities or violent behaviour. 
To resign to one's fate means that a child awaits the decisions of parents and tries to 
see the positive sides of his prolonged dependency: 
If it wasn't for my dad, I was a poor mozo. I use my father's land, his house plot, to 
build my house and to dry my coffee, I use his mules to fetch firewood and the product 
from the fields. 
By working for his parents and doing as they wish, this young man hoped and prayed 
that his father would transfer his properties to him. He reckoned he would increase his 
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chances by staying 'close to the fire' instead of living his own independent life. The 
strategy of this young man was most common among possible heirs. In fact, house 
plots in the main village of El Zapote became smaller and smaller as they were 
subdivided to build houses for the offspring. 
Children try to influence their parents' decisions about the transfer of rights to land. 
A son might refuse to work on the assigned inherited land when he does not receive a 
deed to prove his ownership. Instead, he might look around for other land to buy for 
himself. He uses such actions to emphasise his independence vis-a-vis his parents. 
Another strategy for sons to influence and speed up their parents' decisions is to start 
talking about the possibility of migrating. Migration means that parents may lose their 
son's labour power and support during hard times and old age. 
The main causes of problems between siblings are the preference of parents for 
certain heirs and the consequential denial of the rights of others, and inequality in what 
had been distributed. It is not easy to challenge decisions made by parents; children 
cannot involve judicial authorities because they lack time and money. However, the 
very idea that siblings will indeed go to court is sometimes enough for the preferred 
heir to look for a solution. A preferred heir may give his siblings use rights to the land 
while he or she remains the owner of the land. Or a preferred heir may buy his 
brothers and sisters out, which is common, such as when the preferred heir does not 
live in the village but has a job in town. Having a job in town means that he has the 
means to indeed buy his siblings out. Buying out is also a solution when the land has 
become equally divided among the heirs but the divided plots are too small to work. 
The LNA titling programme complicated existing inheritance problems in many 
ways. One of the problems was that siblings, who were assigned plots of land by their 
parents - with or without deeds of purchase - ended up sharing a land title which was in 
the name of only one of them. The LNA said that joint ownership was not to be 
recognised, and the LNA brigades that were sent into the field did not pay attention to 
the problem of the division of plots after inheritance transfers and thus assigned the 
title to only one of the heirs. They then advised the heirs to first pay for the title, then 
a division could be made with the help of a lawyer. It was impossible for many people 
to complete this last step. The title owner could easily take advantage of the situation in 
which he was officially the owner of the plot of land as a whole. 
Force and violence among the Ldpez family siblings 
The story of the Lopez family siblings demonstrates the extreme mechanisms that 
people were able to use to obtain a share of the parental inheritance. Sale of land to a 
third person was a common mechanism in the village to avert a crisis about land and it 
was also a common occurrence in struggles over land related to inheritance. The case 
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about the Lopez family shows what might happen when a land-owning parent is not 
absolutely clear about the division of the inheritance. 
Father Lopez had planned to transfer his properties to his youngest son, but the 
behaviour of this son made that impossible. His hesitations led to room for all the 
children to work their strategies. As a result, the youngest son tried to gain complete 
control over his father's properties to the detriment of other children by using extreme 
force and violence. 
Demetrio Lopez, the youngest son, was a feared man in the village because of his 
aggressive behaviour when he was drunk. One day, he killed another man in a local bar 
and was locked up in the Santa Barbara prison. His father did everything he could to 
get him released; he hired a lawyer and sacrificed the small store he owned to pay the 
expenses and made sure that Demetrio received good food while he was in jail. 
Demetrio was released within a few months. When he came back in the village, father 
Lopez wanted to help him to get on with his life and he gave Demetrio a house and a 
bar he owned so that his son would be able to make a living. 
Demetrio, however, sold both the house and bar without asking his father's consent. 
He did not have any deeds but he forged his father's signature for the sale. After 
discovering Demetrio's deceit, father Lopez was extremely disappointed. According to 
his other son Dario, their father said that Demetrio had consumed his inheritance and 
that he would not receive anything more. 
Things changed, however, when father Lopez became ill. Without his consent, 
Demetrio assigned himself a part of his father's coffee field. It was the part that his 
father had already promised to his daughter Elisa. The family discovered that he had 
grabbed the land when they tried to sell the coffee field in order to pay the expenses of 
the father's illness. Demetrio fenced in part of the coffee field and demanded his family 
pay 500 lempiras for the improvements which he said he made. 
After the death of his father, Demetrio tried to grab the properties which his father 
had given to the other heirs. Elisa, for example, received a house from her father. 
Demetrio tried to grab her house and drive Elisa and her family away. Fortunately, 
Elisa had a deed of purchase, so he stopped trying after a while. He did grab a tule field 
belonging to his brother Dario, which Dario did not have a deed of purchase to. 
Demetrio showed up with a deed of purchase for the tule field, but it was a falsified 
deed on which a forged signature of their father figured. When I asked Dario what he 
would do to get this land back, he said: 'I do nothing. You better do not quarrel with 
your family... he acts with force, and remember that he already killed a man.' 
According to Dario, Demetrio insolently grabbed the tule field (a puro huevos); he did 
not want to use it, but proceeded to sell it immediately.15 
Dario also held another plot of land of one manzana that had belonged to his 
deceased mother. When he saw that Demetrio was getting ready to grab this land as 
well, Dario decided to sell the manzana to another person. He needed to visit two 
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lawyers to complete the sale because again, his brother showed up with a falsified deed 
of purchase. Through this action, Dario avoided the emerging conflict with Demetrio 
and was able to buy new land. He said: 'It is better this way. He [Demetrio] has to fight 
with someone else now. The new owner has a document [hence he has more secure 
rights than Dario]'. Elisa also obtained half a manzana of her mother's land which 
Demetrio also grabbed. Elisa considered the plot too small to pay a lawyer and fight 
over so she decided to resign to the fact that Demetrio had grabbed it. Only the 
brothers and sisters who received deeds of purchase to the inherited properties felt 
secure. Both Dario and Elisa expressed that they were very afraid of their brother. He 
knew of their fear and easily used it against them. 
A few years after he grabbed his siblings' land, Demetrio again landed in prison. He 
was sued by a man to whom he sold the tule field that once belonged to Dario. 
Demetrio sold the land but then tried to grab it back by starting to work on it. The 
new owner did not resign himself to the loss of the land, but immediately pressed 
criminal charges of usurpation against him. 
Linsering on the doorstep 
From the children's point of view, receiving inheritance is important, although 
whatever they receive is rarely sufficient for making a living. Children have to do more 
to build their lives up than just wait for their inheritance. To make the best claim on 
the inheritance of land-owning parents, it is important to live on the parents' doorstep 
and to work for them. If the available space allows to do so, children ask permission to 
build their own houses on the parental house plot. In this situation, sons who already 
live in their own farm household continue to work for their father. They receive 
payments in money or harvest shares. These sons also work for themselves at times 
that their father does not need them. For example, they sow their own maize for then-
own households and they might start a coffee field of their own on land that is still 
owned by the father. They are allowed to use their father's horses and mules to bring 
home the harvest. These sons silently await the decisions of their father regarding the 
division of his properties. 
Children may press their parents to come up with a solution to the division of the 
land. They threaten to migrate if they might not receive land, or they buy other land 
and start to live independently. Demetrio used a third strategy to get what he wanted: 
he deceived his father and used force and violence to contest the rights of other siblings. 
Strategies such as those used by Demetrio are less common but, nevertheless, prevail in 
the construction of images and perceptions about inheritance. 
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Inheritance, norms and adaptation 
Inheritance practices are closely connected with important aspects of agrarian change. 
The value of land and definitions of quality and scarcity have changed over the past 
decades. Land has continuously been divided, sold, transferred or joined together. 
Practices of inheritance are part of, and react to, such changes. 
This section first takes up the character of inheritance practices in El Zapote. 
Inheritance practices are not transfers of land between 'the dead and the living', but 
between living people. The transfer is explicitly reciprocal: it is considered to be a 
reward for care or labour. Next, I elaborate the argument that, in order to understand 
inheritance, it is important to shed light on the stacked character of the norms that 
shape these practices. 
Inheritance is considered to be a special way of transferring property because it takes 
place between the dead and the living (Goody 1978). This chapter has shown that the 
idea of inheritance as a transfer between the dead and the living actually sketches an 
inaccurate picture. The main features of inheritance originate from the fact that the 
transfer does take place between living people: between land-holding parents and their 
offspring, and between siblings when the land-holding parent is deceased. Inheritance 
only rarely starts at the moment of a property holder's death. Before the time of death, 
years of anticipation, development and adaptation of strategies by property holders and 
potential heirs, discussions and appeals to different norms and ideologies, have already 
passed. Inheritance frequently mingles with sale or quasi-sale, in which prices of the 
land are settled and (sometimes) paid. In this way, inheritance is not a way of 
transferring property rights to the living. In contrast, it is part of daily strategies and 
struggles between living people, about the bare essentials of life. 
Inheritance is explicitly reciprocal: it is considered as a payment for work, care and 
efforts for the benefit of the property holder. Although parents say that they work for 
their children's future, they do not treat them all equally and prefer certain children 
while excluding others. Inheritance is thus not a process of property transfer that 
automatically distributes rights to these properties according to one's social position in 
kinship terms. A division of inheritance is not fixed beforehand: it is a question of 
struggles and negotiations in which both parents and children consider the promotion 
and development of strategies to be legitimate tactics to achieve their own aims. 
Inheritance practices in El Zapote entail images of the future. Parents claim they 
work for their children's future and that children work with them for their own 
future. Parents do not strive to preserve the unity of their farm, nor do they convey a 
strong cultural attachment to the land in their decisions and strategies. Parents think of 
their own future by wanting to maintain control over their property and the labour 
power of their children and securing an irrefutable position for obtaining old age care. 
From the children's point of view, the future entails an extended dependence on their 
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parents in order to obtain access to their parents' land. The different images of the 
future that are embodied in inheritance practices put pressure on these practices (for 
example: the idea that land is becoming increasingly scarce) and lead in the end to 
changes of norms (the lazuro rule is about to be replaced by equality as the central 
norm). 
Through practices of inheritance, a continuous process of stacking of norms takes 
place. I consider this process of stacking as the result of the lopsided and delayed 
adaptation of norms to changing circumstances and changing perceptions on 
inheritance. A central feature of the process of stacking norms through practices of 
inheritance is that it is relatively autonomous from the law. The law of inheritance has 
practically remained unchanged ever since 1906. Family law abolished the difference 
between illegitimate and legitimate offspring in 1984 and different agrarian laws settled 
special provisions for the inheritance of land that was assigned to individuals through 
agrarian reform or land titling programmes. Central to legal prescriptions about 
inheritance are equality between heirs on the one hand, and testamentary freedom on 
the other. Very few people in El Zapote know that legal prescriptions regarding 
inheritance actually exist and that being married or not, for example, influences the 
legal rights to inheritance of particular persons. Neither the parties involved in 
inheritance practices, nor judicial or other authorities that intervene in conflict 
situations, refer to or comply with legal stipulations of inheritance. 
On the other hand, inheritance practices are changing in a direction quite similar to 
the legal prescriptions. Equality between heirs has slowly become the norm since the 
lazuro rule has been set aside because it no longer responds to people's expectations and 
perceptions about land and their own future. The norm of equal rights has affected 
former differences between illegitimate and legitimate offspring, and between women 
and men. Equality as a norm, however, has not undermined practices of preference for 
certain heirs. Writers of testaments, for example, use legal testamentary freedom to give 
preference to a certain heir and to disinherit others. The content of testaments clearly 
attempts to anticipate conflicts between offspring and attaches conditions to the receipt 
of property rights. In local inheritance practices, people strive for similar goals. The 
norm of equality generates new inequalities and feelings of injustice, a process that 
again produces new norms about how equality should be interpreted and perceived. 
This leads to norms about alternatives to inheritance, the rights of migrated children, 
the rights of illegitimate children and the divergent rights of women and men. 
Practices of inheritance only slowly react to changed circumstances, and changing 
practices fall out of step with changing norms. The adaptation of norms takes place, 
either coincidentally and in a single instance or as newly emerging 'rules'. This process 
is not smoothly evolving from changed practices but it is essentially a result of struggle: 
the complicated process of (silent) negotiations between parents and offspring, as well 
as between siblings, about the what, how and when of property transfer rights. 
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The stacked character of inheritance norms makes it so that every actor in the 
inheritance process is able to develop a strategy and draw on a whole repertory of old, 
adapted, and new norms. People have a strong sense that change is central to 
inheritance practices: in their view, inheritance practices themselves should change and 
are themselves responsible for generating change. Characteristic of the process of 
changing inheritance norms is that the participants are actively involve in, and are able 
to consciously interpret, the changes. This stands in sharp contrast to the stacking of 
land rights as I explained in Chapter Two, which is not a conscious process to every 
land holder who is affected by it. 
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Notes 
1 Several villagers conveyed that they realised at that moment that Eduardo was a 'brujo', a wizard. They 
stated that Eduardo was locked up in the prison of El Zapote, but at night, he left the cell and was seen 
sitting before the entrance of the prison. Some people said that they saw him strolling through the village 
while he should have been in jail. 
2 At this point in his story, two of Anastacio's daughters, who were present during this interview, said to 
each other: 'That's what women are for' (Para eso son las mujeres). 
3 Anastacio knew his lawyer through his activities for the political party PDCH, of which this lawyer was 
also an active member. 
4 These conditions stipulate that the surviving spouse must not be guilty of a separation. Moreover, he must 
not have left the deceased for more than six months preceding death. 
5 In the past, a death certificate included information about the existence of a testament, and whether the 
deceased person left any goods. In the 1980s, the written declarations of the local civil register was 
replaced by a standard form which lacks this information. 
6 A manzana is officially 0.697 hectare. 
7 Jorge had enough property to divide between his heirs. In other testaments, the properties themselves had 
to be split up. For example, I read a testament of a man who divided the rooms of his house between his 
heirs. 
8 Foster (1960:144) has described this custom in his book about America's Spanish heritage: "During each of 
the nine following nights [following the burial] friends and relatives drop by to pray for the soul of the 
departed, and on the ninth the novena, or final period of prayer, is held'. 
9 The word lazuro possibly stems from the Indian idiom nahuatl. The people of El Zapote pronounce it as 
'el azuro'. Preference of the youngest son in inheritance is common in the departments of Santa Barbara, 
Lempira, and Copan, although in the latter department people used the term cumel instead of lazuro. 
Testaments, judicial court cases and interviews with lawyers in Santa Barbara, confirm that the system of 
preference in inheritance is not at all specific to El Zapote. 
10 A common name for penquillo (Yucca elephantipes) is also izote, which is used for making fences. The 
flowers are generally considered a delicacy by the villagers. 
11 PTT only titled the land and not the improvements (Chapter Two). 
12 The civil procedure case file of the first court case did not contain a copy of this agreement. 
13 The often heard statement in conversations about inheritance was 'los padres trabajanpara que tengan los 
hijos'. 
14 Parents' fear that a child will sell the inherited land is not inspired by the desire that the farm will remain 
intact and be continued. Parents rather regret the choice of the heir or their own diminished chance to 
receive old age care from this child. Another reason to fear the sale of the transferred land is that another 
owner will start to play a role. An inherited plot of land is often part of a larger parcel that is still owned 
by the parents, or that is transferred to other heirs. Parents have no control over who the new owner will 
be and they are not able to prevent problems with the new owner. 
15 Dario and Elisa also used the expressions 'with force' [a la fuerza] and 'like a macho' [a lo macho], to tell 
about the behaviour of their brother Demetrio. 
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Chapter five 
Women and land rights 
Only 205 plots out of 982 (21%) are in the hands of women in El Zapote (calculated on 
the basis of combined data of PTT and National Cadastral Directorate). The unequal 
distribution of land between men and women is, for different reasons, a source of 
concern to the Honduran state and to national and international development 
organisations. This chapter addresses two shortcomings of the Honduran discussion 
about the unequal distribution of land rights between men and women. A first 
shortcoming is that the discussion suffers from instrumentalism regarding the 
relationship between women and development. A second shortcoming is that the 
solution to gender inequality in relation to land is exclusively sought by changing the 
law. 
After discussing these two shortcomings and their consequences, this chapter 
addresses strategies of widows and future widows regarding the inheritance of land. 
Furthermore, I will discuss the gender dynamics of the PTT land titling programme, 
through which some women lost and other women gained access to land. This chapter 
not only looks at gender differences in mechanisms of accessing land, but also at the 
gender-divergent ways of enforcing control over property, in which land use strategies 
play an important role. 
Instrumentalism and the law 
The theme of the law is dominant in discussions about the gender inequalities in the 
distribution of land in Honduras. This is understandable considering the fact that laws 
have discriminated against women for decades. Spanish law that continued to rule for a 
long time after independence did not allow women to hold, to buy, or to sell property 
(de Oyuela 1989).1 The Civil Code that was introduced at the end of the nineteenth 
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century allowed women to inherit and to hold property, but it was not until 1957 that 
women obtained full civil rights (CDM 1997:67). 
The main subject of recent discussions about women's land rights has been article 79 
of the Agrarian Reform Law (SafUios-Rothschild 1983, Leon et al. 1987, Kuhn 1990, 
Martinez et al. 1995). This article stipulated that a beneficiary of the Agrarian Reform 
should be 'a Honduran by birth; a man (who should be) more than sixteen years old in 
case he is single, or whatever age when he is married; or a woman (who should be) 
single or widowed with responsibility for a family'. Feminist organisations considered 
this article to be discriminatory against women and that it was cause of the fact that, 
among the beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform, there were only few women.2 
In the fanatic discussion that emerged about changing the challenged article, two 
shortcomings came to the fore. First and most notably, the state expressed an 
instrumentalist view on the relationship between women and development: that 
women should have access to land to become incorporated into productive activities 
that are indispensable to achieve development, prosperity and economic efficiency. For 
example, Martinez et al. (1995:79) cite Azcona Hoya when he assumed the presidency 
of the Republic in 1986: 
In their condition as mothers and wives, women constitute the largest reserve of our 
society. Through history, they have been the central characters of a human drama, 
bastions of their families, the personifications of the most noble values. Therefore, 
without causing detriment to the primary functions that only women are able to 
perform, we have to incorporate them into the sphere of social work. We have to 
culturally elevate and train them in order to entrust them with important productive 
functions that preserve their dignity. With the collaboration of women's organisations, 
and taking into account the programmes of international organisms that already 
exist, we take the responsibility to support the Honduran women as indispensable 
factors for the solution ofsocial problems by increasing national production rates. 
Feminists and women's organisations have challenged the state point of view on the 
role of women in development in a particular way. They have argued that women are 
not only mothers and wives, but that they also contribute significantly to the national 
economy. Their contribution, however, is 'invisible' (Leon et al. 1987, Noe Pino et al. 
1993, Martinez et al. 1995). Rural women have double workloads, performing both 
domestic and agricultural labour. Their production activities are less eye-catching than 
those of men because they focus on subsistence instead of commercial crops. Moreover, 
women's incomes seem to end up absorbed by the daily needs of their households 
without the possibility of being used for productive investments. As a peasant woman 
said in a workshop about women and access to land (Noe Pino et al. 1993:5): 
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The woman works and is more sensible, and the man works, puts the money in his 
pocket and does not think about whether there is soap and the woman, although she 
earns the same as the man, it is the woman who buys the soap, an aspirin, the medicine 
for the child and many things, hence the result of her work vanishes and it is not 
possible to see where it has gone. 
In their criticism of the state view of women as 'mothers and wives', however, the 
women's organisations fail to challenge its instrumental character. The criticism itself 
expresses a different but still instrumental standpoint about women as mothers and 
wives (Zuniga 1989). The main objection to the state view is that it denies women's 
contributions to the economy and does not consider women as heads of household or 
as producers. The women's organisations assert that, in contrast to the state's 
viewpoint, women are already contributing to development because they are the only 
people responsible for feeding and sustaining their families. In fact, their view 
reproduces a peasant image of rural women: women work on the land and put food on 
the table of their families. Women are thus mothers at the service of their families, and 
by taking care of these families, they provide an important economic input in the 
national economy and, therefore, they should have rights to the land. This chapter will 
show why, in my view, it is necessary to abandon an instrumentalist view on women 
and development, instead of replacing the state instrumental view by another equally 
instrumental view as the women's organisations tend to do. 
A second shortcoming of the Honduran discussion about women and land rights is 
that both the analysis of what goes wrong, and the possible solutions, are to be found 
in the law. Looking at the content of law on the one hand, there are few legal 
restrictions on women's rights. Women have equal rights to inherit and, according to 
the law, spouses are equal with regard to the administration of marital property (Leon 
et al. 1987, Galan 1998). On the other hand, agrarian law does impose restrictions on 
women's rights, most notable in the Agricultural Reform Law. Furthermore, family 
law restricts the legal recognition of cohabiting couples, a restriction which most likely 
limits cohabiting women's opportunities to claim rights to their husbands' land (Galan 
1998). 
The focus on law when explaining gender inequality and land rights involves the 
assumption that law indeed directly determines social practices of land distribution. In 
practice, nevertheless, gender inequality may be caused by the interplay of all kinds of 
mechanisms. This book takes the view that we should not assume the existence and 
working of these mechanisms, but instead, we have to research them. Regarding the 
centrality of the law as solution, this chapter will argue that equal rights for men and 
women in the law are a necessary condition for achieving equality, but it is not the 
guarantee that equality will become reality. Moreover, it is a question whether 
changing law should be the one and only strategy to solve the problem. 
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Women, labour and land rights 
'Access to property' refers to the various ways in which women gain control over one 
or more elements of the bundle of property rights. How women in Honduras use 
which mechanisms of access, and how they lose or gain property, are processes that are 
not easily observable. First, there is little data on land rights or land transfers available, 
and the available data is not gender specific. Thus, there are no national statistics on 
property and women (Leon et al. 1987). Data on women's land ownership, as deduced 
from the PTT registration, do not give insight into transfers of property that are more 
important to women than state-landholder transfers of land, as for example, inheritance 
and sale/purchase. These processes play an important role in the daily lives of women of 
all social classes, regardless of whether they struggle for a hacienda complete with dozens 
of cattle, or for a tiny plot of tule. Hence, women inherit, buy, sell, rent, lease out and 
occupy land. They are involved in transfers and endeavours to gain land that take place 
outside official land markets and are completely invisible to national statistics. 
Secondly, the land-to-the-tiller concept that dominates the Honduran discussions 
about the land question does not help us gain insight into women's relationship to land. 
Women are not 'tillers', but they do struggle for and own land.31 explained in Chapter 
Three that El Zapote women do not do daily or regular work in the fields. The only 
source of statistics related to women's role in agricultural labour is the national agrarian 
census that compiles gender data about the amount of independent agricultural 
producers. According to the agrarian census of 1994, only 9.7% of the independent 
agricultural producers in El Zapote are women. The percentage of female producers in 
the entire Santa Barbara district is even less, at 7.5% (SECPLAN 1994:14).4 
However, the census data refers exclusively to the percentage of independent female 
producers but no more. Thus, this data does not inform us about all agricultural labour 
performed by women. The data disregard women's seasonal labour, such as work 
performed during the coffee harvest, and they also ignore unpaid 'help' in times of labour 
shortage. The role of women in decision making, post-harvest activities, the sale and 
manufacturing of products and keeping domestic animals is therefore often 
underestimated (Buvinic 1982, Fordham et al. 1987). 
The land-to-the-tiller concept would incorrectly lead us to believe that women do not 
work in the fields and thus, they do not own the land. However, women themselves 
generally de-link work in the fields and rights to the land. They feel that although they 
do not work in the fields, they do have the right to claim land, a right that they derive 
from their own perception about their tasks and responsibilities. In a seminar about the 
Law of Agricultural Modernisation, a member of FEHMUC, an organisation of rural 
women, explained why she thought that women should have land rights: 
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Because, although we do not work on the land directly, but our sons with our 
husbands, that's the way we live, because they are the ones who work, and we use to 
say that women do not work, but we are the first to get up to prepare food and we stay 
to prepare clothes and we are the first to work in our households., that is why I say that 
maybe the beneficiary of the land is the one who cannot use it and we see that the one 
who needs it doesn't have it.. (Noe Pino et al. 1993:24).3 
Women may own land even though they are not the user, so in order to understand the 
relationship between women and land, it is important to unleash the often 
unconsciously made, land-to-the-tiller-like association between labour and land rights. 
A third problem which has received little attention so far in Honduras is that 
women's struggles do not end once they have obtained land rights because, for several 
reasons, they may easily loose control over it thereafter. This chapter will show that 
women try to establish control over their rights to the land by deploying different land 
use strategies. 
Widows and inheritance 
Inheritance is important to women because it is one of the main mechanisms through 
which they are able to gain access to land. Chapter Four explained that inheritance 
practices are characterised by a preference for the youngest son, and that new norms 
have emerged as part of, and as reaction to, the need to adapt the system of preference 
to changing circumstances and changing perceptions of the people involved. Women 
play a vital role in the ongoing discussions about how inheritance should be changed. 
In this section, I explain more specifically how women face inheritance processes which 
they become involved in and the specific gender constraints they cope with. The 
section looks particularly at widows and women who are anticipating their lives as 
widows. As daughters, women do not have many possibilities to claim rights vis-a-vis 
their parents or brothers. As potential widows, they do not await the death of their 
husbands but instead start to plan their old age security at an early stage. 
Ermelina Ponce was the oldest woman when we came to live in El Zapote; she died 
during our fieldwork period. Her case serves in several ways as an object lesson to other 
women, not in a positive way but merely as a representation of the extreme situation 
that women seek to avoid. 
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The old age ofErmelina Ponce 
Ermelina Ponce was the mother of four living sons (one of them was Excequiel, 
Chapter Four) and one daughter. Born in 1901, Ermelina lived through a whole 
century of profound changes. By the time of her death in 1996, her life had become the 
illustration in the conviction of other women in the village that they wanted to change 
their destiny. 
Ermelina's husband entirely transferred his house and all his land to his youngest son 
Ariel. After the death of his father, Ariel allowed his mother Ermelina to live in the 
house which he then owned. He decided to rent out the land he inherited to his brothers 
and went back to the city where he lived. 
The first years as a widow, Ermelina earned a living by weaving petates. When she 
grew older, however, she nearly lost her vision and she was not able to take care of 
herself any longer. The house partly collapsed and she had no kitchen and no running 
water because she could not afford to pay the subscription. Ariel never visited her and 
he had no intention to repair the house. Her sons who lived in the village were not very 
willing to give her food or to help her out in the household. They blamed their mother 
for not trying to change their father's mind about the division of the inheritance. In 
public, however, they said that they were not able to care for Ermelina because they 
were poor themselves. In their opinion, Ariel should take care of her because it was bis 
duty as the heir. 
In spite of his resentment about not obtaining a share of his father's inheritance, one 
of the sons, Excequiel, felt obliged to give his mother food. Excequiel was poor 
compared to his brothers and he did not produce sufficient maize and beans to feed his 
own family. His wife Rosa obeyed his wish to give food to Ermelina, but she was also 
angry: Excequiel's brothers had more to give but they refused to feed their mother. 
Rosa told me: 
I told Tulio: Look, you, Ariel, and Chema, you do not lift a finger for your mother. 
We give her food, hut Excequiel does not have an idea about how I struggle for her 
food. You do not give me half a bottle of milk from your cow and say, Take it and 
boil it for my mother'. I can give her tortillas and beans without any problem but 
apart from that.. If I buy milk she receives her part but when I can't buy it she gets 
nothing. I do not give her food to have a say in the division of the inheritance because 
this old woman does not have anything to divide. I give her food because I pity her. I 
am not after her inheritance, nothing she has is mine. The only thing that is mine is 
what my old man has in the mountains... 
Ermelina had to walk to Excequiel's house when she wanted to eat. Her walks, three 
times a day, formed part of the village picture: a tiny, very old, blind woman with a 
walking stick walking in the middle of the main road, not noticing horses, cars or other 
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dangers. Ermelina's situation was a shock to other aged people who commented: 'It is 
terrible when you have to tail along after your children to receive food'. 
Ermelina became a collective village problem when she started to get up at nights and 
walk around in the village. She scared people by wandering around the cemetery (which 
was close to her house) in the middle of the night. Excequiel's sons were sent to sleep 
with their grandmother. However, they refused to go after a few days because they were 
sure that their grandmother received visits from her late husband at nights, and they 
were very scared: 'I am sure I saw my grandfather; he was sitting at her bedside and they 
were talking. I am not going to stay another night in that house'. Thereafter, Excequiel 
locked Ermelina's door from the outside and unlocked it again in the early morning. 
In 1996, Ermelina fell and was not able to walk again. She spent day and night in a 
dirty bed in the dark and collapsed house. Her daughter Maria lived in a neighbour 
village and she tried to visit her mother once a week. She then prepared food and 
washed her mother. Rosa and other women in the village also came with food 
regularly. After a while, Ermelina had the company of her granddaughter Martha and 
her third husband, who had been looking for a place to live. Martha cooked food but 
she did not set aside any food for her grandmother, and when other people sent food 
for Ermelina, Martha's family ate it. Martha was irritated when visitors passed by to 
offer their help; she sent them away, conveying that she gave her grandmother food 
already. Rosa and Maria were worried because Martha's behaviour made other people 
stop sending food to Ermelina. It was clear that Martha was trying to starve her 
grandmother out, and Ermelina actually died a few months after Martha moved in. 
When women in El Zapote talked about Ermelina's fate, they automatically related 
this to their own situation and future. They believed, on the one hand, that Ermelina 
only had herself to blame for her situation because she had not been a loving and caring 
mother and she did not speak up against her husband to protect her children's 
inheritance rights. On the other hand, the village women considered that Ermelina 
never stood up for herself and that she had counted on her children for her old age 
care.6 The story of Ermelina was a lesson to the village women that they had to develop 
a strategy that would enable them to take care of themselves, a strategy that very often 
focused on acquiring property rights to land. 
Widows and future widows 
In general, women convey that they have more rights to their husbands' properties than 
in their parents' land. Their brothers gain rights to the land by working in the fields of 
their parents. As daughters, women work for their parents but their work is not in the 
fields and, therefore, it does not substantiate a claim to land. As wives, women feel that 
they contribute to the building up of their husbands' properties through working in the 
farm household, investing money in agricultural production and taking care of their 
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children. Wives generally contemplate that they therefore have rights to their husbands' 
properties too. 
The literature sometimes portrays widows as transitional figures between two 
generations of male property holders (Metcalf 1990, Voyce 1994). Metcalf, for example, 
studied Brazilian widows in colonial times, who controlled their deceased husband's 
property but were not in his position of power. They only had control over the 
property while their sons grew up. 
The women in El Zapote's strategies to take control of their husbands' inheritances, 
however, do not express the idea of being transitional figures. Women try to get hold 
of land in order to prevent a life of poverty, misery and dependency, without the 
notion that they should be intermediaries. Examples such as Ermelina, who was 
eventually abandoned without the possibility of controlling her own life, motivated 
other women to take action on behalf of their own fate. Women prepare to contest 
their children's efforts to use a family discourse to leave their mother out, such as: 
"Mother does not need land because we, her children, will take care of her". 
Separating ownership and use 
The lazuro played an important role in Doris Ponce's struggle to keep control over her 
late husband's land. Doris named her youngest son as the heir while he still lived under 
her authority. She was in her seventies and had eighteen children, eleven of whom 
survived. Her husband died unexpectedly in 1983, leaving a coffee field, a piece of 
pasture land and cattle. He had always been in good shape and able to work and he 
never thought of dividing his properties among his heirs. 
The children expected Doris to distribute the land and cattle among them. However, 
Doris immediately proceeded to sell the majority of the cows. When I asked her why 
she sold them, she said that she needed money to pay the funeral expenses and to 
survive the first months. She kept the remaining cattle. When the UNA came to title the 
land, they registered Doris as the holder of the 5 hectare pasture and, in accordance 
with local regulation, they told her that the other plot should be titled in the name of a 
relative. Doris decided to title the mountain land (10 hectares) in the name of the 
family's lazuro, Ricardo. He was only fifteen years old at that time and he still lived in 
her household. She decided that she wanted to keep control over her husband's 
properties and that Ricardo would be the most suitable person to assist her because he 
still lived under her control. In Doris' eyes, she had made decisions according to her 
best interests. 
Doris knew that she would lose the land if she were to leave it up to her adult sons to 
decide about the land and the cattle. Regarding this story, one of her adult sons said: 
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When my father died, all his belongings stayed behind in the hands of my mother. We, 
her children, expected her to divide it between us. Yet it was not possible to talk to my 
mother about the subject. She kept on crying when we tried. We were all angry in the 
end.. I think she did it on purpose, she wanted to keep control. 
This son was certain that his mother developed a conscious strategy and that she 
intended to avoid problems with her children by crying and refusing to talk about the 
subject of the property. His comments revealed that the sons would not have thought 
about their mother's rights to the land. Only Doris' own manoeuvres protected her land 
rights and made it so she was able to live independently and control her own income. 
Her situation would have been totally different if she had divided the land among her 
sons and was dependent upon them for her care. 
Doris did not tell her sons about the land title that the LNA had issued in Ricardo's 
name; they found out about it only years later. At that time, Doris tried to change the 
situation by giving parts of the mountain land to her other sons. Several of them did not 
live in the village anymore, and they immediately proceeded to sell it. This generated 
new problems because then there were several owners of the mountain land, while 
Ricardo remained the holder of the undivided land title. 
Doris used the lazuro rule of inheritance to keep control over the land and to protect 
her own rights vis-a-vis her adult sons. Her strategy clearly focused on maintaining 
control regarding ownership and income while she left the use of the land to her 
youngest son Ricardo. Although Ricardo managed the cattle and worked in the fields, 
she was still recognised by other villagers as the owner of her properties. 
Owner and producer 
In contrast to Doris, Belinda Matute not only succeeded in claiming ownership to her 
husband's properties, but she was also able to convert herself into an independent 
producer and manager of her land. The contrast with Doris was considerable: Doris was 
old and, despite being the recognised owner, she was heavily dependent on her youngest 
son. She was always worrying about how Ricardo ran the farm, but she had little say in 
the decisions he took with regard to the production process. Belinda, on the other hand, 
was a young, rich and innovative entrepreneur and she created the impression she had 
everything under control. 
Belinda was one of the largest landowners in the village with 63 manzanas of land 
suitable for food crops, coffee and pasture. She was an important member of 
AHPROCAFE, the national organisation of coffee producers, and was also deeply 
involved in local and regional politics on behalf of the Liberal Party.7 She drove her own 
car, and several of her children were in college in San Pedro. 
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She inherited her land from her late husband when she became a widow at the age of 
thirty-two. She had six young children. When he fell ill, her husband, a rich farmer, 
followed the advice of friends and officially married Belinda. He thought that this 
would be sufficient to secure her rights of inheritance as his legal spouse. Her husband 
was not yet buried when her in-laws advised her to leave the village to find a job 
elsewhere. She told me about this period in her life: 
They [her in-laws] said that it was not the same without the principal head8., that it 
was better to go [to the city] and leave the kids with their grandmother. Between them 
they said that I was young and that I would have a boyfriend soon who would make a 
run for my late husband's properties.9 They only thought of the properties and they did 
not feel the grief and the pain Ifelt, I who missed him in the house... No way I would 
give my children to my mother-in-law. My children will live with me until the day I 
die. 
She suspected that her in-laws were playing games with her, but she did not yet 
understand what they wanted. She felt that she did not have a person she could trust, as 
she had no parents herself and only two younger brothers. One day, her sister-in-law 
Julia came and took her to the district capital of Santa Barbara. They went to visit a 
lawyer. When they approached the lawyer's office, they happened to run into Marcos 
and Myrsa, a couple that had previously also meddled in the discussion between Belinda 
and her in-laws about her leaving the children. 
When we entered the office, the lawyer said to Julia: "Marcos and Myrsa have already 
explained everything to me. You want to get hold of your brother's properties and take 
it away from his wife". He already had a document on his desk which I was supposed 
to sign. Julia's face grew red. The lawyer had not known that I was his wife. I went to 
the door and said that I was his widow and that I now understood what they wanted 
from me. I left the office. The next day I went to another lawyer. Within ten days I 
had arranged all the papers. I had everything registered in the Public Register of 
Property. For the future, for my kids. Nobody can take it away from them, I explained 
it all to them [her children] 
Through her experience with her in-laws, Belinda learned about the value of her 
properties and her rights as a widow with six little children. She claimed the properties 
for herself and for the future of her children; not as transitional figure in the service of 
her offspring, but as the owner. 
I was totally ignorant in the past, but after my husband's death I began to understand 
things about land and papers. I think that ignorance is the cause of so many women 
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losing their rights of inheritance. I had always been busy in the house, with my shop 
and my kids, and I had hardly ever left El Zapote. They [her in-laws] thought I was 
stupid In those days my heart was still soft. Now I am a hard-hearted woman'. 
Belinda was an exceptional woman whose position in the village was unique. The way 
in which she nearly lost her rights to her late husband's properties was, nevertheless, 
not at all exceptional, but comparable to what many other women with much less land 
went through. Just like many other women, Belinda had never been involved in 
decisions about agricultural production before her husband's death. She did not know 
how much land he had or the number of cattle, and she had no knowledge of property 
rights and documents. This seriously affected the way in which she was able to confront 
her aggressive in-laws after her husband's death. 
Secondly, just like other women, she had no idea of the law or her rights of 
inheritance. Her husband had sensed beforehand that his family would try to get hold of 
his properties after his death. He therefore married Belinda in an attempt to protect her. 
However, he failed to inform her about the rights that she could derive from the 
marriage. The marriage made it more difficult for Belinda's in-laws to grab the land just 
like that. They had to bring in the knowledge and skills of a lawyer who was able to use 
the law as a resource. The lawyer drew up a document that he wanted Belinda to sign 
which would cause her to give up all her rights to the land. He considered that Belinda 
was so ignorant that she would not understand the content of the document, and that it 
would not be difficult to convince her to sign it. Yet the lawyer and the in-laws made a 
stupid mistake that alarmed Belinda and made her aware of their intentions. 
Thirdly, the in-laws used notions about gender which Belinda found difficult to ward 
off. Belinda's in-laws considered her to be stupid because she had been a 'housewife', only 
engaged in household work and child care (although she also ran a shop but even Belinda 
did not consider this as an activity of importance). They said that she would not be able 
to provide for her children all by herself and that life without a 'principle head' would be 
impossible. They did not consider her to be capable of managing the farm. 
Just like other women in El Zapote, Belinda had to struggle for her land rights while 
she had no knowledge about land, papers and property rights. She did not know that 
she had legal rights to her late husband's property. She had to struggle against local 
gender notions that defined her as not being able to hold land. 
Doris and Belinda were both confronted with the consequences of the sudden death 
of a husband. Doris had to protect her rights against her own children, Belinda against 
her in-laws. The 'success stories' of Doris and Belinda both concerned farms with 
considerable amounts of land that were already producing, which enhanced their 
chances to successfully continue running the farms of their deceased husbands. 
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Anticipating widowhood 
The best protection for women against becoming a new 'Ermelina' is to anticipate the 
possibility of widowhood. Women do not await the decisions of husbands or sons, but 
they actively claim their own property rights. A first possible strategy is to 
immediately react to any emerging reorganisation of property rights. A second possible 
strategy is to start discussing norms of inheritance and their practical consequences in 
the abstract. 
Patricia Garcia was a woman who expected to become widowed because her 
husband was ill. She died a few years before we came to live in the village, but many 
villagers were able to tell the story of her actions concerning the inheritance of her late 
husband. The story goes that, one day, don Sebastian, the husband of Patricia, fell ill and 
became concerned about how to divide his properties. He decided to call upon his 
youngest son Francisco to talk about it. Francisco advised his father to draw up a last 
will. In his last will, don Sebastian declared that Francisco should be entitled to his 
properties after his death. After drawing up and signing the document, Francisco took it 
with him. 
A few days later, however, don Sebastian deeply regretted his decision and he told his 
wife Patricia about it. When she heard what the last will entailed, Patricia became afraid 
that Francisco would expel her from the house after the death of Sebastian. She thought 
seriously about the situation. Then, she waited until Francisco came home drunk, which 
was virtually his daily habit. She stole the document out of her son's pocket en went to 
don Mario, an important patron. She asked him if there was something she could do 
about it. Mario said that there was no problem, and he changed the document so that 
Patricia got the house until her death, and two manzanas of the land. After her death, the 
house and her share of the land would pass on to her daughter. Patricia went home and 
put the changed document back in her son's pocket. Francisco discovered the change 
only after his father's death. He went with the document to don Mario as well, asking 
the same question of whether it could be changed. Naturally, he did not know that don 
Mario had been involved in making the changes. Don Mario told him that he was sorry 
but that it was not possible to change the last will of a deceased person. 
Patricia did not trust her son Francisco and did not expect him to care for her until 
her death. She therefore had to act and she did so perfectly by making use of her 
youngest son's weakness: his drinking behaviour. She cheated her son and forged the 
document with the help of don Mario. 
A second strategy of women that I frequently came across was to start discussions 
about the subject of inheritance in plain terms, even before the property holder was 
thinking about bis own death. As I said before, women are very active participants in 
the discussions about the necessity of changes with regard to inheritance, and the rights 
of the surviving spouse are an important issue. I observed the use of discussion as a 
deliberate strategy by Rosa. Motivated by the illness of her husband Excequiel, I 
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witnessed how Rosa started to carefully think about her position. She told me that she 
did not have any property, and that she was with a husband who could die any moment 
while leaving four adult sons. Excequiel was set on conferring rights of inheritance to all 
his children as a matter of principle, but Rosa did not agree with him in this respect 
(Chapter Four). Rosa was not only worried about her children's rights, however, but also 
about her own prospects. Excequiel never showed any interest in protecting her position. 
One day, he bought a new plot of land. Rosa asked him to buy it in her name, yet he 
refused. After that, she tried to persuade her husband to register a newly bought mule in 
her name, but again she did not succeed. 
At dinner, or when they all worked together to thresh maize, she initiated 
conversations about the subject of inheritance. She talked about everybody's rights, and 
she took inventory of her children's views on the subject. She made suggestions on 
possible property divisions and revealed her own wishes. 
The coffee estate is far away in the mountains and I would not be able to manage it 
myself. So it will be in better hands with the boys. If I would have the tule field, I could 
take care of myself. 
Although many tule fields were not close to the village (it took a two hours walk to 
reach them), they were relatively accessible compared to the fields in the mountains. 
Therefore, they were attractive to women. Several women in the village managed a tule 
field on their own and earned a good income. These women set the example for Rosa, 
that a woman should be able to manage a tule field and that it would offer an 
opportunity to live independently. 
Apart from talking about the inheritance, Rosa started to meddle in agricultural 
decisions and to help out in the tule field at harvest time (see Chapter Three). In the past, 
she never really participated in decision-making about agricultural production and 
working in the fields. As part of her strategy to anticipate widowhood, she forced herself 
to become involved and to gain more control and say in the agricultural production 
process. In spite of all her efforts, Rosa was still not sure whether Excequiel would give 
his tule field to her before his death. However, the result of her talks and monologues 
about inheritance was that the whole family became well aware of the fact that she 
wanted this field for herself and that she would be prepared to fight for it. 
The hidden gender facets of land titling 
Chapter Two explained the importance of the PTT land titling project in the emergence 
of differential notions of property regarding land. The main aim of this programme was 
to sell national land to individual landholders and to grant the holders registered 
ownership titles. As I stated in the introduction of this chapter, 21% of the issued titles 
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in El Zapote bore the names of women.1 0 Leon et al. (1987) found that 17.8% of a total 
of 16000 land titles in the Santa Barbara district were in female hands. Who were these 
21% of female owners in El Zapote? Were they indeed female landowners who ended 
up with a title? 
During the titling activities in the framework of PTT, LNA officials used specific 
implementation rules in El Zapote.11 The official LNA policy was that a landholder 
could receive as many land titles as he wished as long as the total amount of land did not 
exceeded the maximum of 200 hectares. One title could contain up to ten parcels. 
However, during the implementation of the project, the rule was that a title could only 
contain four parcels and that one person received one title only.1 2 
The fragmented land in El Zapote obliged landholders to title large plots of their land 
in the names of wives, sons, daughters or other trusted persons. The LNA functionaries 
themselves advised landholders to title any other plots that they might have in the names 
of other people. Landholders thought that this was a purely bureaucratic move. They did 
not imagine that it would really affect their status as property holders. 
The specific rule that encouraged the titling of plots in the names of people who were 
not the holders affected the gender division of land. Some female owners lost their land 
because it was titled in the name of a husband or son who happened to be working on it 
the day that the PTT brigade passed by. The introduction of this book told the story of 
Ana who lost her land because it was titled in the name of her son Antonio. I also met 
women whose land was titled in the names of their husbands. They were often not sure 
about the actual implications of such mistakes, especially when the land was used 
primarily by their husbands and they had never used it themselves. When a female 
landholder in her thirties was telling me about their farm, I got the impression that that 
her husband owned the land. Only after I explicitly asked about it she said: 
That is... this land is mine, it was I who bought it but they made a mistake so now the 
document is in my husband's name. People told me that I should change it and that I 
should take care to register it in my own name again. Supposing me and my husband 
should end up in troubles... It was my own mistake that I did not do it so far. But we 
never had any problems. And when we will have problems., well, then the land will 
be his eternally [laughingj. 
The implementation rules of the PTT also resulted in women receiving the titles to land 
that they neither owned nor controlled, but which was the property of their husbands or 
sons. For attentive women, this meant that they obtained a potential source of power to 
use for securing a future life as a widow. The two gender effects of PTT only partly 
counterbalance each other in the statistics; the average of female title holders at the 
district level, as calculated by Leon et al. (1987), was slightly lower. This possibly 
indicates that there were more women who received land through PTT than lost it. 
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The following conversations between Anastacio Garcia and his wife Flor (see 
Chapter Four) addressed how the PTT rule of titling in other people's names worked 
out in daily life. Anastacio and Flor seemed to be continuously arguing about land. 
Anastacio was a healthy man but he was twenty years older than his wife so it was 
likely that he would be dead first. He had already divided thirteen manzanas of 
mountain land among his eleven children. He was also aware of his wife's interest to 
have a say in the land. The LNA allowed Anastacio to title only one plot in his name, 
which was the land in the mountains. He therefore decided to title another plot of land 
of IVimanzanas in the name of Flor. When I was visiting them one day, we talked 
about the land that Anastacio owned, and we also came to talk about the plot that was 
titled in Flor's name. Anastacio said: 'That plot of land is mine, I bought it. But when 
LNA came, they told me that I could only title one of my plots. So I put Flor's name 
instead'. Flor was listening carefully and intervened: 'The land is mine, and if I want to, 
I can sell it. But why should I do that., nowadays money is not worth anything. I still 
have to pay for the title, of course. Maybe I will do that with money from Anastacio's 
pocket'. Anastacio looked very displeased and quickly changed the subject. He knew 
that she was able to claim this land because she had a land title in her name. Her claim 
made it impossible for him to transfer the land to one of his children. Flor was obviously 
joking during this conversation. At the same time, however, she used the opportunity to 
re-enforce her claim. 
Several months after this conversation, I noticed how Flor had shifted her attention to 
another plot of land that she also wished to have. This was a coffee field of one manzana, 
situated in the lowlands and not so far from the village. Don Anastacio and Flor invited 
me to visit the coffee field. It was the harvest season and several day labourers (an old 
woman, a son-in-law and several young boys) went with us in the early morning. I was 
surprised that Flor was really going with us. She ran a big household with several young 
children and grandchildren. I guessed that she was not used to walking to the fields often 
and that she would leave it to don Anastacio to show me around. Before we left, their 
eldest daughter Norma (who lived in a house next to her parents) said that she would 
love to accompany me but her husband forbade her to leave the house. When we arrived 
at the field, Flor emphasised that everything I was seeing was the result of her work and 
not Anastacio's. It was actually Flor, and not Anastacio, who managed this coffee field. 
She supervised the day labourers, watching them pick the coffee and giving orders on 
how to do it.1 3 She regularly called the young boys to order when they started to play 
instead of working. She weighed the coffee at the end of the day and helped her youngest 
son load the bags of coffee on the donkey. When we returned home, Flor said that she 
would take care of the sale of this coffee herself. She said: 
Women know more about the facts of life. Look at Anastacio. There are things that I 
cannot leave up to him, like hiring day labourers or selling the coffee. If a man comes 
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and says "I will buy this coffee for this price", then Anastacio gives it to him. He has no 
idea that you have to negotiate and that you must investigate which of the buyers pays 
the best price. He says "what this man offers must be the right price". If I do not take 
care, he will give the coffee away forfree. 
A discussion arose in the coffee field about the use of chemicals on the young plantings, a 
subject which obviously had her interest and about which she had a clear opinion. The 
issue was whether it would be worthwhile to use chemicals on young plants, 
considering the risks. Anastacio did not want to use it while Flor was in favour of using 
chemicals. Anastacio argued that chemicals were too expensive and he didn't consider it 
a proper investment. Flor had the opposite opinion. She had an interest in long-term 
investments because she wanted the coffee field as her share of Anastacio's inheritance. 
On the other hand, Anastacio had lost interest in the field and did not want to invest 
any more money into it. 
Flor took advantage of the fact that Anastacio was getting older. He was no longer 
able to do all the work by himself. Her claim was successful because she convinced 
Anastacio that she was able to manage the field. Hence, Flor successfully expanded her 
successful claim on the land that was titled in her name and to the coffee field that she 
also wished to have. 
Widows and land use 
The widows whose stories I presented in this section do not struggle for an intermediate 
role in agricultural production, waiting for a son to take over. They do not expect their 
children to care for their widowed mother. Women actually develop strategies as a way 
of preparing themselves to defend against the claims of offspring. Women's strategies 
involve making their own wishes explicit and becoming active participants in inheritance 
processes. They think about the land they want to have and how they will make it 
productive. 
I also noticed another feature of their strategies. Rosa (anticipating widowhood) 
wanted a tule field and Flor (taking advantage of the land title she obtained) wanted a 
coffee field. Belinda and Doris - widows who inherited large amounts of land from their 
late husbands - were involved in coffee and cattle production. These women's interests 
and intentions were not directed at working in the fields to produce food for feeding 
their families. Rather, they opted for producing cash crops or cattle to earn money. 
Belinda and Doris were relatively well-to-do producers. Belinda had enough capital to 
pay an overseer and day labourers to do the work. She was able to invest in and 
technologically modernise the coffee production. Doris had her youngest son Ricardo to 
do all the work and who occasionally hired day labourers. Ricardo lived with his own 
family in her house and took responsibility for her well-being. Rosa and Flor, on the 
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other hand, did not have the same options as those of Doris and Belinda. Rosa and Flor 
were interested in having fields suitable for cash crops that were close to the village. Such 
fields would give them the opportunity to supervise the work in the fields themselves. 
They would not think, however, of doing the work in the fields all by themselves. They 
figured out how to earn money so they in turn would be able to pay for day labourers. 
The following section discusses women's ideas and intentions with regard to land use in 
greater detail. 
Control and land use 
What do women do when they have made a successful claim to property and what are 
reasons behind their land use strategies? Male and female landholders are constantly 
busy keeping their land under control to validate their claim and exclude others, but 
they differ in the means they have at their disposal to these ends. Land use strategies are 
central to the reinforcement of claims to ownership. Here, land use strategies include 
all kinds of 'using' land by women. First, this section addresses the reasons behind why 
some women decide to give their land to a trusted male member of their family or farm 
household. It then portrays women who keep control of the land in their own hands 
by selling or renting out their land or by making it productive themselves. 
Women own, men use 
A common way that female landowners use land is by allowing male farm household 
members (husbands, sons) to work their land while they maintain ownership of it. 
Several female owners stated that they had never visited their own property because 
they considered it to be too far away. Yet, despite their lack of familiarity of it, these 
women remained owners of their land and reserved the option of making decisions 
about its use, sale or transfer. 
The arrangements between Marcia Garcia and her son Marvin were exemplary for the 
tensions that the separation of ownership and use might create. Marcia told the story of 
her life as a series of misfortunes and troubles: she married the wrong man, was 
bewitched by him and became blind. He left her pregnant with a third child when 
another child got polio and died. Only one child survived: her son Marvin who was 
mute. Marvin married a woman with normal sight and hearing who served as an 
intermediary in communications between mother and son. They lived in a house of mud 
and branches which was divided in two: one part for Marcia, who had her own kitchen, 
and one part for Marvin and his family. 
Marcia inherited eight manzanas of land from her own father. She cared for him until 
he died so she considered the inheritance as a payment for her efforts. She no longer had 
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the full eight manzanas because she sold three manzanas when she needed money. She 
nearly lost her land on two occasions. She held a tule field in the construction area of the 
hydroelectric power plant. (Chapter Two) She lost the land and was compensated with 
160 lempiras and a new plot in a neighbouring municipaUty. However, the new plot 
wasn't suitable for tule cultivation. Her neighbour, who was an employee of the 
electricity company, wrote a letter to the company stating that they deceived a poor 
blind woman and her mute son. Thereafter, she received 1000 lempiras from the ENEE. 
She gave half of the money to her neighbour and used the other half to buy herself a 
small coffee field. The second time she thought she was going to loose her land was when 
the LNA issued land titles. She wasn't able to pay the title since she had land but no 
capital. She was afraid that the LNA would take over the land. 
Marcia allowed her son Marvin to use the land. He sowed maize and beans and cared 
for the coffee field. The products were used by Marcia and Marvin's own family. 
Although Marvin worked on the land, Marcia had no intention of transferring 
ownership to him. However, she grew older and decided to transfer part of the land to 
Marvin in 1997 as his inheritance. He received the coffee field that was already titled in 
his name and two manzanas in another location. Marcia continued to control three 
manzanas of her deceased father's land. Marvin continued to use this land as well. A few 
years later, however, she decided to sell the rest of her land. She first offered it for sale to 
Marvin but he refused to buy it and said that he did not have the money. She then sold 
two manzanas to her brother Pablo and one manzana to a friend. Marvin was forced to 
stop using the land. 
There was tension in the relation between the mother (owner of the land) and son 
(user of the land). The son hoped to become the owner one day; this was the reason why 
he worked on the land and took care of his mother. His work should have enforced his 
claim. However, the mother chose to sell part of the land to others, generating enough 
capital for her to live independently for the rest of her life. 
In this case, Marcia completely entrusted her son with the use of the land and did not 
expect him to contest her property rights. This, however, was often a major problem for 
the female owners that chose a similar option for using their land. Catarina Lopez was 
not so sure whether her rights would be respected by her family. Catarina inherited two 
manzanas of land from her father when his properties were divided after his death. After 
she received the land, her nephew Elmer invaded it. Catarina's land was not fenced in 
and was not in use. This made it relatively easy for Elmer to invade since he owned the 
adjacent plot. Catarina's husband and sons started to plant penco as a fence and some 
coffee seedlings. They were too late to avoid a conflict, however. Elmer proposed that 
Catarina should buy him out and, in order to avoid problems, Catarina's son Pedro paid 
him. Afterwards, Pedro and his father quickly finished the fence and planted more coffee 
trees. 
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When the INA titling brigade came, Catarina wondered of what she should do with 
her land. She decided to transfer ownership to her son Pedro as she trusted him more 
than her husband. Her husband was famous in the village for his drinking habits and for 
the fact that he had sold everything he once owned in order to be able to buy alcohol14. 
Pedro was a member of one of the Christian communities and he did not drink. She 
expected to have more support from Pedro than from her husband. 
On the face of it, one might conclude that Catarina was not interested in having land 
and that she therefore decided to give it to a son. This, however, would be a wrong 
interpretation of her motives and intentions. Catarina's nephew Elmer did not accept the 
way in which the estate of his grandfather had been divided between the heirs, and he 
thought he had rights to more land. He thought that his aunt would be incapable of 
acting against him. The response of Catarina - making a fence and planting coffee - made 
him demand a financial compensation in exchange for giving up his claim. Thereafter, 
Catarina concluded that she did not have complete control over the land and that there 
was the possibility she would have to withstand new claims. 
She did not trust her husband, whom she thought to be quite capable of selling her 
land without her consent. This would be even a greater danger if she permitted him to 
work the land, as this would allow him to reinforce any claim to it. Moreover, it would 
impose a socially accepted claim: he works on the land, thus it must be his. Even if 
people recognised her ownership of the land, her husband would be able to sell it because 
the buyer would think that, as a spouse, he was acting completely in his right. She 
expected that her son Pedro would work the land and not sell it. In fact, she exchanged 
ownership for the prospect of guaranteeing her son's support of her household and care 
in her old age. Her own insecurity with respect to her property rights made her decide to 
transfer it so she could at least take some advantage of it. 
By allowing male household members to work on the land, female owners were not 
able to automatically make a claim to the products of that land. More than property 
rights alone, labour allowed for a strong claim to the harvest as a compensation for the 
invested labour. Hence, female owners kept dealing with the contested claims on the 
produce in the farm household, even though it originated from their own property. 
Sale and renting-out 
Female landowners have possibilities other than allowing male household members to 
use their land. Just like Marcia, women often opt for selling part of their land. I 
consider selling to be a land use strategy as well. The sale of the land means that women 
have cash at their disposal. However, sales also occur in emergency situations, such as 
when money is needed to cover medical expenses. In some cases, the land itself is not 
sold but is instead used as collateral for a loan. 
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A term that I frequently heard when talking to female landowners was 'need' 
(necesidad). According to women, land is sold out of 'need'. This can mean all kinds of 
things: illness, threats of violence, poverty, emergencies or a loan which has to be paid 
off. Need is a very vague but socially accepted motive for selling land. Illness is a very 
common 'need' which leads to the sale of land. As a woman who sold the land inherited 
from her mother told me: 
You know how this happens with poor people. I became ill, it was serious and I had to 
go to Santa Barbara, to the hospital. I was brought home again but I did not recover 
from the illness. I needed a real doctor. I asked my mother, who was still alive at the 
time, what to do. She said "the land I gave you is yours, you decide whatever you 
would like to do with it, but... it is not wise to die because you do not have money". 
Now I am sorry about it [the sale of the land] because my sons do not have land to 
work on. 
Hence to women, land is a source of cash and a possible safety net to be activated when 
needed. Land thus serves as a social security provision (Agarwal 1994). 
Some female owners used their land by renting it out to male producers. Renting-out 
has the advantage of receiving cash in a relatively easy way. There were two women in 
El Zapote who were known for renting their land out year after year: both were old 
widows for whom cash was important to survive. One of these widows kept partial 
control over the production process of her tenants by forbidding them to burn their 
fields in order to protect fruit trees and a well. She needed a trusted man, however, to 
actually impose and enforce sanctions on tenants who disregarded this stipulation. 
Female agricultural producers 
Renting-out provides a landholder with cash, but she does not produce: production is in 
the hands of male tenants and the landholder does not receive the harvest. Female 
landowners consider themselves to be 'producers' when they independently control, in 
one way or another, the production process on the land. Thus, women who let male 
household members use their land do not define themselves as producers. There are 
relatively few female producers, which indicates that it is not easy for women to start 
producing for themselves. Female producers are not always single women, but many are 
widows. They are generally not small landowners and may hold considerable amounts of 
land, often of good quality, which increases the ability to establish a viable production 
system. 
Whether or not female landowners succeed in becoming producers themselves 
depends not only on the amount of land they have access to, but also their access to other 
resources, perceptions of their own possibilities, the choices they make, or the influences 
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of husbands and other male household members. The following case of three sisters and 
their mother shows that the same amount of land may lead to differences in production 
systems, productivity and income, as well as differences that women who are producers 
and landowners have in the control over their land. Laura, Mara, and Silvia were three 
sisters who, together with their mother Amalia inherited a large coffee estate from their 
late father and husband. The fields were quite a long distance from the village, in the 
mountains of the adjacent district Lempira. After her husband's death, Amalia left her 
house in the village and went to live in the coffee field. She thought that she would best 
be able to take care of the fields by doing this. Her three daughters had their own 
households in the village. Table 5.1 outlines the different ways in which these four 
women were using their coffee fields. 
Silvia and Amalia made a good income from the production of coffee. Silvia had a 
husband who did not meddle in his wife's affairs concerning her coffee field; he 
completely considered it to be her property and responsibility. Unlike other men in the 
village, he did not object to the fact that she left the household for several weeks during 
harvest time. He said that he did not have to make claims on Silvia's field because he had 
a paid job as the municipal secretary and he managed his own coffee field. 
Table 5.7 The production activities of three (adult) daughters and their mother 
Laura Mara Silvia Amalia (mother) 
Obtained Inheritance father Inheritance father Inheritance father Inheritance husband 
through: 
Area 1.5 manzanas 1.5 manzanas 1.5 manzanas 10 manzanas 
(coffee) (coffee) (coffee) (several with coffee) 
Management By her husband;she By her husband and By herself; her mother helped By herself, with 
and herself travelled during two sons; she only by recruiting the necessary labourers from nearby 
decision- the harvest season to travelled to the field in labour power for weeding villages. Her house was 
making help pick coffee. Her case it was absolutely and other tasks. She stayed in in the middle of her 
husband considered the necessary. She was the field without returning land and she was able 
field as her property. nevertheless the home during the harvest to inspect the 
recognised owner and season. She did not pick labourers herself. 
kept partial control coffee herself but brought 
over the product, along women from the village 
who were indebted to her. 
Husband managed his own 
coffee field. 
Production Traditional way, no inputs Traditional way, no Modernised production Modernised 
system were used inputs were used system with use of inputs production system, 
(mainly fertiliser) with use of all required 
Sold coffee as wet Sold coffee as wet Paid transport to the village inputs 
parchment because she parchment. Same and took wet parchment Dried coffee in patio in 
lacked space to dry it reasons as Eleonore coffee home to dry on her coffee field and sold 
and the money to own patio. Sold dry dry parchment 
transport the wet coffee parchment. 
to the village'5 
169 
Laura and Mara did not independently manage their coffee field. Laura's husband 
worked in the field and made decisions with regard to improving the production; in 
Mara's case, this was done by her husband and two sons. The women, however, 
continued to be the recognised owners of their fields, and to a certain extent they also 
were recognised as producers because they were involved in decision-making and in the 
work in the field. In contrast to Silvia, Laura and Mara were not able to exclusively lay 
claim to the product derived from their coffee fields because their husbands and children 
worked as well, which meant that they also had a say in the product. Laura's and Mara's 
field output was low but, nevertheless, it was still worth the effort. 
The inheritance of the coffee fields meant a considerable progress in life for the 
sisters, yet there were also differences in what this meant for each of them. Silvia was a 
rich producer who was able to make investments. She received crucial support from her 
mother. For her two sisters, the coffee fields were essential to their strategies for 
survival. However, they did not succeed in increasing their production and earn more. 
They needed their husbands' knowledge and labour power and, in turn, they had to 
give up part of their control of the land and its product. 
I observed female producers who were involved in cattle, coffee, and tule production, 
while very few female producers cultivated food crops such as maize and beans. Only 
female landowners who were able to easily mobilise reliable labourers, and who had 
suitable land, cultivated maize for home consumption. Maize and beans are much more 
difficult to cultivate because they involve more risk, more labour power and permanent 
vigilance. 
Coffee production and cattle holding confronted female producers with considerable 
managerial problems as well. It was not easy for aged widows, for example, to continue 
their production activities. Two widowed sisters of 75 and 67 years old, respectively, 
inherited considerably large estates from their deceased husbands. The youngest owned 
17 hectares of land divided into four plots, the most important of which a coffee field. 
Her deteriorating physical condition made it increasingly difficult to manage it on her 
own. She became totally dependent upon her son to care for the coffee field and to 
organise labour power, and the de-pulping, drying and sale of the coffee. However, he 
preferred to take care of his own coffee fields first. He was only willing to start on his 
mother's field after he had taken care of his own needs. 
The eldest sister owned three plots of land, consisting of 1, 17, and 25 hectares each. 
She was mainly engaged in cattle and milk production. When I talked to her in 1994, 
she was thinking about selling the land. She experienced problems because the grass on 
her pasture lands did not grow in the way it did before and the cows therefore had less 
fodder and gave less milk. She had no money to repair the fences and to divide the 
pasture land into sections which gave the grass the opportunity to grow without being 
devoured immediately. 
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In 1995, I met her while she was talking to a friend who proposed some possible 
solutions. In the end, she said: 'As a single woman, how should I do that? No, it will be 
best to sell the cows. I am demoralised [by the situation]'. She confided to the friend 
that she did not know how she to monitor the work of day labourers. The labourers did 
not perform the tasks in the way she expected of them: 'The day labourer is not as the 
owner'. She said that the milk she produced provided her only with sufficient money to 
pay the salary of the day labourer who milked the cows, but she complained that it did 
not leave her with a real income. She was convinced that there were people stealing her 
wooden fence posts to use for firewood. 'While they should take care of a poor widow 
they steal from her'. She was still uncertain if selling would be the best option. She was 
thinking about her late husband, who had built it all up and the memory of whom made 
it difficult to think about selling. Her daughters who lived in the capital city were both 
trying to persuade her to sell the land and to come and live with them. She actually did 
this in 1998. 
Both these old widows lived alone. The first widow had a son who lived in the village 
and was expected to manage his mother's field. She could not prevent him giving 
preference to his own fields before attending hers. The problem of the second widow was 
that she did not have a trusted person who could assist her in the management of her 
land. Her only two daughters lived in the capital city. She had a permanent day labourer 
to take care of the cattle and the pasture fields, but she lacked access to knowledge about 
keeping cattle. She never went to her fields to inspect the condition of the grass and relied 
only on what her day labourer and other people told her about the condition of her 
pasture fields and cattle, and the destruction of her fences. She did not know what to do. 
In spite of the support of friends with whom she discussed the problem, she had lost the 
spirit to tackle her problems. 
The way in which these widows used their land was characteristic of female producers. 
They concentrated on production to generate cash; they depended on their ability to 
build up a trusting relationship with the people who worked for them; they used as little 
paid labour as possible, but did not work in the fields themselves; they had no capital to 
invest in better production methods; and they were focused on ensuring their own 
survival and not on improving their enterprise. 
A female manager 
One of the rare women who definitely tried to break out of the standard pattern for 
female producers was Belinda Matute (see previous section). She was one of the few 
women who actually managed well on her own. She considered herself to be different 
from other women because she was widow and single: 'Other women have husbands to 
care for them'. 
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After she successfully contested her in-laws' claim on the land, she never thought of 
selling it. 'I never thought about selling. I would have eaten it and then I would be left 
without anything'. She wanted to continue with her late husband's ideas concerning 
the six manzana coffee plantation. She therefore took courses about coffee production 
that were given by AHPROCAFE, the coffee farmers organisation and she hired the 
services of her brother, who became her permanent overseer. He organised the daily 
work and provided her with technical advise. 
Belinda did not know much about the technical side of coffee production. She hardly 
had any idea about how much fertiliser she used in the coffee plantation, or the effects 
of certain chemicals. She was not in the habit of regularly visiting the field and she only 
went frequently during the harvest season16. The day labourers who worked in her 
coffee field during the harvest season were practically all women. According to Belinda: 
My workers come from the hamlets... It is easy for these women to reach my field 
because it is close to their homes [she referred to a hamlet in the mountains near the 
coffee fields]. They work for me because I am a woman. If women need money they 
come to me." There is only confidence among women. 
The coffee plantation was her main source of income. In addition, she cultivated half a 
manzana of maize and half a manzana of beans for home consumption. She did this for 
the same reason as male producers who sowed these crops: 'I do not like to have to beg 
other people to sell me their maize. I like to eat what I produce myself'. The 
production of maize and beans was also organised and supervised by her brother. 
Belinda confirmed that women have more difficulties in sowing maize: 
In my position., it is more difficult to manage the labourers. It is expensive for me to 
sow maize. It's because I am not present [during work] It's not the same as when the 
owner is around. This year I decided to pay three day labourers in advance. Sometimes 
I pay labourers on contract, which makes it cheaper. 
Her wish for the future was to start cattle holding. She had land which was suitable for 
pasture but it was still a guamil (secondary growth of forest). 
This year I wanted to give the guamil to the people so that they would clear it and sow 
maize. I didn't want them to pay [rent] [After the clearing] I would be able to sow 
grass. So I told my brother to he pass on this information [to other villagers] Only a 
few people, only four, came to request a plot. I do not know why they did not want 
[the work}.. I am not in a hurry [to clear the guamil] because I do not have cattle yet. 
But I have hopes. 
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Other villagers, however, said that Belinda did have cattle once, but that she failed to 
attend to the animals. They frequently escaped from the pasture field and caused damage 
to adjacent plots. She received so many claims for damages that she decided to sell them. 
Belinda's success as a producer also became a source of criticism. If she would have left 
her children and the property in the hands of her family-in-law, the villagers would 
almost certainly have labelled her as a degenerated mother. She could have opted for 
selling the land, and gossip would be that she squandered her late husband's property. 
She decided to start producing herself, and people reacted negatively to that choice as 
well: 
A woman criticised me the other day. You know how people like to criticise someone 
else. This woman said "you are consuming your late husband's work". I told her the 
land was left by my husband but he did not leave his labour. I am the one who is 
producing. If I would have sold the land and eat it, yes.. It is true, the old coffee field 
was his but lam the person who makes it produce. That is how land my children eat 
today. 
She was a loner in the village and, in this respect, the place she chose to sit during 
community meetings was revealing. She did not sit with the other women, who usually 
gathered at the back of the community centre, but always sat in front by herself apart 
from the men. She was informed by her work in AHPROCAFE, and she was the only 
woman who dared to speak at public gatherings. On the one hand, she was a role model 
to other women. She showed them that it was possible to live independently as a widow 
and a single mother. She enjoyed this role enormously. She told me in 1997 that she 
wanted to be elected the mayor of the village to work towards new income generating 
possibilities for poor women (she was eventually elected mayor for the Liberal Party in 
1998). The other side of her story was that she was rich and influential. This isolated her 
from other village women and sided her with the ruling elite. 
Many people rejected her aspirations to become a mayor. One of the critical persons 
commented: 
/ will not deny that she has her merits. She always worked hard for the party. Yet her 
private life does not combine with being the mayor. The people will say: if she cannot 
lead her household in an adequate way there is no hope that she will be able to lead the 
municipality.18 She is not social, she does not know how to deal with people. This could 
all be a disadvantage to the party, because in a dirty campaign this can all be used to 
discredit the party. 
Men and women harshly criticised her style of living. Her political affiliation with the 
Liberal Party was an eyesore to the members of the National Party and some of the 
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members of her own party. She dressed as an urban secretary with suits and high heels. 
She became involved in relationships with younger men, among them a young man who 
broke up his marriage to live with her. She drank beer in public, which was a most 
unusual thing for rural women to do. Some people labelled her as either as a 'prostitute' 
iputa) or as a bad producer: 'A woman alone cannot keep control - look at what 
happened to her cattle'. However, others admired the way she managed her coffee field, 
which produced very well. 
Land use and the gender division of labour 
The foregoing cases of land use strategies by female landowners have shown that they 
have several options: 
• Temporarily lend it to a husband or son to work 
• Transfer all their rights to a male household member 
• Rent it out 
« Sell it 
• Use it as collateral to receive a loan 
• Work on it themselves 
• Try and manage it themselves. 
These options stand for divergent ways to achieve, control and transfer elements of the 
bundle of property rights. Through the choice of particular land use options, women 
become differentially engaged in property relations inside and outside their farm 
households. 
Lending land to a husband or son means that a female landholder loses control over 
the use of the land, but she is still owner. Furthermore, transferring ownership to a 
husband or a son is not some kind of irrational act, but a woman might expect that she 
will receive care in return. Several of women's strategies, moreover, focus on generating a 
cash income that they are able to control themselves. 
Belinda suggested during the interviews that female landholders would only convert 
themselves to producers when there is no man around. She reproduced an image of 
women as dependent on men. In her eyes, it is not desirable for women to be 
independent producers, but it is an alternative for women who are left by themselves and 
do not, or no longer, have a man to care for them. On the other hand, Belinda would not 
give up producing at if she were to become engaged in a new relationship with a man. 
Generally, female landholders seek land use options that do not contest the gender 
division of labour. They do not neglect their housekeeping duties and their 
responsibilities as mothers; and they do not operate in a way that requires them to 
frequently leave the boundaries of their farm households. They operate as distant 
managers of their land and do not work in the field, which at the same time restricts their 
possibilities. 
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Female producers complain that it is difficult to control the day labourers they send to 
do the work. Furthermore, they lack access to knowledge because they do not attend 
meetings or courses given by outside agencies, and they do not take part in the informal 
networks of knowledge exchange which exist between men. Even a rich producer like 
Belinda, who has been an active member of AHPROCAFE, has limited knowledge 
about the production process on her coffee plantation. She depends on the knowledge of 
her brother, who she hires as a superintendent. Female landholders are in big trouble the 
moment they lose such an intimate and trusted person. 
It is important for female landowners to avoid openly questioning the boundaries of 
the gender division of labour. Typically, at the moment Belinda intended to overstep 
these boundaries, she was immediately criticised and had to put up with very negative 
labels about her life and production capabilities. She was a successful producer, she was 
important in village politics and she maintained her libertine life style, all of which made 
her a threat to most of the village men. 
Beyond instrumentalism: women, land and the law 
The general points raised in Honduran discussions about land and women are that 
women have to become productive in order to combat poverty; that women want to 
produce food to feed their families; that women work on the land and thus should have 
rights to the land; and that improving women's access to land is a development issue 
that requires special policies. I previously concluded that, thus far, changes in law have 
been the main strategy to achieve these goals. 
What do the situations and strategies of female landholders in El Zapote teach us? 
This chapter has demonstrated that women's struggles for land can only be understood 
when attention is paid to the constraints and possibilities of women to obtain land 
through inheritance practices. Moreover, it is important to note how women struggle 
to obtain land rights, but it is equally important to understand how they struggle to 
keep these rights once they have acquired them. Women and men experience different 
threats to their property rights. Male landholders anticipate other property holders or 
the state to make claims; female landholders have to deal with these as well as husbands 
or sons making claims on their land on their land. 
Women struggle to own land to obtain an independent source of income with 
decision-making power. Having land means having the social status of a property 
holder. Landholders are able to participate in state programmes for agricultural 
producers and they have a say in community land management. Land rights may 
strengthen women's say in the use of labour and income in farm households; they may 
reinforce women's position when they are confronted with divorce or inheritance; and 
land may guarantee their old age care. 
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Pleas in favour of giving women access to land refer to the specific and unique 
responsibilities of women. Women are considered to be responsible for the well-being of 
their families and children; they are potentially productive and therefore a blessing to 
the national economy; or they are, more than men, responsive to sustainable 
production methods. Rather than seeing women as being entitled to land because they 
are ordinary citizens and equal to men, such pleas see women's entitlement as rooted in 
their usefulness to their families, the economy, the environment, etc. 
This section will first examine the gender constraints that women experience in their 
efforts to obtain land rights. It then turns to the solutions that the state proposed in 
order to deal with the gender inequality of property rights to land: gender neutral law 
and joint titling. The section then discusses whether land ownership is indeed a tool for 
achieving women's emancipation. 
Gender constraints 
Women who struggle to acquire and control land are confronted with specific gender 
constraints. Women are primarily considered to be people who have a right to be taken 
care of, a very strong perception that is not easy to break through. This perception 
positions women exclusively in the sphere of la casa (the house) (Radcliffe and 
Westwood 1996). Women are not considered to be possible participants in property 
rights relationships, but as mothers and caretakers instead. 
A second constraint to women is the linkage between rights to land and 'work'. 
Women's work and men's work are differentially valued, which makes the link 
between labour and land rights directly detrimental to women's opportunities to claim 
land. Men's work on the land, for example, reinforces their claims to inherit land. 
Women, on the other hand, have difficulties claiming inheritance rights because they 
do not work on the land and are thus not able to make a direct claim. 
A third constraint is that female landholders develop all kinds of use strategies that 
are not considered as 'proper' use by men. What female landowners do with their land 
is often not identified as a land use strategy. As a result, women in general are viewed as 
not being capable of properly using the land and not being worthy landowners. The 
range of women's land use strategies includes giving land to a son or husband to 
cultivate, transferring it to heirs in a variety of ways, renting-out or managing it by 
using day labourers. Through all these different strategies, female landholders derive 
advantages from their land and they choose a land use strategy according to their own 
wishes and abilities. 
Even if women sell their land, it is often a conscious decision which they speak of 
with pride or with regret in hindsight. Selling is thus not necessarily a sign of 
oppression, poverty or a lack of ability to make land productive. Nevertheless, men 
choose not to understand women's land use strategies and they stick to conveying that 
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women unjustly demand land because they do not work on it, that women only want 
land to sell it and that women are not able to make land productive. 
Negative gender images are not the only impressions playing a role in women's 
struggles for land. Women engaged in petate production have a strong self-image of 
being producers with autonomous responsibilities. The petate means arduous labour 
and, in many farm households, the petate generates an income that is essential to the 
survival of the household. Women use the petate image to show that they are able to 
work hard and produce. 
Gender constraints are important reasons why female landholders develop land use 
strategies that do not contest the gender division of labour. They continue to attend 
their domestic and motherly affairs and do not work in the fields themselves. When 
they choose to produce themselves, a male adviser helps with the organisational and 
technical sides of production. It is exactly through maintaining the image of housewife 
and not openly meddling in 'male' activities, which makes it is easier for women to 
enter the public sphere of agricultural production. Keeping pace with the gender 
division of labour and the image of a decent wife and mother protects women against 
criticism and makes their activities less hostile to men's positions. 
Generally, female producers do not choose to cultivate food crops, but they are 
interested in generating cash. Cash allows them to buy whatever they need for then-
farm households, to hire day labourers, to save regularly, to make investments. It 
reinforces their position and it fits in with their principle goal, which is to have 
authority and decision-making power over their land by omitting negative labels and 
making use of the space that they have within the gender order of their society. 
The consequences of gender neutral law 
I stated in the introduction to this chapter that the law has been the central subject of 
discussions about women's land rights in Honduras. In the Law of Modernisation of 
1992, the discriminatory gender provisions of the Agrarian Reform Law were replaced 
by gender-neutral requirements affecting potential beneficiaries of the land distribution 
programme (Sandoval Corea 1992, Noe Pino et al. 1993, Hendrix 1993, Martinez et al. 
1995). Directly after implementing the Law of Modernisation, however, a discussion 
emerged about the effects of gender-neutral law. Palacios (1994:7) argued that: 
...the normative component of this law [the Law of Modernisation] prescribes that 
women participate in the agrarian reform programmes in conditions equal to men's. 
However, while stipulating equality of conditions for women and men, this law does 
not establish natural equality for women... Social, cultural and emotional differences 
are ignored, which also affect economic and political aspects. 
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Palacios furthermore added that nothing has been done to prevent gender 
discrimination in the sphere of the implementation of the law. Leon et al. (1987) made 
similar observations with regard to the gender-neutral PTT programme, in which they 
assumed that the absence of gender differences in the programme were not sufficient to 
achieve equal land rights for women. 
Feminist organisations considered the abolition of discriminating criteria in the Law 
of Modernisation to be an important step because it embodied a political decision to do 
something for rural women. On the other hand, they argued that the state did not 
provide the necessary conditions to make women able to be 'competitive and efficient', 
as the law stipulated, such as relieving them of the burden of reproductive work or 
changing gender constraints. The female president of C O C O C H 1 9 pointed out that 
women will never be able to work in agriculture on a full-time base (a legal requirement 
for becoming beneficiary of the law) because of their housekeeping duties. She 
considered that women thus do not qualify to obtain land from the state through the 
arrangements of the Law of Modernisation (January 30,1995: Diario Tiempo). 
A related point of discussion regarding the effects of gender neutral law is whether 
law really enhances women's opportunities to claim land. To what extent do changes in 
agrarian law really improve women's land rights? Women may use the newly created 
legal space to claim land from the state, yet knowledge of the law among trained female 
members of peasant organisations is limited, and women who are not organised or 
trained have even less knowledge (Noe Pino et al. 1993). Agrarian law does not 
immediately influence or change the gender constraints on claims to land, the same 
constraints that nevertheless form the major obstacles for women to claim land in daily 
life. The gender-neutral law may inspire the emergence of new gender notions that 
could gain influence in daily life at a certain time, but such changes easily take years and 
their outcomes are unpredictable. 
The aura of the developmental discourse placed around the issue of women and land 
has meant that a kind of instrumental reason has to be created to plead for land rights 
for women. Instead of unconditionally conferring equal rights on all men and women, 
women are depicted in unique positions with specific responsibilities such as food 
providers and caretakers that have to justify their land claim. 
The state and joint titling 
Gender equality in land rights is an important policy goal for the state. It was an 
important point of discussion when the Law of Modernisation was formulated, 
stimulating a discussion that involved many organisations for peasants and rural 
women. It has also become an issue in the discussion about land titling. The following 
quote of the Honduran President Carlos Flores illustrated the dilemmas of the forced 
gender equality in state policy: 
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Yesterday President Carlos Roberto Flores announced a change in the policy of land 
titling which means that the majority of titles will be issued in the name of women or 
couples. Traditionally land was legalised almost exclusively in the names of men... 
Flores said that in the past the titles have been fundamentally for men but "terrible 
things happened, for example, that women who worked together with their spouses and 
contributed to the patrimony., the questions of life left them in the cold afterwards. 
This will not happen again because we want women and couples to have rights to titles 
and to their patrimony and that, together with him, she is able to pass an inheritance 
to the children and future generations''. (October 22,1999: ElHeraldo). 
The Law of Modernisation allows for the possibility that land can be titled in the 
names of both spouses, but only if they both agree to it and file a special request (art. 
64). Joint titling is considered to be a possible solution to gender inequality in land 
rights (Galan 1998, Deere and Leon 2001, Deere 2001). This might be advantageous to 
women, although at the same time, the article in the Law of Modernisation stipulates 
that a woman cannot demand joint registration independently but she is still dependent 
upon her husband's consent (Hendrix 1993). 
Yet on the basis of this chapter, I see other problematic aspects of the joint titling 
solution. The proposal of President Flores is actually only applicable to areas that are 
empty and without inhabitants or pre-existing property rights distributions. A new 
area to be colonised for migrants to live and work might offer the possibility for the 
state to consider how plots of agricultural land should be distributed and titled. This is 
not possible in all other cases where villages exist and people have been working the 
land for generations. 
Women have received land titles ever since the start of PTT, both on property they 
owned and coincidentally, as in the case of El Zapote. To increase the number of 
women with land titles, their opportunities to acquire and control property rights in 
daily life first must first be increased. This is a process far more complicated than was 
expressed by Flores. Moreover, it should be taken into account that titles jointly held 
between husbands and wives can bring about problems in cases of divorce, inheritance, 
or sale. Moreover, the joint title does not say anything about who makes the decisions 
about land use or who controls the product. 
Land titling as a process interacts with existing property relationships and may very 
well have unintended outcomes, both to the advantage and disadvantage of women. 
Information about the concrete daily struggles of women, their claims and arguments, 
their problems managing and keeping land, need to be dealfwith if the objective is to 
propose concrete titling policies. 
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Land ownership as a tool to emancipate rural women 
Can land provide welfare, efficiency and, especially, the empowerment of women? Is it 
the means of rural women's emancipation? This chapter has shown that property rights 
to land are a potential source of power, through which the position of women may be 
significantly altered. However, this chapter has also demonstrated that such changes do 
not follow a clear and singular route. 
Relatively few women in El Zapote succeed in claiming land rights and when they 
do, what women actually do with their land makes a difference. Female landholders are 
generally able to improve their position in the farm household in terms of decision-
making power and ability to control production and income. They have something to 
fall back on in case of emergencies or crisis and they are able to rent it out and they 
receive a regular income. Through inheritance strategies, female landholders are able to 
exercise power over their children. By binding the children in anticipation of the 
inheritance, they guarantee themselves support, free labour and care when they become 
old. Women who actually manage the production on their land themselves are able to 
provide themselves with the autonomous control of cash and product. 
The outsiders interpretation of women's land use strategies very often misses crucial 
points. Men for different reasons use the occasional argument that women misuse land. 
Development organisations and the state either argue that women do not work on the 
land and therefore are not interested in having land; or that women are interested in 
land, hence, they work on it. In my view, the important step to take is to recognise that 
the land use strategies of women are reasonable in the light of women's circumstances; 
reasonable in the sense that they are consciously created to bring in products, income, 
proceeds, or to have a say in decision-making at certain moments. 
Female landholders, however, do not automatically use their land to change their 
bargaining position in the household or to structurally change gender relations. A once-
only sale of the land, because of illness for example, generates cash to cover the costs of 
travel, hospital care or medicine. Such an action in itself does not yield power or 
improve their bargaining position. However, land ownership does change power 
relations when women use their property to improve their bargaining position and 
decision-making power regarding the division of products and income, and fetter their 
husbands and offspring by cleverly bringing inheritance into play. In this sense, land is 
indeed a means to women's emancipation. 
Honduran women's organisations, NGOs and national and international 
development agencies have opted to use the law as the central focus of attention in the 
elimination of discrimination against women and their rights to land. This chapter has 
shown that improving women's access to land means that many elements besides the 
law that cause this discrimination against women have to change, such as: 
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• Recognition of women's land use strategies 
Female landholders in El Zapote do not live up to the peasant image: they do not 
work on the land themselves and do not produce food for their families, but they use 
land in such a way that they are able to achieve economic independence. 
• Changes in gender images 
Gender images play a crucial role in struggles for land rights by women. Any 
demand for more land rights for women should include an answer as to how 
ideological barriers put up against women in struggles for inheritance may be 
overcome without establishing new ones (as is often done, for example the peasant 
image). 
• Equal rights claim 
The claim of equal rights is already strong in local inheritance practices (Chapter 
Four). Equality between men and women is one of the most important aspects of the 
equal rights claim. It is possible that women's demand for land rights will become 
more successful when more women start to publicly demand their rights, and when 
men will continue to argue that inheritance should be divided equally between heirs. 
Many voices in Honduras, as well as in the international discussion about women and 
development, have claimed that women's rights to land are crucial to the welfare, 
efficient distribution of resources and empowerment of women. By adding an 
instrumental perspective - women need rights to land for achieving different objectives -
they have created, perhaps unintentionally, a difference between women's rights and 
men's rights. 
I have often asked myself why women's demands for land rights are only justified 
when it serves a purpose in the light of women's servitude to the familiar and the 
societal welfare. Are women not normal citizens with normal rights just like men? The 
demand for ending discrimination and giving women the rights they are entitled to 
should start with a recognition that we need to stop patronising rural women. The 
demand should begin where these women want it to begin: by recognising their right 
to independently decide on the use and transfer of their land. 
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Notes 
1 In her study of pre-independence documents and case files in the General Archive of the Judicial Power, 
de Oyuela (1989, 1994) came across many files about women who intended to transfer property rights to 
another person. She observed that the court rejected the requests when the women lacked permission of 
their husbands. 
2 Beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform were expected to join a co-operative or association. Safilios-
Rothschild (1983) argues that this was also an obstacle to women because the members of these 
organisations refused to accept women who did not have adult sons who could substitute for the women 
in the work required for communal purposes. The idea behind their refusal to accept female members was 
that they considered women to be incapable of performing these tasks on their own without male 
support. 
3 Garifuna women on the northern coast, and indigenous Lenca women in the departments of La Paz and 
Intibuca do work in the fields on a regular base. 
4 The percentage of female producers is higher in other departments of Honduras. 
5 Fehmuc is the Federacion Hondurena de Mujeres Campesinas. 
6 Impoverished widows who are completely abandoned by their children are also observed in other parts of 
the world (Ortiz 1973, Mtengetti-Migiro 1991, Wanitzek 1994, Palriwala 1994). 
7 AHPROCAFE is the Asociacion Hondurena de Productores de Cafe. 
8 The 'principle head' is a common expression for the male household head. 
9 Other villagers informed me about a story which took place right after her husband's death. Belinda 
indeed met another man, but after a few months he left her while taking along the entire coffee harvest of 
that year. 
10 This data is based on the number of female names on a list that combined data of the National Cadastral 
Directorate and PTT. Leon et al. (1987) found that 154 plots were owned by 131 women with a total area 
of 565.38 hectares in El Zapote. It is not clear how Leon et al. collected this data since the titling 
programme itself did not provide gender separated data at that time. 
11 Possibly, this not only happened in El Zapote. An ex-member of an INA titling brigade in the department 
of Comayagua confirmed that the same rules were used during the pilot project in this department. The 
head of the PTT office of the DMA, however, denied in 1995 that these rules had ever existed and had been 
applied. 
12 In El Zapote, multiple plot titles incorporated one to four plots smaller than the minimum size of one 
hectare. By registering several small plots in one title, the land obtained the minimum size. 
13 Just like other coffee producers, Flor was complaining that day labourers and, especially, irresponsible 
young boys, did not pick, but strung the berries in order to work faster. This method allowed the 
labourer to work quicker but it damaged the coffee trees. 
14 Alcoholics become impoverished because they sell everything they have when they need money. This can 
easily be their wives' properties as well. Although a husband has no legal say at all in his wife's land, the 
illegal 'sale' will very often lead to the woman's loss of the land. The husband consumes the money, and 
the buyer of the land needs to be paid off if he does not receive the land. The excessive drinking behaviour 
of men and its consequences is not typical only for Honduras. Nuijten (1998) describes the importance of 
drinking behaviour with regard to the choice of an heir in rural Mexico. 
15 Wet parchment means that the beans are freed of the pulp with a hand pulper and sold without drying 
them. Dry parchment is coffee that is dried in the sun. Dry parchment obviously has a higher value than 
wet parchment. 
16 It took one and a half hours by mule to arrive at Belinda's coffee field. In 1996, the producers of that 
particular mountain area succeeded to receive funds to construct a road in order to be able to take the 
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coffee to the village by car. Belinda's property was not on the road but she was able to construct a private 
side-road to her own field. She was the only woman in the village driving a car, and one of the first 
persons in the village who owned one. 
17 Practically all the day labourers who picked coffee in the harvest season were involved in a debt relation 
with Belinda. They paid this debt off by working during the coffee harvest. 
18 A nice detail was that Belinda used the same metaphor in a conversation with me about her aspirations to 
become mayor, stating that the problem with male mayors was that they did not understand that it was 
not feasible to decorate the house when it had not yet been cleaned. 
19 Comité Coordinador de Organizaciones Campesinas (COCOCH) is an umbrella organisation of several 
peasant organisations and organisations of rural women. COCOCH strongly opposed the Law of 
Modernisation. 
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Chapter six 
Land conflicts and the judicial system 
There are popular sayings in Honduras that express how people perceive their judicial 
system: 'Justice only bites the barefooted' (Lajusticia solo muerde a los descalzos), and 'fleas 
only bite the bony dogs' (solo a los perros flacos pegan las pulgas). The image created 
through these sayings is that the judicial system exclusively focuses on punishing the poor, 
and that it never catches rich people. The previous chapters have looked at the emergence 
of conflicts between landholders, why and how conflicts come about and how 
landholders deal with them. Landholders find it difficult to resolve their conflicts; there 
are hardly any 'informal' or alternative ways of conflict resolution and people do not have 
many opportunities to call upon the judicial authorities. And when a conflict ends up in 
the hands of the judicial authorities, their activities and decisions raise a lot of questions. 
This chapter seeks to analyse how different social actors - landholders, local authorities, 
lawyers, court personnel - perceive the judicial system. It does so by taking land disputes 
as a starting-point for analysing these perceptions and experiences. What are the main 
problems in the working of the judicial system? How do courts deal with land disputes, 
and what effects do their dealings have on solving such conflicts? How do people's 
perceptions of the judicial system relate to legal insecurity? This chapter first discusses 
perceptions of, and experiences with, the judicial system, from the points of view of 
landholders, lawyers and court officials. Next, I look at three land dispute case files in the 
Third Chamber of the Santa Barbara court to examine practices and procedures and what 
they tell us about evidence, the role of the judge and the involved lawyers. I then analyse 
how the nature of court procedures relates to the persistence of legal insecurity. Finally, I 
look at the possibilities for changing the system and improving legal security in 
Honduras. 
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The judicial system: perceptions and experiences 
Figure 6.1 is a simple organisational chart of the judicial system in Santa Barbara that 
also shows several institutions that are directly related to it. The part of the judicial 
system that villagers know best is the justice of the peace, his secretary and the assistant 
mayors. The justice of the peace holds office in El Zapote and his competence is very 
limited. El Zapote falls within the jurisdiction of the Third Chamber, which consists of 
a judge overseeing all civil and criminal cases, a secretary and an archivist.1 Santa 
Barbara also has a court of appeals. 
Police 
DGIC 
(Ministry of Security) 
Lawyers Human rights 
office 
Public prosecutor 
Public defenders 
(Public Ministry) 
Courts of Justice Court of Appeals 
First Chamber 
Judge 
1 1 
Second Chamber 
Judge 
Third Chamber 
Judge 
Secretary Archivist 
Justice of the peace 
Secretary 
Assistant mayor 
Figure 6.1 Santa Bdbarba court and related institutions 
The Ministry of Security is responsible for the preventive police and the DGIC, the 
criminal investigations directorate. The preventive police maintains law and order; the 
DGIC has to investigate crimes and collect evidence. As part of the Public Ministry, the 
public prosecutor institutes proceedings against criminals. The task of the public 
defenders is to guarantee legal defence for poor people. The drastic renewals of the 
Public Ministry in the 1990s (Honduras 1993) have made it easier for people to press 
criminal charges against another person, although I shall explain in this section that the 
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public prosecutor system in Santa Barbara is not funaioning well and is still harshly 
criticised for its poor operation.2 
Furthermore, some twenty-six graduates in law (licenciados en derecho) worked in 
Santa Barbara at the time of this research. Three of them were abogados. The abogado is 
a lawyer who has completed an examination before the Supreme Court and who may 
also act as a notary (Espinal Irias 1990). The common practice in Santa Barbara is that 
the licenciado and the abogado do the same jobs, including the notorial acts. The 
abogado signs the documents in case the licenciado is not permitted to do so. People 
who consult a lawyer do not distinguish between the licenciado and the abogado, and 
in local terms they are called either abogado or licenciado. 
Finally, the Human Rights Office, a regional auxiliary branch of the National 
Human Rights Commissioner, works on the sidelines of the court.3 The Human Rights 
Office investigates illegal detentions of people by the police, and researches case files to 
detect irregularities. Furthermore, the Human Rights Office mounts campaigns about 
human rights and is actively involved in counselling women who are confronted with 
domestic violence. 
The justice of the peace 
The judicial functionary that is most known and visited by villagers is the local justice 
of the peace (JP).4 He runs an office in the municipality building in the main village in 
which he and the secretary receive clients and draw up documents and reports for the 
regional judge.5 The typewriter (one of two available in the village) on which the 
secretary of the JP types declarations, witness statements and inspection reports, is 
awarded a central place in the office. 
The JP is appointed by the Supreme Court and is part of the state judicial system. 
He has usually been a committed political activist of the political party in power. 
According to the official regulations concerning the appointment of judges, the JP 
should be a legal expert who has finished the study of the law, but this is not the case in 
El Zapote. The local requirements for becoming JP are that one should know how to 
read and write; and only when a new JP starts his job does he receive training about his 
tasks and obligations and the completion of legal procedures. The JP is replaced every 
four years after the general elections. 
The JP in El Zapote may impose fines of up to 90 lempiras.6 Criminal acts that 
require higher fines are directly sent to the regional court in Santa Barbara. The JP's 
task also includes assisting with the gathering of evidence in criminal investigations 
(Espinal Irias 1990). The JP will inspect the location where a crime has taken place and 
interrogate witnesses. 
Every hamlet within the municipality borders has its own assistant mayor, who 
assists the JP. In the main village, the assistant mayor job rotates among the members of 
187 
the municipal council. The assistant mayors handle small conflicts that do not entail 
violence, like small thefts and neighbours' quarrels. The JP settles conflicts that result 
in blood from wounds or slaps. In contrast to the JP, the assistant mayors are not 
allowed to send out arrest warrants. 
The JP of El Zapote, Beto Rodriguez, was born in El Zapote, where he worked as an 
agricultural producer. Being a Liberal Party activist, he became appointed JP in 1994 
after his party won the general elections. He received courses about the tasks of the JP, 
which he defines as 'to administer justice and to be impartial in criminal cases, public 
and private'. As JP, he learned to apply a limited number of laws, among which are the 
rural police law, the penal code, the procedural code, and the Constitution of the 
Republic. 
Beto is not a highly educated outsider, but he is a villager equal to others. His 
position as JP does not automatically grant him the authority that he needs to do his 
job. Beto was not appointed JP because of his abilities, but because he was a liberal 
party activist. People are therefore suspicious about what he does. Beto recounted the 
following example: 'The money which I collect through imposing fines goes to the 
municipality. But the people think that I become rich because of the fines. I do nothing 
and I put the people's money in my pocket, they say'. Being a villager, it is difficult for 
the JP to uphold an impartial image of independent authority. One day, a group of 
villagers went to the Public Ministry and pressed charges against Beto. They said that 
Beto refused to conduct an investigation into a particular case. However, according to 
Beto, these people wanted him to charge a person for two crimes that were not 
committed at the same time, and that did not relate to each other. This was not in 
accordance with the law and Beto refused their request. The villagers thought that he 
had not been impartial and that he favoured the offending party. Beto said that he 
learnt to consult his superiors as often as possible to cover himself against the 
complaints of the villagers. 
Murders were common occurrences in the village, and Beto found them extremely 
difficult to deal with: 'The people are angry because they say I do nothing to arrest the 
murderers. But that is not true. Why should I send out an arrest warrant if there are no 
police to arrest the person?'7 
The JP who had been in charge before Beto had been known as the 'judge who was 
afraid of blood'. During our stay in the village, this man refused to investigate a least 
two cases of bloody machetazos (fights with machetes). In the first case, two cousins 
fought over an inherited plot of land, a conflict that transcended generations (Chapter 
Four). In the second case, a mentally retarded man named Monchito became angry 
with his mistress, ran out of her house and hit the first person he saw with his machete. 
The father of the victim, a young boy of sixteen years old, went to the Santa Barbara 
court 'to demand justice'. Not that he wanted Monchito to be punished, he said, but he 
wanted to file a complaint against the JP about his behaviour. Beto still dealt with the 
188 
consequences of the bad reputation of his predecessor. But he also realised that he had 
to act when confronted with a murder case, and that his actions would be interpreted as 
'mingling in the conflict' instead of impartially rendering justice. 
Being a villager means that the JP has the advantage of knowing the people and the 
background of conflicts. However, he is almost inevitably related to one of the parties, 
which makes it very hard for him to gain the necessary authority and impartiality. 
Moreover, people were not convinced of Beto's abilities. Beto made procedural 
mistakes -intentionally or not- in several cases, after which the regional court declared 
the cases inadmissible. The duped parties blamed Beto for being incapable to fulfil his 
role as the JP. 
Besides being a villager like everyone else, the political character of Beto's 
appointment meant that nobody considered him as an independent authority whose 
judgement could be trusted and that his was a reliable institution to turn to. As an 
activist of the Liberal Party, he was not able to convince members of other parties, as 
well as other fractions of the Liberal Party, that he would not favour his political 
friends above others. 
Recently, the DGIC's role in collecting evidence has been enlarged at the expense of 
the JP's responsibilities in this respect. Moreover, the Supreme Court has started to 
take seriously the requirement that the JP should be a legal scholar. 
Access to the judicial system 
The villagers have easy access to the JP, even though they have little confidence in his 
impartiality and expect little result from his rulings. As soon as a case has been passed 
on to the district court in Santa Barbara, however, the easy access disappears.8 Articles 
82 and 83 of the Constitution (Honduras 1994) guarantee access to the court and 
defence for the poor, but poor people actually lack access to the judicial system because 
of the obligatory involvement of lawyers. 
A consultation with a licenciado in Santa Barbara cost 150 lempiras (US$11.50) in 
1997, a price that was settled on by the National Council of Lawyers. Lawyers in Santa 
Barbara acknowledged that the price for a consultation restricted poor people's access 
to the judicial system. One of them said: 
The price is too high. We can decide to drive it up but we cannot lower it because then 
they will throw us out of our profession. I often have clients who are too poor and 
cannot afford it. They prefer to lose it [property]. So we stick to the people who can 
afford our services.. Because of the obligation that you need a lawyer, except in cases in 
the labour law sphere, we had the system of the lawyer for the poor' in the past. And 
now the Supreme Court has introduced the public defence. Here in Santa Barbara we 
have three [public defenders], each chamber has one. These are young people, recently 
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graduated with no experience. They are from outside, not from here., they do not earn 
much because they are employed by the government. But in reality... they take good 
care of themselves.9 The only thing that is really for free is the Juridical Advice Centre 
(Consultoria Juridica) in the capital, where university law students gain experience. 
But I would not recommend submitting complicated conflicts to them. If you want to 
modify the spelling of your name, okay, but one cannot leave serious business to them. 
Hiring a lawyer does not mean a once-only payment for a consultation: clients have to 
pay for every document drawn up by the lawyer during the course of the procedure. 
Landholders who had been involved in court cases conveyed that they had never 
understood what their lawyers were doing, and that they had to make payments for 
reasons they did not understand. 
People facing criminal charges who are not able to pay for a lawyer themselves are 
now assigned a public defender. I came across indications that the introduction of 
public defence in court practices influences the course of criminal procedures. Although 
somewhat disordered, there was a relatively small pile of criminal case files in the 
archives of the Third Chamber labelled 'sentenced cases'. A large majority of these 
sentenced cases (more or less 75% of the case files from this pile) involved a public 
defender. The majority of the case files in the large piles of discontinued criminal 
procedures concerned private lawyers. A possible explanation is that, in contrast to 
private lawyers, public defenders seem to be keen on completing the procedure. Private 
lawyers often manipulate the charges so that bail can be paid and the accused is set free, 
after which the procedure is discontinued. To public defenders, on the other hand, it 
was essential that they produced completed and sentenced cases. 
The lawyers referred people who were too poor to pay for the services of a lawyer to 
the Human Rights Office or the National Office of Women. 1 0 The head of the Human 
Rights Office confirmed that she received people who had been referred to her by one 
of the lawyers. She often advised poor people to abstain from entering a juridical 
procedure because: 
... it costs more than it yields. People have rights, but in order to be able to assert these 
rights they have to pay first That is injustice. We [the Human Rights Officejcan only 
go to a friend and beg him to do the case for free. You absolutely need a lawyer. 
Without a lawyer you end up with nothing. You need a lawyer to prevent your case 
from fizzling out. 
Villagers in El Zapote addressed the problem of court access with the words 'you lose 
more than you gain'. The 'you lose more than you gain' phrase stems from Sebastian 
Ayala, a man who ended up dirt poor and robbed of all his properties because he insisted 
on defending his rights to a plot of land in the regional court. He and his brother-in-law 
190 
Lucio Pineda disputed land in the hamlet of Yoro, which is locally famous for its violent 
land conflicts (Chapter Two). The Pineda father died without dividing his properties. 
After his death, Lucio, who was his illegitimate son, stole the papers of his father's land, 
including the original land title from Yoro. The land had originally been bought by a 
group of brothers, the descendants of whom all claimed land in the area. His father had 
never possessed all the Yoro land, but he happened to be the person who kept the 
original title. There were dozens of landholders on the original Yoro land, and Lucio was 
only able to gain control over a small part of it; the part that his father had held before he 
died. Lucio went with the papers to the Public Register of Property in Santa Barbara and 
received a public deed. 
Sebastian's version of the story was that Lucio refused to recognise the claim of Mirsa, 
who was his sister and the wife of Sebastian." According to Sebastian, Mirsa only wanted 
fifty manzanas to cultivate coffee. It was not clear whether she really claimed fifty 
manzanas, which is a lot in terms of this village. Sebastian conveyed that Lucio refused to 
reward Mirsa's claim and that this was why Sebastian went to court. He started a 
procedure that took years, during which he sold 8 manzanas of land, three mules and 
five cows to pay the lawyer. Sebastian claimed he had already paid 3,500 lempiras to the 
lawyer but without results. 
Other villagers contested Sebastian's version of the story. Their story was that the 
deceased father named his illegitimate son Lucio as his heir, but on the condition that 
he should give six manzanas of the land to Mirsa. She received the six manzanas, but a 
few years later Sebastian decided to sell Mirsa's land to Lucio. The sale was laid down in 
a private deed drawn up by the mayor. Nine years later, Sebastian decided to reclaim 
the land, which was a coffee field. He went to the plot with two day labourers to pick 
the coffee, but a son of Lucio saw them working and warned his father. 
It was Lucio who sued Sebastian. Lucio went to visit the mayor who had drawn up 
the deed of purchase. The mayor said that he did not remember if he was the one who 
had made up the private deed, and Lucio became enraged. He shouted that the mayor 
was a 'liar without shame' and that there had also been other witnesses. The mayor 
became scared and said that he must have forgotten it. Lucio had the deed that was 
drawn up when Sebastian sold him the land, and there were also witnesses who knew 
that Sebastian sold him the land. He visited a lawyer in Santa Barbara who told him 
that he had a winning case. 
When Sebastian understood that Lucio had sued him, he went to the political leader 
of the Liberal Party, Mario. Mario asked him if he had a document for the land but it 
turned out that he had nothing. Mario said that there was nothing he could do about it. 
Then, Sebastian went to the mayor as well. Sebastian was a member of the Liberal 
Party and the mayor, a prominent member of the Nationalist Party said that his party 
would be willing to 'help' him because they had the best lawyers. Hence, Sebastian 
became a member of the Nationalist Party and the Party provided him with a lawyer. 
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In order to pay for this lawyer, Sebastian had to sell everything he owned. He had not 
been poor; he had some land and cattle, but in the end, he had nothing. The procedure 
developed into a lingering process that continues to this day because neither party has 
enough money to push the procedure ahead. 
Villagers do not use this case to talk about who made true and false claims on the 
land. Instead, they refer to it in order to talk about the consequences of contact with 
lawyers or courts. The story serves them in their conviction that lawyers are expensive, 
that they cheat poor people and that only involvement in the right political party 
makes lawyers act. Hence, if a person is not able to comply with the conditions 
(wealthy and active in a political party), it will be very difficult to secure a lawyer. 
The difficult question of court access is not only related to the prohibitive costs of 
lawyers. People who become involved in civil or criminal lawsuits enter a world of 
mysterious and unknown actors: judges, court personnel, national police officers, 
DGIC researchers, the regional Human Rights Commissioner, prison personnel, public 
defenders and lawyers. People have to travel from remote mountain villages to the 
district town; they have to stay the night in strange places; they have to deal with 
jargon, documents and ways of reasoning that they do not understand. All these aspects 
make involvement in court cases something that is extremely unattractive, even to 
people who may be able to afford to do it. 
Procedures and practices 
The phrase 'muertes a los jueses vendidos' (including its spelling mistakes), means 'death 
to the corrupt judges'. Painted on a white wall in big blue letters, it cried out to all the 
passers-by at the technical school in the centre of the town of Santa Barbara. The 
writing was apparently an act of frustration by someone whose sense of justice had been 
seriously offended. What is wrong with the role the Santa Barbara court plays in 
rendering justice and how do different actors perceive the working of the court? 
The problems of the judicial system in Santa Barbara that people mentioned were: 
• The problem of access to justice (previous section) 
• The involvement of politics in the system 
• The poor workings of the Public Ministry and the DGIC 
• Problems related to the internal working of the court 
Supreme Court magistrates are elected by the National Congress every four years after 
the general elections. The choice for Supreme Court magistrates is merely a political 
act. An important lawyer and influential advisor of the Public Ministry conveyed to 
the press:12 
192 
Judges are not selected according to the adequate mechanisms, correct, a real selection, 
and through an investigation of their antecedents which prove that they are honest 
and reliable, fin factj people who are mentioned by some congress members are 
appointed. 
Romero and Salomon (2000:69) analyse the appointment of Supreme Court Magistrates 
as political 'clientism': 
When they have achieved such a position, they have become involved in multiple 
political compromises and they owe many favours to powerful economic sectors, which 
they will pay through using the influence that their jobs permit, to assure favourable 
results in trials of their patrons, protectors or allies. The clientist spiral is extended to 
their task to name the magistrates of the courts of appeal, judges and other judicial 
officials. 
The Supreme Court names the JPs, the judges of the courts and the magistrates of the 
court of appeals. Given that Supreme Court magistrates are necessarily involved in 
politics themselves, the appointments of JPs and judges are also political. JPs and judges 
at the district level are appointed through political channels and not on the basis of 
their experience and knowledge. Consequently, already at the very beginning of their 
career, judges and JPs are committed to political influences those responsible for 
providing them with their jobs. The political character of their appointments makes 
many of them are only one step away from becoming politically corrupt. 
Another aspect that frequently popped up in conversations about the working of the 
judicial system was the poor functioning of the Public Ministry and the DGIC. Both 
lawyers and villagers thought that the officials of these institutions were involved in 
corrupt practices and that they lacked interest in performing their tasks. Lawyers in 
Santa Barbara harshly criticised the investigations of the DGIC. As one of them stated: 
Those boys kill time dancing and visiting parties. They do not even know how much a 
bullet of a .22 weighs, or of a .38. The only thing they do is to count the perforations 
fin the bodies of people who were shot]. 
I shall later discuss how and why villagers in El Zapote openly questioned the 
functioning of the DGIC. 
The heart of the problematic working of the judicial system are procedures and the 
internal functioning of the court. Lawyers indicated the working of the Santa Barbara 
court using such words as 'abominable', 'rotten' and 'backward'. Civil and criminal 
lawsuits are essentially procedures on paper assembled in a case file (expediente) (Kara 
& Rosenn 1975, Livio Tabora 1987, Livio Tabora 1994, Padilla n.d., Ziiniga n.d.). Both 
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parties and the judge add documents to the case file: declarations, evidence, requests to 
interrogate witnesses or to execute inspections; reports of inspections, public and 
private property documents, expert reports (such as from a forensic doctor) and 
testimonies. Furthermore, the case file contains the written conclusions of the 
respective lawyers and the sentence. The judge does not meet the involved parties as all 
proceedings are conducted on paper and not in person; he generally does not hear and 
question witnesses of the involved people, which makes it difficult for him to form his 
own independent view of the conflict that he is supposed to resolve. 
The judge unites all required roles in himself and can judge indiscriminately. He 
investigates and collects proof, and only he interrogates the witnesses. The next section 
addresses some examples of case files of land disputes that painstakingly exhibit the 
weaknesses of the investigative task of the judge. In civil procedures, the judge is merely 
passive: he only carries out the requests of lawyers with respect to the inspection of 
sites and the interrogation of witnesses. Yet in most cases, he does not do this himself, 
but orders the JP to do it instead. The JP submits written witness statements and 
inspection reports; and the judge does not extensively check these reports but just takes 
them for granted whether or not they make sense. In criminal case files, the judge plays 
a more active role that may entail such actions as ordering a medical investigation of 
wounds or the questioning of witnesses and suspects brought in by the Public Ministry. 
The argumentation of the judge in case files is often unclear and very limited, using 
only a small number of laws to generate and substantiate his conclusions and sentences. 
In Chapter Two, I explained that judges have difficulty interpreting the law with regard 
to land rights. I also noticed that in many case files, civil and criminal, the judge had 
copied the verbatim text of the conclusion drawn up by one of the lawyers. 
The multiple roles of the judge as investigator and administrator of justice, as well as 
his solitary position with no oversight, make him vulnerable to manipulation and more 
inclined to favour important persons. As one of the lawyers in Santa Barbara stated 
about land disputes: 
The problem is that in such cases one can easily have irregularities. Judges are easily 
influenced by economic or political power. If the case is a large landowner against a 
peasant, then he will choose for the landlord and he will order the land cleared. That is 
the way it works with the majority of the judges. 
The judge 'follows the doctrine', as I was often told: he sticks to trusting documentary 
evidence and looks for the right articles in the law. He is not interested in researching 
the background of the conflicts that they deal with. The quality and the content of the 
evidence that is brought up in court cases is often flimsy and unconvincing. Witnesses, 
for example, are expected to sign declarations that have been previously drawn up by 
one of the lawyers. In many case files, I found lawyers protesting that the witnesses 
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from the other party were relatives or friends of the involved person and could not be 
considered to be independent. JP inspection reports often only created more confusion 
and, moreover, the JP was not the reliable and independent party that he was supposed 
to be. 
A civil court case never ends without lawyers continuously pushing the procedure 
ahead. The client has to pay the lawyer over and over again to achieve this. If the 
procedure is not pushed ahead by the lawyer, the file ends up in the archives without a 
sentence. A private lawyer might not be interested in pushing the procedure ahead 
because, when nobody acts, the case file is abandoned and ends up in the archives. If 
this is possible and in the interest of the client, the lawyer will not act until the criminal 
charge lapses. In contrast, the prosecutor of the Public Ministry and the public 
defenders are interested in pushing the procedures ahead, as they are judged by the 
percentage of convicts that inhabit the prisons, a percentage that has to be increased. 
A criminal procedure abruptly ends when the suspected party is released on bail. 
Paying bail does not mean that the procedure has ended, but this is nevertheless the 
practice. The discontinuance of a procedure after the payment of bail is so common 
that people in Honduras do not seem to realise that, officially, it has to continue. 
Paying bail is thus practically tantamount to freedom. Corrupt state officials, for 
example, escape charges of fraud or abuse of authority by paying bail. 
The untimely end of procedures is not a specifically Honduran feature. On the basis 
of a study in the US, Galanter (1981) concludes that the majority of court cases 
untimely end because of abandonment, withdrawal or settlement. He considers this to 
be positive, because courts would otherwise become overloaded. In his view 'courts are 
arenas in which various kinds of dispute (and non-dispute) processing takes place' 
(1981:3). A court provides a backdrop of norms and procedures against which 
negotiations and regulation in both private and governmental settings take place. 'Thus 
courts not only resolve disputes: they prevent them, mobilise them, displace and 
transform them' (1981:11). 
The causes and effects of the unfinished court cases in Honduras are, however, 
different. The poor's lack of access to justice means that people may want a judge to 
issue a sentence in a dispute, but they know that it is impossible. The untimely end of 
court cases does not mean that this intentionally happens according to the wish of the 
involved people. A procedure may be cancelled because the people involved are no 
longer able to pay the lawyer. This doesn't mean the conflict has already been solved 
through mediation or another means. Another example is that, although this is against 
the law, criminal procedures often stop after paying bail, which may also be against the 
wishes of the victim of a criminal offence. 
It is easy for the best lawyers (and the best paid lawyers) to manipulate the course of 
events during processes. For example, common actions for a lawyer are: 
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• To continuously accuse the judge or the lawyer of the opposite party of procedural 
failures, for example, the exceeding of terms 
• To manipulate the formulation of criminal charges so that bail will become possible 
• To push ahead or abstain from pushing ahead the procedure, according to the clients 
best interest 
• To produce as many documents as possible to the disadvantage of clients, thus 
producing so many papers that the judge will not be tempted to read the whole case 
file 
Hence, the nature of the procedural paperwork, the multiple role of the judge, the 
poor working of the Public Ministry, the inferior quality of investigations and 
evidence, the way in which lawyers push ahead or stop procedures depending on the 
interests of their clients: all are aspects of the emergence of the 'jueces vendidos' (bought 
judges) referred to on the walls of the technical school. 
To my surprise, the head of the human rights office in Santa Barbara told me that 
she had not found irregularities in the working of the court. She had researched case 
files, she said, but they were all dealt with according to the procedures. A possible 
explanation for this is that she did not want to directly attack her confreres in the 
court. Being new in town, she had to fight to be taken seriously by the judges and 
lawyers. Another explanation, however, is that she only investigated the sentenced case 
files and that she did not pay attention to the unfinished case files that fill the archives. 
Facing corruptive practices 
Relations between villagers, the police and the judicial authorities are extremely 
important in the construction of local representations of justice. On the one hand, 
people complain that they do not have access to the judicial system because they are 
poor and, on the other hand, when they have access to the system, they are confronted 
with corrupt practices turned to their disadvantage. 
A large-scale theft of coffee in 1997 involved a large number of villagers whose 
perceptions of justice took a definite turn toward a complete distrust of authorities. 
When I arrived at the house of Rosa and Excequiel in March of that year, I immediately 
noticed that something was wrong. This was uncommon because they usually 
concealed their daily 'disasters' very well until weeks or months later when they 
mentioned them as part of a joke. This time, Excequiel excitedly began to tell me that 
he had a problem, which was the reason why he did not visit us earlier in our house in 
Santa Barbara. He had sold his coffee harvest to a man from Olancho.1 3 However, he 
had never received his money. He was not the only victim: more or less fifty producers 
lost parts of or, in some cases, their entire harvest. Excequiel: 
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He is called Nelson Monterossa but we now know that he uses the name of Alexis 
Martinez as well. He also bought coffee here last year. Ramiro Variento sold him his 
harvest that year. The Olanchano paid a good price. This year he came again and he 
was recommended by Ramiro, who said that the man was very honest. So we all sold 
him our coffee, even though he was a stranger. It was time to sell, and the price he 
offered was so attractive that other [local] buyers stopped buying. The man appeared in 
mid-February for the first time and he transported three trucks loaded with coffee to 
his warehouse. 
Another victim was Tono Pineda, who said: 'I trusted the man. I saw him pay good 
prices to others. So I helped him'. They received cheques for their coffee, but they 
found out later that he had signed them using different names. It was Tono who 
discovered in Santa Barbara that the bank account to which the bank drafts belonged 
had been cancelled the day before. He then knew that something was wrong. 
The Olanchano had not only been stealing coffee in El Zapote but also in 
neighbouring villages as well, and the duped sellers reckoned that the man had run off 
with five million lempiras worth of coffee, more or less. The victims in El Zapote lost a 
total of 800,000 lempiras (more than 60,000 US$) worth of coffee. Excequiel lost seven 
bags of coffee, which were half of his total harvest. Tono lost his entire harvest and he 
also lent the Olanchano 9,000 lempiras. 
The group explored several theories about what had happened. One of their theories 
was that the man bought coffee without having much capital. He bought the coffee 
from one person, which he resold to a third party, then used the money he earned to 
buy coffee from another person. The man started to run up debts after a while because 
of the fluctuations in coffee prices. Another theory of the duped coffee producers was 
that producers from a neighbouring village - of which the inhabitants were known as 
much more aggressive - threatened to kill him if he didn't pay for their coffee, after 
which the Olanchano had run off. Both theories explained that the man did not have 
the intention of running off with the coffee at first, which was important to them to 
justify why they had trusted the man. 
The first thing the group decided to do was inform the DGIC and the national 
police.14 Their story was that, while they were waiting to be received in the DGIC 
offices in Santa Barbara, they saw the Olanchano walk out of the office. He had been 
arrested for another criminal offence but had just been released. The DGIC official 
listened to the villagers' story about what happened but he said that it would be 
impossible to charge the man with theft because they all voluntarily handed their coffee 
over to him. Hence, he didn't steal it according to the law. The charge had to be fraud. 
Tono went to the Third Chamber of the Court to request information. They told him 
that a person charged with theft could not be released on bail, while this was possible 
with a charge of fraud. This would mean in practice that if the DGIC were to arrest the 
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Olanchano, he would be released in five minutes after paying the amount of 1,200 
lempiras. The functionaries of the court told Toiio that this would not be the way to 
get his coffee back. The best way, they said, was to confiscate the Olanchano's 
properties. 
Tono was convinced that the Olanchano had bribed the DGIC. Several persons in 
Santa Barbara told him that they saw him drinking beer with the head of the DGIC. 
Tono's lawyer said that if the Olanchano bribed the DGIC, then there was nothing he 
could do. He advised the victims that they only could wait and see if the DGIC would 
start an investigation. 
The group felt completely abandoned by the authorities. Tono said: 'If we would 
know that the law would punish him we would charge him. But if they arrest him he 
will be out in five minutes. This is also the way it works for people who steal millions 
from the state'. The group therefore decided to start an investigation themselves. They 
went to the house of the Olanchano in Santa Barbara only to discover that, unlike a 
week earlier, nobody lived there anymore. Thereafter, a delegation travelled to the 
district of Copan to a coffee export house. The cheques which Tono and the others had 
received belonged to a bank account in the name of this export house. The victims had 
heard that there were still 5,000 bags of coffee in the warehouse which belonged to the 
Olanchano. The owner of the export house, however, denied this and stated that the 
Olanchano still owed him 600,000 lempiras. Although the delegation did not believe 
him, they could not do more than travel back home. The group subsequently planned 
to travel to the district of Yoro because they understood that the man owned two 
haciendas in that district. If this were the case, they would confiscate these haciendas. 
At this point, however, the group dissolved. Most of the victims were desperately 
trying to solve their personal problems which stemmed from the loss of their harvest 
(no income, outstanding debts which could not be paid back, wives who became 
furious and blamed their husbands). Tono complained that only few producers took 
the time to join the self-made investigation team. Many of them were afraid that they 
would need to hire a lawyer and that they would lose more money. Most producers 
implicitly blamed Tono as the person who had convinced them to sell to the unknown 
buyer. They argued that it was up to Tono to try and recoup the coffee or cover their 
losses. Tono became desperate because even the richest producers refused to co-operate 
and to help him in any way. Excequiel said: 
Nobody is to blame. It isn't Tono's fault, these things happen.. He only saw that the 
man paid good prices. You know TomasiHe knew that the man was not to be trusted, 
but he did not say anything.. Why didn't he tell the others? He was afraid. And he 
probably thought: okay when others want to lose their money, let them do it. 
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A few months later, Tofio decided to hire a lawyer in San Pedro. This lawyer requested 
30% of the value of the missing coffee for his work. The group would have to start 
paying him this after the Olanchano was captured. However, nothing happened and 
they never succeeded in capturing the Olanchano or in getting their coffee back. The 
group felt deceived once again, this time by the lawyer from San Pedro. 
The case of the disappeared coffee clearly demonstrates the impotence of villagers 
with respect to the behaviour of police, the DGIC and the judicial system. The villagers 
suspected that the Olanchano bribed the DGIC and, although no proof existed of this 
bribery, the DGIC did not visit the swindled coffee producers nor even investigate the 
charges. Tofio's lawyer and the personnel of the Third Chamber clearly explained how 
the Olanchano would be able to escape the judicial system through the definition of 
what happened under the legal category of 'fraud', instead of what the producers felt 
was 'theft'. He would not even need to actually bribe someone to be set free. He would 
only have been obliged to pay a minor bail fee, minor compared to the value of the 
coffee he had stolen. 
The theft of the coffee by the Olanchano was a serious offence involving a large 
group of victims, for whom the impact on their daily lives has been significant. 
Nevertheless, there was no authority to come and investigate the case and to help the 
victims. The involved villagers were immediately confronted with the fact that the 
suspect made use of protective relationships. They also had difficulties in dealing with 
the juridical translation of the delict into 'fraud', which in no way covered how people 
felt about it. The result was thus that, confronted with bribery and lack of interest in 
their case, the group of victims felt abandoned by the authorities and experienced the 
consequences of a profound lack of legal security. 
The paradox of classjustice 
The term 'class justice' refers to the legal system's role in maintaining the class 
character of the state (Collins 1982, Thompson 1987, Luckham 1987). Studies may use 
the term to refer to different phenomena (Haafi 1990). Class justice may refer to judges 
who originate from one and the same class, which impedes them from acting impartially 
in relation to other classes: law is upheld in such a way that it favours a particular group. 
Another interpretation of class justice refers to the sentences of a court that favour one 
social group, and to the law that is configured to become an instrument for the ruling 
class. In this interpretation, the content of the law is manipulated so that it favours a 
certain group. In Honduran newspapers, I came across the term class justice regularly, 
meaning the same as what landholders in El Zapote called 'the judicial system favours 
the rich'. Class justice, in the way the term pops up in Honduras, refers to an 
upholding rather than a content argument. People who refer to it do not consider the 
content of the law as favouring the rich; in their opinion, it goes wrong in the process of 
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upholding the law; a task which the state fails to perform and in which the rich become 
favoured. 
Judges are corrupt; lawyers line their own purses at the expense of the poor; sentences 
are delayed or do not evolve at all; jails are filled with poor people while white-collar and 
other well-to-do criminals leave within a day. In such perceptions of the judicial system, 
the content of law is above suspicion: the content is merely unknown. In the case of the 
disappeared coffee, for example, the duped landholders depended on legal experts in 
Santa Barbara to tell them what the law entailed. People are not interested in getting to 
know the detail of the law until the moment they are confronted with a specific 
problem. Basically their idea of the law is that the law expresses the right values and 
norms: 'right' in the sense that they are the same as their own values and norms. 
In addition, the Honduran view of class justice is about access to justice for the poor, 
a problem that nevertheless is not only a question of having capital. We have seen that 
landholders differ in their abilities to enter a lawsuit, but that this difference is not only 
a question of money or class. Between Sebastian and his brother-in-law Lucio, for 
example, there was not much of a class difference. Both men were more or less equal in 
terms of poverty and property. The crux of their participation in the conflict was then-
capacity of to participate in the political game, their abilities to read and write, and to 
control the work of a lawyer. These issues seemed to work to Lucio's advantage. He 
had access to a good lawyer. He had some knowledge about property claims, the value 
of title deeds, and the working of lawsuits and the court. Sebastian, on the other hand, 
was no longer able to pay his lawyer as he had sold everything he owned. He played a 
political game but it did not help him in any way. 
Talking about their perception of justice with landholders, it struck me that they 
somehow tried to uphold a paradox: a paradox between their own cynical experiences 
with the judicial system, and their high expectations about the role that the judicial system 
should play. In spite of the failure of the judicial system to provide legal security, people 
stick to believing in it since there is no alternative. They want to have access to it even 
though they know the risks and they may sell all they have to be able to defend then-
contested rights in court. They do not understand the legal procedures and the expert 
jargon, they know that they will be cheated by lawyers and that the chance is very small 
that the outcome will be favourable, unless they are able to follow the same strategy as 
rich people do. Yet when all their conflict avoidance strategies have failed they have no 
choice: they have to enter the system and believe in it. 
Land disputes: three cases 
This section looks at three examples of land disputes in the Third Chamber of the Santa 
Barbara court. When a conflict enters the public arena of a court, it is transformed 
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because its history and content become translated into legal categories, but the 
translation takes place outside of public view (Galanter 1981). Landholders do not 
understand this translation. They have no idea why the judge does not simply hear 
their stories and arguments, but instead only grasps those aspects of the story that can 
become part of the legal doctrine and translated into juridical arguments. 
What happens in a court case and why does it happen? How do civil procedures 
tackle problems of contradictory claims of ownership? How are land conflicts treated 
in criminal procedures? Are problems in lawsuits a simple question of bribery, or do 
more complex processes contribute to landholders' feelings of injustice and legal 
insecurity? 
Before I introduce the cases I am going to present in this chapter, some general 
comments on the case files are necessary. The case files of the Third Chamber, all 
recent date (as from 1980), were in a disorderly pile in the filing room, where the court 
also keeps the collected material evidence, like machetes, guns, rifles, stolen bicycles and 
bloody clothes. Since I was looking for case files in which a conflict over land had 
played a visible role, I had to look through hundreds of case files. There have been 
attempts to order the case files. Some rubrics were still visible: civil, criminal, 
condemned, divorces and adoptions. Yet the system was in collapse and a clear order no 
longer existed. 
I reconstructed thirty land disputes, which often entailed more than one case file. I 
searched for civil and criminal cases but, in the latter category, it was more difficult to 
establish if a dispute had concerned a land conflict. When the accusation was 'land 
occupation' or 'usurpation', this obviously had something to do with land, but I also 
came across land conflicts where the accusation was 'damages', 'homicide' and 
'murder'. Most criminal files did not even contain a sentence. 
The Court of Appeals' role was striking. With regard to civil case files, the Court of 
Appeals declared many procedures invalid because of elapsing time limits and other 
technical failures in completing procedures. It is unclear what happened after the court 
declared a procedure invalid. Some cases started all over again, some were transferred to 
another Chamber and in most cases, it remained unclear whether these procedures were 
done again. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals, just like the judge of the Chamber, 
often copied the demands and conclusions of the lawyer who appealed to the letter, 
which created the impression that the Court of Appeals does not 
rule independently. My impression of criminal case files was that the Court of Appeals 
tended to maximise sentences in cases in which the original judge had given a milder 
punishment. 
Civil case files about land conflicts are mostly vindication procedures to determine 
who has the best claim and who is the rightful owner of the land. The documentary 
evidence in this case files was often the original land documents. The involved 
landholder had submitted the original document but it had never been returned: he or 
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she again needed a lawyer to file a return request. The INA played a role in several of 
the studied case files. As the third case shows, the INA and the court of justice wrestled 
with the question of the LNA's jurisdiction in determining who claims what rights to 
the land. 
The next case file that I discuss concerns a prolonged inheritance conflict, fought out 
in two subsequent civil procedures: a vindication procedure and a demand to measure a 
plot of land.15 In the case after that, a land conflict resulted in a 'usurpation' criminal 
procedure of. This case involved people and land in El Zapote, which made it possible 
to relate the content of the case file to what people in El Zapote knew about it. The 
third conflict is about land that the INA guaranteed to a peasant group; a guarantee that 
was contested by the original owner of the land. The agrarian reform background of 
this escalating conflict makes the setting different from the other two cases. 
I chose to present these particular cases because they represent general characteristics 
that I found in all case files, which I will later discuss as the main features of legal 
procedures and court practices that contribute to legal insecurity. In my reconstruction 
of these three cases, I intend to fill in the knowledge gap that originates from reading 
case files by suggesting possible explanations for each conflict. This is not just 'guessing' 
out of the blue, but is based on what we have learned about land disputes in the course 
of this book and, particularly in the second case, on villagers' knowledge about the 
case. 
Land dispute: a civil vindication procedure 
This case involves a vindication procedure that treated a conflict between brothers and 
sisters over the inheritance of their late father. It started in the First Chamber in 1983 
and subsequently proceeded to the Third Chamber. Gloria, one of the sisters, asked the 
court to restitute a plot of land of eighteen manzanas that she considered hers, but 
which had been occupied by her three brothers and her sister (who were children of 
another mother). Gloria presented a public deed to the court that provided evidence 
that she bought the land from her father in 1981. She declared: 
More or less two years ago, the accused introduced themselves at my property behaving 
as if they were owners, although there is no a legal ground for this, and they caused 
severe damages because, on different occasions, they harvested a coffee field of four 
manzanas on my land. I summoned them to leave my property but this was to no 
avail because they argued that the property was exclusively theirs and that, in contrast, 
I have nothing. 
The defendants, three brothers and one sister, answered the demand through their 
lawyer: The land in dispute had been their father's, who had bought it with the 
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proceeds from a land sale. The father had requested and received court permission to 
sell their mother's properties after she died.16 Their father bought thirty-seven 
manzanas of land with the proceeds from the sale of the mother's land.17 The 
defendants declared that their father sold them the plots of land, on which they 
cultivated grains and coffee, and on which they had also built their houses ten years 
previously.18 They held four manzanas each, and they had private documents which 
their father had given to them. 
The brothers and sister further stated that the coffee field, which Gloria had 
mentioned in her accusation, did not fall within their own sixteen manzanas but within 
the original plot bought by their father. It had been completely abandoned, but they 
managed to rehabilitate it and make it productive. They admitted that their father had 
indeed sold land to Gloria, but in their opinion the sale did not include their own plots. 
Furthermore, according to the siblings, Gloria had never possessed the land. 
The judge ordered the lawyers of both parties to present evidence. Gloria presented 
her public deed as her only evidence. The defendants asked the judge to interrogate 
three witnesses who declared that the brothers and sister possessed the land and worked 
on it, and that they held private documents. Another four witnesses outlined how the 
father distributed the plots among his offspring. They also declared that the father had 
a coffee field of five manzanas and that his idea had been to divide this field among his 
five children. After the presentation of this evidence, the case file provisionally ended. 
Three years later, in 1986, the file was reopened when Gloria hired a new lawyer. 
This lawyer introduced more evidence in favour of Gloria's version of the story. 
Witnesses declared that the other siblings threw Gloria of her land and that the father 
had not sold land to the other children after the date of issue of Gloria's public deed 
(which was supposed to prove that they could not have the land). There was no 
reaction from the defendants' lawyer, but witness declaration statements supporting 
their side appeared in the case file. Gloria's lawyer objected to the fact that these 
witness declarations had been typed on normal paper instead of certified paper with the 
required stamps. He requested that the statements be typed on certified paper, but the 
defendants did not react within the prescribed twenty-four hours. 
Gloria's lawyer presented his conclusions: Gloria had full ownership of the land and 
her accused siblings should be sentenced to pay damages, losses, and the restitution of 
the land. According to the lawyer, the defendants' witnesses only submitted superficial 
declarations and they had not been able to prove that they had possession in the land 
(which would generate some kind of claim). 
The defendants' lawyer did not formulate his conclusions, but he requested that the 
judge declare the whole process invalid because of the case's large time span, taking 
place between 1983 and 1986. He argued that such a long time span within one 
procedure was only allowed in cases with circumstances beyond one's control, such as 
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natural disasters. Gloria' lawyer reacted by accusing his colleague of delaying tactics and 
lack of professional ethics. 
Although the judge rejected the defendants' proposal that the procedure be declared 
invalid, the court of appeals did accept the argument. After reviewing the case file, the 
court of appeals declared the procedure invalid because of the many technical mistakes. 
Thereafter, the judge of the First Chamber declared himself incompetent and the case 
file was sent to another chamber: the procedure had to start all over again. 
Gloria's lawyer immediately began the new procedure by adding the witness 
declarations to the new case file. These declarations, nevertheless, appeared with 
numerous deletions in the case file data. The defendants did not respond and, in 1988, 
the judge pronounced sentence. The judge argued that 'the defendants let the procedure 
pass by without making use of their rights, and therefore they do not negate the facts 
on which the demand is based'. Furthermore, he considered that Gloria was the owner 
of the land and she was within her rights to demand it back from anyone who may 
possess it. 
Gloria thus won her case and she immediately demanded the sentence be executed. 
The accused party reappeared, however, represented by a new lawyer who again 
requested that the judge declare the procedure invalid. The new lawyer argued that 
Gloria demanded the execution of the sentence without fulfilling the legal requirement 
that she should have notified her brothers and sister about it. He also pointed out that 
the defendants' former lawyer had been appointed judge in the First Chamber during 
the course of the procedure and this was why Gloria's siblings had lost their lawyer. 
The judge of the Third Chamber who treated the case should have known this because 
the appointment was public and it concerned his own colleague. The defendants' 
lawyer further argued that no person should be convicted without his constitutional 
right to defense (art. 82). The judge considered the plea of the new lawyer and he 
decided to declare the sentence execution orders invalid on the basis of the argument 
that Gloria should have notified her brothers and sister. He did not, however, declare 
the entire procedure or the sentence invalid. 
One year later, the defendants' lawyer again tried to declare the whole process 
invalid. He argued that one of the brothers died in 1986 and that his heirs should have 
been summoned in his place. Yet his request was turned down once more. The second 
case file ended. 
The dispute continued in 1990 when a third case file was opened in which Gloria's 
sister, Saturnina, sought to 'determine the boundaries of a property and [be] given back 
what she possesses'. Her reason for presenting this demand, she stated, was that during 
the execution of the previous sentence: 
... they unjustly gave thirty-seven manzanas [to Gloria}., which causes us to be 
deprived of a coffee field of five manzanas as well as our little plots that our father 
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gave to us, and in my case a plot of one and a half manzanas. I think that I should not 
have become the victim of a inappropriate measurement because, if the corresponding 
sentence grants her eighteen manzanas, she should give back the land that does not 
belong to her... 
Sattirnina's demand referred to the execution of the second case file sentence. Although 
the execution was declared invalid in that procedure, Gloria apparently proceeded to 
measure the plot she considered herself entitled to. Gloria answered the demand: 
She [Saturnina] wants to surprise the judge because I honestly bought eighteen 
manzanas, more or less, from my late father, the property boundaries of which he 
defined in the public deed and if, in reality, this is more than eighteen manzanas this is 
correct because the surface area is enclosed by the same boundaries. We understand 
that not one seller of land knows the exact number of manzanas he sold in the first 
place because it is not measured with a precise device nor with a basic measure, but he 
sold it more or less, but it is precise when the seller specifies the boundaries, which 
means that neither the seller nor the buyer will exceed this boundaries... the accusing 
party pretends to revive the death because they did not argue this during the 
vindication procedure, presumably because they took the time to elaborate this private 
document [presented by Saturnina to sustain her claim], which does not have the same 
probative value than the public deed according to which I bought this land.. I cannot 
give back one inch of the terrain because I... respect the boundaries of the property, as 
the owners of the adjacent plots will affirm. I will agree to measure the plot in order to 
demonstrate to the judge that the boundaries of the plot that was sold to me are the 
same, which is important because I know that if the terrain is more than eighteen 
manzanas this does not mean anything because the seller and the buyer respect the 
boundaries and an estimation of the surface.. 
Gloria thus argued that she possibly held more land than the eighteen manzanas she 
bought from her father, but the land within the boundaries was given in the public 
deed. 
Saturnina's lawyer subsequently presented evidence, which consisted of Saturnina's 
private document and six witness declarations. These witnesses declared that, after the 
previous court procedure, Gloria claimed to be owner of all her late father's land , 
which included the land of Saturnina and her brothers, instead of the eighteen 
manzanas she was entitled to. According to the witnesses, the late father distributed his 
land between all his offspring, but Gloria eluded the law. The father never sold the 
whole plot to Gloria. Furthermore, Saturnina's lawyer requested a measurement of the 
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plot. The report of the measurement, however, did not arrive at court in the prescribed 
period and the judge did not allow an extension of the period. 
The judge declared that he was not able to determine whether Gloria received more 
than she was supposed to, and that he did not have the special knowledge to be able to 
interpret the situation. He argued that Gloria did not do anything to counter the 
demand, but Saturnina did not present sufficient evidence to sustain her point. 
Additionally, he used the argument that the witness declarations were not relevant in 
this case because it concerned an immovable property in which the rights could only be 
determined by presenting documentary evidence and not through witnesses.19 
Saturnina lost her case. Her appeal arrived at the court of appeals too late and the third 
case file ended. 
The case files of this inheritance conflict were stuffed with documents, requests and 
other papers. Through reading these case files, however, the background and causes of 
the conflict remained unclear. Four children received land from their father through 
private deeds and one child, at a later stage, through a public deed. The boundaries of 
Gloria's plot as specified in the public deed enclosed the complete area that was her 
father's property. This, however, included more manzanas than the eighteen she ought 
to have received, and also included her siblings' plots. She argued that the number of 
manzanas may be unclear, but the land she claimed fell within the boundaries as settled 
in her public deed. 
It is possible that the father did not know the exact number of manzanas he had or 
how many he sold to Gloria. It is rather inconceivable, however, that he did not know 
whether he had thirty-seven or eighteen manzanas. For example, he would have known 
how much land he bought in the first place because he paid a certain price for each 
manzana. The boundaries as mentioned in the private deeds of Saturnina and her 
brothers, and the boundaries mentioned in Gloria' public deed, showed no relationship 
at all. 
Based on my reading of the three case files, I see one possible scenario as an 
explanation of what occurred. This is that the father gave four manzanas each to 
Saturnina and her brothers, and then decided to sell the remaining land to Gloria. This 
would have been eighteen manzanas, more or less. In the process of issuing the public 
deed to Gloria, however, the boundaries of the whole property were incorporated as if 
they represented the boundaries of Gloria's eighteen manzanas. Gloria took advantage 
of this mistake to throw her sister and brothers of their land. Gloria took possession 
over her land only after her father's death when he was no longer able to control what 
she took. 
What should the court do with this conflict and how should it evaluate the presented 
evidence? One problem that stood out was that the boundaries of the private 
documents and the public deed did not match at all. The judge, however, did not 
investigate the documents that were presented by the two parties. He confirmed that 
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the documents existed but he admitted that he lacked the knowledge to determine who 
had what rights on the basis of those documents. Furthermore, witness declarations 
were added to the case files but their content was merely taken for granted: whether or 
not they were compatible seemed not to be of interest to the judge. 
In the verdict, the first judge followed the reasoning and conclusions of Gloria's 
lawyer, because the other party was no longer represented at that time. He based his 
judgement on the principle that the 'onus of proof rests with the accused'. In general, 
this would mean that those people confronting a demand but who are not able to pay 
for the services of a lawyer are declared guilty beforehand. Although the judge must 
have known that this was against the Constitution (art. 89), he nonetheless did so. 
Gloria's siblings did not have a lawyer to write conclusions in their favour, and the 
judge seemed to have read only the lawyers' conclusions. The lack of conclusions from 
the defendants' side meant that nothing spoke in their favour, which meant a 
guaranteed loss of the case. 
In the second process of Saturnina against Gloria, the judge declined the witness 
declarations in the favour of Saturnina by stating that they were irrelevant in disputing 
immovable properties. He considered that only documentary evidence was suitable to 
determine property rights. Without witness declarations and without valid 
measurements, Saturnina did not manage to prove her allegations against Gloria. 
Land dispute: reconstruction on the basis of criminal accusations of usurpation 
The previous case was an inheritance conflict that was dealt with in three successive 
civil procedures. In the following case, a land conflict accumulates into criminal 
accusations of usurpation and damages. The main actors in this story, Bernardo and 
Eduardo, were both related to a man called Chepe Aguilar. Chepe left two families 
behind when he died. One was his legitimate family in the village of El Zapote, the 
other an illegitimate family in a nearby hamlet. His grandson Bernardo was the son of 
Chepe's legitimate daughter. Eduardo was one of Chepe's two illegitimate. Eduardo 
and his brother Eudocio received a plot of land each as their inheritance while their 
father lived. 
Qiepe Aguilar 
Spouses Spouse 1: 
Clara Castellanos 
(unmarried) 
Spouse 2: 
deceased 
(married) 
Children Eduardo Eudocio Gabriel 
(eldest son 
who claimed 
all land) 
Son 
(failed to contest 
claim of elder 
brother) 
Son 
(insane) 
Daughter Daughter Daughter 
Grandchildren Bernardo 
Figure 6.2 Actors in the dispute over the inheritance of Chepe Aguilar 
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At the time of his death in 1987, Chepe did not have a testament nor had he divided his 
remaining properties. His legitimate family proceeded to divide the properties. His 
daughters had expected some kind of payment after several years of caring for then-
father day and night, and paid most of the expenses out of their own tight pockets. 
They were extremely disappointed to find that their father had left them nothing 
special. At first, their eldest brother proposed that some of the land had to be sold to 
pay off some of their father's remaining debts. The other heirs agreed, and a plot of 
Chepe's land was sold to his grandson Bernardo Ponce. Then, the eldest brother 
claimed that he was entitled to have the rest. His sisters, a mentally handicapped 
brother, and a brother who lived in the capital city, did not receive anything. When the 
migrant brother discovered that his eldest brother had appropriated his father's land, he 
tried to sue his brother in court. But for reasons that were not clear in the case file, the 
unfinished case file ended up in the archives of the court. 
Several years after Chepe's death, grandson Bernardo entered into a conflict with 
Chepe's illegitimate son Eduardo: they started to accuse one another of the usurpation 
of their land, which is a criminal offence. First, Bernardo accused Eduardo of 
usurpation in front of the JP, which resulted in Eduardo being sent to the local jail. 
One month later, Eduardo accused Bernardo of 'usurpation and alteration of 
boundaries' in the Third Chamber of the Santa Barbara court. 
Eduardo declared in the Santa Barbara court that he possessed the disputed land for 
the last twenty-five years. He said that Bernardo: 
...maliciously and capriciously has been busy to appropriate this property while pulling 
out the posts and the barbed wire which he left rolled up. He did this to be able to freely 
enter my small property which is the only plot I own, where the accused ordered his 
day labourers to sow a maize field, knowing that it [the land] is mine. On August 8, he 
ordered them to construct a new fence which encloses more than half of the property. 
An inspection, which will be realised will prove this... In July 1993, my son and I 
reconstructed the fence that was pulled down by the accused. And days after they 
arrested me by order of the JP, and I was imprisoned for four days in spite of the fact 
that I presented my title deed of which they said that it did not have any value, and 
thanks to the intervention of some friends who went to the superiors of this judge [the 
JP], I succeeded in regaining my freedom. 
The judge proceeded by ordering the JP of El Zapote to inspect the site and to estimate 
the damages. The judge also ordered that the LNA should re-measure the plot (it is not 
clear whether the LNA indeed became involved). The case file included a report by one 
of the assistant mayors of El Zapote who had inspected the disputed land. He observed 
six posts that were pulled out, fifty brazos of rolled up barbed wire, fifty-six brazos of 
barbed wire attached to four posts and six trees, five tareas with old coffee trees, six 
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tareas of maize and V4 tarea of land prepared for sowing maize.20 He estimated the 
damages to the posts at 690 lempiras. The assistant mayor also observed that there was a 
sown maize field, which belonged to Juan Alvarado. Juan declared that he rented the 
plot from Bernardo Ponce. 
The case file further held the declarations of several witnesses. One of them declared 
that the disputed land was once owned by Clara Castellanos (the unmarried spouse of 
Chepe), who had given this land to her son Eduardo. A second witness said that he did 
not know anything about it; he held the adjacent plot but he did not work on it 
anymore. He added that he had recently visited his plot and saw that somebody had 
sowed maize on Eduardo's plot but he didn't know whether this was Eduardo's maize. 
The judge decided to order the arrest of Bernardo, who appeared in the court two 
days later. He declared that he was thirty-seven years old and worked as a coffee 
producer. When asked what he was doing on August 8, he stated that he was probably 
working because 'that is what I do'. Furthermore, he said that he had accused Eduardo 
three months earlier of illegally placing posts in his property. He did this because 'I 
consider myself the owner and because I have documents that prove that I am the 
owner and that I have to defend what is mine'. 
In addition, the case file held a declaration of the JP of El Zapote, stating that 
Bernardo accused Eduardo of invading his property. Eduardo and Bernardo both 
submitted documents to prove their rights to the land. Eduardo presented a title deed 
from the DMA, while Bernardo presented a private deed to the land which he bought 
after his grandfather died.21 
The same day Bernardo was arrested, the judge declared that there was not sufficient 
evidence to imprison him. In his view, the conflict should be solved by way of a civil 
vindication procedure. He emphasised in his judgement that 'both the accuser and the 
accused presented property documents in their favour', but that he was not able to 
determine who held better property rights to the land. Therefore, he decided to release 
Bernardo. 
In its review of the court's decision, the court of appeals decided that it had acted 
incorrectly to liberate Bernardo because the procedure had not yet been completed. 
Furthermore, the court of appeals stated that the inspection of the assistant mayor had 
pointed out that there had been damage to the field, but that this did not prove that the 
accused (Bernardo) was responsible for causing this damage. The Court of Appeals 
noted that Bernardo thought he was the owner and that he possessed documents to 
prove his ownership, but that the opposite party had documents as well. The Court of 
Appeals therefore restated the judge's decision that it was not convenient to continue 
the criminal procedure and that the conflict has to be resolved through a civil 
procedure. 
The story of the conflict between Bernardo and Eduardo was well known to other 
villagers, who told the story in various versions all contrasting with the case file. One 
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version was that Chepe transferred parts of the land to his two illegitimate sons 
Eduardo and Eudocio through private deeds of purchase. The legitimate children, 
however, considered Eduardo's land to be part of the inheritance from their father. 
When they sold part of the land to Bernardo, to pay off Chepe's debts, they included 
part of Eduardo's parcel in the sale. Eduardo became enraged, and he reclaimed his 
land. But he lost his own private document when he was on his way to a lawyer in 
Santa Barbara; it fell out of the pocket of his shirt and he could only find bits and pieces 
of it. He tried to create a new private deed, but as he used new certified paper, his own 
lawyer quickly discovered the deceit. The loss of his private deed considerably 
weakened Eduardo's claim to the land. 
How should we evaluate the contrasting claims of Bernardo and Eduardo? Were 
they both owners of the plot? What did the documents which they submitted actually 
claim? The judge did not succeed in unravelling the claims of Bernardo and Eduardo, 
possibly because he was not able to investigate the content of the documents. To the 
judge, it was important that both men felt themselves to be owners and that they had 
documents to prove ownership. Whether their claim was justified or not was a question 
that the judge did not consider suitable for a criminal procedure, hence he suggested 
that a civil procedure should verify who had what right. 
I have tried to reconstruct the situation on the basis of the bits and pieces of 
information from villagers and the information in the case file. According to the 
villagers story, Eduardo no longer had his private deed. It is possible that he therefore 
submitted the LNA title which he possessed, but which concerned a plot of land other 
than the one covered by the lost private deed. As one of the witnesses confirmed, 
Eduardo had received land from his mother Clara Castellanos and it had been this plot 
that was titled in his name. 
The public INA title that Eduardo presented to the court concerned the plot that 
once belonged to his mother, Clara. It did not concern the land he inherited from his 
father, Chepe. The JP had insisted that Eduardo's title deed 'had no value' when he sent 
Eduardo to jail, possibly because he thought that the title did not concern the disputed 
area. Bernardo's private title concerned the land he bought from his relatives after his 
grandfather's death. 
According to the judge, both parties presented documents and considered themselves 
owners.22 When researching the described boundaries, however, it is clear that the 
documents do not concern the same, but (possibly) two adjacent plots. Figure 6.3 is an 
attempt to schematically reconstruct the situation. The area in dispute was thus on 
Eduardo's land and possibly overlapped both his plots. The boundaries as described in 
the private deed of Bernardo suggested that he had no claim in the disputed area and 
that he was just trying to grab a part of Eduardo's land. It appears that Bernardo had 
sent Juan Alvarado to sow maize in the area, through which Bernardo made a claim to 
the land without being directly involved. Eduardo would not attack Juan as he had 
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nothing to do with the conflict: Juan was only sowing the maize as a temporary tenant, 
and he had rented the land in good faith. 
Eudocio 
(Eduardo's 
brother) 
Ana 
Free land 
Juan 
Eduardo / 
(title deed; formerly ^ 
Clara's land / 
(private deed) 
Gabriel 
(formerly 
Chepe's land) 
Eduardo"" 
(lost private 
deed) Ernesto 
Maize field Lugardo 
in 
boundary 
Figure 6.3 Schematic view of the situation regarding the conflict in the Agui/ar family 
Source: based on the documents of Eduardo and Bernardo and the cadastral map of the area. 
The conflict appeared in the judicial system twice. The first time, Bernardo accused 
Eduardo of invading his property. The JP sent Eduardo to jail but had to release him 
after the intervention of some influential people. The second time, Eduardo sued 
Bernardo in the district court but they were again sent home with their unsolved 
conflict. 
Neither the first nor the second intervention of the judicial authorities led to an 
investigation and a solution to the conflict. By referring the parties to a civil 
vindication procedure, the judge did not contribute to a quick solution: a vindication 
procedure may take years and requires the intervention of lawyers. The violent way in 
which Bernardo and Eduardo contested each other's claims to the land, however, 
required a quick and definite solution to prevent further escalation of the conflict. 
The vindication procedure to determine the different claims of Eduardo and 
Bernardo never took place. Eduardo decided to give up his claim. He had lost his 
private deed and had nothing to sustain his claim in the area in front of the judicial 
authorities. He was poor and it was not possible for him to pay a lawyer to proceed 
with the vindication procedure. 
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Land dispute: land reform and emerging violence 
Three case files, all criminal accusations, dealt with a complicated land dispute in 
another village in the Santa Barbara district. The accusations concerned a peasant group 
whose members claimed land on the basis of the Agrarian Reform Law. 
In the first case file of 1990, a woman named Antonia Cruz accused the peasant 
group of land occupation, robbery and damages. She declared that the group had 
invaded her property and that they had stolen some barbed wire, four cows and a horse 
'to finance the group'. Furthermore, the group intimidated Antonia's labourers, who 
were sowing maize on her land with her permission, and they threatened Antonia 
herself with death. 
By order of the court, the JP inspected the site and declared that the land in dispute 
included fifteen manzanas prepared to sow maize and that cows and horses were 
grazing there. The JP furthermore observed several posts from which the barbed wire 
had been recently removed, and piles of wood to build a camp. He stated that he met a 
group of men armed with machetes, rifles and shotguns. 
The judge ordered that the men be arrested. They declared that they had not stolen 
cows and a horse from Antonia because there had not been any in the field. They also 
told the judge that they were in their right because they had a recently issued guarantee 
card from the LNA. The INA issued these guarantee cards to peasant groups during the 
agrarian reform period, although such a card was not a legal property document. 
Several witnesses declared that the group did steal the cattle and that they threatened 
the labourer who lived on the land and took care of the cattle, saying that he had to 
leave or they would kill him. 
The case file continued with a declaration of an INA lawyer, who said that, 
according to the guarantee card, a plot of eighty-eight manzanas was taken away from 
Antonia Cruz and given to the group. The lawyer argued that the guarantee card 
proved that the men did not illegally occupy the land and he questioned the 
competence of the judge in the conflict by arguing that, not the judge, but 'the LNA is 
the organisation to know and resolve everything that has to do with access, 
exploitation, alienation, recovery and distribution of land'. 
The judge decided to release the men. Antonia Cruz was furious, as the telegram she 
sent to the judge proved: 
/ beg you to summon the men who I charged with robbery of cattle and illegal 
occupation, given the fact that they occupied land that was in use by producers of basic 
[food] grains. I already informed the Supreme Court, the National Congress, the 
Ministry ofNatural Resources and the President of the Committee Production ofBasic 
Grains; it is justice that I want. 
212 
Nevertheless, the judge decided that there was not sufficient evidence to charge the 
group with robbery of cattle or any of the other charges. The first case file ended. 
Four years later, in 1994, Antonia Cruz again pressed charges against three members 
of the peasant group 'El Limon' because of illegal occupation and damages. Only one of 
the accused men was arrested. A witness declared that the group had continued to claim 
the land after the first court case, because 'she [Antonia] is a single woman, maybe this 
is the reason why these men do not want to leave'. Yet the situation had changed 
considerably compared to the first case file. According to documents that were attached 
to the second case file, Antonia Cruz had started a procedure within the LNA after the 
first court case, lodging an objection to the LNA decision to take the land away. The 
LNA had argued that Antonia Cruz was not the owner of the land, but that she 
occupied national land and the peasant group could therefore claim it. Moreover, the 
LNA stated that Antonia had not claimed her land within the prescribed period after 
the LNA made the decision to grant it to the peasant group. According to Antonia, 
however, the LNA officials were responsible for many administrative irregularities, and 
that was the reason why she had not reacted to the LNA's decision in time. Antonia 
argued that she had the right to claim the land which had been her late husband's 
concession (on ejido land). The LNA thereafter decided in her favour and admitted that 
Antonia had legal rights to claim the land. In this second procedure, Antonia submitted 
a public deed to the judge to prove her ownership of the land. The second case file 
ended when the imprisoned group member was released on a bail of 2,610 lempiras. 
The payment of the bail meant discontinuance of the criminal procedure and the case 
file ended up in the archives. 
Two months later, the third case file about this same dispute was opened when a day 
labourer working for Antonia was brutally murdered. Eighteen members of the peasant 
group were charged with the murder, several of whom were relatives of the murdered 
labourer. The victim, accompanied by a young man and a grandchild, was on his way 
to leave some cattle, owned by Antonia, in a pasture field near the land that was 
claimed by the peasant group. The JP reported that the victim was decapitated, that his 
brains and chest were beaten in, and his stomach was eviscerated. The seventeen year 
old grandson of the victim who witnessed the murder declared: 'When they saw that 
my grandfather was dead, they stood on his corpse and jumped on him and they fell on 
his corpse and they made jokes about him even though he was dead...'. 
The declarations of people who saw what had happened unanimously confirmed the 
involvement of peasant group members. Many of them were arrested in the following 
days, but they either denied the accusations or were able to provide an alibi. Various 
members of the group tried to put the blame on other members. One of them declared: 
'The devil has carried us off. The group will vanish because of this problem which has 
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happened to us'. Some imprisoned group members who hired a lawyer were 
immediately released. The judge issued arrest warrants against fugitives. 
A young man, who was not a member of the group but who had the group's 
permission to sow maize on the disputed land, finally made a declaration in which he 
acknowledged his responsibility: 
For several days I have worked on dona Antonia's land., to sow a maize field because 
the peasant group... allowed me to work on this land... The motive to kill Juan was 
because he wanted to deposit several cows in dona Antonia's property, a property that 
is subject of a battle between her and Samuel Lopez and Sergio Perdomo and other 
members of the peasant group... When we killed Juan... Sergio Perdomo, Samuel Lopez 
and others., they summoned me to the house of Sergio on a certain day and they gave 
me the following advice: that when the police would arrest me and bring me before the 
judge I would say to the judge that dona Antonia paid me a certain amount of money 
to kill Juan in order to save the land which is the object of the struggle of this group of 
men who call themselves peasants. This confused me and I started to think about the 
advice of Sergio and the others, that it would not serve me in any respect because dona 
Antonia.. Ida not even know her and she never offered me money to commit a crime, 
because this was a slyness invented by these men and that we should kill Juan.. We hit 
him three times with a machete in his upper body, the first Osmin Romero, then 
Sergio Perdomo, Fernando Orellano, Nelson Cruz.. Sergio gave him the deathblow 
because he cut off his head... We were fifteen men all armed with machetes to kill any 
day labourer ofdofla Antonia... I did not want to accompany the peasant group, and 
because I didn't want to I was reprimanded by Sergio, Samuel and Osmin, that if I 
would not go I would be a coward and a chicken and that I had to accompany them 
because otherwise they would end my life as well.. 
In his second statement he said: 'we fled because they could get us because of the crap 
we made...'. At a later stage, he withdrew his declarations and said that he knew 
nothing. 
Several men who were mentioned by witnesses and by other group members 
presented an alibi in the form of a written statement of the INA, which said that these 
men were in the LNA office in San Pedro at the time of murder, 'to estimate the 
damages made by the cattle of dona Antonia in their maize fields'. The LNA 
functionary who wrote the written alibi presented himself in court to declare. He 
explained that 'these men were handling the problem of a confrontation because 
someone had introduced cattle on a plot of land which the LNA guaranteed them, and 
three days later they came again to say that there were problems and that there was 
someone killed'. At this point, the case file ended up in the courts' archives. 
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A procedure within the LNA, and not a civil vindication procedure, determined the 
property rights of Antonia Cruz. She appealed the LNA's resolution that the land she 
possessed should be given to the peasant group. The court dispute between Antonia and 
the group, then, were all criminal charges filed against the group. The LNA guarantee 
card that the peasant group had received played an important role. The LNA had issued 
the guarantee without effectively controlling the land that was in Antonia's possession. 
In the proceedings within the LNA to determine Antonia's property rights, her lawyer 
suggested that the LNA committed administrative irregularities in order to take the land 
away, but it remained unclear what kind of 'irregularities' the LNA had committed. 
The LNA functionary who appeared in the third case file still denied Antonia's rights, 
in spite of the fact that she had been assigned the land in the internal LNA procedure 
and had a public deed to the land. 
There was a tension between the LNA and the judge about the competence of the 
court in this case. The LNA argued in the first court case that the judge did not have 
competence in cases related to access, exploitation, alienation, recovery and distribution 
of land. It was not clear, however, whether the LNA wanted to discuss the competence 
of the judge only in this case, since it was a dispute directly related to the agrarian 
reform process, or that the LNA claimed to have jurisdiction in all disputes related to 
land. In the third case file about the murder, the LNA again played an unclear role in 
influencing the course of the criminal procedure, in that it provided an alibi to 
members of the group who had been positively identified as being responsible for the 
murder by several witnesses. 
The judicial system and legal insecurity 
The working of the judicial system as it is perceived by rural landholders, practices in 
the court, and our knowledge about how judges complete civil and criminal 
procedures, point out that the system does not work properly according to the law and 
that it does not fulfil the job that it ought to fulfil in the eyes of the people. The 
problematic aspects of the working van the judicial system are the procedures and the 
practices with respect to these procedures, the investigations, the content of the 
evidence, and the role of the bail system. Furthermore, the working of the judicial 
system has special features as a result of formalism, politics and manipulation. 
The role of the judge 
The judge operates completely on his own. He does not confer with anyone on the 
case, he has hardly any technical or administrative support and is not obliged to 
extensively substantiate his decision. The Court of Appeals' role is restricted to 
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evaluating whether or not procedures are completed correctly. In the case files that I 
reviewed in the Third Chamber, the Court of Appeals did not really meddle in the 
content of a decision, but only imposed the maximum sentence when the judge had 
chosen to impose a lesser one. As long as the procedure is correctly completed (time 
limits are not exceeded; the proper order of procedural stages followed), the Court of 
Appeals is not able to see through the nature of judgements. Moreover, both the judge 
and the Court of Appeals tend to copy the conclusions or the demand of a lawyer to 
the letter, creating the impression that there is no impartial evaluation of evidence in a 
case. 
Becoming judge is a first step in the career of a graduate in law, and judges do not 
need any special or additional training and they are not evaluated on their expert 
knowledge or suitability for the job. In cases of obvious failure or bribery, judges are 
removed from their posts without further consequences; discredited judges frequently 
opened their own law firm in the same town as where they had been appointed judge. 
Judges have thus developed little vision for their own job: they stick to the doctrine 
because that is a safe thing to do. District court judges in Santa Barbara deal with all 
types of cases that require knowledge about a wide range of subjects such as property 
rights, labour rights, criminal offences and divorces. It is not unusual if they do not 
know everything about all these subjects and they stick to applying the few laws and 
articles from laws that they do know. 
The judge considers following the procedures to be a major part of his investigative 
task, which should automatically generate the right knowledge about a case to come to 
a juridical and factual consideration. In reality, of course, it does not. The judge is 
passive in civil cases where he only evaluates the evidence trotted out by the parties. 
The parties' lawyers propose certain witnesses be heard and prescribe the declaration 
that these witnesses should sign. They also demand site inspections and prepare the 
questions and answers that should be produced by way of inspection. The only thing 
the judge does is order a JP to hear the witnesses and inspect the site and report about 
these activities to the court. The investigative role of the judge in criminal cases is more 
active, such as in giving out arrest warrants and hearing suspects. 
Evidence 
The quality of evidence in civil and criminal procedures is meagre; it is hardly ever 'real 
evidence', as one of the lawyers put it. The involved parties provide evidence according 
to their own interest: witness declarations and inspection reports may be completely 
contradictory, which makes it impossible for a judge to determine what is right and 
what is wrong. Lawyers frequently clash about the antecedents of the witnesses that are 
brought in, witnesses who obviously do not have an independent position with respect 
to the dispute. Witnesses have been primed to provide a certain declaration. The lawyer 
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makes a proposition regarding the questions that a witness is supposed to answer. For 
example: the witness is supposed to answer the question whether Gloria's brothers and 
sister received the land from their late father and whether they possessed and worked on it for 
more than ten years. The JP report thereafter states that the witness has declared that 
Gloria's brothers and sister received the land from their late father and that they possessed 
and worked on it for more than ten years. JPs and judges never thoroughly question 
witnesses; they are merely supposed to say 'yes or no' (or sometimes not even that is 
necessary) and then sign a written statement. 
Furthermore, the judge has great difficulties in understanding the content and the 
value of property documents. In some cases, the judge is convinced that he does not 
understand the legal value of property documents and completely abstains from reading 
them. In the second case between Eduardo and Bernardo, for example, it was enough 
for the judge that Bernardo presented some kind of document and that he declared that 
he felt himself to be the owner. The judge did not find out what kind of document 
Bernardo presented and what rights to which plot of land it was supposed to attest to. 
The judge also has no instrument to determine whether a JP's or assistant mayor's 
inspection report has been manipulated. 
Despite the fact that the judge is confronted with evidence of a completely 
contradictory nature and content, he balances the information in a way that is totally 
unclear. The judge does not evaluate information but decides about the case using his 
own criteria; in most case files I studied in the Third Chamber archives, the judge chose 
to believe one of the lawyers and he copied the conclusions of this lawyer in his 
decision. 
Paying bail 
The role bail plays deserves special attention as it is an important mechanism of 'class 
justice', as the prisons of Honduras are exclusively inhabited by people who cannot 
afford to pay bail. Payment of bail in criminal procedures means that the procedure has 
ended, in spite of the fact that this is not the intention of the law. Not all criminal 
offences can be bailed, but contracting a good lawyer means that the lawyer will first 
work on having the charges defined in a way that bail becomes possible. Someone 
charged with murder cannot be bailed out, but someone charged with homicide can, so 
a good lawyer will take care that the charge will be homicide instead of murder, after 
which the bail can be paid and the suspect will be set free. The Olanchano stealing 
coffee in the poor remote mountain villages of Santa Barbara, can only be charged with 
fraud, a charge which practically means that he pays a relatively small bail and is then 
released. 
The payment of the bail makes it so that the process is not continued by the lawyer 
of the accused party; it is no longer in his interest and he abstains from any action until 
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the offence has become precluded by the lapse of time. The Public Ministry should 
continue to push the procedure ahead, but the practice is that this does not happen. 
Formalism as a problem 
Legal culture in Honduras shows great respect for, and an excessive concern with, legal 
formalities (Karst and Rosenn 1975).23 Deep respect for formalities can be found at all 
levels within the state and in many other forms of social organisation. For example, a 
newly formed women's group in El Zapote does not start with a discussion about the 
goals of the organisation, but with the formal election of a 'board of directors' (la junta 
directiva), and the establishment of rules and procedures that define the organisation and 
the responsibiUties of members. The tendency to first create an 'official' organisational 
structure with official tasks and obligations is very strong even in such informal groups. 
Formalism and the importance of procedures are strongly related to the slow and 
uphill battle for démocratisation of Honduran society. People experience procedures like 
the one I described in the women's group or, as used in courts, as stepping stones towards 
transparency. In this sense, procedures fulfil the role of rituals to counteract feelings of 
distrust that there might be people in power who have the wrong intentions. Procedures 
form a guarantee against clientism, favouritism and corruption. 
Formalism in courts leads, for example, to a tendency 'to presume that every citizen is 
lying unless one produces written, documentary proof that one is telling the truth' 
(Karst and Rosenn 1975:63). In the three cases presented, property documents were 
extremely important, but it was merely the existence of these documents and the fact 
that the parties involved were able to present them to the judge, as opposed to the 
actual content and meaning of these documents. In the three cases, the judges had 
difficulty reading these documents and interpreting their content, which is nevertheless 
important considering that the Public Register of Property is not reliable and that there 
is a fair chance that documents are falsified or do not represent the true situation. 
Formalism provides an alibi for judges and lawyers who make use of the features of 
the paper procedures to achieve particular aims. They are either focused on the proper 
completion of procedures, or they deftly use the opportunity to abstain from 
completing procedures when it is in their own or their client's interest (for instance, the 
payment of bail, after which the procedure does not continue). They may use 
procedural arguments to justify all kinds of contradictory demands, protests and 
actions. 
Procedural mistakes are a reason to extend the procedure or to declare it invalid and, 
herewith, lawyers and judges may deliberately or unintentionally influence the 
outcome of a dispute or a criminal accusation. Procedural failures are often deciding 
factors, as the first case about Gloria and her siblings has shown. The judge in that case 
decided in favour of one party, using the argument that the other party did not contest 
218 
the charges within the prescribed period. If this were a general principle, then, it would 
inevitably lead to the conviction of poor and illiterate people who are not represented 
by a lawyer, and who are not able to respond to the charges. 
The Honduran press tends to blame the problematic working of courts on judges who 
neglect to complete procedures or that fail to do so properly. The idea is that corruption 
occurs because there is a lack of respect for procedures. This chapter has shown that the 
centrality of procedural arguments in court practices is leading to problems as well. 
Excessive attention to procedures, and complete lack of attention to meaning and content, 
mean that parties involved in a dispute are left with feelings of injustice when judges 
declare evidence or the entire procedure to be invalid and when lawsuits are never 
finished. 
Politics, manipulation and bribery 
There is a lot of talk in Honduras about corruption and bribery in the courts of justice, 
but as could be expected, this is very difficult to prove in concrete cases. What is 
certain, however, is that the appointment of judges at all levels in the justice system is a 
political affair (political in the sense of directly linked to party politics), in which their 
expertise and suitability for the job do not play a role. The JP of El Zapote has not 
completed the study of law, and he is not a law expert. However, his lack of expert 
knowledge is not his main problem. Rather, it is the political character of his 
appointment and, consequently, his lack of impartiality and credibility that prevents 
him from properly doing his work. 2 4 The general viewpoint is that it is impossible for a 
person who is deeply involved in politics to be impartial as politics involve networks of 
people who are related, who know each other and who owe each other. 
The marked influence of politicians on well known cases of judicial bribery heavily 
influence the perception that the judicial system provides 'class justice'. The Supreme 
Court researched the activities of 500 judges in 2000 and found that, over a period of 
three years, 100 judges were charged with fraud, corruption or abuse of authority (US 
Department of State 2001). Politics also affect Santa Barbara court practices. Many 
lawyers are actively involved in politics and landholders stick to lawyers who share 
their political preference in order to ensure that the lawyer will work for their benefit. 
Judges have been party activists or they have direct connections with someone who is 
in politics. In spite of the fact that landholders have deep respect for expert knowledge 
and juridical jargon, they sense the political character of the judge's actions, although 
this is sometimes less visible to them than the direct link between a JP and politics. 
This leads them to conclude that judges are vendidos ('bought') without realising the 
details of how and why. 
Influencing judges is thus possible in the system and it is relatively easy because of 
the deficiencies of the juridical procedures themselves. Without being bribed in a literal 
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sense, judges might be more inclined to decide in favour of rich and influential people 
whilst carefully completing procedures. Juridical procedures are not transparent, 
nobody has visible influence on the activities of a judge, and a judge imposes sentences 
which he is not obliged to argue about extensively. 
There is a second point related to manipulation and bribery, which is obviously true. 
The inhabitants of the crammed and inadequate prison in Santa Barbara are all poor, 
and there must be a reason for that. Poor people do not inherently commit more 
crimes than rich people, and the famous white-collar criminals are everywhere but in 
prison. This chapter has not, of course, presented an extensive study of these problems. 
On the basis of this study, nevertheless, it is possible to say that poor people end up in 
jail because they cannot afford a lawyer and that everyone who is able to hire a lawyer 
will keep himself out of jail. The lawyer, by making use of legal instruments such as 
influencing the formulation of charges and payment of bail, and perhaps by also using 
such not-so-legal instruments as bribing the judge, will be able to keep his client out of 
prison. Every person charged with a crime who ends up in jail will stay there until a 
lawyer gets him out, which is the ultimate consequence of the failures and inadequacies 
of the entire judicial system. 
The role of legal insecurity in property relations 
Most landholders in El Zapote are poor people who try to stay out of conflicts and 
who are even less eager to enter court. This chapter has concluded that poor people do 
not have access to the judicial system, not only because they lack the money to pay for 
a lawyer, but also because they are anxious to enter an unknown world of expert 
knowledge, documents, signatures, stamps, registrations, prisons and long and 
expensive travels. Poor and illiterate landholders lack mechanisms to control the course 
of events as soon as they cross the threshold of this unknown world. They end up in 
more than one procedure for reasons that they do not understand: they have to sell 
land or other valuable assets to continue paying the expenses; they have to tap their 
social networks to gain access to loans or political power, and deal with the 
consequences. 
Landholders in El Zapote will not feel comfortable with the consequences of looking 
for justice in the judicial system and, consequently, they will try to avoid a situation in 
which this becomes inevitable. The lack of access to the judicial system does not mean 
that alternative forms of dispute regulation have emerged. People either stick to the 
hope that the judicial system will work in their favour or they try to avoid becoming 
involved in the conflict by all means. A central feature of property relations regarding 
land is thus conflict avoidance, which influences sale and inheritance practices. For 
example, avoidance strategies entail the enforcement of claims by using land, efforts to 
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gain social recognition of a claim, and to eventually sell the land as a last attempt to 
evade being dragged into a conflict. 
Only in rare situations did I find that local leaders (mayor, head of political party) 
had 'mediated' conflicts. This kind of mediation was not gratis, but it required political 
contacts and compromises. Not everyone had access to it, and not everyone was willing 
to pay the political price. 
An important aspect of legal insecurity is the unclear status of landholders' property 
rights. Chapter Two explained that how the lack of clarity in property rights creates 
conflicts not only between landholders and the state, but also triggers conflicts between 
landholders themselves. In the first court case, the public deed of Gloria created 
confusion about what she should have bought from her late father. The boundaries 
settled in the document enclosed much more land than the number of manzanas she 
had bought. She was right in arguing that measurements are not precise and that there 
might be a difference, yet it is a not plausible explanation when the difference is 18 or 
37 manzanas. Hence, her public deed did not lead to transparency about her own 
property rights and those of her siblings. Instead, it led to a conflict. In the second 
court case, two property documents, one public and one private, confused the judge 
because he considered that the documents proved that both parties had rights to the 
disputed land. The third court case was more clear about the claims of both parties, but 
it was not clear why the LNA refused to recognise Antonia's property claim at first, and 
gave the peasant group a guarantee card for the land. 
The state recognises the opaque and unclear property rights to land as problematic 
and has proposed the creation of agrarian tribunals that would especially concern 
themselves with land conflicts and contradictory property claims (Honduras 1996, LNA 
1996). The question remains, however, whether such an agrarian court would also 
generate a new legal culture with less formalism and more focus on understanding the 
background of disputes and the juridical meaning of property claims, and that 
landholders would be able to easily access, no matter how poor and illiterate. 
Changing the judicial system 
It has become widely recognised over the last decade that the Honduran judicial system 
needs a thorough revision (Romero and Salomon 2000). Several developments and 
coinciding incidents have led to a broad acknowledgement of the problematic working 
of the judicial system and the lack of legal security in all sectors of society. The IMF has 
put Honduras through a Structural Adjustment Program beginning in 1990. For 
example, the poor working of the judicial system hampers adequate property rights 
protection, which is a major obstacle to attracting foreign investment. The IMF's intent 
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was to remove such obstructions, resulting in increased attention being paid to the 
judicial system. 
Another change opening the way for changes in the judicial system has been the 
attempt to break the power of the military and to place it under civil control. The 
creation of a Human Rights Commissioner expedited the decline of the military power: 
one of his first reports was about the human rights abuses by the military in the 1980s 
(Comisionado Nacional de Proteccion de los Derechos Humanos 1994). The report 
called for the imprisonment and conviction of the involved military officials, but it also 
questioned the capability of the judicial system to seek justice. Furthermore, the rape 
and murder of the student Riccy Mabel in 1991 led to joint social protests by students 
and the anti-military and feminist movements (Mendoza 1996). The demonstrators, 
who held a group in the military responsible for her murder, demanded that the 
impunity of the military be brought to an end, and that severe punishments should be 
imposed on rape and murder. 
Majorchanges 
These events resulted in major changes to the Honduran judicial system, including the 
dissolution of the Investigation Directorate DNI (accused of illegal detentions and other 
human rights abuses in the 1980s), the creation of the criminal investigation directorate 
DGIC, and the reformation of the Public Ministry. The state took the national police 
force out from being under the control of the military and placed it under civil 
mandate. Furthermore, the state reformed the 1906 Penal Code; the idea was to limit 
the number of crimes subject to bail and to modernise the penalties for certain crimes. 
Rape, sexual abuse and domestic violence were high on the agenda of the interest 
groups that participated in discussions about the reformation of the Penal Code. Major 
discussions were held concerning the penalties for corrupt judges and abuses by 
journalists, as well as about the penalties for land occupation. 
After the reformation of the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedural Code also became 
subject to revision. These changes took much more pain and effort due to the resistance 
of the 'political and economical powers' (June 15, 1998: La Prensa). The specific 
character of these powers remained slightly vague. However, accusations were made 
about the role politicians played (for example: August 6, 1998: La Prensa) in explicitly 
delaying the approbation of the Criminal Procedural Code. This was approved in 
December 1999, but without the necessary adjustments to the budget of the Judicial 
System in order to be able to implement the reforms. 
The important reforms in the new Criminal Procedural Code include the following: 
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• The establishment of oral hearings: 
Oral hearings will allow lawyers to hear witnesses themselves, it will change the role of 
the judge and will allow for more control over the court's activities. Part of the 
magistrates and judges have been opposing the reforms because they do not want to 
lose their monopolistic position with regard to the investigation, and they resist the 
stronger role of the Public Ministry. 
• Eradication of imprisonment without a sentence: 
People will no longer be sent to jail unless they are sentenced. The general expectation 
is that this will put an end to the overcrowded prisons and will diminish the number of 
unsentenced prisoners. In 1996, only 835 (9%) of a total of 9,342 prisoners at the 
national level were sentenced for a crime. All others were still awaiting a trial, 
sometimes for years and some even longer than the duration of the penalty for the 
crime they were charged with. Generally, these are the well known poor people 'who 
stole a chicken to feed their families'. 
The Judicial Branch's resistance to the new Procedural Code was not the only reason 
why the National Congress was slow to accept the new code. The members of 
Congress were also responsible for the delays. Many Congress members did not want 
an efficiently working judicial system: they enjoy immunity (imunidad), which is 
generally considered to be synonymous with impunity (impunidad). The immunity of 
members of Congress means that nobody is able to sue them in court for any kind of 
offence, whether such an offence is related to the performance of their duties or not. 
When a member of Congress murders another person, he cannot be charged with 
murder, which thus generates impunity. A judicial system that works effectively would 
possibly eliminate the immune status of Congress members and end impunity. 
Congress members were thus extremely reluctant to approve a law that would possibly 
begin breaking the circle of political clientism in the judicial system. 
Human Rights 
The writers of the Report on Human Rights Practices for 2000 (US Department of 
State 2001) seem to be well-informed about the judicial system. Every year, this report 
is extensively discussed in the Honduran news media, which generally greet its 
conclusions about the working of the judicial system with approval. The report for 
2000 (US Department of State 2001:7) concluded that the judicial system continues to 
favour rich and politically influential people, thus making the problems of the judicial 
system a prime indicator of the 'state of the art' of Honduran human rights: 
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A number offactors limit the effectiveness of the system: Both the judiciary and the 
Public Ministry suffer from inadequate funding; low wages and lack of internal 
controls make law enforcement officials susceptible to bribery; the civil law 
inquisitorial system is both inefficient and opaque, and powerful special interests still 
exercise influence and often prevail in the courts.. An accused person has the right to 
an initial hearing by a judge, to bail, to an attorney provided by the State, if necessary, 
and to appeal. Although the Constitution recognises the presumption of innocence, the 
Criminal Code in practice often is administered by poorly trained judges operating on 
a presumption that the accused is guilty... Modest progress was made in using a judicial 
career system to enhance qualifications of sitting judges, depoliticise the appointments 
process, and break the subcultures of corruption, clientism, patronage, and influence-
peddling within the judiciary. Nonetheless many courts remain staffed by politically 
selected judges and by unqualified clerks who are inefficient and subject to influence 
from special interests. The reforms have not been implemented fully. 
The creation of a national human rights commissioner, and the increased influence of 
the global debate on human rights, have certainly had a positively effect on the 
Honduran discussion about the lack of legal security and the inadequacies of the 
constitutional state. Yet the human rights debate has another important influence, 
which has so far not been noted in the State Department reports. It concerns changes in 
people's perceptions of justice. Chapter Four explained how human rights serve as a 
stepping-stone for reconsidering inheritance rights. Human rights introduced the 
notion of equality, which fundamentally differed from the rules of preference that had 
always ruled inheritance practices. More generally, human rights have positively 
influenced the rights of women, or at least the idea that women should have rights at 
all: 
In the past, you married a woman and you thought of her as your property. You 
possessed her, used her and dominated her. If she did not obey you, you were allowed to 
punish her and beat her black and blue. You were allowed to lock her up in the house 
if you wanted to. That has changed now. The woman has rights. She can leave the 
house if she likes and she can join organisations. And if you do not allow her to do this 
she can go right to the Public Ministry and press charges against you and you end up in 
jail... Iam maturing now but I have been brutish in the past. I commanded my wife 
"go to the kitchen, make dinner!". I punished her if she did not obey. I now see that 
women and men are equal, that she freely needs to mix with others... Hike to watch the 
young girls myself, I long for them. That doesn't mean that I really want them.. I 
learned that this is the same for women. My wife likes to chat with everybody. There 
was a young man who also came when I wasn't in. He talked and flirted. People told 
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me to chase him off. Me and my wife... we talked. I said that she had to decide if he 
would he a better husband. I told her that I gave her everything, a house, food.. But if 
she thought that he would be better then she had to leave. You see, in the past women 
had only a voice fvozj, now they have a say [votojas well. 
This man was very positive about the changes in the relations between men and 
women induced by the human rights discourse. However, there are also less positive 
interpretations of the human rights influence among villagers. Several villagers argued 
that human rights 'favour the criminals'. In the following quote, human rights appear 
as a 'law': 
/ have always been in favour of human rights and the work of COFADEH and 
CODEH for the [people who] disappeared in the eighties.25 But the law of human 
rights.. I don't know. The police and the army say that this is why so many criminals 
walk around freely and cannot be captured. This law says that nobody can be captured 
without an investigation by the judge, [after which] a judge can give an order to 
capture a person., that everyone has the right to be convicted before he is locked up. If 
minors have been raped which often happens, not here but in other places, then you 
cannot lock up the rapist just like that. The police have to wait for an order of the 
judge to capture that man. The judge had to await the investigation [of the Public 
Ministry] and that information never appears. So the rapist can walk out and he stays 
away from prison. I don't know.. that is what the army and the police say. 
Human rights have become an issue of great importance for people in El Zapote. Many 
of them are constantly confronted with injustice and they may have never before 
perceived themselves to be subjects with legal rights, as citizens equal to other citizens. 
The increasing attention being given to human rights seems to lead to a change in the 
perception of these rural people about themselves. People have become interested in the 
content of the law, the effects of rights on their own life and on the lives of other 
people. In this way, the human rights issue potentially changes the relation between 
people and it might catalyse a break with their idea of living without institutions, in the 
law of the jungle. 
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Notes 
1 All civil and criminal cases of a municipality are assigned to a specific Chamber. In the case of El Zapote, 
this is the Third Chamber. 
2 The Public Ministry existed before 1993 as well, but it was organised in an opaque and disordered way 
(Espinal Irias 1990). 
3 The Human Rights Office was active at the time of research but was disbanded later on. 
4 Until 1997, all JPs in El Zapote happened to be men. In 1998, the state appointed a female JP, a legal 
expert who was born in El Zapote. 
5 The institution of the JP has a local character, but it is not comparable to an 'indigenous' or community 
court (Collier, 1973, Sauveplanne 1975, Hunt and Hunt 1987). He is part of the state judicial system. 
Thus, the JP does not seem to be a starting point for developing alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 
6 The JPs of the district capital were allowed to impose fines up to 1,000 lempiras in 1997. 
7 El Zapote has never had a steady police force. The municipality built new accommodations for the police 
and possible detainees in 1995. However, the police post was staffed only few days a year. If the 
authorities need the services of the police, they had to file a request to Santa Barbara or a neighbouring 
village. 
8 In civil cases, both parties need a lawyer; in criminal cases, the accused person needs a lawyer while the 
person who presses the charges is represented by the public prosecutor. 
9 Several lawyers and court officials conveyed that public defenders demanded payments from their clients. 
10 The National Office of Women is a state organisation, which is mainly involved in the issue of domestic 
violence. 
11 Sebastian emphasised that his wife Mirsa had more rights than Lucio because she had been a legitimate 
child, while Lucio was illegitimate. 
12 Jesus Martinez in La Prensa, October 7, 1997. 
13 Olancho is a district to the north-west of the capital city of Tegucigalpa. The Olanchanos enjoy a dubious 
reputation as brutes who love to fight with guns (pistoleros). 
14 It was difficult for village authorities to persuade the DGIC to come and investigate a crime. According to 
the villagers, the DGIC officials said they had no cars, that they were short of fuel or that there was no 
money to pay their travel costs. In the rare cases that the DGIC did show up, villagers say that the 
officials arrested the wrong people and carried out investigations that were rather imprudent. 
15 The three cases in this section were all in the Third Chamber, but in different periods. Therefore, they 
were all sentenced by different judges. 
16 He had to ask the court's permission because the children, heirs of their mother, were underage at that 
moment. 
17 The suggestion made in this declaration was that Gloria could not claim this land because she had another 
mother. 
18 Although they used the word 'sold' in their declaration, it is possible that they did not pay for the land as 
it concerned their inheritance share (Chapter Four). 
19 Witness declarations are nevertheless commonly accepted as evidence in vindication procedures. 
20 A brazo (arm) is a longitude measurement. A tarea is 1/16 manzana, which is, according to the local 
standard, 523 m 2. 
21 According to the private deed of Bernardo, he bought five manzanas of land from his late grandfather for 
2,000 lempiras. His grandfather had held a concession on this land since 1936. 
22 The Santa Barbara court does not have special judges for criminal and civil matters. It would thus be the 
task of the same judge to investigate the presented property documents in a vindication procedure. 
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23 According to Karst & Rosenn (1975), Latin American legal cultures feature idealism, paternalism, 
legalism, formalism and lack of penetration. This chapter has shown us the importance of formalism and 
lack of penetration with respect to Honduras, although the other characteristics may also be salient. 
24 Laymen judges are common and perform well in customary justice systems elsewhere in Latin America 
(Nader and Metzger 1963, Collier 1973, Parnell 1978, Sack and Aleck 1992). 
25 The Committee for the Families of the Detained and Disappeared (COFADEH) and the Committee for 
the Defense of Human Rights (CODEH)are two central human rights organisations. 
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Chapter seven 
Beyond disorder: land, justice and stacked law 
Property conflicts have an enormous impact on relations between the members of farm 
households and their families. Given the long duration, frequency and intensity of 
these conflicts an investigation of how they arise and how they affect the daily lives of, 
and relationships between, landholders is certainly warranted. Conflicts over land 
visibly manifest themselves in destroyed fences, stolen crops, poisoned dogs, horses that 
are set free, bloody machetazos, hails of stones between children and murder. But there 
are also less visible symptoms of potential conflicts over property. Inside the walls of 
the farm household, hidden from public view, people discuss the consequences of 
migration or education on inheritance rights; they mull over the advantages and 
disadvantages of a land sale; they argue about the division of labour and they silently 
develop strategies to control income or products. These discussions and strategies 
generate and express conflicting views on how property rights should be distributed 
and who is entitled to obtain a particular right to property. 
The central research question of this book has been: What is it about law and norms 
that enables them to generate conflicts about property rights to land? Conflicts about 
property are related to the way in which social actors define and perceive rights to the 
land. This book has handled three research themes: practices of land transfer, stacked 
laws and norms and conflict resolution. A major point of departure has been that land 
rights do not by definition consist of legally recognised full ownership. Instead, we 
have researched who claims to have what right to the land (Chapter One). Therefore, I 
suggested that the notion of stacked laws and norms (Chapter One) could be helpful to 
explore the differential claims and contradictory property definitions with regard to 
land. This book has been an effort to test the usefulness of this notion for a better 
understanding of the constellation of land rights and the emergence of conflicts. 
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Understanding conflict and transfer of land rights in Honduras 
Against the background of the process of national state building after independence, 
land became a primary subject of state regulation in Honduras. Private ownership 
became a condition for the development of the nation, and the state established rules 
and procedures to protect ownership. Land obtained a particular status: it became 
subject to special agrarian laws. These laws have been major subjects of comprehensive 
discussions about land policy. 
The introduction of the agrarian law notion of the 'social function of land' affected 
the absolute character of ownership. This was one of the changes that agrarian law 
brought about in the original Civil Code notions of property, as well as a source of 
confusion about the property status of land. However, and this is a major argument 
developed in this book, Civil Code notions of ownership, possession, usufruct and 
occupation have continued to be very important and should receive more attention in 
the land debate. Civil Code notions of property have been decisive in at least three 
ways: in the particular property concepts used in agrarian law; in the way in which 
land policies of different state agencies have applied these definitions; and in the 
perceptions of rural landholders about their rights. 
Ample confusion exists about the preference of agrarian to civil notions of property 
with regard to land. The LNA, juridical experts, judges and landholders have their own 
ideas about the applicability of the Civil Code property concepts in relation to land. 
While rural landholders tend to think in terms of Civil Code notions, the LNA -
responsible for enforcing agrarian law - accepts the applicability of Civil Code notions 
only to a point, but in general denies their validity. During the implementation of the 
PTT land titling program, the LNA recognised that landholders had possession of 
national land, but at the same time declined the validity of any property claim other 
than registered ownership through a PTT title (Chapter Two). 
The national state, the municipal government and landholders have developed 
contradictory perspectives on land rights in different regions of the municipality of El 
Zapote (Chapter Two). Central to these divergent perspectives is the ejido. Former 
agrarian laws characterised ejidos as grounds that the national state handed over to the 
municipality for free in order to make them accessible for use by local producers. Rural 
producers could apply to the municipal council for concessions on ejido lands. 
Concessions were officially temporary use rights that included requirements regarding 
the use of the land. Furthermore, these use rights could be registered and turned into a 
title of usufruct, while landholders were also allowed to buy their plot of ejido land and 
to convert it into private ownership. 
An entirely different construction of what happened to the ejido can be told from 
the perspective of landholders. The national state continuously changed its perspective 
on exactly which rights had been handed over to the municipality and landholders, and 
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in time, the landholder perspective about the ejido drifted away from the standpoint of 
the state. The notion that concessions provide temporary use rights has slowly become 
remodelled into a concept of ownership. Landholders comply with locally accepted 
means of proving ownership: fencing; working; participation in communal activities as, 
for example, the maintenance of trails connecting the fields; and the neat conservation 
of the piles of private and public deeds that testify about the history of consecutive 
transfers. They have forgotten the precise meaning of the concession and perceive their 
rights as ownership and themselves as owners of the land. 
The different perceptions of property by ejido landholders and the state emerge 
from processes which I describe as 'stacking' of laws and norms. I have distinguished 
two separate processes of norms stacking about land rights, in the law and in the minds 
of landholders. In state law, agrarian notions of land rights are stacked on former 
agrarian notions that are for their part stacked on Civil Code property notions. In the 
minds of landholders, temporary use rights have been converted into permanent use 
rights, which have been reconverted into a notion of ownership. At the same time, the 
temporary use right concept has not vanished completely and is still applied at certain 
times for certain parcels. 
The process of stacking in state law shows that Civil Code notions of property have 
not become totally replaced by agrarian law concepts. Agrarian laws are full of 
property concepts derived from the Civil Code that have not received a new or distinct 
meaning in these laws. Furthermore, there is an ongoing discussion about the 
appHcability of agrarian law stipulations to land and landholders who obtained then-
land through transfer practices other than the agrarian law regulations for the transfer 
of national land to private owners. The property concepts in the minds of landholders 
are largely consistent with Civil Code notions of property. The claims they make on 
the land are thus not derived from a 'customary' normative framework (e.g. Stanfield et 
al. 1990). Landholders base their claims on norms that have not developed as opposed 
to, and separated from, state law, but these norms can be traced back to legal notions 
and local reinterpretations of law. 
The state-landholder clash of perspectives on property is only one side of explaining 
conflicts; the other side is to be found in the struggles for property that take place 
within farm households and between family members. To understand why family 
members bash each others brains out for a square meter of land means that we cannot 
stick to the prevailing romantic image of the campesino-with-straw-hat working in his 
maize field (Chapter Three). The harmonious peasant family representation with the 
unity of property, labour and income seems incongruent with the daily ins and outs of 
farm households. The descriptions of daily village life and farm households in El 
Zapote show that a farm household is not a collective whose organisation is determined 
by kinship bonds or by machismo culture. Members of farm households do not share 
231 
their labour unconditionally. Land, animals or other assets are not collective property 
but are held by individuals who have decision-making power over their use. 
Although fights over property take place day after day, they can become very 
intense in specific contexts. One of these settings is inheritance. In contrast to the idea 
that inheritance is a transfer of property between the dead and the living, I have 
analysed it as a process of struggle and negotiation between living people, and part of 
daily strategies about daily things (Chapter Four). In practices of inheritance, local 
norms chiefly determine who is entitled to inherit, and these local norms are also 
subject to the process of 'stacking'. The traditional rule of preference for the youngest 
son, for example, is less appreciated nowadays, and the norm of 'equal rights for all' is 
gaining importance. On top of the equal rights norm, other norms are stacked that 
express divergent ways of interpreting 'equality': For example, women should not 
receive land but houses; migrant offspring who do not financially support their parents 
should not have rights; and nor should children whose education was financed by their 
parents. These new norms are new interpretations of preference and exclusion. 
Changes in inheritance norms are a slow and unbalanced reaction to changed 
circumstances, including population growth, increased land scarcity, migration, 
changing perceptions of people about equality and changing expectations about the 
future. Actors deliberately create new norms to achieve different goals through the 
inheritance norms stacking process. The new stacked complex of local inheritance 
norms has unintentionally led to more compatibility with state law: state law departs 
from equal inheritance rights for all offspring, and thus is the pretension of the new 
equality norm in inheritance practices. Although people do not deliberately seek 
compatibility with state law, the fact that they see their own norms as 'legal' 
contributes to the legitimacy of new inheritance norms, in contrast to the earlier 
inheritance 'customs'. 
'Equality' is a rather new issue for people and has become important to inheritance 
as well as on a more general level. A recent influence to put equality first has been the 
human rights discussion. It has had a considerable impact on gender relations in the 
village. Women have difficulties claiming their rights of inheritance and access to land 
(Chapter Five). Men work on the land, women don't. In inheritance practices, this 
means that women, unlike men, cannot make a claim to land by working on it. The 
equality norm has changed women's views of inheritance because they now have a new 
basis on which they can found their claims to land. 
The state and international donor agencies have found that women's access to land is 
a major impediment to development. I have depicted their views as instrumentalist, as 
they define women as a potentially productive force and as major caretakers. Then-
knowledge of women's land use strategies is blurred by the following ideas: first, only 
tillers should have rights to the land and, second, women work on the land to produce 
food for their families, hence, they should have land rights. 
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The instrumentalist view creates, in fact, a distinction between women's and men's 
rights to the land, probably without intending to do so. Women are not given the same 
rights as men. They only are entitled to land because of their functionaUty as food 
producers and family providers. I have argued against this view by proposing that 
women's interest in land must be understood through an understanding of their land 
use strategies. Not working the land themselves, but instead renting it out, selling, 
mortgaging or lending it, are not ways of a misusing the land but instead rational and 
reasonable forms of land use. An important feature of women's land use strategies is 
that they do not contest the gender division of labour. 
Conflict avoidance characterises property relations in El Zapote. However, when a 
conflict does persist it may escalate and end up in the judicial system (Chapter Six). 
Poor people do not have free access to the judicial system because they cannot afford a 
lawyer. Furthermore, judges and lawyers dealing with land conflicts experience great 
difficulties in finding their way through a jungle of stacked legal concepts and 
regulations about property (Chapter Two). The poor working of the judicial system 
contributes to the lack of legal security as well. The correct completion of procedures 
receives much more attention than the improvement of the quality of the evidence. 
Judges are vulnerable to outside influences and downright bribery because of their 
solitary position that makes it difficult to control their work. People perceive the poor 
working of the judicial system as a type of class justice: the poor always lose against the 
rich and influential. It is a class justice image with a paradoxical side. On the one hand, 
people are convinced that judges are corrupt and that the poor will always lose. On the 
other hand, they continue to believe the state is the ultimate authority fulfilling the 
role of neutral conflict solver. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I first discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the 
metaphor of the stacked laws and norms to explain the differential perceptions and 
definitions of property rights to land. Thereafter, I look at what can be learned from 
this analysis for the Honduran debate about the land question. I again take up the poor 
working of the judicial system to discuss the implications of this study for the validity 
of the so-called 'rotten apple theory'. Finally, I comment on some consequences of my 
analysis for development interventions on the basis of the argument developed in this 
book. 
Stacked laws and norms 
Law experts and policymakers in Honduras tend to start from a 'law is reality' point of 
view, i.e. the goals of the law are achieved in practice by implementing the law. Starting 
from this perspective means that they find it difficult to deal with the unintended 
outcomes of the law, which they usually attribute to the law not being enforced, people 
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having the wrong mentality or old-fashioned, customary practices. In the eyes of law 
experts and policymakers, property rights to land are an apparent 'disorder', a 
'disorder' that plays an important role in the emergence of conflicts that has to be 
solved by implementing new laws. 
I started this investigation with a rather broadly defined notion of stacked laws and 
norms, which I used to visualise the processes that create the apparent 'disorder' of land 
rights. The notion of stacked laws and norms ended up being helpful in analysing the 
situation of land rights in El Zapote, and we are now able to refine the meaning of the 
term. This book has described three processes of law and norms stacking in property 
rights arrangements: in state law, in practices of land rights transfer from the state to 
landholders, and in inheritance practices. 
State law stipulations regarding land rights are not consistent or coherent, and its 
meaning confuses landholders, but also lawyers, judges, and policymakers. Agrarian 
laws have continuously been changed, replaced, amended and re-amended, which 
creates ambiguity in their message and makes it unlikely that the meaning and practical 
implications of these changes have been clearly passed on to the involved people and 
agencies. Agrarian laws have, in time, encompassed differing views on which property 
rights were passed from the state to the municipalities and the holders of ejido land. 
The result has been lack of clarity, which has left room for the emergence of divergent 
views on the meaning of the concession and the property rights involved in it, and for 
the continuous importance of Civil Code-like definitions of property in the minds of 
ejido landholders. 
Additionally, this book has developed the argument that the relationship between 
Civil Code and agrarian law notions of property is ambiguous. Agrarian law 
stipulations incorporate Civil Code constructions as possession, occupation or adverse 
acquisition. Moreover, there is no unanimous stand among law experts and 
policymakers about the validity of Civil Code property notions versus agrarian law 
stipulations. 
The process of stacking in state law has become more clear by looking at practices of 
land rights transfer practices between the state and landholders in El Zapote. The actual 
laws and legal articles are only one side of state regulation; the other side is that state 
agencies and officials interpret the law and create implementation rules during state 
interventions. Hence, metaphorically speaking, on top of the stacked legal regulations, 
they stack their own interpretations of the rules, which are adapted to the specific 
situation. Landholders, on the other side of the spectrum, interpret and adapt the parts 
of the law that they know or come in touch with, and they add their own norms to it 
as well. 
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Stacking of property notions seen from the perspective of 
landholders 
Stacking of properly notions seen from the state's point of 
view 
Interpretations of equality: new norms of preference and 
exclusion 
'Law of human rights" notion of equality 
Interpretations of the rules concerning land titling by state 
officials 
Local gender norms: women not entitled to inheritance Agrarian law land titling procedures 
Local inheritance arrangements Oazuro rule) Agrarian law notion of the social function of land 
Interpretations of landholders about ownership and their 
property rights to ejido land Agrarian law notion of land to the tiller 
Civil Code notion of indivisibility of ownership and 
improvements Local ejido regulations 
Local ejido regulations Rural police law 
Local norms about fencing and working as expression of 
claim to ownership Different agrarian law regulations for ejido 
Civil Code notion of adverse acquisition 
Civil Code notion of possession Civil Code: Ownership is registered in Public Register of Property 
Figure 7.1 Stacked norms and laws with regard to rights in the land of El Zapote 
The different norms in the complex of stacked norms and laws in Figure 7.1 do not 
completely merge and they do not become clearly demarcated hybrids. The renewed 
complexes of norms consist of the different elements that have been added in time and 
that can be distinguished and used by the involved landholders, national state agents 
and the municipality, or that may also be forgotten and disappear in the end. Figure 7.1 
thus does not represent a static situation; the process of stacking is continuous and will 
change the constellation of the complex. 
With regard to inheritance, we have seen that people are actively involved in 
making, changing and adding new norms through their dialogues and endeavours, 
while striving for certain goals at certain moments. The result is a complex of stacked 
norms, different elements of which the actors in inheritance practices (landholding 
parents and their offspring) use in their strategies to obtain what they want. They are 
aware of the existence of different norms and they seek to legitimise the norm that best 
suits their own aims. The whole process of stacking inheritance norms contrasts with 
stacking in reference to land rights, in which people do not deliberately try to develop 
new norms. 
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The advantage of the notion of stacked laws and norms for describing norms about 
property and the land rights derived from it, is primarily that the concept of stacking 
describes the historical changes of these norms better. By deconstructing the empirical 
process of the stacking of norms as regard property rights to land, it has become clear 
that land rights arrangements are not 'customary', referring to a separate legal system 
that has developed in opposition to, and disconnected from, state law. It has taught us 
that landholders' notions of property coincide with civil code concepts of ownership 
and possession and that the rights that others consider as local or customary are 
derivatives of old Civil Code property concepts. 
'Stacking' in this book is not just a notion to explore an empirical situation of 
disorder. Its main value as an analytical concept is that it clarifies how 'plurality' of 
norms come into being, as well as the structure of this plurality and the elements it 
consists of. In the complex of laws and norms, divergent legal concepts and 
interpretations and re-interpretations of these concepts are assembled and serve as a 
basis for rights and claims to land, whereby in time, new elements and interpretations 
are continuously added to the complex while other elements disappear from it. 
Sometimes one element is more important, and sometimes another. Furthermore, the 
notion of 'stacking' makes clear that the constellation of norms surrounding land rights 
is constantly changing; it is a never-ending process. This process does not create a 
disordered pluralism, an untidy and random heap of norms without any sense or logic, 
but it leads to a certain stacked structure in which the separate elements have not 
merged into a kind of fluid constellation. Its stacked character implies that social actors 
may be able to recognise the different elements and to use them for their own purposes. 
They distinguish between different elements and exchange them, reinterpret them or 
discard them. 
By unravelling the stacked elements of the complex, the separate norms and their 
sources, interpreted meaning, influence and relative importance vis-a-vis the entire 
complex of laws and norms can be taken more seriously. State law elements differ from 
other norms because of the state's monopoly on authority. People consider the state as 
the entity to implement rules, exercise authority and administer justice and as such, a 
special status is attributed to state law. State law may have far-reaching effects without 
being adequately implemented. For example: gender equality is a main goal of recent 
legal changes, but despite the fact that serious enforcement of the new legal stipulations 
is lacking, the notion of gender equality is filtering through and profoundly influencing 
gender relations in El Zapote. 
Norms that are not related to state law may stem from different sources and differ in 
their effects and how they obtain legitimacy, which refers to the basis on which people 
consider a norm to be justified. For example, this book has shown that the lazuro 
inheritance rule is not comparable to gender norms used by men to contest women's 
claims to land. People seek legitimacy of the lazuro rule (the youngest son preference in 
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inheritance) by describing it as a custom: something that has always been there. The 
legitimacy of particular gender norms, on the other hand, is based in the gender 
division of labour. Men translate women's ways of using land - mostly aimed at not 
contesting the gender division of labour by not working on the land themselves - into 
misuse in order to safeguard their own claims. 
Landholders' perception of law involves them considering those norms that they 
themselves consider morally justified to be law; and law is what the state has laid down 
in codes and legal prescriptions. By attributing legality to norms, thus starting from the 
idea that the norm is state law, they institute and confirm the legitimacy of the norm. 
Deeds of purchase, for example, are important to landholders not only because they 
prove that a payment has been made, but also because they are supposed to be legal 
documents of unquestionable value in a court of justice. These private documents are 
drawn up using official language and are signed by the parties in the presence of 
witnesses. 
The analysis of the norms and laws stacking process has focused our attention on 
shifts in the relative importance of laws, norms and new laws. Without intending to 
adapt inheritance practices to state law prescriptions of inheritance -which most people 
in El Zapote lack knowledge of -, the choice for equality as the leading norm in 
inheritance actually creates greater similarity between civil law and inheritance norms. 
Gender norms and the local rule of youngest son inheritance preference have been 
slowly pushed aside and new norms have gathered strength and legitimacy by referring 
to law, such as the 'law of human rights.' The reference to human rights has had the 
effect that people seek to legitimise changing inheritance practices through the state, 
while they found it sufficient to refer to 'custom' in the past. The reference to legality 
also enables people using the new inheritance rules to challenge entrenched customs 
such as the youngest son preference and the denial of women's inheritance rights. 
State interventions in El Zapote have affected landholders' ability to maintain the 
idea that local property concepts are 'law'. Landholders have learnt from the clashes 
between their own norms and those of the state that the force of their own stacked 
constellation of property norms is limited. Although legitimate in their eyes, their own 
norms lacked validity vis-a-vis the state. The difference in how the state and landholders 
define property rights has distorted their relationship. The state itself, as the institution 
that defines and protects private property through its laws and legal system, has become 
an actor in land conflicts. Civil Code property notions are losing strength; the 
legitimacy of local property concepts has been seriously undermined and landholders 
have thus become even more insecure about their property rights. 
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Lessons for the land question 
Debates about the land question in Honduras have concentrated on the unequal 
distribution of land between large landowners and the mass of landless and the scarcity 
of land as a result of excessive population growth. This book's intention has been to 
take this debate a step forward by shifting our attention to the organisation of property 
to develop a better understanding of the constellation of existing property rights 
instead of taking quantifiable redistribution as point of departure. 
The daily conflicts between landowners that appear in this book, where in some 
cases the subject of conflict may be as tiny as a square meter, may look like marginal 
problems, but landholders make decisions as a result of these and other factors that 
profoundly influence their production systems and daily lives. The number of people 
that are involved in and influenced by such land conflicts is far greater than those who 
have been engaged in agrarian reform. However, agrarian reform rather than the 
problems of this majority have received all the attention in the Honduran agrarian 
development debate so far. Now that the land reform heyday seems to have passed, the 
land debate in Honduras should focus on understanding the property conflicts that 
small and independent landholders deal with and provide solutions to the increasing 
insecurity of property rights. 
The state's propagation of land ownership registration in the Public Register of 
Property has meant that landholders perceive state intervention in property rights as 
menacing and aggressive. From the state's perspective, hardly any landholder in El 
Zapote owns the land, a view that is in strong contrast to the way landholders perceive 
their rights. They have bought or inherited the land, or they have an original 
concession in ejido land and, as a consequence, they claim to own the land. In my view, 
the recognition of registered private property should not relieve the state of the 
obligation to deal with the question of what rights landholders have to their land. This 
book has studied the histories of people's claims to land and I have contended that these 
claims are legitimate and reasonable and that they are based in state law concepts of 
property. A consequence for state intervention in these property rights should be that 
the state should not be allowed to reclaim land by arguing that landholders do not have 
registered ownership. In fact, intervention practices have shown that the state's point of 
view of ownership is difficult to sustain. During the PTT land titling program (a state 
project to sell national land to resource poor producers), for example, the LNA 
recognised that landholders had possession, and it sold the land to the holders rather 
than to the highest bidder. 
The state, by departing from the registration system, unjustly places too much 
weight on the registration. The quality of the registration system is so poor that it 
cannot serve as starting point to determine who the owner of the land is, and isolated 
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efforts to improve the registration system will not make sense without tackling such 
related problems as, for example, the deficient judicial system. 
The recognition of different property rights instead of focusing exclusively on 
registered ownership might provide the state with a differentiated image of the peasant-
landholder as well, by asking such question to determine who the holder of the land is, 
who the land user is and who exerts control over the land and its products. The state, 
policymakers and scientists who participate in debates about the land question often 
have a certain presumption about the landholder that runs as follows: the landholder is 
the owner, the user, the decision maker and the controller of the product all at the 
same time. This book has presented ample evidence that it is not so easy to establish 
who a landholder is. The person who possesses the land may not be the one who owns 
the land; the person who works in the field may not be the holder of the land; the 
person who has 'papers' may not be the same person as the one who has a land title or 
a registered title deed; and the person who is the holder might not possess any deed of 
the land. All of these are people who all have figured in this book. 
An important lesson to be drawn from this book is that the state should take into 
account that landed property rights interventions rarely occur in unclaimed areas 
where there are no vested property rights. Wherever people live, there will be divisions 
and divergent claims to property, and the very fact that these claims exist implies that 
the state will not be able to start all over again with the distribution of property rights. 
Newly proposed policies such as 'joint titling' to improve women's position in 
property relations are difficult to apply in areas where people have been living for 
centuries and have their rights to the land and definitions of property firmly 
established. 
Solving property conflicts means that we have to understand local land rights 
transfer practices. Landholders may not transfer ownership to the land at all at once, 
but different 'sticks' in the bundle of property rights are transferable at different times. 
For example, this happens in inheritance practices where adult sons continue to work 
on their father's land while the father remains owner and determines what the right 
moment to transfer ownership to his sons will be. Inheritance is thus not just a cultural 
practice that can easily be changed through new laws. This book has demonstrated that 
the state has goals with regard to inheritance that differ remarkably from the divergent 
perspectives of landholders. Nobody wants to comply with the legal inheritance 
prescriptions, but people use inheritance in strategies to achieve their own particular 
aims. 
Female landholders tend to deploy each element of the split bundle of property 
rights at different moments. They gain from the land without working on it themselves 
by renting it out, giving temporary use rights to husbands or sons, working it 
themselves and making it produce, using it as a collateral for a loan or transfer 
ownership through a sale. For the women in the research area, only full control over 
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the land through ownership allows them to effectively split the bundle of property up 
and make use of the their land. 
A related factor that also influences landholders' dealings with their land rights is 
that transfer practices not only mean that rights transfer to another holder, but that 
they also reproduce images about the capabilities and rights of people to obtain, hold 
and use land. These are practices through which ideology is produced and changed. It is 
therefore important that they are understood whenever the objective of new policy is 
to improve the rights of excluded groups. The rule conferring inheritance preference on 
the youngest son, for instance, is disappearing in favour of the new 'equal rights' 
discourse based on the 'law of human rights'. In fact, new norms of preference and 
exclusion are coming into existence: norms that define who is right and proper to hold 
land. Insight into the role that images of people and property rights holders play in 
land rights transfer mechanisms is vital to understand inequitable distribution and 
conflict. 
The failure of the judicial system 
Legal insecurity as experienced by poor people is a central problem that is perhaps even 
more consequential than the low agricultural productivity and low incomes they are 
subject to. Lack of legal security touches the core of their existence as members of a 
community they depend on for their survival. 
This book has dealt with two aspects of legal insecurity: access to the judicial system 
and the working of the judicial system. Landholders notice that the judicial system is 
not for the poor but instead favours the rich. When they witness the rich cattle holder 
with political ties murdering a day labourer and returning from prison unhindered after 
a few days, they compare this with the poor old man they know who stole a chicken 
and is still imprisoned after five years without being sentenced. Few poor landholders 
can afford a lawyer to represent their affairs, and they find it difficult to pay bail when 
the judge has made this possible. Many of them are not able to read and write, let alone 
to understand and control the actions of a lawyer. Access to the judicial system is thus 
extremely problematic for poor landholders, and entering the system is only possible 
through selling other properties or lending money at social high costs for themselves 
and their families. 
Where does the judicial system itself fall short? This book has revealed many 
problems related to the internal working of the courts. The autonomous role of the 
judge makes it difficult to control his work; the paper procedures do not allow for a 
thorough investigation; evidence is untrustworthy; and the legal regulations 
surrounding property rights are complicated. These characteristics of the courts' 
internal workings and judges' dealings with land disputes allow ample opportunities for 
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all kinds of corrupt practices. Political clientism is another characteristic of the judicial 
system that may contribute to the persistence of corrupt practices in the courts. 
Political clientism begins at the Supreme Court and filters through the entire judicial 
system down to the level of the local justice of the peace. Moreover, the judicial system 
suffers from such organisational problems as lack of experience and the low quality of 
training judges and court personnel receive, deficient salaries and lack of control 
mechanisms. Finally, an additional factor contributing to the failure of the judicial 
system is that not every official is trustworthy and law-abiding and able to deal with a 
position of power. 
The effects of the judicial system's failure can be seen directly in people's daily lives. 
Conflicts over property have an intense effect on small rural communities where 
people have known each other their whole lives and feel themselves compelled to side 
with one of the parties. For a landholder, involvement in a conflict means that he or 
she can no longer walk at ease through the village because he or she runs the risk of 
facing all kinds of violence. 
The examples presented in this book have shown that conflicts may persist for 
decades and may even involve succeeding generations. The lack of institutions that are 
able to effectively deal with conflict leads to people individually developing conflict 
avoidance strategies. When involved in a conflict, they are confronted with the 
politicised character of their own community and the dual roles of village and regional 
judicial authorities, who are expected to maintain law and order but who are politicised 
and not able to judge independently. It is at this juncture where a class justice 
perception develops and settles in the minds of rural people. The judicial system is 
accessible exclusively to the rich and the administration of justice works in such as way 
that it provides advantages to the rich, thus enforcing the class justice image. 
Paradoxically, however, the state at the same time is the people's only frame of 
reference as the institution that they expect to be responsible for wielding authority, 
issuing rules and administering justice. 
Criticism of the judicial system's operation mainly refers to the 'rotten apple' 
theory, wherein the rotten apple among good apples bears the potential danger of 
infecting the others. Now and then, an official of the judicial system is suspended or 
faces criminal charges because of corrupt practices: he or she is the 'rotten apple' which 
has to be removed from the system so that the system can keep working. My analysis 
of the judicial system in Chapter Six shows that the problem of the judicial system is 
not a simple question of removing a rotten apple. An apple does not begin rotten; there 
are specific conditions and circumstances that make it rot. Class justice is more than just 
how people perceive the justice system to be: it is also rooted in the system itself. 
A major problem with the prevailing analysis of the working of the judicial system is 
that a cause of failure is seen as a problem of individual morals: a judge or court official 
lacks the appropriate morals and therefore, the judicial system falls short. Morals, in 
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this view, are the driving force instead of the consequence of the way the system works. 
At the same time, personal morals are something that are among the most difficult 
things to change. The emphasis on morals as the heart of the problem makes it difficult 
for landholders to understand why the removal of one corrupt official does not change 
the systemic characteristics of the judicial system that are responsible for the emergence 
of the class justice image. They consequently think that all judges are 'rotten apples' 
without further questioning the deficiencies of the system. 
Some consequences for development issues 
The theoretical and political consequences of my findings strongly relate to 
contemporary development issues. This book has discussed the many difficulties of 
land titling, which is still a main goal of agricultural development policies. The state 
expects that land titles will help create a land market through which land can be 
transferred into the hands of the most efficient producers. These producers would get 
access to productive credit, extension services and new technologies, whereby owned 
land could be used as collateral. They will then modernise their production systems, 
make long-term investments and enhance their productivity. Land titling advocates 
think that titling will thus put an end to poverty. 
I have discussed the following problems in this book that emerged when a land 
titling program was implemented in El Zapote in the 1980s: 
• Land titling is a state intervention in unknown vested property rights 
• The state lacks insights into the dynamics of the local land market 
• The state acts in a double role as owner of national land and as protector of citizen's 
private property rights 
• The expected benefits of land titling are merely assumptions, which are not 
supported by the outcomes of titling programmes 
The analysis presented in this book calls for a thorough revision of land titling policies. 
Landholders are not negative about titling in itself and they are not all completely set 
against registration. I have argued that a titling program that focuses on protection and 
security goals rather than the sale of state-owned national land to private owners would 
have more legitimacy in the eyes of landholders. Moreover, this book has emphasised 
the enormous consequences of the lack of legal security and access to justice, problems 
that every land titling project will encounter and have to deal with. Even in a case of a 
tiny plot with no serious economical value, a conflict about who holds and controls the 
rights to this plot may be utterly devastating to people's wellbeing. Access to an 
independent judicial system which is able to independently evaluate contradictory 
claims to land would be of great help in avoiding the emergence and persistence of 
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conflicts. It may thus be necessary to harmonise Civil Code and agrarian law notions of 
property, to think about the legal validity of agrarian law property concepts relating to 
land that has not been distributed through agrarian reform, and to evaluate and 
understand the vested and stacked property notions in the minds of landholders. 
A second consequence of this book in the context of development relates to 
women's rights to land. Women's land rights is a prominent subject in development 
discussions that focus on abolishing gender inequality. The argument elaborated in this 
book is that land rights for women are unjustly seen as a specific development issue 
instead of an inherent part of their citizenship. Whilst men are considered to have a 
natural and inherent right to land as Honduran citizens, women's rights are 
particularly wrapped up in an instrumental development discourse. Men seem to be 
able to automatically claim inheritance rights, while women cannot. There is for the 
time being a lack of insight into why women gain or lose out with respect to land 
rights (Deere 2001, Deere and Leon 2001). Yet this is the key to understanding 
women's multiple strategies and interests in land, the multiple meanings they attach to 
the land, how they want to use land, or why and how they wish to transfer their rights. 
Additionally, enhancing legal security means that it is very important to facilitate 
the poor's access to the judicial system, to improve the quality and independent 
character of the court of justice, and to change the class justice perceptions of 
landholders. This book has only treated a limited aspect of the consequences of the 
absence of legal security. Lack of legal security in Honduras not only affects rural 
landholders but all sectors in society. We have seen that the judicial system suffers from 
problems that are not solved by removing rotten apples. Legal security is high on the 
political and development agenda (World Bank 2001b), but projects to improve it and 
stimulate legal and judicial reforms feature merely technical questions of more training, 
computers or renewed procedures.1 The outcome of this book suggests that one would 
be better off starting at the very heart of the problem: the politicised Supreme Court 
and, subsequently, all other judges and court personnel. Yet this requires a change of 
the political system, a solution that is still far from becoming reality and which will 
result in little credit for the development agencies. 
The relationship between the state and its citizens is problematic and contradictory. 
People continuously mix cynicism over failing authorities with hope regarding the 
desired future role of the state with regard to land rights. Ana Salgado, the woman who 
appeared in the introduction of this book, lost her land to her son who received the 
unintended help of the state in putting forward his false claim, thereby creating a 
conflict situation in which many villagers became involved. A situation such as this is 
not easily solved by villagers themselves, and it is not unusual that they would hope 
and expect an independent authority to show up to help them solve it in a peaceful 
way, so that the almost unavoidable conclusion of crossing machetes can be avoided for 
once and justice might be at hand. 
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Any future activity of the state will certainly be confronted with scepticism. It will 
take enormous effort to transcend the general distrust in the working of the state, and 
particularly of the judicial system. It is a distrust that finds its roots in the state's own 
inabUity to change it. Meanwhile, landholders will be imprisoned in the paradox they 
reproduce themselves: they complain about the working of the state and expect the 
same state to solve their problems. 
Notes 
1 The aim of putting legal insecurity on the development agenda is not always inspired by the desire of 
improving the lives of the poor. The government of the USA has been pressing to implement new 
property laws and improvements of the judicial system, to the benefit of the American investors in 
Honduras. 
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Glossary 
Actas municipales: 
Alcalde auxiliar: 
Concession: 
Deed of purchase: 
Ejido: 
Escritura publica: 
LNA: 
Juez de paz: 
Land title: 
Lazuro: 
Lempira: 
Manzana: 
Petate: 
PTT: 
Sindico: 
Tarea: 
Tule: 
Records of the minutes of the municipal council, including official 
agreements and land measurements carried out by the sindico. 
Assistant mayor, having the tasks to solve small conflicts and assist 
the JP in doing inspections at crime sites. Each hamlet has its own 
assistant mayor. 
Usufruct rights to the land given by the municipal council to 
producers. 
Private deed, the common way to transfer land rights. 
National land designated to the municipality by the national state. 
The municipal council could grant usufruct rights in ejido lands to 
its inhabitants on an individual base. 
Public deed, document of the Public Register of Property, legal 
proof of ownership. 
Instituto Nacional Agrario, state institute to enforce agrarian laws. 
Justice of the Peace (JP); local judge who is part of the state judicial 
system. 
Document of ownership, issued to landholders during the PTT 
titling program. 
Youngest son, the preferred heir according to local inheritance 
rules. 
Honduran currency, 1 US$= 13 lempiras (1997). 
Area measure, officially 0.697 hectare; in El Zapote the manzana 
measures 0.8361 hectare (Jansen 1998). 
Sleeping mat made from tule, women's most important source of 
income. 
Proyecto Titulacion de Tierras, land titling project of the state. 
Member of the municipal council who is responsible for land 
measurements, settling boundaries and solving boundary conflicts. 
1/16 of a manzana, 523m2. 
Cyperus canus, perennial crop of which the stems are used for 
weaving petates. 
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Summary in Dutch / Samenvatting 
Gestapeid recht. Land, eisendomsrechten en 
conflict in Honduras 
Conflicten over zelfs het kleinste stukje land kunnen potentieel gewelddadig zijn en 
reorganiseren relaties tussen mensen en tussen burgers en de S taa t . In de bergen van de 
provincie Santa Barbara in Honduras leven de mensen van de landbouw; land is een van 
hun belangrijkste en meest waardevolle bezittingen. Dit boek analyseert de oorzaak van 
conflicten over het eigendom van land, en kijkt daarbij met name naar de achtergrond 
en betekenis van normen, wetten en stukjes van wetten waarop mensen en de overheid 
hun claims op het land baseren. De onderzoeksopzet combineert gedetailleerde 
gevalstudies van landconflicten, eigendomstransfers en praktijken random overerving 
in een ruraal dorp met uitgebreide analyses van rechtbankdossiers en interviews met 
sociale actoren in het rechtssysteem. Ik beschrijf in dit boek uitvoerig de organisatie van 
eigendomsrelaties in boerenhuishoudens, de verdeling van de verschillende 
eigendomsrechten tussen mannen en vrouwen, sociale praktijken rondom de verdeling 
van landrechten zoals overerving, de verschillende betekenissen van land voor 
verschillende groepen mensen en de rol die het landgebruik speelt bij het kunnen 
volhouden van een claim. Een ander belangrijk onderwerp in dit boek is het verschil 
van mening tussen burgers en de overheid ten aanzien van de eigendomsrechten op het 
land. De vraag is of de claims van de overheid op het land in alle gevallen legitiem zijn. 
Ook ga ik in op de bestaande mogelijkheden van conflictbeslechting en kijk met name 
naar hoe de rechterlijke macht met conflicterende eigendomsclaims omgaat. 
De wijze waarop mensen in Honduras hun eigendomsclaims verwoorden en de 
normen en regels waarop ze zieh baseren wordt in de literatuur over land vaak 
'informed' of gewoonterecht genoemd. Het gewoonterecht zou bestaan uit een wirwar 
van regels die landrechten vastleggen en die de basis vormen voor eigendomsclaims. 
Deze gewoonterechtregels zouden echter losstaan van de wijze waarop landeigendom 
wordt gereguleerd door het statelijk recht. De gewoonterechtanalisten concluderen 
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daarom dat conflicten en onzekerheid over eigendom ontstaan omdat mensen geen 
wettelijke rechten op het land hebben. Een daaraan gekoppelde beleidsconclusie is dan 
ook dat de overheid nieuwe eigendomscertificaten aan eigenaren zou moeten 
verstrekken. De essentie van het eigendomscertificaat is dat de overheid het nationale 
land (eigendom van de Staat) door middel van een verkoop overdraagt aan een private 
persoon. Een evaluatie van een project via welke de overheid eigendomscertificaten 
verstrekte aan boeren in Santa Barbara laat echter zien dat de certificaten de 
onzekerheid met betrekking tot eigendomsrechten niet hebben bevorderd en dat 
conflicten eerder versterkt dan opgelost zijn. 
Door middel van het concept 'gestapeld recht' ontwikkel ik in dit boek een 
alternatieve analyse die beter dan de term gewoonterecht in Staat is om de 
uiteenlopende definities en de organisatie van landrechten te begrijpen. Het concept 
'gestapeld recht' vraagt aandacht voor normatieve pluraliteit in de regulering van 
sociaal gedrag. Bovendien stelt het de dominante vooronderstelling ter discussie dat er 
een directe relatie zou bestaan tussen de voorschriften uit het statelijk recht en de 
sociale werkelijkheid. 
Het concept 'gestapeld recht' gebruik ik om meer helderheid te verschaffen in de 
compilatie van de bestaande rechten en in het ontstaansproces van eigendomsclaims op 
het land. Stapeling vindt allereerst plaats in de formulering van het statehjk recht. In de 
loop der tijd worden nieuwe wetten en wetsartikelen geformuleerd zonder dat het 
precies duidelijk is hoe deze zieh verhouden tot eerdere wetten. Dit boek beschrijft 
bijvoorbeeld de verwarring over de wettelijke bepalingen ten aanzien van 
eigendomsrechten op het land, waarbij claims gebaseerd op het civiele eigendomsrecht 
ofwel het agrarisch recht contradictoir zijn. Het proces van stapeling in het 
overheidsrecht is nooit 'af', het zal continue doorgaan en altijd weer leiden tot 
meervoudige interpretaties. 
Stapeling vindt niet alleen plaats in de formulering van wetten en regels door de 
overheid. Er vindt opnieuw stapeling plaats als het overheidsrecht een rol gaat speien in 
sociale praktijken, waarbij sociale actoren bepaalde voorschriften interpreteren en 
herformuleren en hun eigen normen hier weer bovenop 'stapelen'. Dit proces is goed te 
zien als we kijken naar de ontstaansgeschiedenis van de lokale definities van 
landrechten. 
Landeigenaren vinden dat zij hun land in eigendom hebben. Deze definitie van hun 
landrechten is niet altijd dominant geweest. Oorspronkelijk had een deel van het land 
in de gemeente de Status van een ejido. De ejido was land dat de nationale overheid had 
toegewezen aan de gemeente, die daarover, onder bepaalde voorwaarden, tijdelijk 
vruchtgebruik gaf aan agrarische producenten. Het land kon niet zomaar worden 
verkocht, herverdeeld of overgeerfd. In de loop der jaren verloor de gemeente haar grip 
op het ejido land. De mensen begonnen hun pereeel als hun eigendom te beschouwen 
en zij verkochten en vererfden het land zonder inmenging van de gemeente. Zij 
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voegden eigenhändig steeds meer rechten toe aan het vruchtgebruik, totdat men 
voldeed aan de lokale standaarden voor volledig eigendom: zij omheinden htm percelen 
en bewerkten ze. Een eventuele verkoop werd vastgelegd in private 
transactiedocumenten. De regels en normen die ze ten aanzien van eigendom 
ontwikkelden, hadden de betrokkenen niet ter plekke zelf verzonnen. Het blijkt dat de 
gestapelde elementen in de gehanteerde eigendomsdefinities in feite afkomstig zijn uit 
het civiele recht. Op grond daarvan concludeer ik dat 'gewoonterecht' geen accurate 
term is omdat de lokale definities van landrechten en eigendom een duidelijk wettelijk 
basis hebben. 
Dit boek beschrijft nog een derde proces van stapeling in het recht. Overerving is 
een van de belangrijkste oorzaken van conflicten. In de context van groeiende 
landschaarste en een groeiende bevolking vormt de erfenis een steeds belangrijker 
mechanisme van toegang tot land. Erfenissen worden verdeeld volgens regels die geen 
enkele verbintenis lijken te hebben met het officiele recht. De lokaal gebruikte regels 
voor overerving zijn onder invloed van de snel veranderende omstandigheden aan 
voortdurende bijstelling en verwerping onderhevig. Een belangrijke regel die de jongste 
zoon aanwijst als enige erfgenaam, lijkt achterhaald omdat de toepassing van de regel 
vaak leidt tot gewelddadige conflictsituaties. Nieuwe normen zijn in ontwikkeling en 
worden gestapeld op de oude, waardoor het arsenaal aan normen, waaraan men 
besluiten en gedrag ten aanzien van overerving kan toetsen, is uitgebreid. De rechten 
van vrouwen ten aanzien van overerving worden bijvoorbeeld steeds belangrijker. 
Onder invloed van de groeiende belangstelling voor mensenrechten speelt 'gelijkheid' 
een steeds belangrijkere rol. Dit resulteert onder andere in een veranderend gender-
discours (en daarmee ook in andere gender-normen) en in het vergroten van het 
zelfbewustzijn van vrouwen. 
Het concept 'gestapeld recht' vervult twee nineties in dit boek. Ten eerste zorgt het 
voor een historische kijk op de ontwikkeling van landrechten, waarbij in de loop der 
tijd verschillende regels over de verdeling van landrechten op elkaar worden gestapeld. 
Het boek beschrijft de schijnbaar chaotische constellatie van normen die bij 
eigendomsclaims een rol speien als een gestapelde struetuur. Oude elementen worden 
niet compleet vervangen door nieuwe, maar de nieuwe elementen worden bovenop de 
oude gestapeld waardoor de verschillende belanghebbenden zieh nog steeds kunnen 
beroepen op de oude elementen. Een tweede funetie is dat ik door middel van het 
concept 'gestapeld recht' de verschillende elementen waaruit de 'stapeP bestaat, apart 
kan belichten. We zien dan dat de verschillende elementen van elkaar verschillen wat 
betreft hun brennen, betekenis, invloed en belang. 
Het boek belicht verder een belangrijke paradox met betrekking tot de rol van het 
statelijk recht. Mensen beschouwen hun eigen normen, waarop zij hun claims baseren, 
als legitiem omdat zij denken dat deze normen statelijk recht zijn. Door recente 
staatsinterventies hebben zij echter ervaren dat de Staat de legitimiteit van hun claims 
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niet erkent. Dezelfde Staat die in de ogen van landbezitters eigendomsclaims legitimiteit 
zou moeten verschaffen en hun rechten zou moeten beschermen, doet in werkelijkheid 
het tegendeel. 
Deze Studie laat zien dat in het beleid rondom de toewijzing van landrechten, de 
Staat (daarbij aangestuurd door ontwikkelingsorganisaties) zieh minder zou moeten 
concentreren op de verkoop van het nationale land aan particulieren en aan 
i eigendomsregistratie. In plaats daarvan zou men meer aandacht moeten besteden aan 
', het verhelderen van het wettelijke kader dat landrechten zou moeten reguleren en aan 
j het opheffen van de rechtsonzekerheid. Rechtsonzekerheid blijkt sterk gerelateerd aan 
i de falende capaciteiten van de rechtbank om geschülen over eigendom te besiechten. 
Het boek concludeert tevens dat de rechten van vrouwen op land niet langer meer 
gerelateerd zouden moeten worden aan hun speeifieke taken als moeders en 
voedselproducenten, maar dat net als bij mannen, de nadruk zou moeten liggen op hun 
burgerschap en de daaraan verbonden wettelijke rechten. Het benadrukken van de 
unieke positie van vrouwen gaat voorbij aan de werkelijke betekenis van land voor 
vrouwen en creeert -onbedoeld- juist ongelijkheid. 
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